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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the quality of Malaysian interim financial reports 
(interims) and the impact of corporate governance on the quality. The 
quality of interims is proxied by timeliness; compliance with the FRS 134, 
Interim Financial Reporting; compliance with the Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements (BMLR); and comparability of profit and loss items when 
they were originally issued and placed in the next year’s corresponding 
quarter and comparison against the annual reports. Two methods are 
used to assess the quality of interims namely dichotomous and 
continuous. The first method provides one score for each proxy if it is in 
compliance and zero score otherwise and the latter method use the 
actual values. This thesis has found that the quality of interims is 
remarkably high for each proxy if a dichotomous method is used and it is 
moderate for continuous method. The lower quality is due to timeliness 
and comparability, because Malaysian companies are inclined to publish 
interims towards the end of the allowable period and most of the interims’ 
profit and loss items are not comparable. Consequently, compliance with 
the FRS 134 contributes the most to the quality of interims, while 
comparability contributes the least. Corporate governance is proxied by 
the frequency of directors’ meetings, independence, financial literacy, 
corporate governance expertise, and the ethnicity of directors. This thesis 
has found that all corporate governance variables are associated with the 
quality of interims except independence and corporate governance 
expertise. Despite these associations, multivariate regression reveals 
that the impact of corporate governance on the quality of interims is very 
low. These findings have implications for several users such as 
Malaysian regulatory bodies to ensure that PLC complied with the interim 
reporting standards; policymakers to ensure there is no misapplication of 
provision of accounting standards; protect shareholders to appoint 
appropriate composition of directors; and academicians for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
The global economic outlook has continued to deteriorate recently. This 
deterioration has been especially acute in the United States (US) and in the 
euro zone. Many Western economies continue to struggle in a debt crisis 
and their currencies are steadily shrinking in value. Despite the uncertain 
economic climate in the US and euro zone, Malaysia’s capital market is 
predicted to remain strong and perform reasonably better than its peers in 
the Asian region (The Star, 1 August 2011). Foreign investors are 
particularly attracted to the Malaysian market because of its strong economic 
performance and the increasing level of risks in developed Western markets. 
The Malaysian government’s strong level of foreign currency reserves has 
further increased the favourable perceptions of foreign investors in the 
Malaysian economy. 
 
One of the sources that Malaysian investors rely on before making a 
decision to invest is the financial reports of Malaysian public listed 
companies (PLC). A financial report is a formal record that is prepared by a 
company’s financial controller that reveals the quantitative financial activities 
and financial health of a company. The conceptual framework of the 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) states that the objective of 
a financial report is to provide the users of financial reports with the 
company’s financial information, performance, and any changes of financial 
position. 
 
Financial reporting is an important economic activity (Ball, 2008) because it 
assists a number of internal and external users (such as management, 
employees, suppliers and investors) to make intensive and extensive 
economic decisions. Management uses financial reports to appraise a 
company’s performance and make prominent decisions that influence their 
   
- 3 - 
 
business operations. The employees use financial reports to assess the 
ability of a company to provide remuneration, retirement benefits and 
employment opportunities. Suppliers use financial reports to evaluate a 
company’s financial strength before they approve credit purchases. 
Prospective investors use financial reports before making decisions to 
invest, and existing investors use them to monitor their investments 
continually. 
 
To help the users of financial reports to make accurate decisions, the 
financial reports’ information should be of good quality. Independent audit 
review is one of the means to improve financial reporting quality. The 
involvement of external auditors can yield relevant and reliable financial 
information and, therefore, they can enhance the quality of financial reports 
(Raedy and Helms, 2002; Wiedman, 2007). However, there is no 
independent audit review requirement for quarterly or interim financial 
reports (interims) in Malaysia. Additionally, there is no mechanism set by the 
regulatory body, Bursa Malaysia, to ensure that Malaysian PLC have 
prepared interims in accordance with interim reporting standards. D’Arcy and 
Grabensberger (2003) support the finding that the lack of an enforcement 
mechanism by the regulatory authority may influence the quality of financial 
reports, even though the accounting standards and regulations are clearly 
issued. Therefore, the reliability of Malaysian interims may be uncertain 
because of the absence of audit reviews and monitoring mechanisms. Since 
numerous stakeholders make decisions grounded on the interims’ 
information (Beuselinck and Manigart, 2007) the quality of interims needs to 
be evaluated to confirm that the information is reliable. 
 
Integrity of financial reporting relies on corporate governance (Norwani et al., 
2011). In other words, Board of Directors (BOD) is responsible to monitor the 
companies’ financial reporting process (Yatim et al., 2006). According to Part 
1, Section D (I) of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG), 
the BOD is accountable in ensuring that a financial report presents a 
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company’s position and prospects. In other words, BOD who is a part of 
corporate governance actors can take up a monitoring role to ensure that the 
published financial report is of a good quality. Corporate abuse and fraud 
seems to be a daily event in the recent years (Myring and Shortridge, 2010) 
such as: Parmalat (2003) in Italy; Xerox (2000), Enron (2001), Kmart (2002) 
and WorldCom (2002) in the US; and Perwaja Steel Sdn. Bhd. (1994), 
Malaysian Airline System (1995) and Technology Resource Industries 
(1999) in Malaysia. One of the reasons behind many recent scandals has 
been the weaknesses of corporate governance. 
 
In Malaysia, Perwaja Steel incurred losses and was unable to pay its debts. 
Therefore, a new director was appointed to turnaround the company. 
However, total losses massively increased due to poor corporate 
governance performance such as unauthorised contracts amounting to 
hundreds of millions and misappropriation of funds. Malaysian Airline 
System was unprofitable when the corporate governance expanded the flight 
destination and ordered new aircraft and paid more than the ordered cost. 
Technology Resource Industries was involved with fictitious invoices totalling 
RM 260 million in 1998 and 1999. Those charged with corporate governance 
in Malaysia were thought to have failed to discharge their duties 
conscientiously and were accused of causing the companies to face 
financial difficulties. Nevertheless, corporate failures and financial 
irregularities still occur in companies with good corporate governance. 
Corporate scandals and failures, as well as broader economic concerns, 
have driven the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries to devote increased attention to corporate governance, 
which is now recognised to be a vital factor in economic growth and financial 
stability (Jesover and Kirkpatrick, 2005). 
 
Consequently, two empirical studies will be examined in this thesis: the first 
empirical study will identify the quality of Malaysian interims with the 
absence of independent audit reviews; the second empirical study will 
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investigate the influence of corporate governance on the quality of Malaysian 
interims. The next section will give more detail on how this background 
informs the objectives of this thesis.  
1.2 Research Objectives and the Motivations of this Study 
The first research objective is to determine the quality of Malaysian interims. 
Preceding research has found that the quality of interims improves if interims 
are subject to independent audit reviews. The US Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s (US SEC) proposed that the usefulness of interims may be 
enhanced by expanding the roles of the independent auditors in the financial 
reporting process. The involvement of external auditors can produce a 
relevant and reliable level of financial information and thereby improve the 
quality of interims (Raedy and Helms, 2002). A mandatory review may 
heighten the reliability of interims and diminish the frequency of restatements 
in interims (Wiedman, 2007).  
 
Despite the absence of independent audit reviews, Ku Ismail and Chandler 
(2004) and Rahman and Ismail (2008) have discovered that the quality of 
Malaysian interims that are respectively proxied by timeliness and disclosure 
of interims reporting standards are high. The prior research has used one 
proxy to determine the quality of Malaysian interims; however, McFie (2006) 
has suggested that the financial reporting quality that is represented by a 
single proxy is unlikely to be high, even though the single proxy measured is 
excellent. A single proxy focuses at one aspect and ignoring other aspects. 
Consequently, the present study used several proxies by integrating the 
proxies of the quality of interims used by Ku Ismail and Chandler (2004), and 
Rahman and Ismail (2008), in addition to using a new variable, 
comparability. This study will identify whether the quality of Malaysian 
interims remains high in every quarter and in every year. In addition, the 
present study will also investigate whether the quality of interims is 
consistent in every quarter and equivalent in the two types of Boards of 
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Stock Exchange (BSE) (that is, first tier and second tier markets) and in 
different industries. 
 
The second research objective is aimed at determining the impact of 
corporate governance on the quality of interims. Previous research has 
discovered that corporate governance influenced the quality of interims (e.g. 
Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008; Ezat and El-Masry, 2008; and, CheHaat et 
al., 2008). These previous studies have used timeliness and disclosure of 
interim reporting standards as proxies for the quality of interims and 
associate them with several corporate governance characteristics (CGC). As 
far as the present study is concerned, there seems to be less research on 
the impact of corporate governance on the quality of Malaysian interims. 
Therefore, it is essential to explore the influence of corporate governance on 
this issue. The present study also investigates whether the influence of 
corporate governance on the quality of Malaysian interims is consistent in 
every quarter and equivalent in different types of BSE and industries. 
 
The motivation for this study derives from four factors. Firstly, there is a lack 
of research on quality of Malaysian interims, although the Bursa Malaysia 
has regularised the issuance of quarterly reports to PLC since July 1999. 
Nevertheless, in developed countries, especially in the US, there is a 
substantial research literature on interims. 
 
Secondly, Bagshaw (2000) and Boritz and Liu (2006) points out that the 
quality of interims is unreliable especially if they are not being reviewed by 
the external auditors (Raedy and Helms, 2002). As Malaysian interims are 
not subject to audit review, this study is necessary to ensure that the 
information provided to the interims’ users are beneficial and the 
shareholders are protected. 
 
Thirdly, most prior research only used one proxy to determine the quality of 
interims. McFie (2006) argued on using a single proxy to determine the 
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quality of financial reports as the researcher only look at one aspect and 
ignoring other factors. The excellent result by using a single proxy may not 
present the actual quality of financial reports. Therefore, the present study is 
motivated to use several proxies to determine the quality of interims and the 
results are expected to be more comprehensive. 
 
Fourthly, there is limited empirical evidence regarding the influence of 
corporate governance on quality of interims. Prior research were done in 
developed and middle east countries (e.g. Mangena and Pike, 2005; 
Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008), and Ezat and El-Masry (2008) and the 
results are mixed. Inconsistent results may be due to difference in the 
economic environment across countries. 
1.3 Research Contributions  
By using the interims’ financial information for the year 2007 and 2008, the 
present study presents a comprehensive study of the quality of Malaysian 
interims and the impact of corporate governance on the quality of interims. 
The present study differs from the previous research by having several 
proxies to evaluate the quality of financial reporting, namely: timeliness, 
compliance with the Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) 134, compliance 
with the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (BMLR), and an addition of a 
new proxy namely, comparability. Additionally, the present study assessed 
the quality of interims according to the types of BSE and industries. 
 
The literature review that was conducted as part of this research project 
indicated that there is less research on the influence of corporate 
governance on the quality of Malaysian interims. The corporate governance 
actors that are assessed in this study are the BOD and audit committee 
members. The CGC that are assessed include the frequency of the 
meetings, independence, financial literacy, corporate governance expertise, 
and the ethnicity of the directors. This thesis makes several contributions to 
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the growing literature on the quality of interims and corporate governance. In 
particular, this study expands the prior literature in the following areas: 
 
1. This thesis contributes to the debates on the quality of interims, 
especially with the absence of audit reviews. The finding of the first 
objective reveals that the quality of an interim is remarkably high if a 
dichotomous method is used; however, the quality of interims is 
moderate if a continuous method is used. The lower quality of 
interims is due to the companies’ inclination to publish interims 
towards the end of the allowable period given and the interims’ profit 
and loss items are not comparable. The quality of interims is quite 
consistent for the first three quarters and very low for the fourth 
quarter due to the low comparability of interims. This trend also 
applies to PLC in both type of BSE and industry. Low comparability in 
quarter four may be due to adjustments made by PLC before financial 
reports are due to be audited. 
 
2. By using either the dichotomous or the continuous method, the 
qualitative item that contributes the most to the quality of interims is 
compliance with the FRS 134. The qualitative item that contributes 
the least to the quality of interims differs if a different method is used, 
which is comparability for the dichotomous method and timeliness for 
the continuous. The qualitative item that contributes to the quality of 
interims slightly differs for different type of BSE. For the dichotomous 
method, regardless of the type of BSE, the qualitative item that 
contributes the most to the quality of interims is compliance with the 
FRS 134. The qualitative item that contributes the least to the quality 
of interims is comparability for PLC in the first BSE (‘the big board’) 
and a mixture of other qualitative items for PLC in the second BSE. 
For the continuous method, the item that contributes the most to the 
quality of interims is compliance with the FRS 134 for PLC in the first 
BSE and comparability for PLC in the second BSE. However, in 
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quarter four, compliance with the FRS 134 is the item that contributes 
the most to the quality of interims for PLC in the second BSE. 
Regardless of the type of BSE, timeliness is the item that contributes 
the least to the quality of interims. 
  
3. This thesis disagrees with the previous finding that time is required for 
management to make adjustment in quarter four, which causes a 
delay in timeliness to publish interims. This disagreement is due to 
this thesis finding that timeliness is reasonably consistent in all 
quarters and comparability of interims is still low even though quarter 
four interims were published on a more timely basis than the other 
quarters. 
 
4. Mean timeliness of Malaysian PLC is consistent every quarter and 
year. However, with the absence of audit reviews and no additional 
tasks required by the external auditors, PLC are inclined to publish 
interims towards the end of the allowable period given. PLC in the 
second BSE published interims less timely than PLC in the first BSE. 
Some PLC in the first BSE published interims within two weeks after 
the quarter ends and none PLC in the second BSE publish interims 
less than 30 days every quarter. The most plausible reason is that the 
higher capital issued by PLC in the first BSE enable them to acquire 
more sophisticated accounting system and hire more professional 
and qualified accountants to prepare interims. With regard to the 
types of industries, mean timeliness insignificantly differs except for 
the finance and technology industries. The possible reason for 
finance industry to publish interims early is due to their blue-chip 
stocks and they are always in the eyes of prospective investors. 
 
5. The policy makers should be aware of the wording used in the rules 
and regulations imposed on PLC. For example, in FRS 134 and the 
BMLR, PLC has to publish interims within the allowable period of 60 
   
- 10 - 
 
days and two months, respectively. This thesis found that Malaysian 
PLC is inclined to follow the BMLR’s requirement than the FRS 134’s 
requirement. In 2007, 10% to 14% PLC did not publish interims timely 
by following the FRS 134, and 1% to 2% did not publish the interims 
timely by following the BMLR. Although PLC published interims within 
the two months period, the number of days to publish them exceeded 
the allowable time period of 60 days required by the FRS 134 as the 
number of days for the first three quarters is 61, 62, and 61 days 
consecutively. The second example is the word “immediate preceding 
quarter” stated in the BMLR. The PLC compared the profit before tax 
between a current quarter and “immediate preceding corresponding 
quarter” instead of “immediate preceding quarter”. 
 
6. The compliance with the FRS 134 is higher than compliance with the 
BMLR. The compliance score are around 92% and 94% for the FRS 
134 and 77% and 78% for the BMLR. Regardless of the type of BSE 
and the types of industries, the compliance score with the FRS 134 
and the BMLR is quite consistent in all quarters and years. However, 
the compliance score with the FRS 134 is slightly higher for PLC in 
the first BSE than the second BSE. Most PLC comply with the FRS 
134 and the BMLR requirements except accounting policies and 
contingent assets or liabilities for the FRS 134 and performance 
review, taxation, off-balance sheet financial instruments and 
dividends for the BMLR. Another important point to highlight is that  
even though all PLC disclosed in the narrative disclosure that 
revenues are not associated with seasonality and cyclicality factors, 
this thesis found that mean revenues vary across quarters and 
possibly link to the seasonality, which is the festive season of 
Malaysian native who form around 65% of the Malaysian population. 
 
7. The comparability ranking score is the lowest in quarter four. Although 
quarter four is not the least timely quarter to be published by some 
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PLC in certain industries, the comparability score remains low in the 
fourth quarter, which is around half of the first three quarters. This 
finding supports this thesis disagreement as mentioned in number 
three above. PLC in the second BSE have a higher comparability 
ranking score than PLC in the first BSE for the first three quarters and 
vice versa for the fourth quarter. Therefore, interims for PLC in the 
second BSE are more comparable in the first three quarters, but they 
are more inclined to make accounting adjustment in quarter four. 
Despite a high comparability ranking score, this thesis found that 
most profit and loss of interims are not equivalent to the annual 
reports that are audited by an independent party. Consequently, the 
overall quality value is low. 
 
8. With regard to CGC, non-independent executive directors dominate 
the composition of the BOD in Malaysia. Technology has the lowest 
mean of independent directors, and the finance industry has the 
largest mean of independent directors. Most PLC may not comply 
with the MCCG requirement to have all audit committee members to 
be financially literate commencing January 2009. The finance industry 
has the highest proportion of financial literate directors, and the 
construction industry has the lowest proportion of financial literate 
directors. PLC in the second BSE (around 52%) have a lower 
percentage of corporate governance expertise than PLC in the first 
BSE (around 72%). Corporate governance expertise for PLC across 
industries significantly differs. PLC from the finance industry have the 
highest proportion of directors who have an expertise in corporate 
governance, and the industrial products industry has the lowest 
proportion of corporate governance expertise. Services and finance 
industries have the highest proportion of Bumiputra directors, while 
the lowest proportion of Bumiputra directors is to be found in the 
consumer industry. 
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9. A Pearson correlation coefficients was used to determine the 
relationship between dependent, independent and control variables. 
The corporate governance characteristics of the BOD (CGCB) that 
are associated with the quality of interims are the frequency of BOD 
meeting, financial literacy and ethnicity of directors. Independence 
and corporate governance expertise of BOD are not associated with 
the quality of interims. There is no relationship between all qualitative 
characteristics of interims except for: a) inverse relationship between 
timeliness and compliance with the BMLR; b) direct relationship 
between compliance with the FRS 134 and compliance with the 
BMLR; and c) direct relationship between compliance with the FRS 
134 and comparability of interims. With regard to CGCB, all variables 
are interrelated except financial literacy and independence, as well as 
the corporate governance expertise of directors. The results indicate 
that a) PLC with high proportion of independent, financial literacy, 
corporate governance expertise and Bumiputra directors held a more 
frequent BOD meeting; b) high proportion of Bumiputra directors are 
independent, financially literate and have corporate governance 
expertise; and c) high proportion of independent directors are with 
corporate governance expertise. Finally, all control variables are 
correlated with each other. However, control variables are not 
associated significantly with all qualitative items of interims except 
timeliness and all CGC are either partly or fully associated with the 
control variables. 
 
10.  The impact of CGC on the quality of interims was examined by 
multivariate analyses. The results reveal that the impact of CGCB on 
the quality of interims is very low. Additionally, the influence of CGC 
on each qualitative characteristic of interims is mixed. This study also 
found that the group of variables that has more to less influence on; 
a) timeliness is control variables, followed by CGCA and CGCB; b) 
compliance with the FRS 134 is CGCB, followed by CGCA and 
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control variables; c) compliance with the BMLR is CGCB, followed by 
control variables and CGCA; and d) comparability is control variables, 
followed by CGCB and CGCA. 
 
1.4 Chapter Organisation 
This thesis is structured into six chapters, as follows: 
Chapter 1 focuses on the outline of the thesis and it includes the justification 
of the study, research objectives, research motivations, research 
contributions, and a brief description of the organisation of this thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the existing literature on two main topics, the quality of 
interims and corporate governance. This chapter firstly describes an 
overview of the importance of interims to the financial report’s users, 
especially investors, pursued by the quality problem of interims. This chapter 
will then define the term quality and the possible measures of interims’ 
quality. The quality of interims is then reviewed based on the qualitative 
characteristics of financial reports, which is a collective result of relevance, 
reliability and comparability. One of the obligations of corporate governance 
is to produce quality financial reports. Literature reviews proved that 
corporate governance accountabilities are partly expounded by agency and 
resource dependence theories. This thesis discusses the association 
between corporate governance and the quality of interims to ensure that 
those responsible for corporate governance have executed their 
responsibilities conscientiously.  
 
Chapter 3 describes the research design and methodology. It includes a 
brief explanation of the research framework, research questions, 
hypotheses, design of the data collection and research instrument, the 
construction and list of the disclosure indices, the pilot test to check the 
reliability of the disclosure indices, how to measure and analyse the quality 
of interims, and the impact of corporate governance and control variables on 
the quality of interims.  
   
- 14 - 
 
Chapter 4 reports the results and discussion of the empirical findings on the 
quality of interims, and the impact of corporate governance and control 
variables on the quality of interims. The quality of interims is measured by 
using dichotomous and continuous methods, and is evaluated across the 
type of BSE and industry to identify any differences. This chapter describes 
the impact of corporate governance and control variables on the quality of 
interims by using the Pearson correlation coefficients and multiple 
regression analyses. The results of additional analyses are also presented to 
check the robustness of the initial regression analyses.  
 
Chapter 5 summarises an overview of the study, the main research findings 
and it details a conclusion of this thesis. It also states the implications, 
limitations and recommendations for future research.  
 
The next chapter is literature review that contains relevant information to the 
topic of this thesis and enables the present study to identify the research gap 
that has been less explored and thus create a research space for the 
present study to continue. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews the existing literature on two main topics; the quality of 
interim financial reports (interims) and corporate governance. This chapter 
begins by giving an overview of interims and their importance. This is 
followed by a discussion of the quality of interims, which is important 
because the users of financial reports are inclined to utilise updated 
information published in interims to make decisions. This chapter will then 
review factors that may impair or enrich the quality of interims and the 
various methods that have been used by previous research to evaluate the 
quality of interims. These reviews provide a general understanding of the 
areas to be investigated in this thesis and they detail the research gaps that 
demand further investigation.  
 
This chapter will then review the literature of corporate governance and the 
importance of corporate governance accountability to the quality of interims. 
The previous research has shown that corporate governance accountability 
is expounded by agency theory and resource dependence theory. Corporate 
governance alone will not ensure that companies have executed their duties 
attentively and transparently since accounting scandals persist despite the 
good disclosure of corporate governance information in the financial reports. 
The last section of this chapter focuses on the association between 
corporate governance and the quality of interims. This chapter ends with a 
brief summary of this literature review.  
2.2  An Overview of Interims and their Importance 
Malaysia’s Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) 134 defined interims as a 
financial report that contains either a complete or condensed set of financial 
statements for a period shorter than an entity’s full financial year. Previous 
research provides evidence that the users of financial reports consider 
financial reports to be one of the most useful resources to use when making 
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economic decisions (Newell, 1969). For example, financial information is a 
prerequisite to bankers and creditors before they can make a decision about 
allowing loans and credit purchases by a company. Additionally, both the 
company’s management and employees need to know the financial activities 
and financial health of a company in order to strategise an effective business 
plan and ensure that the company can provide wages and employee 
benefits. Consequently, the financial reports must be produced regularly due 
to the importance of the use of financial information. 
 
Financial reports are either published frequently (e.g. monthly, quarterly or 
half-yearly) or less frequently (e.g. annually). The frequent issue of financial 
reports will disclose more information to the users and this will make the 
company more transparent (Newell, 1969). The less frequently published 
financial reports are defined as annual financial reports, while those that are 
published more frequently (i.e. in less than a year) are defined as interims. 
Globally, all PLC are expected to publish annual financial reports. 
Meanwhile, some countries mandate PLC to publish interims half-yearly 
(such as the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia) while others require 
interims to be published every quarterly (such as the US, Malaysia, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and China). The US is amongst those countries with the 
earliest issue of interims. The publishing frequency of financial reports is 
subject to the PLC readiness to publish and their willingness to comply with 
mandated requirements by the securities commission.  
 
Publishing frequent financial reports has been a divisive issue in many 
countries. Those who are supportive of interims argued that they are 
essential because frequent financial disclosure can meet the needs of 
increasingly conversant investors (Gajewski and Quere, 2001; Aubert, 
2006), provide timely information for users to make decisions (Joshi and 
Bremser, 2003), and give a greater transparency of information to the users 
of financial reports (Business Times, 12 November 2005; Teen and 
Vasanthi, 2006; Chan, 2007). In other words, interims improve information 
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flow to investors, promote governance and transparency of financial 
information, and they aid investors who wish to make more timely decisions 
(Teen and Vasanthi, 2006). Interims present a company’s progress within a 
yearly reporting cycle and they assist investors to predict the company’s 
outcome, improve the investor’s confidence in the capital market, and 
strengthen the corporate governance and the comparability of financial 
results (Rahman and Ismail, 2008).  
 
Some countries have proved to be resistant to the publication of interims 
because of the increase in business costs, they divert the management’s 
focus from running the business, and they encourage short-termism in the 
market (Teen and Vasanthi, 2006). Short-termism means that a company’s 
management focuses on short-term performance, which encourages the 
investors to invest and which distracts a company from looking at a long-
term perspective (Chan, 2007). Interims may also contain inaccurate and 
misleading information (Brown and Niederhoffer, 1968) and many 
professionals remain uncertain about the benefits that they give to PLC 
(Chan, 2007).  
 
Since there are a number of pros and cons on the issuance of interims, Ku 
Ismail and Chandler (2005b) used questionnaires to ascertain investors’ 
perceptions on the usefulness of Malaysian interims. The study was made 
shortly after the Bursa Malaysia obliged Malaysian PLC to publish quarterly 
instead of half-yearly interims in July 1999. Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005b) 
discovered that although interims are beneficial to investors, the level varies 
according to the types of professional investors. They also determined that 
despite the timeliness of interims, the annual report is more beneficial to 
investors because interims are less reliable and investors are not 
accustomed to the newly published interims. However, their discoveries may 
not be generalisable since the response rate was very low and over the time 
period, the professional investors have become more familiar with the 
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interims and they may have found that they are now informative enough for 
them to be used to make investment decisions.  
 
The usefulness of the information that is published in interims is supported 
by several previous studies. For example, interims have been shown to play 
an important role in equity markets (Wiedman, 2007) where they furnish 
prominent information to stockholders concerning future earnings (Brown 
and Niederhoffer, 1968), provide timely information on companies’ 
development (Mc Ewen and Schwartrz, 1992), and contribute information to 
creditors and other stakeholders in appraising the company’s capability in 
generating adequate cash flows and maintaining liquidity (Joshi and 
Bremser, 2003). The research by Mangena (2004) revealed that investment 
analysts use the information from the interims to make decisions. The stock 
market operates more effectively with high quality and accepted information, 
and the risk of deceptive information in the market may be reduced by 
publishing interims (Bagshaw, 2000). The aforementioned research provides 
evidence on how PLC may benefit from issuing interims and it describes 
how it avails the users of financial reports.  
2.3  Quality of Interims  
Bromwich (1992) stressed on the importance of financial information quality 
and not how the information was disclosed. The relevant and reliable 
financial information will generate highest return and consequently lead to 
efficient capital market. The market that is more efficient will lead to 
productive economy. However, it is questionable whether the financial 
reports provide quality information for the public interests.   
 
Although there is voluminous research on the quality of financial reports, 
there is no universal definition of the term “quality” (McFie, 2006). While 
there is no agreed specific definition, most users of financial reports are 
conversant with the notion of “accounting quality” (Imhoff, 1988). Robinson 
and Munter (2004) defined high-quality financial report as a fair presentation 
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of a company’s operations and financial positions in overall financial 
reporting, including disclosures. Meanwhile, Ross (2009) states that people 
construed quality differently and a few can measure it operationally. For 
example, financial reports may be interpreted as high quality to a researcher 
who studies the topic, but not to other users. Therefore, the term “quality” is 
a subjective attribute that is uniquely defined by different individuals with 
regard to the subject that it relates to. 
 
McFie (2006) further claims that “quality financial reporting” and “the quality 
of financial reporting” is a different concept. “Quality financial reporting” 
refers to “excellent” financial reporting (Francis, 2004) while “the quality of 
financial reporting” varies from “low or poor” to “high or excellent” (Wallace et 
al., 1994). McFie (2006) also indicated that “the quality of financial reporting” 
that is characterised by a single proxy in a study is debatably to be high, 
although the single proxy measured is “excellent”. This is due to focusing on 
one aspect and ignores others. In light of the above arguments, the present 
study fills this gap by evaluating “the quality of financial reporting” on several 
proxies (which are illustrated in detail in Section 2.5).  
 
The quality of financial reports is associated with the importance and 
usefulness of financial information to the users (Jonas and Blanchet, 2000). 
The Association for Investment Management and Research conducted a 
survey of corporate disclosure quality, and determined that corporate 
disclosure and quality of financial reports were considered to be very 
important (43%), extremely important (30%), and somewhat important (22%) 
to a majority of portfolio managers and security analysts. Low quality 
financial reports will persuade investors to turn to financial analysts, money 
managers and other intermediaries to generate and process the information 
that the investors require to make decisions, instead of using the financial 
reports alone (Miller and Bahnson, 1999). Furthermore, if market participants 
perceive an unacceptable quality of financial reports, then this will stimulate 
the demand for additional regulations (Imhoff, 1988) because the current 
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accounting standards can grant too much flexibility for management to 
manipulate the accounting information.  
 
The previous research has evaluated the quality of financial reports in a 
variety of measures. The different measures that are contemplated as 
proxies for quality of financial reports include: timeliness (Dyer and McHugh, 
1975; Davies and Whittred, 1980; Whittred and Zimmer, 1984; Ku Ismail and 
Chandler, 2004; Bowrin, 2008), adoption of accounting standards (Bowrin, 
2008; Morais and Curto, 2008; Paananen and Lin, 2009), compliance with 
the accounting standards (McEwen and Schwartz, 1992; Joshi and Al-
Mudhaki, 2001; Joshi and Bremser, 2003; Rahman and Ismail, 2008), 
information disclosure (Abayo et al., 1993; D’Arcy and Grabensberger 2003; 
Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003), earnings management (Miller and Bahnson, 
1999; Tendeloo and Vanstraelen, 2005), involvement of external auditors 
(Imhoff,1988), audit-firm tenure (Johnson et. al, 2002), and influence of 
corporate governance (Goodwin and Seow, 2002). Most research is driven 
to study the quality of the annual financial report; research on interims is not 
common since publishing quarterly interims is not mandated in the majority 
of countries. The present study contributes to the literature by examining the 
quality of interims that are published quarterly. 
 
The results of preceding research are mixed, which may be due to the 
diverse measurement of quality financial reports and difference in the 
economic environment across countries. For example, D’Arcy and 
Grabensberger (2003) and Rahman and Ismail (2008) discovered that the 
quality of financial reports was high or increasing, while Abayo et al. (1993) 
found that the quality of financial reports was low. In another example, 
Imhoff (1988) found that the quality of financial reports for companies 
audited by main Chartered Public Accountants (CPA) firms do not differ, 
while Miller and Bahnson (1999), Morais and Curto (2008), Bowrin (2008) 
and Paananen and Lin (2009) found a mixed level of quality of financial 
reports.  
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Interims provide an important source of information (D’Arcy and 
Grabensberger, 2003) to the users of financial reports. However, according 
to (Bagshaw, 2000, 40): 
“Interim reports are the only regular financial information received by 
shareholders between annual reports and the quality of this price-
sensitive information is therefore crucial. Despite this, the regulation 
of interim reports is still fairly light, and concern has been expressed 
over many years as to the quality and problems associated with 
interim reports.” 
 
Boritz and Liu (2006), who suggest that interims should not be viewed as 
reliable support Bagshaw’s (2000) view on the crucial quality of information 
disclosed in the interims. Interims furnish unconvincing information to their 
users for several reasons such as: non-disclosure of all required information 
(McEwen and Schwartz, 1992; Miller and Bahnson, 1999); seasonal factors 
(Chan, 2007) that can cause inconsistent earnings due to the costs that are 
only incurred during one quarter and not to other quarters; imprecise 
estimation of accruals, provisions, and tax rates (Jarret, 1983; Bagshaw, 
2000; Boritz and Liu, 2006); and, the absence of an audit review by an 
independent party, such as external auditors (Ku Ismail and Abdullah, 2009). 
 
Non-disclosure of all of the required financial information can have a 
considerable impact on the decisions made by the users of financial reports, 
especially investors. Seasonal factors will cause the earnings trend to 
fluctuate and become inconsistent with the traditional trends. Investors can 
make different decisions due to the fluctuations in earnings. Estimated tax 
rates made by the management during the interim periods may be 
inaccurate. The imprecise estimation of tax rates may have an enormous 
impact on the users of financial reports because profit may be over or under-
estimated. Due to the inaccurate estimation of tax rates, interims’ profits may 
not be a reliable measure of a company’s performance because the 
company can amend the profit to suit its own purposes. Concerning audit 
reviews, Mendenhall and Nichols (1988) concluded that managers have a 
greater opportunity to manipulate earnings when earnings reports are 
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unaudited. In addition, unaudited information may lack credibility and, 
therefore, may cause a market to become unstable (Rahman et al., 2007).  
 
The aforementioned studies provide support for the theory that interims may 
be unreliable. Unreliable information may cause the users of financial reports 
(such as investors) to use other sources of information such as visits to 
companies, interaction with management, advisory services, annual reports, 
prospectuses, stockbrokers’ advice and reports, the corporate press 
releases, company’s information on their web pages, and other 
announcements made by the Bursa Malaysia (Ku Ismail and Chandler, 
2005b) in order to alleviate investment risks and be more confident about the 
financial information before making investment decisions. Consequently, it 
can be inferred that interims may not be a source for investors to rely on to 
make investment decisions, especially if they are unaudited. The unreliability 
of interims is further supported by studies from Newell (1969) and Al-
Darayseh and Brown (1992) who found that quarterly data were significantly 
differs from the annual reports. Although the interims were not subject to 
audit review when their research was conducted, they found that the 
information in interims was used more often than information in annual 
reports. As numerous stakeholders make decisions grounded on the 
interims’ information (Beuselinck and Manigart, 2007) the quality of interims 
should be evaluated in order to confirm that the information is relevant, 
reliable, and comparable. 
 
Al-Darayseh and Brown (1992) examined the accuracy of investment 
decisions by comparing the annual and quarterly data of 190 companies in 
the US. They were motivated to do this research because they posited that 
inaccurate and abnormal decisions made by investors are due to inaccuracy 
and enhancements of the data that are released to the public. They 
compared the sum of four quarterly financial figures with the annual financial 
figures, and they then run a t-test to determine any significant differences. 
They found that the financial data contained in interims might not be as 
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accurate as that in annual reports. They also found that the interims were 
not coherent with the annual reports. Owing to unreliability of interims 
viewed by previous research, the present study is motivated to examine the 
quality of Malaysian interims, which is the first objective of this research. 
 
Cook (1987) proposed that the quality of financial reports will be enhanced if 
three elements are adopted: the independent auditors’ efforts to ensure that 
financial reports comply with accounting standards, the measurement and 
reporting standards that govern the preparation and presentation of financial 
reports, and the efforts of management to prepare financial reports. Similar 
to Cook (1987), Bandyopadhyay et al. (2007) asserts that the quality of 
financial reports is a collective result of the integrity and severity of the 
auditor’s review process, the interim financial reporting standards, and the 
financial expertise possessed by the preparer. Williams (2008) emphasized 
on corporate governance, preparation of financial reports and audit to 
improve financial reporting. By referring to Cook (1987), Bandyopadhyay et 
al. (2007) and Williams (2008) proposals, it can be seen that three important 
elements to enrich the quality of interims is: to perform audit reviews by 
independent auditors, to measure interims’ compliance with the interim 
reporting standards, and to evaluate whether those responsible for corporate 
governance have executed their obligations conscientiously. A detailed 
explanation of each element is given in sections 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 
respectively. 
2.4 Audit Review and Review Reports 
Assurance on the quality of a financial report is categorised into three 
groups, namely: compiled, reviewed, and audited. The quality of compiled 
financial reports is low because the financial information is merely 
constructed in accordance with a specified format and, therefore, the 
reliability is uncertain. Although an audit company may have revised the 
financial reports, they may not be of a good quality because the review is 
more limited than auditing. Audited financial reports have undergone an in-
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depth assessment by an audit firm and are considered to be of a good 
quality if the audit firms issued unqualified opinions. Nevertheless, financial 
reports with an unqualified opinion may not be of excellent quality, especially 
if they are prepared according to concept-based accounting standards.  
 
Accounting standards are categorised into rules-based and concept-based 
accounting standards. However, in reality there are neither purely rules-
based nor concept-based accounting standards (DiPiazza et al., 2008). In 
other words, in practice, accounting standards are a mixture of rules-based 
and concept-based accounting standards. Rules-based accounting 
standards are a list of detailed rules that must be complied with when a 
financial report is prepared. Compliance with these rules may increase the 
accuracy of accounting information and lessen any ambiguities while non-
compliance with these rules may lead to penalties by the authorities. 
Concept-based or principles-based accounting standards provide a 
conceptual basis for the preparer of financial reports to pursue. They are a 
set of broad guidelines that are practical for a variety of circumstances. They 
also enable the preparer of a financial report to manipulate accounting 
information. Meanwhile, concept-based accounting standards enable 
substantial room for companies to manoeuvre and there is always a risk that 
the auditors may fail to uncover errors or manipulations deliberately made by 
the company’s management.  
 
Interims are not subjected to a complete audit. Instead, interims are 
subjected to audit reviews; however, a mandatory review of interims 
depends on the constitutional regulations of each individual country. For 
example, in the US, the interims of PLC are mandated to be reviewed, while 
there is no such requirement for Malaysian PLC. The lack of audit reviews 
may be caused by their high cost. This is evidenced by the study of Bedard 
and Courteau (2008), who determined that total audit fees for companies 
with quarterly reviews are 15% higher than those without a quarterly review.  
 
   
- 25 - 
 
In December 1999, the US SEC released a new regulation that obliged all 
PLC to review their interims. The US SEC advised that the involvement of 
external auditors would enrich the usefulness of interims. Raedy and Helms 
(2002) suggested that the participation of external auditors can produce 
relevant and reliable financial information and, consequently, they can 
improve the quality of interims. Wiedman (2007) also agreed that a 
mandatory review of interims might strengthen their reliability and lessen the 
frequency of restatements in interims.   
 
Audit reviews consist primarily of analytical procedures and inquiries of 
management (Bailey, 1999). They do not include physical inspection over 
the tangible assets, company information from external parties, or 
comprehensive examination of transaction documents (Ettredge et al., 1999; 
Bedard and Courteau, 2008). Audit reviews are designed to enable an 
accountant, without applying comprehensive procedures, to assess the 
management’s representations and consider whether interims are in 
conformity with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
Hence, audit reviews provide a limited degree of assurance in comparison to 
an audit.  
 
Krishnan and Zhang (2005) suggest that conducting a review of financial 
reports is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it signifies that a company’s 
independent audit firm has accomplished a timely or quarterly review on the 
interims, and its presence is alleged to improve the quality of financial 
reports. A higher perceived quality could in turn improve the stock market 
performance. Secondly, just like an audit report, a review report can be 
“clean” or “modified” and, therefore, it can convey information about the 
company’s financial condition.  
 
Initially, the US SEC enabled PLC to select their interim review to be 
conducted on either a timely basis (reviewed quarterly) or retrospectively 
(delay review until the end of a fiscal year at the time of annual audit). Manry 
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et al. (1999) investigated whether timely or retrospective reviews influence 
the credibility of quarterly earnings and a majority of their respondents 
selected a timely review (78%). They determined that a timely review 
enriched the credibility of financial reports due to the earlier contribution of 
external auditors in financial reporting processes. Bedard and Courteau 
(2008) also found that timely reviews improve interims.  
 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2007) states that audit reviews that are based on 
enquiry, discussion, and analyses are not adequate for transactions that 
have occurred in interims. These processes may result in adjustments in the 
fourth quarter where audit procedures are properly performed for all 
transactions. In addition, the adjustments may impair the quality of interims. 
They also discovered that if reviewing interims by auditors is mandated, 
then, all companies are likely to purchase the lowest level of review in order 
to meet the minimum requirements. However, if reviewing interims is 
voluntary, then companies will likely purchase the highest quality level of 
review in order to distinguish their quality from other companies and signal 
their quality to the market.  
 
Notwithstanding the fact that interims are submitted to timely reviews, the 
US SEC has not mandated companies to append the audit review reports in 
interims; the decision to append the audit review reports will be made by the 
companies. Boritz and Liu (2006) learnt that some auditors preferred that 
written audit review reports be attached to interims because the appended 
audit review reports are believed to enhance the interims’ credibility. 
However, contrary to Boritz and Liu (2006), Krishnan and Zhang (2005) 
suggest that the external auditors may discourage companies from 
appending audit review reports because a written form may cause higher 
audit fees to the companies and they can expose the auditors to additional 
litigation risk. Krishnan and Zhang (2005) noted that only a small percentage 
of the companies in their study appended audit review reports. The majority 
of these reports were “clean”, which implies that companies that modified 
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their financial reports may not append their audit review reports. Hussey and 
Woolfe (1998) found that audit review reports are most likely to be published 
by larger companies. It can be concluded from this that audit review reports 
may be disclosed by large companies and they were not disclosed by some 
companies due to the benefit of both parties, which is to reduce the audit 
fees for the companies and to decrease litigation risk for the external 
auditors.  
 
Mangena and Tauringana (2004) examined the relationship between the 
external auditor’s involvement in the UK PLC interims and corporate 
governance. Corporate governance is proxied by the characteristics of the 
audit committee and the Board of Directors (BOD). Mangena and 
Tauringana (2004) found that engaging an external auditor to review interims 
was directly associated with an audit committee’s financial expertise and 
inversely associated with the shareholding of audit committee members. 
These results suggest that audit committee members with financial expertise 
and low shareholding encourage their companies to be reviewed by external 
auditors. Audit committee size, the executive directors’ shareholdings, and 
the proportion of non-executive directors were not significantly associated 
with the determination to include external auditors in interims. They also 
found that large companies, interim profit, interim dividend payment, a long 
stock exchange listing history, and being listed on the London Stock 
Exchange’s market were all positively related to the external auditor’s 
involvement with interims. 
 
There are several advantages and disadvantages to involve the external 
auditors in interims. Continuous involvement of external auditors in interims 
not only benefits the PLC but it benefits the external auditors as well. 
Association with interims throughout the year will allow the external auditors 
to identify problems at an earlier stage and to manage the risks associated 
with a company’s financial reports, and will result in faster completion of 
auditing at the year-end (Raedy and Helms, 2002). This will strengthen the 
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reputation of the external auditors. In addition to producing a high quality of 
financial report, the quality and the efficiency of the annual audit will also 
develop since the annual financial report is produced on a more timely basis.  
 
Despite these benefits, Bedard and Courteau (2008) proposed that audit 
reviews expanded the tasks for external auditors because they have to 
review a company’s interims every quarter instead of annually or semi-
annually. Consequently, the external auditors must evaluate their 
personnel’s ability to do the quarterly reviews for their quoted client base. 
Additionally, association with external auditors may also burden PLC 
because of the higher audit fees (Krishnan and Zhang, 2005; Bedard and 
Courteau, 2008). In addition, the management has to provide more 
estimates of provisions and they have to provide any information that is 
required by external auditors every quarter.  
 
Imhoff (1988) examined the views of financial analysts on the quality of 
financial reports of companies who were the clients of the previous Big Eight 
major Certified Public Accountants (CPA). This study is particularly important 
because it investigated whether major CPA firms tolerated low quality 
financial reports and ignored non-compliance with the accounting standards. 
In other words, some major CPA firms may abuse a company’s non-
compliance with the accounting standards in order to win a long-term 
relationship with their clients. Imhoff (1988) found that there were no 
significant quality distinctions viewed by the financial analysts over those 
PLC. The absence of quality differences would suggest that the uniform 
application of accounting standards by the PLC and the Big Eight CPA firms 
did not ignore the non-compliance with accounting standards; therefore, the 
quality of financial reports is high. A further study by Imhoff (2003) 
suggested that substantive changes in auditing, accounting and corporate 
governance can enhance the quality of financial reports. 
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These previous studies have proved the importance of audit reviews and 
audit review reports to enrich the quality of interims. As mentioned earlier, 
Bagshaw (2000) and Boritz and Liu (2006) points out that the quality of 
interims is unreliable and that the US SEC requires timely review of the 
interims published by US PLC. Meanwhile, the absence of an audit review 
and no mechanism set by the Malaysian regulatory body to ensure that PLC 
have complied with the interim reporting standards provides further support 
for the need of the present study to evaluate the quality of Malaysian 
interims. The quality of interims is evaluated according to Cook (1987), 
Bandyopadhyay et al. (2007) and Williams (2008) proposals which is audit 
reviews, compliance with the accounting standards and corporate 
governance. In addition to that, the present study also uses the conceptual 
framework that is issued by the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
(MASB), which is illustrated in the next section. 
2.5 MASB Accounting Standards and Conceptual Framework 
The MASB is an independent authority that develops and issues accounting 
and financial reporting standards in Malaysia. To prepare interims, the 
MASB released the MASB 26, Interim Financial Reporting in 2002, which is 
a standard that is consistent with the International Accounting Standards 
(IAS) 34, Interim Financial Reporting. In 2001, the IAS was renamed as 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In order to converge 
with the IFRS, Malaysia renamed the MASB standards as the Financial 
Reporting Standards (FRS) in 2005. Consequently, the MASB 26 has been 
replaced by the FRS 134. The IAS 34 was revised in 2005 and 2007. The 
FRS 134 was revised accordingly and the latter revised standard was 
effective beginning 1st July 2007. In conjunction with the FRS 134 
(previously known as MASB 26), the Bursa Malaysia revised the Bursa 
Malaysia Listing Requirements (BMLR) by inserting provisions for interims. 
The provisions in the FRS 134 and the BMLR are not repetitive and they 
complement each other. Therefore, in Malaysia, the interim reporting 
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standards to be complied by PLC to prepare interims are the FRS 134 and 
the BMLR.  
 
According to the MASB’s conceptual framework for the Presentation and 
Preparation of Financial Statements, the qualitative characteristics of 
financial reports determine the usefulness of financial information. Jonas and 
Blanchet (2000) proposed that the usefulness of financial information is 
linked to the quality of a financial report. Therefore, the present study used 
the framework that adherence to the interim reporting standards and 
qualitative characteristics of financial reports will provide useful information 
to the users of financial reports, and they will consequently produce high 
quality interims. Using qualitative characteristics to determine the quality of 
financial reports is supported by the study by Bowrin (2008), who 
conceptualised the quality of annual financial reports by using two qualitative 
characteristics, namely: relevance and reliability.  
 
The MASB qualitative characteristics were revised in November 2011. The 
qualitative characteristics are divided into two categories namely 
fundamental and enhancing qualitative characteristics. Fundamental 
characteristics consist of relevance, materiality and faithful representation. 
Financial information is relevant if it has predictive and/or confirmatory value. 
Information is material if omitting or misstating it could influence the users in 
making decisions. Faithful representation consists of three characteristics 
namely complete, neutral and free from error. Faithful representation 
replaced the term reliability as the concept of reliability is very subjective and 
lack of common understanding of its meanings. Enhancing qualitative 
characteristics consist of comparability, verifiability, timeliness and 
understandability. Comparability enables the users to identify the similarities 
and differences between at least two items. Verifiability means that the 
independent viewers accept that the information revealed denotes the 
economic phenomena that it intends to represent. Timeliness is having 
timely information that is capable to influence the decision makers’ 
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decisions. Understandability means information is clearly and concisely 
classified, characterised and presented. 
 
The unrevised MASB conceptual framework was used as the periods of 
interims in the present study were prior to MASB’s revision. Three qualitative 
characteristics were chosen to determine the quality of interims, namely 
relevance, reliability and comparability. These characteristics were chosen 
because they correspond to the items highlighted in FRS 134. The objective 
of FRS 134 is to provide the minimum content of financial information for an 
interim period so that “timely” and “reliable” information develops the 
awareness of the users of a financial report of a company’s financial 
position. The FRS 134 also emphasises the importance of “comparative” 
figures in interims. Using these variables also add a contribution to the 
literature because the present study extends Bowrin’s (2008) study by 
adding a new variable, comparability. The information of each qualitative 
characteristic according to the MASB unrevised framework is as follows. 
 
2.5.1 Relevance 
According to the MASB conceptual framework, relevance refers to the 
possibility to influence the financial user’s economic decision-making. 
Financial report is useful if the information is relevant to the decision making 
process of users. Relevant information is required by the financial report’s 
users to make predictions and constructive decisions (Zeghal, 1984; Muller, 
2011). Previous researchers used several measures to identify the 
relevance of information. Value relevance of information is commonly used 
by previous researchers (Barth et al., 2001; Sami and Zhou, 2004; Tswei, 
2013). Beest (2009) used predictive and confirmatory value that conforms to 
the composition of revised conceptual framework. Predictive value was 
measured by forward-looking information, business opportunities, business 
risks and use of fair value in financial reports. Confirmatory value was 
measured by conformance to past expectations based on previous 
evaluations.  
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Under the MASB unrevised conceptual framework, relevance consists of 
materiality and timeliness. Information is material if its omission or 
misstatement could influence the user’s economic decisions. Timeliness 
consists of publishing information in financial reports in a timely manner. 
Information that is published more timely provides more information that is 
relevant to the users. The present study used timeliness as the proxy of 
quality of interims because it is of vital importance for the capital market 
(Charumathi, 2011) and commonly used by the previous research. A delay 
in releasing financial information will increase the uncertainty to make 
decisions and the information becomes irrelevant to investors (Fagbemi and 
Uadiale, 2011).  
 
Nevertheless, the MASB highlighted that producing timely information often 
contains ambiguous amounts, which will impair the reliability of financial 
reports. Delaying financial reporting until all of the information is known and 
certain will cause the financial reports to be highly reliable. However, the 
delayed information may no longer be relevant to financial report’s users 
since the information is already outdated. This is evidenced by a study from 
Joshi (2005), who finds that the value of information can diminish with an 
increased time lag in publishing the financial reports because the economic 
and financial decision made by the financial report’s users are greatly 
influenced by the timeliness of the information released. Consequently, it is 
important for the management of a company to strike a balance between 
timely financial reports and reliable information.  
 
2.5.2 Reliability 
The reliability of financial information reflects the reality and substance of 
transactions and events, which is complete and free from bias and material 
errors. Reliability is very important because otherwise erroneous decision 
making will occur. According to the MASB unrevised conceptual framework, 
reliability consists of faithful representation, substance over form, prudence, 
neutrality, completeness and verifiability. Faithful representation means that 
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the transactions that are reported in the financial reports represent the actual 
transactions that have occurred. Substance over form means that it is in 
accordance with the transaction’s substance and economic reality, not the 
legal form. Prudence means exercising judgments for uncertain information, 
especially financial estimates, so that asset or income is not overstated and 
liability or expense is not understated. Neutrality means absence from bias 
while completeness means that it is completed without any omissions. The 
definition of verifiability is similar to the above revised conceptual framework.  
 
Many studies are interested in investigating the reliability of financial reports. 
As there is a lack of common understanding what the term reliability means, 
a range of assorted measures are used. For example, Ku Ismail and 
Chandler (2005c) analysed the exceptional items; Manry et al. (1999), 
Raedy and Helms (2002), Mangena and Tauringana (2004), Krishnan and 
Zhang (2005), Boritz and Liu (2006), and Bedard and Courteau (2008) 
evaluated audit reviews by the external auditors; and McEwen and Schwartz 
(1992), Joshi and Bremser (2003) and Rahman and Ismail (2008) examined 
compliance with accounting standards. 
 
Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005c) examined the reliability of interims by 
studying exceptional items reported in interims. They discovered that most 
PLC (78.9%) deferred reporting exceptional items and made negative 
adjustments in the fourth quarter. The PLC had a tendency to manage their 
earnings in the first three quarters and they used the fourth quarter to settle 
all of the previous restatements. They concluded that interims may not be 
reliable. They also found that deferment of reporting exceptional items was 
more likely for non-profitable companies and there was no association of 
deferment with size, growth, and leverage of a company. The limitation of Ku 
Ismail and Chandler’s (2005c) study is that the sample only consisted of 
companies that disclosed exceptional items; therefore, their conclusion that 
interims are not reliable cannot be generalised to Malaysian PLC that did not 
report exceptional items. Furthermore, the sample was investigated when 
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the related accounting standards had not been enforced to PLC. Therefore, 
PLC with exceptional items may not report the item because there are no 
specific rules and regulations to follow.   
 
McEwen and Schwartz (1992), Joshi and Bremser (2003), Nieuwoudt and 
Koen (1999), and Rahman and Ismail (2008) used compliance with 
accounting standards to investigate the reliability of interims. Accounting 
standards are one of the vehicles for monitoring and enforcing the quality of 
financial reports (Imhoff, 1988). As mentioned earlier, accounting standards 
have been categorised into rules-based and concepts-based standards. The 
FRS 134 is a concept-based accounting standards, which have broader 
guidelines that cause the preparers to misinterpret their meanings and 
therefore cause the financial reports to be inaccurate or unreliable. Following 
the suggestions by Cook (1987), Bandyopadhyay et al. (2007), Williams 
(2008) and previous research, the present study used compliance with the 
interim reporting standards to assess the quality of interims.  
 
2.5.3 Comparability 
Comparability means that the users can determine the trends of financial 
reports through the periods, and then compare the financial position and 
performance with other companies. For example, disclosure of financial 
figures of the preceding corresponding periods in the current financial 
reports assists the users to make decisions. However, preparer of interims 
must be aware of the amendments of accounting standards and they must 
apply them appropriately so that the financial information in the financial 
reports is comparable with other companies. In other words, in order to have 
comparable financial reports, the transactions of a company are treated 
consistently throughout the period, the financial information is amended 
according to the changes of accounting standards, and the changes of 
accounting standards are treated similarly and correctly with other 
companies. As there seems to be no research on comparability of interims, 
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the present study fills this gap by examining the comparability of Malaysian 
interims every quarter. 
 
The information of each qualitative characteristic, which is proxied by 
timeliness, compliance with the interim reporting standards and 
comparability, is detailed as follows. 
 
2.6  Timeliness  
Timeliness of accounting information is essential for the financial report’s 
users (Davies and Whittred, 1980; Zeghal, 1984; Urbanic, 1992) because 
they require current information to make predictions and constructive 
decisions (Zeghal, 1984). The accounting information should be published 
as early as possible (Zeghal, 1984) in order to have an effective disclosure 
of information (Buzby, 1974). Delay in releasing information may cause the 
information to be irrelevant for making decisions. Nevertheless, according to 
Bromwich (1992), timeliness is not deemed a significant characteristic from 
an information economic perspective. Timeliness is a significant factor if the 
information that published early provides greater benefits to the decision 
maker. 
 
The quality of financial reports depends in part upon the frequency and 
timeliness of reporting (Miller and Bahnson, 1999). Timely disclosure and 
presentation of information improves the image of corporate bodies because 
they reflect managerial efficiency and effectiveness (Joshi, 2005). The 
importance of timeliness is further supported by the research of Abdulla 
(1996), who suggested that a shorter time between the financial year-end 
and publication date is more beneficial for users. According to the MASB’s 
framework, undue deferment of financial reporting may lose the relevance of 
accounting information and therefore, may have an immense effect on the 
user’s decisions. A delay in releasing the financial reports may increase the 
uncertainty level of investors’ decisions (Givoly and Palmon, 1982) because 
it intensifies the level of historical information (Zeghal, 1984).  
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Interims are timely if they are published within the stipulated period given by 
the Securities Commission. Different countries have different periods to 
publish their interims. In Canada, Singapore, Japan and Hong Kong, the 
period to publish interims is within 45 days after the quarter’s end. 
Meanwhile, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange has extended the period for 
publication of interims from two to three months for non-European Union 
PLC. The extension period was effective on 15 August 2008. The period at 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange was lengthened because some international 
PLC were not able to meet two months reporting deadlines due to legal or 
practical reasons in their home countries (Anders and Ploetz, 2008). On the 
other hand, the US SEC has shortened the period for interims from 45 days 
to 35 days. Due to the different allowable period to publish interims, the 
definition of timely publishing of interims varies in different countries. For 
example, although the US PLC publish their interims 40 days after the 
quarter ends are not considered to be published on a timely basis, this would 
be considered to be timely for Singaporean or Malaysian PLC. 
 
The FRS 134 requires Malaysian PLC to publish interims not exceeding 60 
days after each quarter ends. Similarly, the Bursa Malaysia obliges 
Malaysian PLC to submit interims within two months after the quarter ends 
(Section 9.22(1)). If PLC requires an extension to the period, then they must 
notify the Bursa Malaysia fifteen days before the allowable period ends 
(Section 9.26(2)). Failure to issue interims within the stipulated time period 
means that PLC must make an immediate announcement to the Bursa 
Malaysia on the expiry date of timeliness and notify the reasons for such a 
failure (Section 9.26(3a)) and they must announce the issuing of interims on 
or before the last market day of each month following the expiry date of 
timeliness (Section 9.26(3b)). Failure to issue interims within three months 
from the expiry date of timeliness will result in the Bursa Malaysia 
suspending trade in securities for PLC until the interims are published 
(Section 9.26(4)). If the delay is longer than six months then the PLC will be 
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de-listed (Section 9.26(6)). The severity of these penalties shows how 
important timeliness is considered to be.  
 
The previous studies have used several methods to measure timeliness. 
Dyer and McHugh (1975), Whittred (1980), Whittred and Zimmer (1984) 
measured timeliness by segregating the reporting lags into three categories: 
a) preliminary; b) the auditor’s signature; and c) total lag. These are 
respectively measured by the number of days from the financial year-end to: 
a) the receipt of preliminary statement by the Sydney Stock Exchange 
(SSE); b) the date of auditor’s signature on the auditor’s report; and c) the 
publishing date of financial reports with the SSE.  
 
Whittred and Zimmeris (1984) examined the reporting lags by comparing 
“healthy” and “entering financial distress” companies. Companies are 
“healthy” if they have succeeded in receiving the receipts of preliminary 
statements, and “entering financial distress” otherwise. Kross and Schroeder 
(1984) compared the actual and forecast reporting lag. The actual reporting 
lag is measured by the number of days between the interims’ date and the 
date they were issued. Forecast reporting lag is measured by a time-series 
analysis of each PLC reporting history for 26 quarterly periods (i.e. from the 
second quarter of 1971 to the third quarter of 1977).  
 
Leventis and Weetman (2004) measured timeliness by measuring the lead 
time and discretionary delay. Lead time is measured by the number of 
calendar days between the balance sheet date and the released date of 
annual reports. Discretionary delay is measured by the ratio of  b/(b+c), 
where b is the period between the date the auditor signs the financial reports 
and the date of releasing the annual reports and c is the period between the 
date of releasing the annual reports and the allowable time given to the 
companies to publish the annual reports. Leventis and Weetman (2004) 
found that all companies reported within the regulatory deadlines, which 
were possibly due to the costs of regulatory actions and adverse impact of 
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the market. However, companies with higher number of remarks in their 
audit reports exercised discretion by releasing less timely information to the 
market. Leventis and Weetman’s approach requires audit involvement. 
Malaysian interims are not subject to audit. Therefore, the discretionary 
delay of the present study can only be measured by the difference between 
the allowable time given to PLC and the date the interims are released to the 
public. This method has been included for the present study. 
 
Kross and Schroeder’s (1984), Annaert et al. (2002), and Ku Ismail and 
Chandler (2004) measured the timeliness of interims by reporting lag, which 
refers to the period between accounting date of interims’ quarters and the 
date when the interims are issued. The present study employs this method 
because it is suitable to measure interims in the absence of audit reviews.  
There has been much research conducted on the timeliness of annual 
reports in: Australia (Dyer and McHugh, 1975; Davies and Whittred, 1980; 
Whittred and Zimmer, 1984), New Zealand (Carslaw and Kaplan, 1991), in 
the U.S (Givoly and Palmon, 1982; Ashton et al.,1987), Hong Kong (Ng and 
Tai, 1994), India (Joshi, 2005), Bangladesh (Karim et al., 2006), Bahrain 
(Abdulla, 1996), Zimbabwe (Owusu-Ansah, 2000), and in Trinidad and 
Tobago (Bowrin, 2008). However, this review has found that there is less 
research in quarterly interims; the most obvious reason for this is due to the 
voluntary nature of publishing quarterly interims in most countries.  
 
At the beginning, most of the previous literature on timeliness found that 
PLC published financial reports within the regulatory stipulated period. Later 
researchers extended this early research by investigating the association 
between timeliness and several attributes, such as: earnings (Chambers and 
Penman,1984; Butler et al., 2007), audit review (Hussey and Woolfe,1998; 
Boritz and Liu, 2006), types of audit firm (Davies and Whittred, 1980), audit 
fees (Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008), audit opinions (Whittred,1980), 
contents of information in financial reports (Zeghal,1984), company size 
(Dyer and McHugh,1975; Lont and Sun, 2007; Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 
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2008), company age (Courtis,1976; Owusu-Ansah, 2000), date of financial 
year end (Dyer and McHugh,1975), number of shareholders (Courtis,1976), 
industry classification (Courtis,1976; Lunt, 1982; Lont and Sun (2007), types 
of news (Chambers and Penman,1984; Annaert et al., 2002), profitability 
(Dyer and McHugh,1975; Owusu-Ansah, 2000; Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 
2008), and extraordinary items (Davies and Whittred, 1980). Similarly, the 
extension studies of timeliness mostly focused on annual reports instead of 
interims. The research on timeliness of interims in various countries is 
detailed below. 
 
Lunt (1982) investigated the timeliness of UK PLC to publish interims. Lunt 
discovered that the UK PLC published interims between 61 and 90 days, 
with a mean timeliness of 72 days. Lunt’s (1982) results indicate that the 
interims of all PLC are published within the allowable period of 90 days. 
Large PLC are hypothesised to publish interims earlier than smaller PLC 
because they have the ability to acquire more sophisticated information 
systems that expedite the financial reporting process. Nevertheless, the 
results have failed to support this hypothesis; Lunt (1982) found that the 
reporting lag between small and large PLC insignificantly differs. Concerning 
the types of industries, Lunt (1982) found that non-industrial PLC published 
interims more timely than industrial PLC.  
 
Kross and Schroeder (1984) examined the timeliness of the US PLC 
interims. Their sample consists of 297 New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
and American Stock Exchange PLC. The period was between 1977 and 
1980. They found that the actual reporting lag of PLC was between 22 to 30 
days after the end of each quarter. Contrary to Lunt (1982), Kross and 
Schroeder (1984) found that the number of days generates a positively 
skewed distribution, which indicates that the US PLC published interims in a 
very timely manner and they did not publish towards the end of the allowable 
period.  
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Chambers and Penman (1984) explored timeliness by comparing the 
interims and annual earnings published in the “Wall Street Journal Index”. 
They found that the reporting lag time was predictable: between three to four 
days for interims and one week for annual reports. This result indicates that 
earnings for interims are published three or four days earlier than earnings of 
annual reports. Additionally, PLC with positive earnings tends to release 
interims earlier than PLC that have forecasted bad news. PLC tends to 
release good news earlier to attract more investors. Apart from timeliness, 
Chambers and Penman (1984) assessed the relationship between 
timeliness and company size (which was measured by the market value). 
They found that timeliness was associated negatively with company size.   
 
Although Zeghal’s (1984) study is similar to that of Chambers and Penman 
(1984) in that it compared the timeliness of interims and annual reports, it 
used different types of variable (i.e. the content of information in interims and 
annual reports). Zeghal (1984) used a large sample of New York and 
American Stock Exchange PLC. The sample consists of 1,402 PLC and the 
periods observed were 1973, 1974 and 1975. Altogether, there were 4,186 
annual reports and 11,933 interims. Zeghal (1984) provides evidence that, 
regardless of the types of financial reports (i.e. whether it is interim or 
annual), timely financial reports have higher contents of information than 
delayed financial reports. However, the delay of information content was 
more significant for interims than annual reports. This may be due to the 
different characteristics of the information contained in interim and annual 
reports. In addition, it may also be caused by the different roles that they 
serve for the investor’s decision-making process. In other words, interims 
contain abstracted and unaudited information to update the investor’s 
expectations while annual reports contain extensive and audited information 
to confirm the investor’s prediction.  
 
Hussey and Woolfe (1998) also investigated the timeliness of UK PLC 
interims. They found that a greater number of UK PLC published interims 
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within the allowable period of 90 days than in the prior five years. The mean 
of timeliness had also significantly reduced from 68.7 days in 1992 to 62.4 
days in 1997. The mean showed that UK PLC published interims 21 to 27 
days earlier than the required 90 days to publish. Hussey and Woolfe (1998) 
also investigated the association between timeliness and independent audit 
reviews. They found that there is no association between timeliness and 
independent audit reviews. However, the audit review is positively 
associated with voluntary disclosures in interims.  
 
Annaert et al. (2002) pooled the time series and cross-sectional data of 67 
Belgian PLC between 1991 and 1998. This period was chosen because 
before 1991, Belgian PLC was not required to issue interims. The Royal 
Decrees that imposed the regulation to issue interims for PLC on the 
Brussels Stock Exchange (BSE) were made effective on 3 July 1996. On 17 
December 1998, the regulation was extended to be effective until 1999 and 
the allowable period to issue interims was reduced from four to three 
months. Annaert et al. (2002) discovered that the mean and median of 
Belgian interims were 57 and 58 days, respectively. Over the years, 
timeliness to issue interims has been found to improve, possibly because of 
the build-up of experience gained by PLC during that period. They also 
discovered that timeliness was not associated with the type of news (be it 
good or bad). This result is in contrast with Chambers and Penman (1984), 
who found that timeliness is associated with the types of news.  
 
D’Arcy and Grabensberger (2003) examined the quality of German Neuer 
market interims. Their sample consists of 47 PLC and the interim periods of 
their study are the third quarter of 1999, 2000, and 2001 only. They found 
that most PLC published their interims within two months after the quarter 
ends. Four PLC delayed publishing their interims in 1999, three in 2000, and 
one in 2001. The results indicate that over the periods, fewer numbers of 
companies published interims more than the given period. Similar to the 
results of Hussey and Woolfe (1998), mean timeliness improves over the 
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periods but insignificantly differs. The mean timeliness was 49 days in 1999, 
and 47 days in 2000 and 2001.  
 
Ku Ismail and Chandler (2004) discovered that all but one of the Malaysian 
PLC included in the sample submitted interims within the permissible 
reporting lag of two months. The mean and median of interims submission 
were 55.7 and 58 days, respectively. This indicated that PLC in Malaysia 
was inclined to submit the interims towards the end of the allowable period. 
This result is in contrast to that of Kross and Schroeder (1984), who found 
that US PLC is inclined to submit interims early. Ku Ismail and Chandler 
(2004) examined only the third-quarter financial reports ending on 30 
September 2001, which is similar to D’Arcy and Grabensberger (2003). Their 
findings may not be generalizable because no comparison is made across 
quarters and years. The present study fills this gap by examining the 
timeliness of Malaysian PLC across quarters and years to identify whether 
the findings remain. Additionally, comparison can be made with the 
subsequent year to identify the trend of timeliness of Malaysian interims.   
 
Butler et al. (2007) investigated the effect of frequency reporting on the 
timeliness of earnings. Their sample included those companies that issued 
semi-annual and quarterly financial reports, and the observations were from 
1950 to 1973. They found that there was no difference on timeliness to issue 
semi-annual and quarterly financial reports. However, companies that 
increased the reporting frequency from semi-annual to quarterly reports 
voluntarily had increased the timeliness to publish their financial reports. 
Companies who are mandated by the US SEC did not increase their 
timeliness.   
 
Lont and Sun (2007) explored the timeliness to issue interims and annual 
reports of New Zealand PLC from 2004 to 2006. The allowable period for 
annual reports and interims is three months after the end of each financial 
year. They found that interims were released on average 10 days earlier 
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than the annual financial reports. They suggest that this may be due to the 
reduced complexity and absence of audit for interims. Lont and Sun (2007) 
also inspected the reporting lag of interims and annual reports based on 
company size, types of industries, and slow and fast reporting companies. 
Their annual revenue measured company size. They hypothesised that 
larger companies report earlier because:  
1) they have greater resources that enable them to purchase less 
delay in issuing the financial reports;  
2) they are audited by the big accounting firms that request audit 
resources for timely reporting; and,  
3) they are often widely held stock companies that are pressured to 
provide timely information to shareholders.  
 
Lont and Sun (2007) found that the median for interims of small and large 
companies were 82 days and 80 days respectively. The median for annual 
reports is consistent for small and large companies, i.e. 89 days. These 
results showed that releasing the interims for small and large companies 
differs insignificantly and releasing the annual reports is consistent, 
regardless of the size of the companies. Reporting lag based on different 
types of industries for interims and annual financial reports differed 
insignificantly. However, the range for interims was larger than the annual 
reports: between 67 and 97 days for interims, and 81 and 93 days for annual 
reports. Timeliness for the first five fastest reporters was around 70 days in 
2004, which reduced to 61 days in 2006. Although Lont and Sun (2007) 
disclosed the first five fastest and all late reporters for annual reports, they 
disclosed none for interims. A comparison may add value to the literature by 
determining whether the same companies are among the first five and late 
reporters for interims and annual reports.  
 
Some of the previous research focuses on timeliness based on industrial 
classification (e.g. Courtis, 1976; Givoly and Palmon, 1982; and Bowrin, 
2008). Previous research has revealed that timeliness of different types of 
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industries differs. For example, Courtis (1976) found that timeliness was 
associated with industry classification: for New Zealand PLC, finance, and 
fuel and energy industries were fast reporters while mining and exploration, 
and service industries were slow reporters.  
 
Bowrin’s (2008) investigation of timeliness according to types of industries 
consists of 16 companies, of which: four companies were from the banking 
industry, six companies from the manufacturing industry, four companies 
were conglomerates, one company was in publishing, and one company 
came from property development and management. Bowrin (2008) found 
that the banking industry in Trinidad and Tobago out-performed non-banking 
industries, which may be due to the banking industry’s “Blue Chip” stocks 
and both the financial sector and general market looked at the banking 
industry’s reports to form expectations for the entire market. In addition, two 
independent bodies supervised companies from the banking industry and 
only one independent body supervised other industries. The independent 
body that supervised all industries is the Trinidad and Tobago Securities and 
Exchange Commission. The additional independent body that supervised 
the banking industry is the Central Bank of Trinidad and Tobago (CBTT). In 
comparison to the independent body, the CBTT monitored the banking 
industry more frequently, on an on-going basis, and more comprehensively 
(Bowrin, 2007). Since the sample size was trivial in Bowrin’s (2008) study, 
the findings obtained may be unconvincing.  
 
Ashton et al. (1987) and Ng and Tai (1994) raised the conflict issue of the 
involvement of external auditors which caused a delay in issuing the 
financial reports. Their concern was proven by a study from Wheatley et al. 
(2001), who found that audit reviews delayed the timeliness of the interims of 
US PLC. However, this phenomenon is restricted to PLC in five of the Big 
Six audit firms. Ashton et al. (1987) determined that an audit delay was 
positively associated with companies that: 
a) received qualified audit opinions;  
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b) were in industrial classification;  
c) were not publicly traded;  
d) were non-December financial year end;  
e) had poor internal controls;  
f) employed less complex data-processing technology; and,  
g) had a greater amount of audit work to be performed after the 
financial year-end.  
 
Factors that are associated with audit delay are categorised into audit-
related and company-specific factors (Owusu-Ansah, 2000). Audit-related 
factors are likely to obstruct (or facilitate) the auditors in carrying out the 
audit assignments and issuing the audit reports promptly. Company-specific 
factors either enable management to produce a more timely report or reduce 
the associated costs that result in issuance of an early report. 
 
Although audit reviews have delayed the timeliness of interims, Raedy and 
Helms (2002) suggested that involvement of external auditors may enrich 
the reliability of interims. Ghicas, (2003) agreed with this view and added 
that interims provide less reliable information due to non-verification by 
independent auditors, although interims were more timely to be published 
than the annual financial reports. On the other hand, Hussey and Woolfe 
(1998) provide evidence that the presence of auditor involvement was not 
associated with the delay in issuing interims but were associated with the 
voluntary disclosure of additional information. Boritz and Liu (2006) agreed 
with this finding when they found that PLC with no audit reviews published 
interims less timely than PLC with audit review. This was possibly due to 
PLC perception that publishing interims without an audit review gives a 
negative signal to the market. Therefore, PLC with the absence of audit 
reviews published interims later than those with audit reviews. 
 
In addition to audit reviews, some of the reasons to defer issuing interims 
include: a frequent issue of financial reports (Gigler and Hemmer, 1998) 
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which cause the management of a company to spend more time to prepare 
the increase number of financial reports; a reluctance to release bad 
financial information to the public (Givoly and Palmon, 1982; Bowen et al., 
1992; Deloof and Weets, 2003; Doyle and Magilke, 2009); financial distress 
(Whittred and Zimmer, 1984); complexity of the consolidation process in 
groups that have many subsidiaries, which includes foreign subsidiaries 
(Bowrin, 2008); and the additional workload forced on companies through 
compliance with the accounting standards (Bowrin, 2008).  
 
Deferment to publish interims may possibly reduce the reliability of 
information disclosed (Joshi, 2005) because the financial information may be 
out-dated and no longer useful for the financial report’s users to make 
decisions. There are several approaches suggested by previous researchers 
to expedite the timeliness of interims. For example, one of the approaches 
that was suggested by Kopcke (2002) was to report interims online, which 
may trigger the finance staff to spend less time on processing the accounts 
and more time on value-added analysis. Lybaert (2002) discovered that 
most companies were not inclined to post the interims’ information online, 
which caused the internet users’ failure to obtain the latest information in the 
fastest way possible. Subsequently, Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) 
investigated PLC timeliness of internet reporting and found that only 11% 
PLC did not post interims on their websites. Their results showed that over 
the period, most PLC were inclined to post interims online and the financial 
report’s users can download the required files at any time without incurring a 
high cost.  
 
The other approach to reduce the deferment in publishing interims is using a 
type of software that expedites the financial reporting process, such as the 
extensible business reporting language (XBRL). The US SEC introduced the 
XBRL to its PLC on 17 December 2008 to facilitate the companies’ 
management to prepare frequent and timely financial reports. XBRL uses an 
interactive data format. It is used for analysing, exchanging, and reporting 
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financial and other business performance information (Rayner and Chandler, 
2008). XBRL defines the contents of financial reports and facilitates the 
dissemination, access, and comparison of financial information. XBRL 
consists of a collection of standardised tags for line items in financial reports. 
The tagged information benefits the preparers and users of financial reports. 
With XBRL, the preparers can easily fill in the tagged data and the users, 
especially investors, can download the information to make analyses and to 
compare financial information across companies, reporting periods, and 
industries. Using XBRL enables PLC to prepare interims faster and more 
easily. However, management may take time to become accustomed to this 
new software. This may cause PLC delays in timeliness to publish interims 
in the short-term. However, in the long-term, timeliness should be improved.  
 
2.7  Compliance with the Interim Reporting Standards  
The MASB released the FRS 134for Malaysian PLC to prepare interims. The 
objective of the FRS 134 is to prescribe the minimum contents of interims 
and principles for recognition and measurement that should be applied in 
complete or condensed interims. PLC are required to provide less 
information at interim dates when compared with annual financial reports 
due to the short allowable period given by the Securities Commission. 
Additionally, it ensures that PLC can publish interims on a timely basis and 
not repeat information from the previous annual report. The Bursa Malaysia 
issued the BMLR to complement FRS 134. Both standards are mandatory 
for Malaysian PLC. 
 
Sound accounting standards will elevate the investors’ confidence in 
published financial reports because they provide a basis for believing that a 
company’s  performance is accurately reported (Jermakowicz and McGuire, 
2002). Completeness of information is one of the items that are contained in 
reliability, while incomplete information will make the interims unreliable. 
Miller and Bahnson (1999) proposed that incomplete information in financial 
reports will increase uncertainty for investors and creditors. Greater 
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uncertainty consequently increased the risks and caused the investors to 
demand a higher expected return. Incomplete information in financial reports 
may in turn cause a diminishing demand for a company’s securities because 
the investors are uncertain about the expected returns and financial 
condition of the company. 
 
Aljifri (2008) found that adequate disclosures in the financial reports assist 
market efficiency. Interestingly, Buzby (1974) provides an integrated 
overview of the nature of adequate disclosure, which partly depends on the 
objective of financial reports (which is to provide relevant information to the 
users in order to make economic decisions). Buzby (1974) suggests five 
interrelated questions to determine adequate disclosures :  
1) For whom is the information to be disclosed?  
2) What is the purpose of the information? 
3) How much information should be disclosed?  
4) How should the information be disclosed?  
5) When should the information be disclosed?   
 
The answers to these questions are that the disclosure is adequate if:  
1) The users of the information are specifically determined;  
2) Financial information is relevant to the specific users;  
3) The elements of the financial reports (the balance sheet, income 
statement, and statement of retained earnings) are prepared 
according to the GAAP;  
4) The methods of presenting the information are understandable; and,  
5) The information is disclosed in a timely manner. 
 
There is a sizeable literature on assessing the financial report’s compliance 
with the accounting standards. However, there seems to be less research on 
compliance with the interim reporting standards. One of the early studies 
was conducted by McEwen and Schwartz (1992) who examined the 
compliance of 76 PLC with the minimum standards of Accounting Principles 
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Board (APB) 28, Interim Financial Reporting. The minimum disclosures 
required by APB 28 are: 
1) Sales or gross revenues, which is subdivided into these categories:  
a) Season revenues, costs or expenses;  
b) Costs that are associated with revenues; and  
c) Costs that are not associated with revenues.  
2) Provision for income taxes.  
3) Net income and earnings per share (EPS). 
4) Other required disclosures:  
a) Discontinued operations;  
b) Extraordinary items;  
c) Cumulative effects of changes in accounting principles;  
d) Unusual items;  
e) Contingent items; and  
f) Significant changes in financial principles.  
 
McEwen and Schwartz (1992) found that all PLC disclosed sales or gross 
revenues in their interims. However, a majority of PLC (89%) did not 
disclose the seasonality that may affect their interims’ operations. 
Information about seasonality is important because the users of financial 
reports can differentiate whether a PLC earnings inconsistency are due to 
the seasonality or turning points in their operations. They identified non-
disclosure of seasonality by observing the EPS values of each interim’s 
quarter. Inconsistent values may indicate the appearance of seasonality in 
the interims’ operations. Since their sample consists of a large number of 
PLC, they used a Friedman test to detect the existence of seasonality in the 
PLC business operations.  
 
Firstly, McEwen and Schwartz (1992) compared revenues across all 
quarters to identify any differences across the year. Subsequently, revenues 
were compared between each pair of quarters. The results indicated 
inconsistency of revenues across the year, of which the highest mean rank 
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of revenues was in quarter four, followed by the second, third and first 
quarters. For the subsequent test,  
a) Revenues for the fourth quarter exceeded revenues for the other 
quarters;  
b) Revenues for the first quarter were lower than the other quarters; 
and  
c) Revenues for the second and third quarters insignificantly differ 
from each other.  
 
However, this study failed to prove that the differences of revenues in all 
quarters were linked to seasonality. McEwen and Schwartz (1992) 
suggested that the differences across the years were more towards industry-
wide or economic-wide sectors and turning points of an individual PLC.  
 
Costs that are directly associated with revenues are to be recognised in the 
relevant interims’ periods. It is recommended that PLC should use the same 
inventory pricing method as in annual reports for their interims. Ending 
inventory reported in interims has to be estimated because no physical 
stocktaking can be done in the interims’ periods. Therefore, APB 28 allows 
PLC to use gross profit or other alternative methods for interims, which 
differs significantly from the method used in annual report. However, the 
methods used must be disclosed in the interims. McEwen and Schwartz 
(1992) found that no PLC disclosed how they determined the ending 
inventory in interims. Therefore, they cannot determine whether PLC used 
gross profit margins, or alternative methods to estimate the ending inventory. 
 
Incurred costs that are not associated with revenues are expensed in the 
interims’ relevant  quarter. However, a problem of allocation arises when the 
costs benefit more than one interim period. APB 28 requires a “settling up” 
process in quarter four, but this adjustment leads to larger forecast errors in 
quarter four when compared with the other three quarters. Costs allocation 
may impair the quarters’ earnings. McEwen and Schwartz (1992) found that 
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no companies disclosed the nature and amount of such costs, and no 
reconciliation information was available for over or under allocation 
adjustment of these costs in the fourth quarter.  
 
APB 28 requires PLC to disclose estimate tax rates for each interim period 
and significant changes in the estimated effective tax rates. McEwen and 
Schwartz (1992) found that two PLC did not make the disclosures and eight 
PLC disclosed them in the quarterly footnote. A Friedman test result showed 
that the estimated tax rates for the first quarter were significantly higher than 
the annual tax rates. Tax rates revision was made after the first quarter 
because estimated tax rates in quarter two and three did not significantly 
differ with the annual tax rates. They suggest that failure to estimate the tax 
rates precisely may affect the usefulness of interims and diminish the 
predictability of earnings. 
 
McEwen and Schwartz (1992) found that all PLC successfully disclosed their 
net income and EPS in interims; however, only a small percentage of PLC 
disclosed other required disclosures, which were: a) 13.1% on discontinued 
operations; b) 7.9% on extraordinary items; and c) 19.7% on the cumulative 
effect of changing an accounting principle in the annual report. Unusual 
items, contingent items and significant changes in financial position were 
frequently reported in the president’s letter or in management discussion. 
There are no requirements in APB 28 for PLC to disclose balance sheets 
and cash flow statements in interims. Despite the lack of requirements for 
disclosure, 82.9% PLC disclosed a condensed balance sheet and 61.8% 
disclosed cash flows statements. Additionally, most PLC provide additional 
disclosures such as: a) 86.8% on the number of outstanding shares in each 
interim’s period; b) 47.3% on dividend information; and c) 43.4% on 
summary segment or product information.  
 
Overall, McEwen and Schwartz (1992) found that PLC in the sample did not 
disclose all the information required by APB 28. Therefore, the interims are 
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not reliable and they concluded that non-compliance with APB 28 diminished 
the usefulness of financial reports. They supported the suggestion by the US 
SEC to include independent auditors in the interim reporting process to 
improve the usefulness of interims and, ultimately, to enhance the 
compliance with the APB 28’s requirements.  
 
Nieuwoudt and Koen (1999) examined the compliance of South African PLC 
with the interim reporting standards for three-year periods (i.e. from 1996 to 
1998). The first objective is more towards PLC compliance with disclosure of 
balance sheet and income statement items, and the second objective is 
more towards the narrative disclosure of interims. The first 50 PLC with the 
highest average of total assets, market capitalisation, net profit and turnover 
were selected as the sample.  
 
For the first objective, Nieuwoudt and Koen (1999) selected 25 out of 55 
interims’ reporting requirements, which were based on the researchers’ 
opinion that the information had a greater risk to be dealt inappropriately by 
PLC. The requirements were classified into four groups, namely: general 
disclosures, income statement, balance sheet and supplementary 
information. Compliance with these requirements varies:  
a) Four requirements with 100% compliance;  
b) Six requirements’ compliance ranged from 80% to 96%;  
c) Four requirements ranged from 50% to 79%;  
d) Four requirements below 50%; and  
e) Seven requirements were uncertain due to insufficient information 
disclosed in interims.  
 
For the second objective, Nieuwoudt and Koen selected all 19 disclosure 
requirements of interims. Compliance with these requirements also varied:  
a) Nine disclosure requirements ranged from 4% to 100%; and  
b) Ten disclosure requirements were uncertain.  
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Nieuwoudt and Koen suggested that low compliance with the interim 
reporting standards may be due to abundant regulations for interims, 
insufficient attention paid by the Registrar of Companies and Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange Board, and the PLC perception that the information was 
outdated and not beneficial to the financial report’s users. 
 
Joshi and Bremser (2003) investigated the preparation of interims and the 
first year adoption of IAS 34 by 31 PLC on the Bahrain Stock Exchange. 
They found that a large number of companies (i.e. around 88% of the 
sample) prepared interims. The degree of compliance with the IAS 34 was 
high, although only 66% of the sample had adopted the IAS 34. Company 
size, profitability and financial leverage were factors that influenced early 
adoption of IAS 34 in Bahrain. Association with foreign operations were not 
significant, and this was probably because no Bahraini companies were 
listed on a foreign stock exchange at the time of their study. 
 
 D’Arcy and Grabensberger (2003) examined the quality of Germany’s 
Neuer Market’s (GNM) interims by focusing on the disclosure level of third 
quarter financial reports. They were motivated to do the research because 
the interims of GNM had failed to meet the investor’s information needs 
(Maier and Herr 2000; cited in D’ Arcy and Grabensberger 2003, p. 330). 
Furthermore, Glaum and Street (2002), cited in D’ Arcy and Grabensberger 
(2003, p. 330), found that year 2000 financial reports of 100 GNM’s 
companies did not comply considerably with either the IAS or the US GAAP 
standards. Consequently, in 2002 the stock prices of GNM’s companies had 
drastically fallen more than 90% from their peak price in March 2000.  
 
D’Arcy and Grabensberger (2003) hypothesised that a higher disclosure 
level will result in higher quality financial reports. Forty-seven PLC were 
taken as the sample and the financial periods assessed covered three 
consecutive financial years (i.e. 1999, 2000 and 2001). D’Arcy and 
Grabensberger (2003) established four disclosure indexes to determine the 
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quality of GNM’s financial reports as follows: 1) whether all parts of interims 
(i.e. the balance sheet, the income statement, the cash flow statement and 
the earnings per share) were present; 2) whether interims complied with 
Neuer Market Rules and Regulations (NMRR); 3) whether interims was 
prepared according to the IAS 34; and 4) whether interims complied with the 
US GAAP. D’Arcy and Grabensberger (2003) also investigated the typical 
attributes of companies that provide a high or low level of accounting 
information disclosure in the interims.   
 
D’Arcy and Grabensberger (2003) found that in 1999, 43% of the sample 
disclosed basic elements of interims, almost three quarters in 2000, and all 
PLC in 2001. The missing disclosure in 1999 and 2000 may be due to the 
NMRR regulation in 1999, which did not require PLC to disclose a balance 
sheet (unlike both the IAS and the US GAAP). For the second index, the 
frequency of compliance with NMRR varied because some rules were only 
applicable to certain conditions. However, the items of information in the 
sample increased progressively over the three-year periods. For the third 
index, two companies in 1999 and one company in 2000 did not provide any 
items of IAS 34 requirements and more than 60% of the sample did not 
disclose segment information in the interims. Finally, they found that the IAS 
disclosure level grew at over 30% per annum and the US GAAP disclosure 
level was more constant. Overall, D’Arcy and Grabensberger (2003) found 
that the level of disclosure had increased over time because of the 
continuous supervision of interims by the relevant authoritative body and 
also because the NMRR had introduced a standardised format in the year 
2000. The good results that were obtained by D’Arcy and Grabensberger 
(2003) are in contrast to those of Glaum and Street (2002), who found that 
GNM’s companies did not comply with the IAS or US GAAP in the year 
2000.   
 
D’Arcy and Grabensberger (2003) investigated the typical attributes of PLC 
that provide a high or low level of accounting information disclosure in 
   
- 55 - 
 
interims. The first attribute was the accounting principles used by PLC. They 
found that the disclosure level of PLC that used the US GAAP was higher in 
the first two years, but in 2001, the IAS disclosure index surpassed the US 
GAAP. The second attribute was the characteristics of PLC that provide a 
full set of financial reports or reconciliation. D’Arcy and Grabensberger 
(2003) presumed that companies that were listed longer in the Neuer market 
would have a higher quality in their interims. They found that when using 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients the relationship was positive but 
insignificant.  
 
The quality of financial reporting not only depends on accounting standards, 
it also depends on the enforcement of accounting standards that vary from 
one country to another (Erickson et al., 2009). Ku Ismail and Chandler 
(2005a) investigated the disclosure of interims since there was no formal 
mechanism set by the Bursa Malaysia to ensure that PLC complied with the 
interim reporting standards. However, they only investigated PLC 
compliance with the BMLR and not the FRS 134. Their first objective was to 
identify the overall disclosure with the BMLR. Their second objective was to 
identify the extent of narrative disclosure with respect to three selected items 
(i.e. material changes in profit before tax, performance review and current 
year prospects). Their third, and final, objective was to examine the 
association between the extent of disclosure and company-specific attributes 
(profitability, growth and leverage).  
 
Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005a) found that Malaysian PLC disclosed all 
mandatory financial reports’ requirements of BMLR, except for cash flow and 
changes in equity statements (which were not provided by any of the PLC 
because the inclusion of these statements in interims was still under the 
proposal stage at the time of their study). The extent of mandatory narrative 
disclosure varies. The extent of the disclosure for material changes in profit 
before tax (85.5%) and performance reviews (87.2%) were high and greatly 
vary for prospects. Profitability and growth were not significantly associated 
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with the extent of disclosure. Leverage was positively associated with the 
extent of disclosure, which indicates that PLC with higher leverage disclosed 
more information in interims.  
 
Mangena and Taurigana (2008) investigated 259 UK PLC compliance with 
the Accounting Standards Board in UK (UK ASB). They measured the 
degree of compliance by using three disclosure indexes, namely: overall, 
narrative and financial reports. The result showed that the overall disclosure 
of compliance was high (74.5%) and the financial statement’s disclosure was 
higher (82.5%) than narrative disclosure (59.9%). The Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression model was used to identify the influence of 
company-specific features and Corporate Governance Characteristics 
(CGC) on the degree of compliance disclosure. Company-specific 
characteristics were proxied by multiple listing, company size, interim 
dividend, and new shares issuance. The characteristics were positively 
associated with the degree of compliance disclosure. For the CGC, auditor 
involvement, audit committee independence and audit committee financial 
expertise were all positively related with the degree of compliance 
disclosure. 
 
Rahman and Ismail (2008) examined the reliability of Malaysian interims. 
However, their study slightly differs from Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005c), 
where they investigated the quality of Malaysian PLC interims by examining 
compliance with the FRS 134 and the BMLR. Rahman and Ismail study used 
the top 100 PLC on the main board of Bursa Malaysia. However, they 
excluded the financial sector industry and PLC with insufficient data, leaving 
76 PLC that met their prescribed criteria. They prepared a checklist based 
on the FRS 134 and Part A of Appendix 9B of the BMLR and determined 
interims in the year of 2005. There were 81 items in the checklist and they 
were not separated based on the types of accounting standards,   the FRS 
134 and the BMLR. They grouped several items of a similar nature into a 
specific category. The checklist was aggregated into 15 categories, which 
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were: financial statements, performance review, taxation, corporate 
proposals, borrowings and debt securities, off-balance sheet financial 
statements, litigation, dividends, accounting policies, qualification of 
preceding audited annual accounts, seasonal or cyclical factors, unusual 
items, segmental reporting, subsequent events, and contingent assets and 
liabilities.  
 
Using ordinal measures, Rahman and Ismail (2008) found that the lowest 
and highest compliance score with the FRS 134 and BMLR was 77% and 
94%, respectively, and the average score was 85%. The results indicated 
that Malaysian PLC disclosed the information required by the FRS 134 and 
the BMLR extensively. Therefore, the quality of Malaysian interims may be 
categorised as high. However, they only studied interims for one year and 
the sample was from large PLC in the main board of the Bursa Malaysia 
Stock Exchange (BMSE). The findings may differ if several financial years 
and all PLC in different boards of BMSE are taken as the sample. 
 
There seems to be less research into the compliance with the interim 
reporting standards according to the types of industries. Therefore, the 
present study fills this gap by examining PLC compliance with the interims 
reporting standards according to the types of industries as well as boards on 
BMSE. According to Aljifri and Hussainey (2007), different industrial sectors 
(i.e. banks, insurance, manufacturing and services) adopt different 
accounting policies, measurement, valuation, and disclosure techniques that 
will result in differences in the level of disclosures.  
 
2.8  Comparability  
The information release to the market may not be comparable between one 
company and another if PLC are given the option to publish interims 
(Business Times Singapore, 12 November 2005). In other words, 
information flow to the securities market will be uneven if some PLC are 
given the option to publish interims. Therefore, all Malaysian PLC are 
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mandated to publish interims regardless of their size or other special 
characteristics. In addition to mandating PLC to publish interims, the MASB 
and the Bursa Malaysia have respectively issued the FRS 134 and the 
BMLR to promote consistency in the requirements to prepare interims.  
 
The objective of FRS 101, Presentation of Financial Reports, is to provide 
the basis for the presentation of financial reports in order to be comparable 
with the companies’ own financial reports of the previous periods and with 
the financial reports of other companies. The FRS 101 is consistent with IAS 
1. The FRS 134 allows PLC to either prepare a complete or condensed 
financial reports in interims. However, if PLC choose complete financial 
reports for interims then they must conform to the FRS 101. Meanwhile, if a 
condensed financial report is chosen then PLC should prepare interims 
according to the FRS 134. To date, no research has been done on the 
comparability of Malaysian interims. A plausible reason for this was 
mentioned earlier: interims, particularly quarter interims, are not mandated 
internationally.  
 
Jacques et al. (1997) investigated whether interims or annual reports provide 
better forecasts by analysing 133 companies over five consecutive years. 
Their analysis was based on total income, operating income, and net 
income. They found that the percentage error was generally lowest for total 
income and highest for net income. Total income is the component with the 
highest degree of predictability. This is probably due to net operating 
income, which contains more items than the total income while net income 
contains unusual and extraordinary items that are generally recognised at 
the year-end. Jacques et al. (1997) suggested that it is not possible to 
forecast the upcoming quarter results accurately, although there is a strong 
correlation of seasonal effect between one quarter and the same quarter of 
the following year. It is only possible to know the magnitude of income. Net 
income for the fourth quarter was higher than the three preceding quarters 
during the fiscal years. Average net income for the first, second, third and 
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fourth quarters were 21.1%, 22.8%, 24.2%, and 31.9%, respectively. Their 
study concluded that the highest income for the fourth quarter could be due 
to major adjustments because the companies were not careful in estimating 
the interim’s results. Additionally, interim results are less accurate to be 
forecast because most decisions are not made until the year-end (e.g. 
unusual and extraordinary events). Inaccurate interim results may cause the 
amount to be incomparable with the corresponding annual reported figures.  
 
Miller and Bahnson (1999) proposed several techniques to evaluate the 
quality of the financial reports of PLC. The first technique is to inspect the 
overstated earnings made by the management. This technique is proposed 
because PLC are motivated to increase earnings in order to meet analysts’ 
expectations, to meet debt covenants, or to improve incentive compensation. 
Hence, many researchers have used earnings quality as one of the proxies 
of quality of financial reports. The second technique is to verify assets and 
liabilities. The management may have the intention to overstate assets and 
understate liabilities in order to make the financial position appear better. 
The third technique is that the quality of reported cash flows needs to be 
examined because the adequacy of the disclosure affects the quality of 
financial reports. Finally, studying all of the information in financial reports is 
a useful tool to discover financial irregularities. For example, increased 
earnings and decreased operating cash flows may indicate aggressive 
reporting of earnings. After using the above techniques, Miller and Bahnson 
(1999) noticed that published financial reports did not contain all of the 
information that the investors required. The financial reports were of low 
quality because they were incomplete, contained useless data, and were 
difficult to analyse. 
 
Joshi and Al-Mudhaki (2001) investigated whether the annual reports of 37 
PLC in Bahrain complied with the extent of disclosures as required by the 
IAS 1. Joshi and Al-Mudhaki (2001) sorted out disclosure items into 10 
groups. They found that the degree of compliance with the IAS 1 
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requirements was high for 4 groups (i.e. components of financial report, 
comparability, compliance and stock information) and there was a fair 
degree of compliance for the remaining groups (i.e. disclosure of 
reclassification, dividends, description of reserves, timeliness, going concern 
and disclosure of income statement).   
 
Joshi and Al-Mudhaki (2001) assessed comparability by ensuring that PLC 
placed the previous corresponding period’s financial reports’ figures in the 
current financial reports. Reclassification was assessed by ensuring that the 
comparative figures were reclassified in order for them to be comparable 
with the current period’s figures. However, if the comparative figures were 
not practicable to be reclassified then the PLC should disclose the reasons 
and the nature of the changes if the comparative figures are reclassified. 
Overall, it can be concluded that the quality of PLC financial reports in 
Bahrain was quite high due to compliance with the IAS1. 
 
Using a mail questionnaire, Mangena (2004) investigated the analysts’ 
perceptions of the information disclosed in interims. Mangena (2004) found 
that the information was helpful for analysts to use to make investment 
decisions. They found that the most important items are the profit and loss 
account and cash flow statement. Following Mangena’s (2004) 
recommendations, the present study has investigated comparability by 
comparing profit and loss items because these items are useful to financial 
analysts when they make decisions. Four profit and loss items are assessed 
in this present study, (i.e. revenue, gross profit, net profit before tax, and net 
profit after tax) from the date when they were originally issued with the time 
when they were placed in the next year’s corresponding period as a 
comparative figure. 
 
Apart from investigating the quality of interims, the previous studies have 
also examined the factors that influence the financial report quality. Chariri 
(2009) suggests on studying the quality of financial reports by looking at the 
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contextual factors, which is corporate governance. Studying on the contents 
of financial reports may not be sufficient due to several factors such as 
flexible accounting standards and manager’s behaviour to hide information. 
The necessity to study corporate governance is proven by the occurrence of 
accounting scandal such as Enron. Epstein and Roy (2010) stated that a 
company’s performance is evaluated comprehensively but when it comes to 
directors, they do not want to be evaluated especially individual directors. If 
they do not perform well, the shareholders may not appoint them for the next 
accounting period. Therefore, it is time to evaluate the corporate governance 
especially BOD to ensure that they have perform their duties responsibly. 
 
Lara et al. (2009) studied on the association between corporate governance 
and conditional accounting conservatism. Corporate governance was 
measured internally (characteristics of BOD) and externally (antitakeover 
protection level) because both have a complementary effect. Accounting 
conservatism is an approach to limit the amount of risks in accounting 
information. Lara et al. used market-based and accruals-based as proxies. 
They found that corporate governance was associated positively with 
accounting conservatism, which indicates that companies with strong 
corporate governance are more conservative and therefore affect the 
companies’ timeliness of loss recognition. They also provide the evidence of 
direction of causality flowing from corporate governance to conservatism, 
which suggests that corporate governance may influence the quality of 
financial reports. 
 
Fortin et al. (1997) asserts that poor corporate governance may impair 
interims, especially if independent directors do not know much about a 
company’s operations. According to Lipton and Lorsch (2002), the public is 
not confident in a company’s financial reports if the corporate governance is 
felt to be ineffective and reliable. These assertions have attracted the 
present study to investigate whether corporate governance has an influence 
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on the quality of interims in Malaysia. More details on corporate governance 
will be given in the next section.  
2.9 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is appointed to monitor management on behalf of 
shareholders and to provide resources to function for the best interests of 
shareholders (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Despite the important and 
abundant research on corporate governance, there is no universally 
accepted definition of corporate governance (Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan; Cohen et al., 2002; Cohen et al., 2010). The term 
is not properly defined because it potentially covers many different economic 
trends. A basic definition of corporate governance that has been broadly 
recognized is stated in the Cadbury Report (1992): 
“Corporate governance is the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the 
governance of their companies. The shareholders' role in governance 
is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy themselves 
that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The 
responsibilities of the directors include setting the company's strategic 
aims, providing the leadership to put them into effect, supervising the 
management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their 
stewardship. The Board's actions are subject to laws, regulations and 
the shareholders in general meeting”. 
 
Following the publication of the Cadbury Report in 1992, the development of 
corporate governance has grown exponentially and corporate governance 
codes are being established globally. In the UK, the Cadbury Report led the 
way for a number of further reports, such as the Greenbury Report (1995), 
the Hampel Report (1998), the Turnbull Report (1999), the Smith Report 
(2003), the Higgs Report (2006) and the UK Corporate Governance Code 
(2010). Due to weakness of corporate governance in Malaysia especially 
during the economic crisis in 1997 (Rahman and Ali, 2006), the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) was issued in March 2000 and 
revised in October 2007.  
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The MCCG has two main parts: part one sets out the broad principles, and 
part two gives the best practices for PLC to follow. Apart from this code, the 
Malaysian Securities Commission (MSC) inserted corporate governance 
provisions in the BMLR. The MSC circulated provisions that state all PLC 
should disclose in a narrative statement the principles applied for part one of 
MCCG and state the extent of compliance for part two. PLC does not have 
to comply with the prescriptions of the code and they have the flexibility to 
develop their approaches of corporate governance. Nevertheless, the PLC 
needs to reveal the reasons for non-compliance and the alternative practices 
that they have adopted. In the event of failure to do so, the Bursa Malaysia 
will take action against the PLC or their directors.  
 
The problems of corporate governance in Malaysia persist despite the 
issuance of MCCG, due to several factors (Singam, 2003) as follows. Firstly, 
there is a high concentration of ownership in Malaysia (Haniffa and Hudaib, 
2006), that provides the power for largest shareholders to make decisions 
for self-interests (Singam, 2003; Fan and Wong, 2002). Secondly, most of 
the largest shareholders opted for nominee companies to hide their identities 
(Singam, 2003) as there are restrictions imposed by Bursa Malaysia for 
ownership composition. Thirdly, there is a tendency for biases to pay the 
remuneration of family-owned company’s directors. Concentration ownership 
and family-owned companies may cause the controlling shareholders to act 
for self-interest at the expense of minority shareholders and investors 
(Singam, 2003). Due to the weakness of corporate governance in Malaysia, 
it is important for the present study to be conducted. 
 
Corporate governance has to ensure that their companies disclose relevant 
and reliable financial and non-financial information to the stakeholders 
(Epstein and Roy, 2010). Prior research reveals that weaknesses in the 
corporate governance structure are often correlated with lower financial 
reporting quality. In other words, the quality of financial reports is attained 
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when there is a well-balanced and functioning system of corporate 
governance (Rezaee, 2003).  
 
The importance of corporate governance may be appreciated by looking at 
the key corporate actors. Cohen et al. (2010) proposed that corporate 
governance actors (such as management, the BOD, the audit committee 
and the auditors) play an important role in ensuring the quality of financial 
reporting. Rezaee (2003) recommends a company to develop a 
metaphorical “six-legged stool” that comprised of the BOD, the audit 
committee, the top management team, internal auditors, external auditors, 
and governing bodies in order to ensure the reliability of financial reports. By 
referring to the above suggestions, it can be seen that the importance of 
corporate governance may be appreciated by looking at the key actors of 
corporate governance who actually have to perform their duties.  
 
The BOD and audit committees monitor management on behalf of 
shareholders (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) and they are expected to monitor 
the quality of financial reports. The BOD, particularly independent directors, 
are an effective form of monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Bathala and 
Rao, 1995; Rediker and Seth, 1995; and Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996, Garg, 
2007) because a lack of credible financial reporting may distort the image of 
independent directors to the public and reduce their demand for monitoring 
services (Ahmed et al., 2006). Meanwhile, an audit committee is effective if 
they protect the stakeholders’ interests by ensuring that the financial reports 
are reliable (DeZoort et al., 2002). Audit committee members can also 
improve the monitoring of financial reports and the internal control of 
companies (Sori et al., 2007).  
 
Fllowing Rezaee’s (2003) suggestion, the present study mainly focuses on 
the BOD and audit committee members because:  
a) Malaysian interims are not subjected to audit reviews and, therefore, 
there is no involvement of external auditors in interims;  
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b) Internal auditors and management are directly involved with the day 
to day activities of financial reporting process and, therefore, they are 
not independent;  
c) There is no control mechanism set up by Malaysian governing bodies 
for Malaysian interims.  
 
One of the objectives of corporate governance is to produce quality financial 
reports (Miettinen, 2008). The next section describes the responsibility of 
corporate governance to ensure that they produce quality financial reports. 
2.10 Corporate Governance Responsibilities 
In US, two legal standards govern the responsibility of corporate 
governance, namely: the duty of care and the duty of loyalty (Wilson, 2002). 
The duty of care requires BOD to perform their duties with reasonable care, 
diligence, and skills. The duty of loyalty requires BOD to exercise their 
powers for the company’s interests. The National Association of Corporate 
Directors issued ten principles to strengthen corporate governance for the 
US PLC. The principles of corporate governance structure and practices 
should be designed to:  
1) position the BOD to fulfil their duties effectively and efficiently;  
2) be transparent;  
3) ensure the competency and commitment of BOD;  
4) ensure the BOD accountability and objectivity;  
5) provide independent BOD leadership;  
6) promote integrity, ethics, and corporate social responsibility;  
7) support the BOD attention to information, agenda and, strategy;  
8) protect against the BOD entrenchment;  
9) encourage shareholders’ involvement in selecting the BOD; and,  
10) encourage communication with shareholders. 
 
The BOD responsibilities to govern a company are underpinned by agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990; 
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Donaldson and Davis, 1991), and resource dependence theory (Aldrich and 
Pfeffer, 1976; Pfefer and Salancik, 1978). Agency theory concentrates on 
the monitoring role of BOD, stewardship theory centres on the proportion of 
inside BOD, and resource dependence theory focuses on other types of 
variables.  
 
As previously described, agency theory is concerned with the monitoring 
function played by the BOD for the best interest of shareholders. However, a 
conflict of interest may arise if managers and shareholders’ interests 
significantly differ. In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory assumes 
that managers are not motivated by individual interests but serve as a 
steward with the objective to accomplish the shareholders’ interests (Davis 
et al., 1997). They are trustworthy individuals and they make good use of the 
resources entrusted to them (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Donaldson and 
Davis (1991) suggest that insiders or non-independent directors can make 
superior decisions than independent directors due to their direct involvement 
with day-to-day organisational activities. In other words, stewardship theory 
views inside or dependent directors as trustworthy. Resource dependence 
theory is concerned with how directors provide resources and how they use 
these resources to benefit the shareholder’s interests.  
 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) and Jackling and Johl (2009) used agency and 
resource dependence theories to assess corporate governance. Similarly, 
the present study will use these theories and it will exclude stewardship 
theory because it assumes that dependent directors are trustworthy and will 
act in the best interests of the shareholders. The next section will provide 
further detail on the corporate governance accountabilities that are 
expounded by agency and resource dependence theories.  
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2.10.1  Agency Theory  
The theoretical background of corporate governance responsibilities is partly 
grounded on agency theory, which separates the ownership and control of a 
company. Jensen and Meckling (1976: 5) defined agency relationship as “a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another 
person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision-making to the agent)”. The principals or the 
owners of a company are the shareholders who employ managers as an 
agent to control a company and make decisions for the best interests of 
shareholders.  
 
Since the owners of a company employ an agent to manage the business, 
problems can arise if there is a conflict of interests between shareholders 
and managers. Managers will make decisions based on their own interests 
and they will tend to ignore the best interests of shareholders if they can gain 
a benefit (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). When the interests of shareholders 
and managers diverge, there is a potential for “managerial mischief” (Dalton 
et al., 2007). This conflict of interests is magnified in larger companies 
(Gayle and Miller, 2009). This is evidenced by a study from Tuggle et al. 
(2010), who analysed BOD meeting transcripts and found that BOD did not 
monitor management consistently enough to protect the shareholder’s value. 
The BOD was found to be very selective about which organisational matters 
to focus on. They only paid attention to organisational matters that deviate 
from prior performance and they overlooked the other matters. Their 
inattentiveness towards other matters may stimulate management to make 
decisions based on their own interests instead of the interests of the 
shareholders.  
 
Managers may be more knowledgeable than the owner because they are 
involved with the day-to day activities of the business. Having superior 
knowledge can also accelerate the manager’s actions to exploit the owners if 
they are not monitored effectively (Miller and Sardais, 2011). Therefore, 
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there is a need to establish an adequate monitoring system to protect the 
owner against a manager’s conflict of interests (Zaitul, 2010) and ensure that 
the manager produces high quality financial reports.  
 
It can be seen from this that agency theory makes two assumptions: goal 
conflict exists between the owners and managers, and the managers have 
more information than the owners. This results in information asymmetry 
between the owners and managers (Waterman and Muer, 1998). Better 
corporate governance is associated with less information asymmetry 
between management and shareholders (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). In 
other words, agency theory is concerned with aligning the interests of 
owners and managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 
The ultimate decision made by the managers may also rest on the portion of 
equity ownership. The portion of equity ownership can also persuade 
managers not to act for the best interests of shareholders. For example, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that in a manager’s wholly owned 
company, the manager will make operating decisions that maximise his or 
her utility. However, if a manager’s fraction of equity decreases then their 
claim on the company’s outcome is reduced and they are inclined to allocate 
a larger amount of corporate resources as perquisites. Meanwhile, if both 
principal and agents are utility maximisers, then they may have different 
goals to accomplish (Waterman and Muer, 1998).  
Agency cost is used to reduce the conflict of interests between the owners 
and managers, which consists of monitoring cost, bonding costs, and 
residual loss (Jensen and Meckling, 1976:6). Monitoring costs are those 
costs that are paid by the owner to control the manager’s behaviour. 
Bonding costs are those costs that are borne by the manager to consume 
resources to guarantee that any actions taken by them are not destructive 
for the owners or the owners will be compensated if such actions are taken. 
Residual loss is the agency loss that arises due to reduction in their welfare 
as a result of divergence of interests between managers and shareholders. 
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Residual loss is associated with an imbalance of monitoring and bonding 
costs.  
 
Agency theory also suggests that a greater number of independent BOD 
members can more effectively monitor a company (Nicholson and Kiel, 
2007). Therefore, the company will incur less agency cost and greater 
returns to shareholders. Epstein and Roy (2010) stressed that BOD have to 
upgrade their performance because some directors lack the required skills 
and knowledge to sustain the company and push through industrial changes. 
Theoretically, inadequate corporate governance processes and practices 
can lead to corporate disaster. Therefore, the present study attempts to 
evaluate the monitoring roles of BOD and audit committee as mechanisms 
that mitigate agency conflicts. 
 
The most dominant path to measure the monitoring service executed by the 
BOD and audit committee is to associate them with financial reporting quality 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Prior research has used monitoring proxies, 
such as the BOD composition and leadership (Jackling and Johl, 2009; 
DeVilliers et al., 2011). Examples of BOD composition and leadership 
include the independence of directors and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
duality. Nevertheless, the preceding research provides no evidence on the 
direction and magnitude of the relationship between corporate governance 
and the quality of financial reports in relation to agency theory (Dalton et al., 
2003). Therefore, it is important for the present study to investigate the 
relationship between CGC and the quality of interims in relation to agency 
theory. This study will use independence of the directors as a proxy for 
corporate governance characteristics, which is similar to the proxies that 
were used in the previous research. The other role of directors, which is to 
provide resources for the benefits of shareholders, is explained by resource 
dependence theory, which is described in more detail in the following 
subsection. 
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2.10.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
A company needs resources to survive (Rao et al., 2007), including financial 
and physical resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). In addition to 
resources, a company needs information obtained from the environment, 
which can make the company dependent on the external sources for these 
resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The company’s dependence on 
these resources has caused the development of resource dependence 
theory.  
 
The BOD is an example of one of the external sources of information. The 
BOD role is to provide essential resources and put them to use (Zaitul, 2010; 
Nicholson and Kiel, 2004) in order to maintain a company’s performance. 
However, there is no universally accepted definition of what is an important 
resource to a company (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). In fact, the association 
between corporate governance and company performance in relation to 
resource dependence theory is less explored (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) by 
previous researchers. Therefore, the present study fills this gap by 
examining the CGC and company performance in relation to resource 
dependence theory. 
 
The previous research initially investigated the relationship between the 
BOD composition and a company’s performance by using the same 
characteristics and attributes, regardless of whether the BOD roles relate to 
agency theory or resource dependence theory (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; 
Daily and Dalton, 1994). Hillman et al. (2000) then proposed that agency 
theory and resource dependence theory are theoretically and practically 
different from each other and, therefore, the BOD characteristics and 
attributes should also differ. After this proposal, the BOD characteristics 
were assessed based on agency theory and resource dependence theory. 
According to Hillman and Dalziel (2003), and DeVilliers et al. (2011), proxies 
for agency theory include the independence of directors while the proxies for 
resource dependence theory are divided into two categories: human capital 
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(e.g. experience, expertise and reputation) and relation capital (e.g. ties of 
network and external contingencies). These variables were then used by the 
previous research to identify the association between corporate governance 
and company performance.  
 
Muth and Donaldson (1998), Peng (2004), Nicholson and Kiel (2007), 
Jackling and Johl (2009), Carter et al. (2010), and DeVilliers et al. (2011) 
determined the association between BOD characteristics and company’s 
performance in relation to resource dependence theory. Jackling and Johl 
(2009) used the size of BOD, the frequency of BOD meetings, and corporate 
governance expertise as proxies to resource dependence theory. Carter et 
al. (2010) used directors’ gender and ethnicity, which are related to human 
capital, because they posit that these characteristics are important in 
corporate governance and may cause the business to be more profitable. 
Although their results provide evidence for a relationship between corporate 
governance and a company’s performance in relation to resource 
dependence theory, the relationship between these items depends on the 
proxies of corporate governance used. In conclusion, the BOD has 
heterogeneous characteristics (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) which cause 
various relationships between the characteristics of BOD and a company’s 
performance to develop.  
 
Based on the above discussion, agency theory and resource dependence 
theory provide the basic foundation for the corporate governance 
responsibility to ensure that the management makes decisions in the best 
interests of shareholders. The previous research on the impact of corporate 
governance on the quality of interims is described in more detail in the next 
section. 
2.11 The Impact of Corporate Governance on Quality of Interims 
A considerable research has been done on the impact of corporate 
governance on the quality of financial reports, especially annual financial 
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reports. As mentioned earlier, interims are not mandated internationally and 
this has caused less research to be done on interims. The proxies of quality 
of financial reports used by previous research to determine their 
relationships with corporate governance are financial performance (Brown 
and Caylor, 2004; Filatotchev et. al, 2007), financial statement fraud, 
(Turner, 2001; Beasley et al., 1999; Persons, 2006), transparency of 
information (Chiang, 2005), audit process (Cohen et al., 2002), internal 
controls (Goh, 2009), timeliness (Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008; Ezat and 
El-Masry, 2008; CheHaat et al., 2008), and level of disclosure (Mangena and 
Pike, 2005; Beekes and Brown, 2006; Mangena and Taurigana, 2008; Kent 
and Stewart, 2008). 
 
The association between corporate governance and financial performance, 
which is proxied by earnings management, has extensively been used by 
previous research. Lo (2007) found that those who are involved with 
earnings management are experienced, intelligent, well-educated, and 
guided by explicit professional codes of conduct or implicit codes of ethics. 
Therefore, it would be very difficult to detect their earnings management if 
they have the intention to garner benefits out of it. Who should be 
responsible to manage the earnings is also questionable because all 
decisions are made by the BOD. According to the law, managers and BOD 
are protected by the “business judgment rule”, which makes it difficult to find 
them liable for business decisions.  
 
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) integrated agency theory and resource 
dependence theory to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and the quality of financial reports. By referring to agency theory 
and resource dependence theory, it can be seen that corporate governance 
serves two important functions, which is to monitor management on behalf of 
shareholders, and to provide resources and act for the best interests of 
shareholders. Beekes et al. (2004), Jackling and Johl (2009) and Zaitul 
(2010) also underpinned these two theories in their studies. 
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The importance of integration between agency theory and resource 
dependence theory is proven by the study of Hillman and Dalziel (2003), 
who interviewed the BOD on how they spent their time on boards. They 
discovered that the directors executed various activities that were attached 
to monitoring and providing resources, such as planning long-term strategy, 
monitoring and evaluating strategy implementation, and building external 
relations to strengthen the company. They found that integration between 
agency theory and resource dependence theory is more useful and 
important than using either one of the two theories by itself.  
 
Although the companies frequently have a comprehensive system to 
evaluate their performance, the BOD may decline and become stressed if 
the board members are mandated to be appraised individually (Epstein and 
Roy, 2010). Epstein and Roy (2010) suggest that if both BOD and company 
performance are evaluated, then it can greatly improve the company’s 
performance. There are several propositions to appraise the BOD members. 
Those highlighted by Hillman and Dalziel (2003), Jackling and Johl (2009) 
and Carter et al. (2010), Epstein and Roy (2010) include the frequency of 
BOD meetings, the percentage of board members who are independent and 
financially literate, the number of boards the directors served on (corporate 
governance expertise), and the diversity of board members in terms of race. 
DeZoort et al. (2002) also suggest that size, composition, expertise and 
frequency of audit committee meetings influence the effectiveness of the 
audit committee’s monitoring activities.  
 
Chiang (2005) investigated the relationship between corporate governance 
and the transparency of corporate performance of high technology PLC in 
Taiwan. The results of this study revealed that the size of BOD, ownership 
by the BOD, institution ownership, financial transparency, information 
disclosure and BOD and management structure and process were all 
significantly related with corporate performance. 
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Persons (2006) inspected the relationship between corporate governance 
and non-financial reporting fraud. The sample used in this study included 82 
companies that had been found to commit fraud, mostly listed on the NYSE. 
The study identified CGC that were associated with non-financial reporting 
fraud companies by using logit regression analysis. A dichotomous variable 
was used, of which 1 denotes PLC engagement with non-financial reporting 
fraud and 0 otherwise. The statistical results indicated that non-financial 
reporting fraud was lower if:  
1) a large proportion of BOD were independent directors;  
2) the CEO and the BOD were of different person;  
3) the size of BOD was smaller;  
4) the CEO tenure on the BOD was long; and,  
5) the profitability of the company was high.  
 
Filatotchev et al. (2007) examined the association between corporate 
governance and large companies’ financial performance in Poland and 
Hungary. They found that the managers’ independence was positively 
associated with companies’ financial performance. Companies with poor 
corporate governance were less profitable, less valuable, and pay less to 
their shareholders (Brown and Caylor, 2004). 
 
There has been less previous research that has examined the influence of 
corporate governance on timeliness and compliance with the interim 
reporting standards. For example, Mangena and Pike (2005) claimed that 
their study was the first to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and interims. They investigated the relationship between 
corporate governance and the disclosure of interims by UK PLC. 
Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008), and Ezat and El-Masry (2008) 
investigated the association between corporate governance and timeliness 
of interims of Irish and Egyptian PLC, respectively. Meanwhile, this literature 
review has found that there is no research on the influence of corporate 
governance on the comparability of interims and only minimal research in 
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the influence of corporate governance on the quality of interims in 
developing countries like Malaysia. The present study seeks to fill this gap in 
the literature by adding the association between corporate governance and 
comparability of interims, apart from timeliness and compliance with the 
interim reporting standards’ disclosures. 
 
Mangena and Pike (2005) examined the effect of the audit committee’s 
characteristics on the level of disclosures in interims. 262 UK PLC were 
selected as the sample. They found that interims’ disclosure is negatively 
associated with audit committee shareholdings, positively associated with 
financial expertise of audit committees, but not associated with the size of 
the audit committee. Their findings indicate that disclosure in interims 
increased if the audit committee shareholdings decreased and a large 
portion of audit committee members have financial expertise. The number of 
audit committee members does not significantly influence the level of 
disclosure in interims. Mangena and Pike (2005) recommend that future 
research should explore other characteristics of audit committee because 
financial irregularities occurred in Enron even though their audit committee’s 
financial expertise exceeded the requirements. 
 
Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) investigated the timeliness of publishing 
Irish PLC interims and annual reports online. 13 criteria were identified to 
associate with the timeliness of internet reporting. Additionally, this study 
assessed the influence of directors’ independence, ownership structure, and 
control variables on the above-mentioned criteria. Independence was 
measured by the percentage of independent directors, chairman dual role, 
and the average tenure of directors. The proportion of shares held by major 
shareholders, managers and the CEO measured ownership structure. The 
control variables were company size, audit fees, and profitability. Company 
size was measured by the company’s turnover. Abdelsalam and El-Masry 
(2008) found that: a) PLC conform to 46% of the criteria and ranged 
between 8% and 75%; b) independent directors, average tenure of directors, 
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and CEO ownership were positively associated with the timeliness of the 
interim internet reporting; c) controlled variables were not found to be 
significantly associated with the timeliness of internet reporting. For the 
interims, a) only one third of PLC reported interims online; and b) 
independent directors were positively associated with timeliness of internet 
reporting. For annual reports, company size was found to be positively 
associated with timeliness of internet reporting. 
 
Ezat and El-Masry (2008) investigated the timeliness of internet reporting of 
50 Egyptian PLC. They also examined the impact of corporate governance 
and company-specific characteristics on the timeliness of internet reporting. 
Corporate governance variables included ownership structure, independent 
directors, CEO role duality, and the size of the BOD. Company-specific 
characteristic consisted of six variables, namely: company size, type(s) of 
business, profitability, leverage, liquidity, and issue of shares. The analyses 
were done by two methods, namely: multiple and logistics regression 
analyses. Ezat and El-Masry (2008) found that only a small percentage of 
PLC (18.9%) published interims online. By using multiple regression models, 
company size, liquidity, ownership structure, business service activity, 
independent directors and size of BOD were found to be positively and 
significantly associated with the timeliness of internet reporting. By using 
logistic regression, all of the variables were seen to be significantly 
associated with the timeliness of internet reporting.  
 
CheHaat et al. (2008) investigated the influence of corporate governance on 
the timeliness of reporting, the level of disclosure, and a company’s 
performance. The sample consisted of 73 top PLC and the period covered 
was the year 2002. This period was chosen because they wanted to observe 
the effect of a newly revamped BMLR on corporate governance, which was 
introduced in 2001. Multiple regression analysis was used to identify the 
association between dependent and independent variables. The 
independent variables were corporate governance, which consisted of the 
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independence of BOD, the leadership of BOD, the quality of BOD, insider 
ownership, foreign ownership, debt financing, and audit quality. These 
variables were divided into three groups. The first group consisted of the first 
four items, the second group consisted of the next two items, and the third 
group consisted of the last item. CheHaat et al. (2008) found that corporate 
governance influenced a company’s performance.  
 
Kent and Stewart (2008) investigated the association between corporate 
governance and the level of disclosure in financial reports and found that 
they were positively related. Meanwhile, Beekes and Brown (2006) 
examined whether corporate governance was related to informative 
disclosures in the financial reports. They found that Australian PLC with 
better corporate governance made disclosures that are more informative. 
 
Corporate governance has a responsibility to monitor management and 
provide resources for the best interest of shareholders. The effectiveness of 
monitoring by the BOD is dependent on its composition (Fama and Jensen, 
1983). There is a vast growing literature on directors’ attributes that makes 
them perform their responsibilities diligently. In order to have effective 
corporate governance, the common and argumentative attributes used by 
prior researchers include independent; knowledgeable and expertise; and 
delegation of adequate authority which is proxied by the frequency of BOD 
meeting (Mohiuddin and Karbhari, 2010). Therefore, the corporate 
governance attributes used by the present study are derived from those 
highlighted by Mohiuddin and Karbhari (2010) as well as the integration of 
agency theory and resource dependence theory proposed by Hillman and 
Dalziel (2003), Jackling and Johl (2009), Carter et al. (2010) and Epstein 
and Roy (2010), which include independent, financial expertise, corporate 
governance expertise and frequency of BOD meetings. 
 
Apart from the four variables, the present study includes ethnicity because 
there is a diversity of BOD due to multi-ethnic societies in Malaysia. Diversity 
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of directors may have an impact on overall organisational performance 
(Enhardt et al., 2003). Diversity of BOD enhances performance by 
increasing decision-making capacity, but reduces group performance by 
increasing conflict of interests (Enhardt et al., 2003).  Malaysian government 
favouritism towards Bumiputra since the introduction of New Economic 
Policy (NEP) has caused non-Bumiputra to appoint Bumiputra directors to 
get business opportunities (Mamman, 2003) and publish poor quality 
financial reports (Ball et al., 2003). This is evidenced by prior studies 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Yatim et al., 2006; Hashim, 2012) who found that 
Bumiputra directors have more favourable corporate governance practices 
and publish more quality financial reports. Therefore, ethnicity is chosen as 
numbers of non-Bumiputra directors in the board are increasing. 
 
The previous research has used all these variables to investigate their 
influence on financial reporting quality. However, the results of previous 
research are mixed and they only used one proxy to determine the quality, 
which is considered to ignore other aspects (McFie, 2006). Therefore, the 
present study used several proxies to determine the influence of each 
variable on the quality of interims and examine whether the results are 
consistent. The findings add a contribution to the literature. Explanation for 
each CGC is as follows. 
 
2.11.1 Frequency of Meetings 
The frequency of directors’ meetings is chosen because there are a few 
studies of the impact of this variable on the quality of interims and the results 
are mixed. Bhuiyan et al. (2000) emphasized on the importance of BOD 
meetings and found that the frequency of BOD meetings is significantly 
associated with companies’ performance. The importance of BOD meeting is 
proven by Section 9.22 (1) of BMLR that require interims to be approved by 
the BOD before they are published. BOD has to conduct meetings 
periodically to discuss the important issues of a company. BOD with multiple 
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educational background and experiences interact with each other to discuss 
important and current issues.  
Despite of the importance, the frequency of holding the BOD meetings 
remains unclear and it is not prescribed in MCCG. However, the MCCG 
requires BOD to disclose the frequency of annual BOD meetings and the 
attendance of each individual director in respect of each meeting held in the 
annual reports. The disclosure of annual BOD meetings’ frequency is meant 
to enable shareholders to evaluate the commitment of a particular director to 
a company’s affairs and to satisfy themselves that the BOD are in control of 
the company. The disclosure of a director’s attendance is important because 
the absence of directors in the meetings may indicate that the directors are 
not doing their duties attentively.  
 
BOD that hold multiple directorships have a higher tendency to be absent 
from the BOD meetings (Jiraporn et al., 2009) because they are busy 
directors and may not be able to attend all of the meetings simultaneously. 
Adams and Ferreira (2008) discovered that the absence of BOD during the 
meetings is less likely if the board meeting fees are higher. This result 
implies that BOD will perform or attend the meetings if financial rewards are 
given to them, even though the reward may be a small amount compared to 
their wealth.  
 
The frequency of BOD meetings provides an important implication to 
corporate governance. To attain better corporate governance, it is less costly 
to adjust the frequency of the BOD meetings than changing the composition 
of the BOD members or ownership structure (Vafeas,1999; Evans et al., 
2002). However, holding frequent BOD meetings raises a number of benefits 
and problems. For example, frequent meetings can increase costs (such as 
managerial time, travelling and administrative expenses, and the directors’ 
meeting fees) while the benefits can include having more time for the 
director’s discussion, and have effective strategy and monitoring 
management (Evans et al., 2002). 
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Vafeas (1999) investigated whether companies that meet more frequently 
perform better than inactive BOD. Vafeas (1999) hypothesised that a larger 
size of BOD requires more time to make discussion. As the size of BOD 
increases, the frequency of the BOD meetings also increases. To reduce the 
workload, some BOD has delegated their work to various types of board 
committees. However, the performance delegated to the board committees 
remains open to question. Surprisingly, BOD that delegated the work to 
board committees meets more often in order to discuss the coordination and 
supervision of the board committees. BOD that meet more frequently are 
more likely to perform their duties for the best interests of shareholders. 
Vafeas (1999) found that companies meet more frequently if they have poor 
performance. Evans et al. (2002) also agreed that frequency of BOD 
meetings is more likely to increase if the companies’ performance declines. 
 
The relationship between the frequency of BOD meetings and a company’s 
performance is mixed. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that a greater 
frequency of BOD meetings is likely to result in superior performance. Craft 
and Benson (2006) suggest that the infrequency of BOD meetings make 
their sharing of the necessary critical information for governance being 
ineffective. On the other hand, Jensen (1993) and Vafeas (1999) suggest 
that a higher frequency of BOD meetings is likely to indicate a response to a 
company’s poor performance. 
 
2.11.2 Independent Directors  
Independent directors is included in the present study because they are 
considered to be an effective form of monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Bathala and Rao, 1995; Rediker and Seth, 1995; and Agrawal and Knoeber, 
1996) because a lack of credible financial reporting may distort the image of 
independent directors to the public and reduce their demand for monitoring 
services (Ahmed et al., 2006). Kelton and Yang (2008) also agreed that 
independent directors enhance the monitoring of managerial opportunism 
and reduce the management’s ability to withhold information.  
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The BOD and audit committee members include both dependent and 
independent directors. Independent, or non-executive, directors are those 
who do not form a part of the executive management team of a company 
while dependent, or executive directors, are associated with the 
management team of a company. In addition, independent directors do not 
have direct interests in a company but are responsible to protect the 
shareholder’s interests. In Malaysia, the first chapter of the BMLR defines 
the term independent as a director who is independent of management and 
free from any business or other relationship that could interfere with 
exercising independence. Non-independent directors possess knowledge 
about the company’s business operations and day-to-day activities while 
independent directors have less knowledge about the business operations. 
 
Bhuiyan et al. (2000), and Filatotchev et al., (2007) found that independent 
directors are significantly associated with a company’s performance. 
Independent directors are one of the internal mechanisms that a company 
can use to control agency problems and improve a company’s value 
(Hossain et al., 2000). Independent directors are important because their 
interests are aligned more closely with those of the owners when compared 
with non-independent directors who have incentives to execute activities that 
do not increase the company’s value (Hossain et al., 2000).  
 
On the other hand, Patton and Baker (1987) suggest that independent 
directors lack the necessary time, expertise, and incentives to perform their 
duties effectively, which leads to their failure to make a meaningful 
contribution to the shareholder’s wealth. Dulewicz and Taylor (2010) asked 
how long the independent directors spent performing their duties and found 
that they only have a limited time to attend the BOD meetings that are held 
less frequently. Therefore, it is unlikely for independent directors to know 
everything about the company within a short period of time, especially on 
highly technical issues. Dulewicz and Taylor (2010) suggested that on-going 
training be provided to independent directors in order to update their 
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knowledge and expertise. They added that support staff should be provided 
to enable independent directors to access internal and external information.  
 
The NYSE and the National Association of Securities Dealers Blue Ribbon 
Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees 
highlighted that the independence of audit committee members is important 
for them to function effectively (Turner, 2006). In Malaysia, the MCCG 
requires all audit committee members  to be non-executive directors. It adds 
that at least one of the members should be a qualified member of the 
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA). The qualification is important to 
ensure that the audit committee performs their duties diligently.  
 
Goh (2009) was motivated to examine whether corporate governance plays 
an important role in monitoring the remediation of internal control 
deficiencies. Goh (2009) found that PLC with more independent audit 
committees, greater non-accounting financial expertise, and larger audit 
committees were more likely to remediate the internal control deficiencies in 
a timely manner. The results indicated that independence, non-financial 
expertise, and the size of the audit committee are important to improve the 
quality of financial reports. Krishnan (2005) also found that independent 
audit committee members are less likely to be associated with the internal 
control problems of a company. These research studies provide evidence 
that audit committee members need to be independent to enrich the quality 
of financial reports.  
2.11.3 Financial Expertise Directors  
One of the means to increase the effectiveness of corporate governance 
mechanism is financial expertise. (Pergola, 2005). Bursey and Pittman 
(2010) suggests that BOD with financial expertise are beneficial to 
companies, especially when they have accounting-based expertise. Cantor 
(2005) suggests that BOD work well with a combination of expertise, 
experience, and good dynamics. There is a risk that BOD will fail to perform 
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if any item of this combination is missing. When BOD have expertise then 
they know “when to act”. When they have experience then they have the 
“will to act”. In addition, when they have good dynamics then they know the 
environment that can replicate and sustain best practices in corporate 
governance. Therefore, financial expertise director is important to be 
included in the present study. 
 
Aside from the audit committee members, the MCCG does not require a 
specific proportion of BOD members to be financially literate. One of the 
possible reasons not to mandate all directors to have financial literacy is due 
to the high costs of acquiring directors with financial expertise, which may 
create needless cost for companies that do not require it (Jeanjean and 
Stolowy, 2009). Nevertheless, recurring corporate failures are caused by the 
weaknesses of corporate governance, whose directors either have little or 
no financial literacy (Suleik, 2011). Many regulators (such as Ontario 
Securities Commission) have stressed the need to have more financially 
expert directors (Guner et al., 2008) on the board and they have suggested 
disclosing in financial reports why companies do not include directors with a 
financial expertise (Bursey and Pittman, 2010). 
 
The Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) recommends that each audit committee 
member should be financially literate, or have accounting or related financial 
management expertise. In Malaysia, at least one of the audit committee 
members should be a qualified member of the Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants (MIA). The qualification is important to ensure that the audit 
committee performs their duties diligently. If there is no qualified member of 
the MIA, then the member must have three years working experience and he 
or she should have passed the specified examination in the First Schedule 
of the Accountants Act or be approved by the Bursa Malaysia.  
 
The BOD needs to be financially literate in order to understand the financial 
position of a company and to understand the required compliance with 
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reporting practices. Defond et al. (2005) investigated whether the markets 
react favourably if appointed audit committee member has an accounting 
financial expertise. They discovered that the market reacts positively to audit 
committee members who have accounting financial expertise rather than 
non-accounting financial expertise. The financial expertise of audit 
committees will strengthen corporate governance by protecting the interests 
of shareholders. Companies with financial fraud are more likely to be those 
companies whose audit committee members have no certified qualification 
or experience in accounting (Turner, 2006). The research mentioned above 
supports the importance of financial literacy of directors to improve the 
quality of financial reports. 
 
2.11.4 Corporate Governance Expertise Directors  
Multiple directorships can signal the quality of the directors (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Directors who hold more than one directorship on a board 
are presumed to have corporate governance expertise because they have a 
lot of experience, which is gained by monitoring the various types of 
businesses that they participate in. Directors with multiple directorships are 
also known as busy directors since they have to give their attention to 
multiple companies. Ferris et al. (2003) found that directors in larger 
companies and those who sit on larger boards are inclined to attract 
directorships elsewhere. Corporate governance expertise directors are more 
likely to have a greater demand for their monitoring services as they have 
more experience with different types of companies.  
 
The question of how many directorships a director can hold in order to 
sustain performance at the expected level has been of interest to many 
previous researchers. For example, Kiel and Nicholson (2006) suggested 
two views on this matter: a) the first view is that it depends on the individual 
directors and the boards on which they are to be placed; and b) the second 
view is that it depends on the association between a company’s 
complications and the workloads of the directors involved. For the latter 
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view, directors who hold more than five directorships are considered to be 
doing a disservice to the companies’ shareholders.  
 
Li and Ang (2000) examined the effectiveness of directors who hold multiple 
directorships and asked if their monitoring performance is impaired. They 
analysed a substantial numbers of directors: 1,195 directors from 121 
companies in the US. The directors’ effectiveness was tested by using two 
hypotheses, namely: attention and expertise hypotheses. The attention 
hypothesis relates to the attention or amount of time spent by directors on 
their work while the expertise hypothesis relates to the expertise possessed 
by the directors. Concerning the attention hypothesis, it was hypothesised 
that directors who hold more directorships may be neglectful in their duties 
because they have to divide their attention towards many companies. In the 
expertise hypothesis, it was hypothesised that directors may have multiple 
directorships because they have specialised skills which means that they are 
in demand to multi boards of companies. However, Li and Ang (2000) failed 
to support attention hypothesis and they found weak support for the 
expertise hypothesis. Their results indicate that directors who hold multiple 
directorships are not associated with a company’s performance. In addition, 
Kiel and Nicholson (2006) also discovered that there is no association 
between multiple directorship and company performance. 
 
One of the audit committee’s duties is to monitor the companies’ financial 
performance and, therefore, ensure their quality. However, the association 
between audit committee members with multiple directorships and financial 
reporting quality has not been thoroughly explored by previous researchers. 
This lack of research motivated Zheng (2008) to study this issue. Zheng 
(2008) used data from 500 companies for the period of 1997-2005, and 
discovered that multiple directorships of audit committee members are not 
associated with financial reporting quality. This result indicates that multiple 
directorship of audit committee member is not a significant characteristic to 
ensure that the financial report that a company produces is of high quality. 
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As the previous findings are mixed and there are many directors with 
multiple directorship in Malaysian PLC, the present study find it necessary to 
investigate the influence of this variable on the quality of interims.  
 
2.11.5 Ethnicity of Directors  
The Malaysian population in 2007 and 2008 was 27.2 million and 27.9 
million respectively. Malaysia is a multi-ethnic country which contains of 
three main ethnic groups, namely: Malays or Bumiputra (60%), Chinese 
(23%), and Indians (6.8%). Each ethnic maintains its own unique ethnic and 
identity values (Hashim, 2012). As Malaysia is a multi-ethnic country, there 
is a diversity of BOD in PLC. Diversity of directors lead to a greater 
knowledge base, creativity and innovation (Watsoon et al., 1993) and 
appeared to have an impact on overall organisational performance (Erhardt 
et al., 2003). 
 
Despite the large Bumiputra population, Salleh et al. (2006) has discovered 
that non-Bumiputra especially Chinese directors dominate BOD in Malaysian 
PLC. The Bumiputra accounted for 38% of directors in the listed companies. 
In addition to that, Chinese and Indians are more likely to support laissez-
faire economic policies whilst Bumiputra managers are more likely to support 
government policies (Mamman, 2002). Chinese play a dominant role in 
Malaysian economics (Mamman, 2002; Hashim, 2012) because Chinese 
show remarkably high entrepreneurship, good discipline and strategic 
thinking (Wah, 2002) since the colonial period (Mamman, 2002). The 
Chinese transformed the family-owned business into professionally 
managed organization (Wah, 2002) which caused them to seize the market.   
 
Malaysia’s official statistics supported the domination of Chinese group in 
Malaysian economy by disclosing a higher income for the Chinese. For 
example, in 2007 and 2009, the mean monthly income for Chinese is RM 
4,853 and 5,011 respectively and for the Bumiputra, they are RM 3,156 and 
RM 3,624 respectively. The Chinese, followed by the Indians and other 
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races earn the highest monthly income. Bumiputra earns the lowest monthly 
income of all Malaysia’s ethnic groups. Eight out of ten of the richest 
Malaysians listed in Forbes 2011 are of Chinese ethnicity. Malaysian 
Chinese have the reputation of being more prosperous than the other ethnic 
communities (Pak, 2011). 
 
Due to domination of economics mainstream by Chinese and politics by 
Malays (Hashim, 2012), Malaysian government introduced the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) in 1970, with the objective of increasing ownership 
of corporate sectors by Bumiputra. Bumiputra was given priority of various 
concessions including business contracts (Johnson and Mitton, 2003).  
Government favouritism towards Bumiputra has caused the Chinese to 
appoint influential Bumiputra directors to enjoy benefits offered by the 
government (Mamman, 2002). Otherwise, they will not get special 
concessions offered by the government that gives benefit to their 
companies. Nevertheless, Yatim et al. (2006) found that PLC with Bumiputra 
directors have more favourable corporate governance practices than non-
Bumiputra directors. PLC controlled by non-Bumiputra tend to disclose lower 
profit for tax avoidance (Ball et al., 2003) as they are usually family-owned 
companies. 
 
Ethnic and employment background of managers may influence their 
attitude (Mamman, 2002). The difference in level of income amongst 
Malaysian ethnic groups and the findings of prior studies (Ball et al., 2003; 
Yatim et al., 2006) that associate non-quality of financial reporting with non-
Bumiputra directors has motivated the present study to explore whether 
ethnicity is one of the important factors to influence the quality of interims. 
Furthermore, there seems to be less research of the influence of ethnicity on 
the quality of interims in developing countries, especially in Malaysia. 
Therefore, the present study fills this gap by adding ethnicity as one of the 
variables that may possibly associate with the quality of interims. 
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Hofstede (1980) defined culture as the collective mental programming that 
differentiates one group from another. Hofstede studied 116 000 IBM 
employees from 50 nations and identified four values that differed 
systematically across cultures namely uncertainty avoidance, individual-
collectivism, masculinity-femininity and power distance. Uncertainty 
avoidance is where the culture faces unknown future with different anxiety 
levels, individualism relates to how an individual lives within the society, 
masculinity-femininity is a pattern of sex roles for most societies where men 
aggressive behaviour relates to decisive decision and women behaviour 
relates to compromise and negotiation and power distance describes how a 
society deals with human inequality (Cohen et al.,1993).  
 
There are several criticisms of Hofstede’s study. Firstly, Hofstede’s survey 
was of one organization and the results may not be applicable to other 
contexts (Gernon and Wallace,1995). Gernon and Wallace debate on the 
applicability of Hofstede’s indices was proven by dissimilar results when 
Harrison et al. (1994) and Merritt (2000) replicated Hofstede’s indices in their 
research. Secondly, Hofstede’s indices were not widely used in social 
sciences of sociology and anthropology because Hofstede equates nation 
states with cultures (Baskerville, 2003). In other words, each nation was 
deemed as one culture. There are many cultures in one nation or country 
(Wildavsky, 1989). According to O’Leary and Levinson (1991), there are 35 
different cultures in 14 nations in the Middle East. Thirdly, Hofstede relates 
cultural differences by comparing the above four values with seven national 
measurements namely gross national product, economic growth, latitude, 
population size, population growth, population density and organization size. 
Baskerville (2003) criticized that Hofstede measured characteristics of 
different nations that relate to socio economics factors and not cultural 
dimensions. In other words, Hofstede was studying on national character 
instead of national culture. Baskerville (2003) suggested that Hofstede might 
not have studied the culture at all. He was measuring the socio economic 
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factors instead. Despite periodical critiques of Hofstede’s indices, many 
accounting studies still used them for their research (Baskerville, 2003). 
 
A number of studies used Hofstede’s framework and provide evidence on 
the influence of culture on financial reporting system such as Abdullah 
(1992), Cohen et al., (1993) and Hope (2003). Abdullah (1992) used 
Hofstede values and provide evidence that Bumiputra is rated lower on 
individualism which may be partly due to concept of zakat (i.e. obligatory 
payment made once a year under Islamic law which is used for charity and 
religious purposes) in Islam that promotes the development of collectivism of 
which the rich helps the poor people. Chinese are more individualistic and 
more secretive due to their entrepreneurial skill that greatly influence 
Malaysian economy (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  
 
2.12 Summary 
The following model summarises the main message of all literature 
discussed in this paper. 
Figure 2.1 Quality of Interims 
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taxes, absence of audit reviews, and the limited allowable period to publish 
the interims report. Various techniques have been used by preceding 
research to assess the quality of interims. This thesis applies the qualitative 
characteristics of financial reports that are itemised in the MASB’s 
conceptual framework and matches them with items highlighted in the 
interim reporting standards to support the importance of choosing the items 
to assess the quality of interims. The qualitative characteristics are 
relevance, reliable and comparability, which are proxied by timeliness, 
compliance with the interim reporting standards and comparable profit and 
loss items respectively.  
 
Cook (1987), Bandyopadhyay et al. (2007) and Williams (2008) emphasised 
on three elements to improve the quality of interims namely audit reviews, 
compliance with the reporting standards and corporate governance. 
Previous research (e.g. Raedy and Helms, 2002; Boritz and Liu, 2006; 
Bedard and Courteau, 2008) has placed emphasis on the significance of 
audit reviews to enrich the quality of interims. Malaysian interims are not 
exposed to independent audit reviews and, therefore, the quality of 
Malaysian interims may be unreliable. Furthermore, there is no specific 
mechanism set by the regulatory body, Bursa Malaysia, to ensure that 
Malaysian PLC comply with the interim reporting standards and make 
adequate disclosures in their interims. These reasons mean that it is 
essential to examine the quality of Malaysian interims.  
 
In addition to assessing the quality of interims, this thesis also investigates 
the impact of corporate governance on the quality of interims. Corporate 
governance accountabilities are expounded by agency and resource 
dependence theories. Agency theory assumes that managers will make 
decisions in the best interests of managers instead of shareholders, which 
causes a conflict of interest to arise. Meanwhile, resource dependence 
theory highlights the BOD role in providing resources and using them for the 
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best interests of shareholders. One of the objectives of corporate 
governance is to produce quality financial reports. However, accounting 
scandals recur despite the good corporate governance disclosed in the 
financial reports. Therefore, it is necessary for the present study to 
investigate the relationship between corporate governance and the quality of 
interims in order to ensure that the corporate governance has executed their 
responsibilities attentively.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
There are two main objectives of this chapter. The first objective is to 
describe the research framework, research questions, and hypotheses of 
this thesis. The hypotheses are related to the quality of interims and the 
impact of Corporate Governance Characteristics (CGC) on the quality of 
interims. The selection of variables on the quality of interims and CGC has 
already been identified in the last chapter. The second objective is to 
describe the data sources, sample selection, research instruments, and how 
the data is measured and analysed. The data sources explain how the data 
were collected, the population of the sample and the procedures to choose a 
sample out of the whole population. The research instruments reveal the 
devices and procedures that are used to answer the research questions of 
the present study in detail. This section is followed by the explanation of 
model specification and statistical tests to analyse the hypotheses. Finally, 
this chapter concludes with a brief summary. 
3.2 Research Framework and Research Questions  
Figure 3.1 illustrates the research framework of the present study. As 
described in Chapter Two, interims provide beneficial information to the 
users of financial reports so that they can make informed decisions (Mc 
Ewen and Schwartrz, 1992; Gajewski and Quere, 2001; Joshi and Bremser, 
2003; Teen and Vasanthi, 2006; Aubert, 2006; Wiedman, 2007; Rahman 
and Ismail, 2008). However, Bagshaw (2000) and Boritz and Liu (2006) 
stressed that the quality of information in interims is crucial due to several 
factors, such as: non-disclosure of required information (McEwen and 
Schwartz, 1992; Miller and Bahnson, 1999), seasonality factors (Chan, 
2007), imprecise estimation of accruals, provision and taxes during the 
interim periods (Jarret, 1983; Bagshaw, 2000; Boritz and Liu, 2006) and 
absence of audit reviews (Ku Ismail and Abdullah, 2009). Malaysian interims 
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are not subject to audit reviews and there are no mechanisms set up by the 
Malaysian regulatory body to ensure that PLC complies with the interim 
reporting standards. This questions the reliability of the quality of Malaysian 
interims. The possibility of the unreliability of Malaysian interims raised the 
necessity for the present study to examine their quality in order to ensure 
that the users of financial reports can rely on the interims to make decisions. 
 
Figure 3.1: The Research Framework  
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According to the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board’s (MASB) 
conceptual framework for the Presentation and Preparation of Financial 
Statements, the objective of financial reports is to provide financial 
information to the users of financial reports and the qualitative characteristics 
of financial reports determine the usefulness of financial information to the 
users of financial reports. Jonas and Blanchet (2000) assert that the 
usefulness of financial information to the users of financial reports is related 
to the quality of a financial report. Therefore, adherence to the objective of 
financial reports and usefulness of financial information, proxied by the 
qualitative characteristics of financial reports will generate high-quality 
financial reports. 
 
Most of the previous research (Abdelsalam and El-Masry, 2008; Ezat and El-
Masry, 2008) has used a single proxy to determine the influence of 
qualitative characteristics on the quality of financial reports. McFie (2006) 
proposed that using a single proxy to determine the quality of financial 
reports is doubtfully to be high, even though the measurements used provide 
an excellent result. The single proxy used to investigate the quality of 
financial reports only focuses on one aspect and ignore other aspects. 
Consequently, the present study uses several proxies to determine the 
quality of interims. The qualitative characteristics used in the present study 
are relevance (measured by the proxy, timeliness), reliability (measured by 
the proxy, compliance with the interim reporting standards namely the FRS 
134 and the BMLR), and comparability (measured by the proxy, comparable 
profit and loss). 
 
Apart from using the MASB’s qualitative characteristics, the present study 
followed the propositions of Cook (1987), Bandyopadhyay et al. (2007) and 
Williams (2008) to assess the quality of Malaysian interims which includes 
audit reviews, compliance with the interim reporting standards, and 
corporate governance.  Audit reviews are designed to enable an accountant, 
without applying comprehensive procedures, to assess the management’s 
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representations and consider whether the interims are in conformity with the 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). The US SEC and 
preceding researchers (Boritz and Liu, 2006; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2007) 
have alleged that audit reviews improve the quality of interims. Unlike the US 
listed corporations, Malaysian PLC are not subject to audit reviews, possibly 
because it may delay the submission of financial reports (Ashton et al., 
1987; Ng and Tai, 1994), increase audit fees, and because it may expose 
the external auditors to litigation risk (Krishnan and Zhang, 2005). 
Consequently, the present study assesses the quality of Malaysian interims 
in the absence of audit reviews. 
 
Compliance with the interim reporting standards is important because the 
objective of interim reporting standards is to provide “timely” and “reliable” 
information to the users of financial reports. The interim reporting standards 
have also highlighted the importance of “comparative” figures of financial 
information in interims. Therefore, there are three significant items 
highlighted in the interim reporting standards which are timeliness, reliability, 
and comparability and they are consistent with the qualitative characteristics 
of financial reports.  
 
One of the objectives of corporate governance is to produce quality financial 
reports (Miettinen, 2008). According to Fortin et al. (1997), poor corporate 
governance may impair interims, especially if independent directors do not 
know much about the company's operations. Lack of knowledge by those 
responsible for corporate governance may then influence the quality of 
interims. The corporate governance accountabilities are expounded by 
agency theory and resource dependence theory. Agency theory is 
concerned with aligning the interests of owners and managers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). When the interests of owners and managers diverge, there 
is a potential for “managerial mischief” (Dalton et al., 2007) which may 
influence the quality of interims. Besides divergent interests between the 
owners and managers, appointed managers have superior knowledge than 
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the owner and they tend to use the superior information to exploit the owners 
if they are not monitored effectively (Miller and Sardais, 2011). Therefore, 
there is a need to establish an adequate monitoring system to protect the 
owner against an irresponsible manager (Zaitul, 2010). BOD is expected to 
monitor the managers’ conflicts of interests and ensure that a high quality 
financial report is issued. Resource dependence theory provides a 
theoretical foundation for the directors’ role as a provider of a company’s 
resources (Zaitul, 2010). In theory, directors use these resources for the best 
interests of shareholders. 
 
A number of previous studies have underpinned agency theory and resource 
dependence theory in relation to corporate governance responsibilities and 
ensuring that they provide quality financial reports (Hilman and Daziel, 2003; 
Beekes et al., 2004; Abdullah, 2007; Jackling and Johl, 2009; and Zaitul, 
2010). The present study also uses these theories for corporate governance 
responsibilities and investigates the influence of CGC on the quality of 
interims. By performing corporate governance duties, are CGC influence the 
quality of interims? 
 
There is a lot of previous research on the influence of corporate governance 
on the quality of financial reports. However, most of the research focuses on 
the quality of annual financial reports and less research has been done on 
interims. For example, Mangena and Pike (2005) claimed that their study 
was the first to investigate the relationship between corporate governance 
and interims. This is followed by research from Abdelsalam and El-Masry 
(2008) and Ezat and El-Masry (2008). The literature review has found less 
previous research on the influence of corporate governance on Malaysian 
interims.  
 
Mangena and Pike (2005), Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) and Ezat and 
El-Masry (2008) studied on relationship between corporate governance and 
timeliness, as well as corporate disclosures. There seems to be no research 
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on relationship between corporate governance and comparability of interims. 
Therefore, the present study seeks to fill this gap in the literature by adding 
the association between corporate governance and comparability of interims 
apart from timeliness and compliance with the interim reporting standards’ 
disclosures. Besides filling this research gap, the present study is different 
from preceding literature in terms of the types of financial reports. Mangena 
and Pike (2005), Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008), and Ezat and El-Masry 
(2008) focused on half yearly interims and the present study used quarterly 
interims.  
 
In addition to corporate governance, the present study incorporates control 
variables to assess the quality of interims. The selected control variables are 
based on the important variables highlighted by the preceding research 
(such as company size, profitability and leverage). Size of the BOD is 
incorporated in the control variables instead of corporate governance to 
avoid problems of multicollinearity. After explaining the present study’s 
research framework, the research questions were developed to address the 
research problems. The two main research questions of the present study 
are as follows:  
 
1) What is the overall quality of Malaysian interims with the 
absence of audit reviews? 
 
2) What is the impact of corporate governance on the quality of 
Malaysian interims? 
 
These research questions are addressed by the test of hypotheses which is 
described in the following section.  
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3.3 Hypotheses Development 
The quality of interims is unreliable (Bagshaw, 2000; Boritz and Liu, 2006) 
because of a number of factors such as: non-disclosure of information 
required (Miller and Bahnson, 19990; McEwen and Schwartz, 1992), 
seasonality factors (Chan, 2007), imprecise estimation of provision and 
taxes (Jarret, 1983; Bagshaw, 2000; Boritz, and Liu, 2006) and the absence 
of audit reviews (Ku Ismail and Abdullah, 2009). Previous research has 
highlighted that audit reviews are necessary to enrich the quality of interims 
(e.g. Manry et al., 1999; Raedy and Helms, 2002; Boritz and Liu, 2006; 
Wiedman, 2007; Bedard and Courteau, 2008).  
 
In December 1999, the US SEC has imposed a regulation for US PLC to 
have their interims reviewed by external auditors in order to enrich their 
quality. Initially, the US PLC is given the option to review their interims 
quarterly or at the end of the annual audit. Manry et al. (1999) found that 
quarterly reviews enrich the credibility of interims due to earlier involvement 
of auditors in the financial reporting processes. Bedard and Courteau (2008) 
also discovered that quarterly reviews improve interims. Raedy and Helms 
(2002) suggest that involvement of external auditors in interims allow them 
to identify and manage in advance a company’s risk associated with 
financial reporting, which then results in faster completion of the audit at the 
year end. Due to the importance of external auditors’ involvement in 
interims, the US SEC obliged US PLC to do quarterly reviews instead of 
reviews at the end of annual audit beginning on 15th March 2000.  
 
Malaysian interims are not subject to independent audit reviews. 
Additionally, there is no specific mechanism set by the regulatory body, 
Bursa Malaysia to ensure that Malaysian PLC complies with the interim 
reporting standards. Consequently, Malaysian interims may not be reliable 
for the users of financial reports to use to make decisions due to the 
absence of independent audit reviews. Therefore, the first objective of the 
present study is to evaluate the quality of Malaysian interims. As none PLC 
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in Malaysia reviewed their interims, there is no variance to do a statistical 
test. Therefore, the first research question is investigated by describing the 
descriptive statistics of each qualitative item of interims namely timeliness, 
compliance with the FRS 134, compliance with the BMLR and comparability 
of profit and loss statements. The average score of each qualitative item is 
accumulated and compared with Table 3.6 to determine whether the quality 
of Malaysian interims is high, moderate or low. Apart from determining the 
overall quality of Malaysian interims, the present study also identifies: 
1) whether the quality of interims is consistent every quarter. 
2) whether the quality of interims is equivalent in different type of 
BSE. 
3) whether the quality of interims is equivalent in different types of 
industries. 
4) whether Malaysian PLC publish interims on a timely basis every 
quarter.   
5) whether Malaysian PLC publish interims that comply with the 
interim reporting standards every quarter.   
6) whether Malaysian PLC publish interims that are comparable 
every quarter.  
7) whether timeliness of Malaysian interims in different type of BSE 
and types of industries are equivalent every quarter. 
8) Whether compliance with the interim reporting standards in 
different type of BSE and types of industries equivalent every 
quarter. 
9) whether comparability of interims in different type of BSE and 
types of industries are equivalent every quarter. 
10) which qualitative characteristic contributes the most and the least 
to the quality of Malaysian interims. 
 
One of the objectives of corporate governance is to produce quality financial 
reports (Miettinen, 2008).The second research question or objective is to 
determine the influence of corporate governance on the quality of interims. 
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Corporate governance comprises of the BOD, the audit committee, the top 
management team, internal auditors, external auditors and governing bodies 
(Rezaee, 2003). Corporate governance is appointed to monitor the 
management and provide resources for the best interests of shareholders 
(Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Corporate governance is expounded by agency 
theory and resource dependence theory to perform their duties 
conscientiously. The corporate governance actors possess various 
characteristics, educational background, and experiences that may influence 
their performance and, therefore, the quality of interims.  
 
Previous research has used various CGC and their findings on the impact of 
corporate governance on the quality of interims are mixed. For example, 
Chiang (2005), Kent and Stewart (2008), and CheHaat et al. (2008) found 
that corporate governance influences the quality of financial reports. 
Meanwhile, Mangena and Pike (2005) found that the number of audit 
committee members does not significantly influence the disclosure level in 
the interim reports. Since there are two views on the influence of corporate 
governance on the quality of interims, the present study posits in null form 
that: 
 
H01 There is no association between the corporate governance 
characteristics and quality of interims. 
 
Altogether, there are five CGC to be assessed in the present study namely 
the frequency of BOD meetings, independent, financial literacy, corporate 
governance expertise and ethnicity of directors. The association between the 
five CGC and each qualitative item of interims is expressed in the form of 
hypothesis and is summarized in Table 3.1. In other words, the second 
research question is address by tests of hypotheses listed in Table 3.1. All 
hypotheses in Table 3.1 are in non-directional form because there are 
supporting and opposing findings from preceding research. A detailed 
explanation of each hypothesis is given in Sections 3.3.1 to 3.3.5. Apart from 
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assessing the influence of corporate governance on the quality of interims, 
the present study also assessed: 
 
1) whether the impact of corporate governance is similar for each 
qualitative characteristic of Malaysian interims. 
2)  the most and the least CGC that contributes to the quality of 
Malaysian interims. 
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Table 3.1: Hypotheses of the Influence of CGC on the Quality of 
Interims 
No Hypotheses 
1 H1A There is no association between the frequency of a BOD 
meetings and timeliness. 
2 H1B There is no association between the frequency of a BOD 
meetings and compliance with the FRS 134. 
3 H1C There is no association between the frequency of a BOD 
meetings and compliance with the BMLR. 
4 H1D There is no association between the frequency of a BOD 
meetings and comparability. 
5 H1E There is no association between the independent directors and 
timeliness. 
6 H1F There is no association between the independent directors and 
compliance with the FRS 134. 
7 H1G There is no association between the independent directors and 
compliance with the BMLR. 
8 H1H There is no association between the independent directors and 
comparability. 
9 H1I There is no association between the financial expertise of 
directors and timeliness. 
10 H1J There is no association between the financial expertise of 
directors and compliance with the FRS 134. 
11 H1K There is no association between the financial expertise of 
directors and compliance with the BMLR. 
12 H1L There is no association between the financial expertise of 
directors and comparability. 
13 H1M There is no association between the corporate governance 
expertise of directors and timeliness. 
14 H1N There is no association between the corporate governance 
expertise of directors and compliance with the FRS 134. 
15 H1O There is no association between the corporate governance 
expertise of directors and compliance with the BMLR. 
16 H1P There is no association between the corporate governance 
expertise of directors and comparability. 
17 H1Q There is no association between the ethnicity of directors and 
timeliness. 
18 H1R There is no association between the ethnicity of directors and 
compliance with the FRS 134. 
19 H1S There is no association between the ethnicity of directors and 
compliance with the BMLR. 
20 H1T There is no association between the ethnicity of directors and 
comparability. 
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3.3.1 Frequency of Meetings 
One of the directors’ activities is to attend and discuss a company’s issues in 
the BOD meetings. An effective corporate governance is attained by 
conducting a focused and productive BOD meeting, and evaluating and 
improve it continuously (Orlikoff and Totten, 2001). The BOD is exposed to 
misunderstanding and miscommunication during the meetings due to the 
diverse backgrounds of individual directors. However, they are tied by the 
BOD membership (Castor, 2007) and they have to reach a consensus to any 
decisions made. If there are any issues of disagreement in the interims that 
require a further investigation, the BOD may deter discussion on these 
issues to the next meeting. Therefore, these issues require frequent 
meetings and cause interims to be published on a less timely basis.  
 
Infrequent meetings may indicate that BOD does not perform their activities 
diligently. For example, BOD must hold meetings at least four times per year 
if interims are issued every quarter. Otherwise, the BOD may not have 
discussed any of the issues published in some of the interims or they may 
have delegated the approval to audit committee members. Since Malaysian 
interims are not subject to independent audit reviews, all decisions made by 
a company with infrequent meetings may solely made by the audit 
committee members and internal auditors. Alternatively, the BOD may still 
discuss these issues but the meetings may have to be delayed, which 
causes the interims to be published on a less timely basis. 
 
Vafeas (1999) found that BOD meet more frequently if the company’s 
performance is poor. Non-compliance with the accounting standards and 
non-comparability of interims are also seen as an indication of poor 
performance. Therefore, non-compliance with the accounting standards and 
non-comparability of interims may trigger BOD to hold more frequent 
meetings. Nevertheless, companies with a large proportion of non-financial 
expertise may not understand the non-compliance and non-comparability of 
interims. Additionally, a company’s compliance with the interim reporting 
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standards may not be of BOD concern since financial information has been 
delegated to audit committee members. According to Adams and Ferreira 
(2007), BOD spent most of the time advising rather than ensuring the 
company’s compliance with the financial reporting standards. Therefore, 
there may not be an association between the frequency of a BOD meetings 
and compliance with the interim reporting standards, as well as 
comparability of interims. 
 
As the association between frequency of BOD meetings and quality of 
financial reports is mixed, the present study posits the association between 
them in null form which is presented as H1A, H1B, H1C and H1D in Table 3.1. 
 
3.3.2 Independent Directors  
Directors, particularly independent directors, are an effective form of 
monitoring (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Bathala and Rao, 1995; Rediker and 
Seth, 1995; and Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996) because a lack of credible 
financial reporting may distort the image of independent directors to the 
public and reduce their demand for monitoring services (Ahmed et al., 2006). 
Independent directors enhance the monitoring of managerial opportunism 
and they reduce the management’s chance to withhold information (Kelton 
and Yang, 2008).  
 
MCCG requires at least one third of directors to be independent. This large 
portion indicates how important the independence is to protect the 
shareholder’s interests. This is supported by Filatotchev et al. (2007), who 
found that an independent BOD was positively associated with a company’s 
financial performance. Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) and Ezat and El-
Masry (2008) discovered that independent directors are positively 
associated with timeliness to publish interims. Beekes et al. (2004) found 
that having independent directors is positively associated with timeliness to 
release bad news in earnings. On the other hand, Bushman et al. (2004) and 
Abdelsalam and Street (2007) found that independent directors are 
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negatively associated with timeliness because they have lack of business 
knowledge to be effective due to less time focused on the company.  
 
Apart from timeliness, the previous research has studied the association 
between independent directors and corporate disclosures. Beasley (1996), 
Adams et al. (1998), Chen and Jaggi (2000), Xiao et al. (2004), Mangena 
and Taurigana (2007) and Abdelsalam and Street (2007) found that 
independent directors are associated positively with corporate disclosure. 
However, the association between independent directors and corporate 
disclosure is reduced for family controlled companies (Chen and Jaggi, 
2000). Eng and Mak (2003), and Gul and Leung (2004) found that 
independent directors are negatively associated with compliance disclosure 
for companies in Singapore and Hong Kong. Haniffa and Cooke (2002), and 
Ho and Wong (2001) did not find any significant relationship between 
independent directors and compliance disclosure. Therefore, the association 
between independent directors and corporate disclosures is mixed. 
 
Independent directors with non-financial expertise may have less knowledge 
of the business operations and financial information. They may not be aware 
of or be concerned with the comparability of interims from one period to 
another. Meanwhile, independent directors with financial expertise may be 
attentive to the importance of comparability of interims because the impact 
of non-comparability of interims detected by investors may impair the 
demand of director’s monitoring services by other PLC.  
 
Bhuiyan et al. (2000) and Filatotchev et al. (2007) found that independent 
directors are significantly associated with companies’ performance. 
However, Patton and Baker (1987) suggest that independent directors lack 
the necessary time, expertise and incentives to perform their duties 
effectively, which leads to their failure to make a meaningful contribution to 
shareholders’ wealth.  
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Due to the mixed associations between independent directors and quality of 
financial reports, the present study hypothesised in a non-directional form for 
these items. The hypotheses are H1E, H1F, H1G and H1H in Table 3.1. 
 
3.3.3 Financial Expertise Directors  
Prior researchers commonly investigate the association between financial 
expertise of audit committee and quality of financial reports instead of 
financial expertise of BOD. Financial expertise directors are able to provide 
better monitoring of financial reports (Davidson et al., 2004). Felo et al. 
(2003) and Ruzaidah and Takiah (2004) found that financial expertise is 
associated positively with quality of financial reports. Mangena and 
Tauringana (2007) also found that financial expertise director is associated 
positively with compliance of interim reporting standards. Absence of 
financial expertise directors has led companies to have financial problems 
(McMullen and Raghunandan, 1996).  
 
According to Domnisoru and Vinatoru (2008), companies with less financial 
expertise directors have internal control weaknesses. Therefore, non-
financial expertise BOD may be less effective in monitoring timeliness to 
publish interims, complying with the interims reporting standards and 
comparability of interims. Nevertheless, Lin et al. (2006) and Ismail et al. 
(2008) found that there is no association between financial expertise and 
quality of financial reports. 
.  
Due to the mixed findings of the association between the financial expertise 
of directors and quality of financial reports, the present study hypothesises 
these relationships in null form, which are H1I, H1J, H1K and H1L in Table 3.1. 
  
3.3.4 Corporate Governance Expertise Directors  
Directors who hold multiple directorships on a number of boards are 
considered to have corporate governance expertise because of the 
experiences and knowledge gained by monitoring various types of 
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businesses. Directors with multiple directorships can generate benefits since 
they have many networks (Pfeffer, 1972; Mizruchi and Stearns, 1994; Booth 
and Deli, 1995) and they can access required resources and information of 
multiple companies (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Corporate governance 
expertise directors are associated positively with quality of financial reports 
(Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Ruzaidah and Takiah, 2004; Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005; Ismail et al., 2008). According to Ismail et al. (2008), corporate 
governance expertise directors are exposed to the economic trends and 
opportunities to compare management policies and practices of multiple 
companies. Therefore, they may not want a company to delay in publishing 
interims if the other company that they hold a directorship of publishes their 
interims timely. Additionally, they may not want a company to produce non-
compliance and incomparable financial reports.  
 
However, holding multiple directorships has become a controversial issue 
because it may impair the director’s focus to monitor the management of a 
company (Ferris et al., 2003). Jirapon et al. (2008) found that multiple 
directorships are inversely related to company performance. Directors who 
hold more directorships are too busy to be effective monitors and this leads 
to delay in publishing interims, non-compliance with the interim reporting 
standards and incomparable interims.  
 
The mixed views of association between corporate governance expertise of 
directors and quality of financial reports have caused the present study to 
posit in null form the association between these items, which are presented 
as hypotheses H1M, H1N, H1O and H1P in Table 3.1. 
.  
3.3.5 Ethnicity of Directors  
The introduction of NEP in Malaysia caused the government favouritism 
towards Bumiputra to receive various concessions including business 
contracts (Johnson and Mitton, 2003). As a result, Chinese family-owned 
PLC appointed influential Bumiputra directors to get business opportunities 
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from the government (Mamman, 2003). Diversity of BOD enhances 
performance by increasing decision-making capacity, but detracts from 
group performance by increasing conflict of interests (Enhardt et al., 2003). 
 
PLC with Bumiputra directors have higher level of disclosure (Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002) and may have fewer tendencies to manipulate accounting 
information. PLC controlled by non-Bumiputra tend to disclose lower profit 
for tax avoidance (Ball et al., 2003) as the PLC are usually family-owned 
companies. Yatim et al. (2006) found that PLC with Bumiputra directors has 
more favourable corporate governance practices than non-Bumiputra 
directors. Therefore, PLC that is dominated by Bumiputra directors has 
higher financial report quality (Hashim, 2012). Nevertheless, Rahman and Ali 
(2006) found no relationship between ethnicity and financial reporting 
quality. 
 
Based on the mix results of prior studies, the present study posits in null 
form the relationship between ethnicity of directors and the quality of 
interims. The relationship between ethnicity of directors and each qualitative 
characteristic of interims are hypothesise as H1Q, H1R, H1S and H1T in Table 
3.1. Besides CGC, the present study also includes control variables to 
identify their influence on the quality of interims. Descriptions and measures 
of control variables are detailed in the next section. 
 
3.4 Control Variables 
Control variables consist of company-specific attributes and size of BOD. 
Company-specific attributes consist of company size, profitability, and 
leverage. Size of BOD is included in the control variables instead of CGC in 
order to avoid multi-collinearity problems. If the size of BOD is included in 
CGC then a multi-collinearity problem may arise because the measures of 
directors with independence, financial literacy, corporate governance 
expertise, and ethnicity are in proportion to the size of BOD. Measures for 
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each control variable are detailed in Table 3.2, and details of each control 
variable are explained in the following sections. 
 
Table 3.2 Measures of Control Variables 
Variables Measures 
1 Company size The logarithm of total assets. 
2 Profitability The ratio of net income to revenue 
3 Leverage The ratio of total debts to total assets 
4 Size of BOD The number of directors at the financial year  end* 
* If a director resigns during the year, that director will not be included in the count. If the 
director is appointed during the financial year, even towards the end of the year, he or she 
will be included. 
 
3.4.1 Company Size 
Company size is one of the important company-specific attributes that 
interest most prior studies that examine timeliness and disclosure of financial 
reports. Three theories are proposed to associate company size and 
timeliness (Zaitul, 2010): client preparation theory, client services theory, 
and transaction theory. Client preparation theory suggests that larger 
companies have better internal controls that may expedite the preparation of 
financial reports (Ashton et al., 1989). Client services theory suggests that 
larger companies are important to the audit firm and they are prioritised to be 
audited sooner than smaller companies (Bamber et al., 1993). Transaction 
theory suggests that larger companies have a larger number of transactions 
which may delay the audit processes (Simnett et al., 1995).  
 
The findings in the previous research of the association between company 
size and timeliness are mixed. For example, Lont and Sun (2007) 
hypothesised that larger companies publish interims on a more timely basis 
because: a) they have greater resources that enable them to purchase less 
delay in issuing the financial reports; b) they are audited by the big 
accounting firms that request audit resources for timely reporting; and c) 
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they are often widely-held stock companies that are pressured to provide 
timely information to shareholders. However, Lont and Sun found that 
releasing interims and annual reports for small and large companies differs 
insignificantly. Courtis (1976), Gilling (1977), Simnett et al. (1995), 
Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) also found that there is no association 
between a company’s size and timeliness.  
 
On the other hand, Dyer and Hugh (1975), Davies and Whittered (1980), 
Givoly and Palmon (1984), Chambers and Penman (1984), Newton and 
Ashton (1989), Carslaw and Kaplan (1991), Bamber  et al., (1993), Ng and 
Tai (1994), Abdulla (1996), Owusu-Ansah (2000), Ku Ismail and Chandler 
(2004) and Ezat and El-Masry (2008) found an inverse relationship between 
company size and timeliness. Larger companies take less time to publish 
financial reports because they have larger resources, more advanced 
accounting information systems, are modernised and technology developed, 
are more visible to the public, and have more external stakeholders that are 
concerned about the company’s financial performance. Additionally, larger 
companies have stronger internal controls, internal audit, and greater 
accountability that expedite the audit process. 
 
With regard to the association between company size and compliance 
disclosure, Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) and Mangena and Taurigana 
(2007) found that they are positively and significantly associated for interims. 
Company size is also positively and significantly associated with the level of 
disclosure for annual financial reports (Firth, 1979; Cooke, 1989; Ahmed and 
Nicholls, 1994; Wallace and Naser, 1995; Raffournier, 1995; Inchausti, 1997; 
Owusu-Ansah, 1998; Singhvi and Desai, 2001; Alsaeed, 2005). However, 
Tan and Tower (1997) found no association between company size and the 
level of disclosure in interims. Stanga, (1976) and Spero (1979) also found 
no association of those items in annual financial reports. 
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3.4.2 Profitability 
Profitability is a business outcome. A company can either gain a profit or 
they can make a loss, depending on political and economic factors. 
According to Naser (1998), management is more likely to disclose good 
news rather than bad news. In other words, management will rather disclose 
profit than losses. Disseminating good information may attract potential 
investors and retain existing investors while disseminating bad information 
may distract potential and existing investors to retain their investments. 
Based on this theory, profitability is associated negatively with the timeliness 
of financial reports. Chambers and Penman (1984) and Ku Ismail and 
Chandler (2004) found that PLC with positive earnings tend to release more 
timely interims. Abdulla (1996), Carlslaw and Kaplan (1991), Courtis (1976), 
Lawrence (1983), Whittred and Zimmer (1984), Owusu-Ansah (2000) and 
(Beekes et. al, 2004) also found that profitability is associated negatively 
with timeliness of financial reporting. However, Annaert et al. (2002) 
discovered that the timeliness of interims was not associated with good or 
bad news. Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008) found that profitability is not 
significantly associated with the timeliness of interims, while Dyer and Hugh 
(1975) found that profitability is not significantly associated with the 
timeliness of annual reports.  
 
There is much research on the association between profitability and 
disclosures. Singhvi and Desai (2001) found that profitability is positively 
associated with information disclosure in annual financial reports. Cooke 
(1989) suggests that profitable companies are more likely to disclose more 
information to signal the market about their superior performance. Low 
profitability may result in less information being disclosed by a company’s 
management (Singhvi and Desai, 1971). On the other hand, Ku Ismail and 
Chandler (2005a) found that there is no association between companies’ 
profitability and compliance with disclosures of interim reporting standards.  
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3.4.3 Leverage  
Leverage refers to the company’s financial debts. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
(2006) suggest that weak corporate governance can result in higher debt 
financing by companies. Higher leveraged companies may deter the 
willingness of financial institutions and creditors to permit additional 
borrowing, due to their inability to pay their debts. Based on this theory, 
highly leveraged companies will publish interims less timely. Ku Ismail and 
Chandler (2005) found that low leveraged companies reported more timely 
interims. 
 
With regard to the association between leverage and compliance disclosure, 
highly leveraged companies are expected to disclose more information, 
which is required by the financial institutions to monitor the ability of 
companies to pay their debts. For interims, Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005a) 
found that leverage is significantly and positively associated with the extent 
of disclosure of interim reporting standards. Ahmed and Nicolls (1994), 
Hossain et al. (1994), Jaggi and Low (2000) and Malone et al. (1993) also 
found that leverage is positively associated with the level of disclosure. 
However, Tan and Tower (1997) found that leverage was not significantly 
influenced by the compliance with interim reporting standards. 
 
3.4.4 Size of BOD 
There is a conflict argument about the appropriate size of BOD in a 
company. Lehn et al. (2009) found that size of BOD is positively associated 
with company size. Although there is no specific size of BOD recommended 
by the MCCG, it has highlighted the need for PLC to examine the impact of 
size of BOD on their effectiveness. Small BOD helps to improve a 
company’s performance (Jensen, 1993). In contrast, Bhuiyan et al. (2010) 
found that larger BOD provides a greater pool of skills and knowledge than 
smaller BOD. However, larger BOD is quite difficult to coordinate and may 
have communication problems (Booth et al., 2002) because they possess 
various types of educational background and experiences. Lipton and 
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Lorsch (1992) suggest between seven and nine BOD members to be 
optimal, and they find that more than ten BOD members make it difficult for 
them to express their ideas and opinions. The number of directors should 
not be too small or too large because their small size will dominate decision 
making by certain directors and a big BOD may cause directors to feel very 
constrained to participate actively. For interims, Ezat and El-Masry (2008) 
found that size of BOD is positively and significantly associated with the 
timeliness of internet reporting. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) found that size of 
BOD is inversely related with company’s performance in Singapore and 
Malaysia.  
3.5 Data Collection and Sample  
This section illustrates how the data were collected and how the sample was 
selected to investigate the quality of interims. 
 
3.5.1 Data Collection 
The main data source to evaluate the qualitative characteristics of interims 
that was used in this study were the public filings on the Bursa Malaysia 
Stock Exchange’s (BMSE) website http://www.klse.com.my, on which 
Malaysian PLC have been required to file their interims online since July 
1999. The selection of the sample and the time period of interims are 
discussed below.  
 
3.5.2 Sample Selection  
The sample of the present study is drawn from PLC listed on the BMSE. In 
2008, the total number of listed companies on the BMSE was 977. With such 
a large population, the researcher was forced to extract a sample of 
companies for examination. The PLC were first categorised into the date of 
financial year-end, type of BSE, and types of industries. In total, 558 PLC 
have a financial year ending 31st December (57.1%), 128 PLC share a 
financial year-end on 30th June (13.1%), and 112 PLC financial year-end is 
on 31st March (11.5%). The first BSE is for more established PLC, the 
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second BSE is for relatively smaller PLC, and the MESDAQ market is for 
high growth and technology PLC. In total, 634 PLC are from the first BSE 
(64.9%), 221 PLC are from the second BSE (22.6%) and 122 PLC are from 
the MESDAQ (12.5%). The main types of industries in the BMSE are 
construction, finance, consumer products, hotels, industrial products, 
plantation, properties, services, technology, mining and infrastructure project 
companies (IPC). The three industries with a large number of PLC are 
industrial products, services and consumer products. 
 
In order to have a more generalisable result, the present study selected PLC 
with the same financial year-end. A December financial year-end was 
chosen because this is common to more than half of Malaysian PLC. The 
PLC listings with 31st December financial year-end were then segregated 
into types of industries, followed by the type of BSE listing. The hotel and 
IPC industries were not included in the sample because their numbers were 
very small. The mining industry was not included in the sample as no PLC in 
that industry has a December financial year end. The sample consists of 
PLC in the first and second BSE only. No PLC was taken from MESDAQ as 
the numbers of PLC in MESDAQ were very small. Finally, the list of PLC 
was organised in alphabetical order.  
 
A stratified systematic sampling method was then used in order to have a 
balanced sample according to the types of industries and type of BSE. By 
using stratified systematic sampling, one third of Malaysian PLC with 
December financial year-ends was selected as the sample. The main 
criterion for sampling the PLC was that all interims were available for the 
years 2007 and 2008. After excluding PLC in the MESDAQ market there 
were 163 PLC, of which 119 and 44 PLC were from the first and second 
BSE, respectively. After downloading the data, the interims for 47 PLC were 
found to be incomplete: 33 and 14 PLC were from the first and second BSE, 
respectively. PLC with incomplete data were excluded from the sample. 
Consequently, the number of PLC in the sample was reduced to 116, of 
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which 86 PLC are from the first BSE and 30 PLC are from the second BSE. 
Table 3.3 summarises the final selection of sample PLC with the December 
financial year-end. The names of PLC included in the study are listed in 
Appendix 3-1.  
 
Table 3.3: Selection of Sample  
   Types of 
           BSE 
Types  
of industry 
First BSE Second BSE Total 
T NA A %A T NA A %A T NA A %A 
Industrial 
Products 
31 5 26 30.2 23 6 17 56.7 54 11 43 37.
1 
Services 31 14 17 19.8 7 3 4 13.3 38 17 21 18.
1 
Consumer 
products 
15 5 10 11.6 8 3 5 16.7 23 8 15 12.
9 
Properties 13 3 10 11.6 1 0 1 3.3 14 3 11 9.5 
Plantations 9 2 7 8.1 1 0 1 3.3 10 2 8 6.9 
Construction 8 1 7 8.1 3 2 1 3.3 11 3 8 6.9 
Finance 7 1 6 7.0 0 0 0 0.0 7 1 6 5.2 
Technology 5 2 3 3.5 1 0 1 3.3 6 2 4 3.4 
TOTAL 119 33 86 100 44 14 30 100 163 47 116 100 
*T- Total, A - Data Available, NA - Data not available or incomplete  
 
There are 928 observations in the present study since the data were 
collected every quarter for the fiscal years of 2007 and 2008 (i.e.116 PLC x 
four quarters x two years). These periods were chosen because the FRS 
134 was revised in 2007 and the revision became effective on or after 1 July 
2007. Additionally, the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
was also revised in 2007. The present study investigated whether the 
revised FRS 134 and MCCG was complied with by Malaysian PLC. Data 
were collected in 2008 with the objective of making a comparison of the 
quality of interims between the two years to find whether the quality of 
interims is consistent, improving or declining. 
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3.6 Measurements of the Quality of Interims  
As described in the research framework, adherence to the objective and 
qualitative characteristics of the financial reports will provide high quality 
interims. The qualitative characteristics that are used to assess the quality of 
interims are timeliness, compliance with the FRS 134, compliance with the 
BMLR and comparability of interims’ profit and loss. This section describes 
how to determine the quality of interims by using the qualitative 
characteristics mentioned above. 
 
The present study used two approaches to determine the quality of interims. 
The first approach used a dichotomous variable where one score is given to 
a company if it complies with the qualitative characteristics; otherwise they 
are given a zero score. The second approach used a continuous variable 
where a higher score is given to a company if it highly complies with the 
qualitative characteristics of interims and is given a lower score otherwise. 
The subsections below detail each qualitative characteristic of interims and 
the scoring procedures to determine the quality of interims. 
 
3.6.1 Timeliness 
Timeliness in releasing information to the users of financial reports is 
important because it will affect their decision making (Ashton et al., 1987). 
Financial information becomes less valuable if more time passes between 
the interims’ reporting date and disclosure (Mc Gee, 2007). Similar to the 
previous studies (Owusu-Ansah, 2000; Ku Ismail and Chandler, 2004), the 
timeliness of interims in this present study is measured by reporting lag, 
which is the number of days between the financial reporting date and the 
publishing date of interims on the BMSE website. The date that PLC initially 
issued their interims is known as the “initial reporting date” and publishing 
interims subsequent to the “initial reporting date” after some required 
amendments are called an “amendment reporting date”. The “initial reporting 
date” is taken as the actual reporting date because the amendments made 
by PLC are immaterial. 
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The FRS 134 requires PLC to publish interims within 60 days of the 
reporting date, while the BMLR requires PLC to publish interims within two 
months of the reporting date. The actual number of days to publish interims 
was counted and by adopting the first approach, which used a dichotomous 
value, a score of one was given to a company if it published its interim within 
60 days and a zero score otherwise. The score of timeliness is abbreviated 
by SCOTI1, and the formula is as follows: 
  SCOTI1 = Time1 
Time1  = 1 (if PLC publish interims within 60 days) 
0 (if PLC publishes interims > 60 days) 
 
The second approach used a continuous value of which PLC have a higher 
compliance score if they published their interims early. The actual number of 
days to publish interims was counted and the scoring procedure is as 
follows: if PLC published interims the day after their interims reporting date, 
they have a compliance score of one; if PLC published their interims one day 
after the end of the allowable period of 60 days, they have a compliance 
score of zero; and if PLC published interims more than the allowable period 
of 61 days, the compliance score with timeliness is a negative figure. 
Therefore, the equation to determine the compliance score of timeliness is 
as follows: 
SCOTI2 = (60 –Time2) + 1 
      60 
Time2             =  the actual number of days PLC publish 
interims 
 
Apart from the general analysis, the analysis on timeliness to publish 
interims was also made across the quarters, type of BSE, and types of 
industries to examine any differences.  
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3.6.2 Compliance with the FRS 134 
PLC is required to publish interims so that the prospective users of interims 
have more transparent information. Following the Asian financial crisis, in 
March 1999, the Bursa Malaysia announced that all PLC in Malaysia had to 
issue quarterly instead of half yearly interims, effective July 1999. The MASB 
issued the MASB 26, Interim Financial Reporting, in 2002 to prepare 
interims. The standards became effective for financial reports beginning 1 
July, 2002. Malaysia renamed the MASB standards as the Financial 
Reporting Standards (FRS) in 2005 and, accordingly, the MASB 26 was 
replaced by the FRS 134. The FRS 134 requirements are identical to the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 134. The revision of 
IFRS 134 in 2007 caused the revision of FRS 134. Malaysian PLC now has 
to comply with the MASB 26 and the revised FRS 134 for the accounting 
periods beginning on or after 1 July 2007.  
 
A PLC compliance with the FRS 134 is measured by constructing a 
disclosure index. The method of constructing the disclosure index, the test 
on reliability of the disclosure index, the items listed in the disclosure index 
and the scoring procedures of compliance with the FRS 134 are explained in 
the four sub-sections as follows. 
 
3.6.2.1 Constructing the Disclosure Index 
Similar to Rahman and Ismail (2008), the present study has constructed a 
disclosure index to determine a PLC compliance with the FRS 134. The 
disclosure items that were adopted from the FRS 134 were based on these 
criteria: 
1) Compliance with the mandatory disclosures. 
2) Select items that were widely applicable to all PLC. For example, 
business combination requirements in the FRS 134 were excluded 
from the disclosure index, although they were mandatory for 
Malaysian PLC. Non-inclusion of this item is due to inapplicable of 
this information to a majority of PLC during the period under review. 
   
- 119 - 
 
Inclusion of these items in the disclosure index will distort the 
compliance score of PLC with the absence of business combinations.  
3.6.2.2 Reliability of the Disclosure Index 
The present study validated the accuracy of all items in the disclosure index 
by reconciling with disclosure index prepared and published by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) on the internet (http://www.pwc.com/enMY 
/my/assets/publications/disclosurechecklistinterimreporting.pdf). All items in 
the disclosure index prepared by the present study were listed on a spread 
sheet and compared with the printed disclosure index that was prepared by 
PWC. Some items in PWC’s disclosure index were not included in the 
disclosure index of the present study due to the selection criteria mentioned 
in the previous section.  
 
To ensure that all important items were selected and included in the 
disclosure index, a control procedure was performed by recording the 
omission of any items and the reasons why these items were excluded from 
the disclosure index. Apart from the selection criteria, the disclosure index 
prepared by the present study slightly differs from the disclosure index 
prepared by PWC in that the item in the FRS 134 that starts with “the nature 
and amount of ...” (e. g. the nature and amount of unusual items, paragraph 
16 C) were counted as two items rather than one single item as in PWC’s 
treatment.  
 
A pilot study was carried out to add further reliability to the present study’s 
disclosure index after all mandatory disclosure items had been listed and 
reconciled with the disclosure index published by PWC. An independent 
accounting researcher tested the disclosure index by scoring the compliance 
with the FRS 134 of one of the companies in the sample. The complete 
scoring sheet of disclosure index prepared by the independent accounting 
researcher was compared with the present study’s completed scoring sheet 
of disclosure index. The total compliance score calculated by the accounting 
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researcher was the same as that calculated by the present study. Apart from 
the control procedure and pilot study, a complete disclosure index was 
checked and proved by two professional accountants and academicians to 
ensure that the disclosure index was free from any discrepancies and can be 
used as a research instrument for the present study. 
3.6.2.3 Items Listed in the Disclosure Index 
Pursuant to applying the above criteria and procedures, Table 3.4 presents 
39 items that are mandatory to be disclosed by Malaysian PLC in their 
interims every quarter. Rahman and Ismail (2008) grouped similar items in 
the disclosure index. Similarly, the present study grouped items of a similar 
nature and classified them into 14 groups (see Table 3.4). 
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Table 3.4: The Disclosure Index of Compliance with the FRS 134  
No FRS 134 items Total 
Score 
Ref 
1 Components of financial statements: 5  
 
a) A condensed Balance Sheet (BS);  8a 
b) A condensed Income Statement (IS);  8b 
c) A condensed statement of Changes in Equity (CE);  8c 
d) A condensed Cash Flow statement (CF);  8d 
e) Explanatory notes.  8e 
2 Periods of financial statements disclosed: 5  
 a) BS: current quarter and preceding financial year end;  20a 
 b) IS: current quarter and Financial Year to Date (FYTD);  20b 
 c) IS: preceding corresponding quarter and FYTD of preceding year;  20b 
 d) CE: FYTD of current quarter and preceding year;  20c 
 e) CF: FYTD of current quarter and preceding year.  20d 
3 Interim financial statement’s general requirements: 3  
 a) Publish either a complete or condensed financial statements;  4 b) Comply with MASB 26/FRS 134;  9 
 c) Are consolidated if the recent annual report is consolidated.  14 
4 Disclose Earnings per Share (EPS) in the face of income statement: 2  
 a) Basic EPS;  11 
 b) Diluted EPS.  11 
5 Accounting policies: 5  
 
a) Accounting policies are consistent with the preceding annual report;  16a 
b) Methods of computation are consistent with the preceding annual 
report;  16a 
c) Disclose any changes of accounting policies:  16a 
        i) Nature of the changes of accounting policies;  16a        ii) Effect of the changes of accounting policies.  16a 
6 Seasonality or cyclicality of interim operations. 1 16b 
7 Unusual items: 3  
 a) Disclose unusual items;   16c 
 b) Nature of unusual items;   16c 
 c) Amount of unusual items.  16c 
8 Estimation of provision: 3  
 a) Disclose changes in estimates of provision;  16d 
 b) Nature of items;  16d 
 c) Amount of changes in estimates of provision.  16d 
9 Debt and equity securities. 1  
 Disclose issuance, cancellations, repurchases and repayments.  16e 
10 Segmental  Reporting: 6  
 a) Business segments:  16g 
        i) Segmental revenue;  16g 
        ii) Segmental result.  16g 
 b) Geographical segments:  16g 
        i) Segmental revenue;  16g 
        ii) Segmental result.  16g 
11 Material subsequent events.  1 16 h 
12 Changes in composition of the entity. 1 16 i 
13 Changes in contingent assets or liabilities:  2  
 a) Contingent assets;  16j 
 b) Contingent liabilities.  16j 
14 Disclose dividends paid according to the types. 1 16f 
  TOTAL SCORE 39  
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3.6.2.4 Scoring Procedures of Compliance with the FRS 134 
A dichotomous procedure is commonly used by previous researchers 
(Cooke, 1989; Ali et. al., 2004; Al-Shammari, 2005; Akhtaruddin, 2005) to 
determine the compliance score with accounting standards. An item scored 
one if it was disclosed and zero score otherwise. However, there was a 
problem when non-disclosure is due to irrelevance or inapplicability of 
information to the company (Yeoh, 2005), meaning that the item can neither 
be given one nor zero score. In order not to penalize a company that did not 
disclose inapplicable information, similar to Al-Shammari’s (2005) study, a 
non-applicable (NA) score was given to the item.  
 
Several steps have been taken by previous researchers to minimise the 
impact of the NA score. Firstly, the financial reports were read thoroughly 
before scoring the information disclosed by the company in order to ensure 
the information was indeed irrelevant to the companies (Cooke, 1989; Al-
Shammari, 2005). Secondly, the information that was irrelevant to be 
disclosed was supported by reviewing the preceding and succeeding 
financial reports (Owusu-Ansah, 2000; Al-Shammari, 2005). Thirdly, the 
information that was irrelevant to be disclosed was determined by logical 
reasoning (Owusu-Ansah, 2000). Fourthly, the companies must mentioned 
that the information was irrelevant to them (Rahman and Ismail, 2008). The 
present study used these four methods in order to avoid marking down a 
company that did not disclose inapplicable information. If the information is 
indeed inapplicable and is being accredited directly or indirectly in the 
financial reports, then the company is considered to be making a full 
disclosure and a NA score will be given to the item. 
 
The total compliance score with the FRS 134 was calculated after 
completing the compliance scoring sheet of the disclosure index. A 
company’s score can vary between 0 and 39, where a zero score indicates a 
perfect non-compliance with the FRS 134 and full score of 39 points indicate 
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perfect compliance with the FRS 134. The total compliance score with the 
FRS 134 is abbreviated as TOFRS. 
 
An index is then created to measure the relative level of compliance with the 
FRS 134. Two methods are commonly used by the prior studies, namely: 
weighted and unweighted approach (Spero, 1979; Cooke, 1989; Ahmed and 
Nicholls.1994; Wallace et al., 1994; Cooke, 1996; Patton and Zelenka, 1997; 
Craig and Diga, 1998; Street and Bryant, 2000; Street and Gray, 2001; 
Yeoh, 2005). The difference between these methods is the importance of 
information disclosed. All items of information are not equally important in 
weighted approach and equally important in unweighted approach 
(Akhtaruddin, 2005) to the average users (Wallace, 1998). In the weighted 
approach the allocation of weights was done arbitrarily by the researchers. 
The unweighted approach was considered superior (Owusu-Ansah, 1998) 
and more appropriate (Tsalavoutas et al., 2008) than the weighted approach 
and was commonly used by the former researchers to measure the 
compliance with accounting standards. Consequently, the unweighted 
approach is adopted for the present study. 
 
A large number of non-applicable items in the disclosure index will yield a 
low total compliance score with the FRS 134. Therefore, it is unfair to the 
company because the information is irrelevant. To overcome this problem, a 
relative index was used by measuring the ratio of what the company actually 
disclosed to the maximum score applicable to be disclosed by the company 
(Owusu-Ansah,1998; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Tsalavoutas, 2008). Consequently, 
the actual (numerator) and maximum (denominator) items disclosed by PLC 
varied as some items were inapplicable to some PLC. The disclosure index 
of compliance score with the FRS 134 is abbreviated as INDEXFRS and the 
formula is as follows: 
INDEXFRS  = TOFRS 
MFRS 
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                        n                                       m 
          TOFRS =  ∑ di    and    MFRS = ∑ di     
                   i=1                                      i=1 
INDEXFRS = Index of compliance score with the FRS134 
TOFRS       =  Total amount of items complied with the FRS 134 
MFRS           =  Maximum applicable items complied with the 
FRS134 
n                    =  number of applicable items in the disclosure 
index which are expected to be complied by a 
company 
m                   =  maximum number of applicable items that should 
be complied by PLC and n ≤ m 
di          =  1 if the item complies with the FRS 134 and  
                   0 if the item does not comply with the FRS 134 
 
The present study used two approaches to measure the quality of PLC 
compliance with the FRS 134. The first and the second approach used 
dichotomous and continuous value, respectively. For the first approach, one 
score is given to PLC if the index of compliance score with the FRS 134 
(INDEXFRS) is greater than 50% and zero score otherwise. The quality 
score on compliance with the FRS 134 by using the first approach is 
abbreviated as SCOFRS1. The second approach uses continuous value and 
is abbreviated by SCOFRS2. The quality score on compliance with the FRS 
134 is measured by the actual value of INDEXFRS. PLC that has a higher 
value of INDEXFRS will have a higher quality value of interims. Apart from 
the general analysis on compliance with the FRS 134 by Malaysian PLC, the 
analysis was also made across quarters, type of BSE, and types of 
industries to examine any differences. 
 
3.6.3 Compliance with the BMLR 
Since Malaysian PLC has had to issue quarterly instead of half yearly 
financial interims since July 1999, the Bursa Malaysia revised the BMLR in 
conjunction with the FRS 134. Apart from complying with the FRS 134 to 
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prepare interims, PLC also has to comply with the BMLR. Items in the BMLR 
that are required to be complied to prepare interims are in Part A of 
Appendix 9B. Except to the allowable time period to publish interims, all 
items in the FRS 134 and the BMLR complement each other. In other words, 
all items listed in the BMLR are not a repetition of items listed in the FRS 
134. 
 
The PLC compliance with the BMLR was also measured in this present 
study by constructing a disclosure index. The methods of constructing and 
testing the reliability of the disclosure index are similar to those used for 
compliance with the FRS 134. The only difference is there is no selection 
process in listing the items in the disclosure index of BMLR as all items in 
Part A of Appendix 9B are a mandatory requirement for PLC to adhere to 
and are applicable to all PLC. Items listed in the disclosure index and 
scoring procedure of compliance with BMLR are explained in Section 3.6.3.1 
and Section 3.6.3.2, respectively. 
3.6.3.1 Items Listed in the Disclosure Index 
Table 3.5 presents the 78 items adopted from the BMLR that are mandated 
to be disclosed by Malaysian PLC in their interims every quarter. Similar to 
compliance with the FRS 134, all items listed in the BMLR’s disclosure index 
are classified into 14 groups of related items as indicated in Table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5: The Disclosure Index of Compliance with the BMLR 
No BMLR Items Total 
Score 
Ref 
1 BOD approval. 1 9.22 (1) 
2 Performance Review: 10  
 a) Describe the amount of material changes in earnings/revenue   1 
 i) Current quarter  1 
    ii) FYTD   1 
 b) Explain the factors affecting the earnings and/or revenue  1 
     i) Current quarter  1 
    ii) FYTD  1 
 c) Describe the amount of material changes in PBT  2 
    i) Current and preceding quarters  2 
 d) Factors affecting the changes in PBT  2 
     i) Current and preceding quarters  2 
3 Prospects 6  
 a) Disclose the prospects   3a 
 b) Prospects for remaining period to FYE or next FYE for the last quarter  3a 
 c) Factors that influence the prospects for the remaining period to FYE or next FYE for the last quarter  3a 
 d) Company’s progress to achieve revenue/profit estimate in the    
    i) remaining period to FYE  3b 
    ii) In the forecast period which was previously announced or        disclosed in a public document   3b 
 e)Board of Director’s opinion to achieve them  4 
4 Profit forecast/guarantee in a public document 5  
 a) Disclose profit forecast/guarantee in a public document  5 
 b) The variance of actual PAT and minority interest (if exceeds 10%)  5 
 c) The forecast PAT and minority interest (if the variance exceeds 10%)  5 
 d) The shortfall in profit guarantee received by the company   5 
 e) Steps taken to recover the shortfall in profit guarantee received  5 
5 Taxation 3  
 a) Breakdown of tax charges    6 
 b) Explain the variance between the effective and statutory tax rate    
      i) Current quarter  6 
      ii) FYTD  6 
6 Unquoted investments and properties 6  
 a) Profits/(losses) on sales of unquoted investments  7 
      i) Current quarter  7 
      ii) FYTD  7 
 b) Profits/(losses) on sales of unquoted properties  7 
      i) Current quarter  7 
      ii) FYTD  7 
7 Quoted securities  (exception to closed-end funds, banking, finance and insurance) 12  
 a) Purchase quoted securities   8a 
      i) Current quarter  8a 
      ii) FYTD  8a 
 b) Disposal of quoted securities  8a 
      i) Current quarter  8a 
      ii) FYTD  8a 
 c) Profit/loss arising from disposal of quoted securities   8a 
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No BMLR Items Total 
Score 
Ref 
      i)Current quarter      ii) FYTD  
8a 
8a 
 d) investments in quoted securities   
  i) at cost  8b 
  ii) at carrying/book value  8b 
  iii) at market value  8b 
8 Corporate proposal  8  
 a) Disclose corporate proposal  9a 
 b) Proceeds raised from any corporate proposal   9b 
 i) Purpose  9b 
 ii) Proposed utilisation  9b 
 iii) Actual utilisation  9b 
 iv) Intended timeframe for utilisation  9b 
 v) Deviation amount  9b 
 vi) Explanations  9b 
9 Group borrowings and debt securities 4  
 a) Breakdown between secured and unsecured  10a 
 b) Breakdown between short term and long term borrowings  10b 
 c) Denominate any foreign currency  10c 
 d) Breakdown of debt/borrowings in each foreign currency  10c 
10 Off-balance sheet financial instruments 8  
 a) Disclose off balance sheet instruments   11 
 i)  Face or contract amount or notional principal amount  11a 
 ii) Nature of off-balance sheet instruments  11b 
 iii) Terms of off-balance sheet instruments  11b 
 iv) Credit risk  11b 
 v) Market risk  11b 
 vi) Cash requirement  11b 
 vii) Related accounting policies  11b 
11 Changes in material litigation 1 12 
12 Dividends  8  
 a) Declared/recommended dividend  13a(i) 
 i) Amount per share for current period  13a(ii) 
 ii) Amount per share for previous corresponding period  13a(iii) 
 iii) Date payable for the current period  13a(iv) 
 iv) For deposited securities, the cut-off date for entitlement to dividends   13a(v) 
 v) Total dividend per share for the current financial year  13b 
 vi) Dividend  is before tax, net of tax or tax exempt  13 
 vii) Relevant tax rate (for non-tax exempt dividend)  13 
13 Earnings per share 4  
 a) Numerator amount    
 i) Basic EPS  14a 
 ii) Diluted EPS  14a 
 b)Weighted average number of ordinary shares used as denominator    
 i) Basic EPS  14b 
 ii) Diluted EPS  14b 
14 Qualification of preceding annual financial reports 2  
 a) Types of qualification   15 
  b) Current status for qualified report  15 
  TOTAL SCORE 78  
FYTD - Financial year to date 
PBT   - Profit before tax 
FYE   - Financial year-end 
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3.6.3.2 Scoring Procedures of Compliance with the BMLR 
The scoring procedures of compliance with the BMLR were similar with the 
scoring procedures of compliance with the FRS 134, where an item scored 
one if it was disclosed and zero otherwise. An item which was considered 
irrelevant or inapplicable to PLC was given a NA score. The total score of 
compliance with the BMLR was computed after completing the scoring sheet 
of the BMLR disclosure index. A company’s score can vary between 0 and 
78, where 0 score indicates a perfect non-compliance with the BMLR and a 
full score of 78 points indicates a perfect compliance with the BMLR. The 
total compliance score with the BMLR is abbreviated as TOBMLR.  
 
The compliance score with the BMLR is measured by creating an index, 
which is then measured by using the unweighted approach because all 
items listed in the BMLR disclosure index are equally important to be 
disclosed by PLC. To avoid underscoring compliance with the BMLR for PLC 
with inapplicable items, the ratio of total compliance with the BMLR 
(TOBMLR) divided by the maximum applicable amount of items complied 
with the BMLR was used. The disclosure index of compliance score with the 
BMLR is abbreviated as INDEXBMLR and the formula is as follows: 
 
  INDEXBMLR  =      TOBMLR 
                   MBMLR 
                            n                                         m 
TOBMLR    =  ∑ di    and MBMLR = ∑ di     
                i=1            i=1 
INDEXBMLR   = Index of compliance score with the BMLR 
TOBMLR   = Total amount of items complied with the BMLR 
MBMLR          =     Maximum applicable items complied with the 
BMLR 
N                    =      Number of applicable items in the disclosure 
index which is expected to be complied with by a 
company 
m                   = Maximum number of applicable items that should 
be complied by PLC and n ≤ m  
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di =  1 if the item complies with the BMLR and  
          0 if the item does not comply with the BMLR 
 
The quality of a PLC compliance with the BMLR was measured by two 
approaches. The first approach used a dichotomous value where one score 
is given to PLC if the index of compliance score with the BMLR 
(INDEXBMLR) is greater than 50% and zero score otherwise. The quality 
score on compliance with the BMLR by using the first approach is 
abbreviated as SCOBMLR1. The second approach used continuous value. 
The quality score of PLC compliance with the BMLR was measured by the 
actual value of INDEXBMLR. PLC with higher value of INDEXBMLR will 
have higher quality interims and PLC with a lower value of INDEXBMLR will 
have lower quality interims. The quality score on compliance with the BMLR 
by using the second approach is abbreviated by SCOBMLR2. Apart from the 
general analysis on compliance with the BMLR, the analysis was also made 
across the quarters, type of BSE and types of industries to examine any 
differences. 
 
3.6.4 Comparability of Interims 
To assist stakeholders, especially the prospective investors to make 
decisions, the interims information must be meaningful and comparable. 
Therefore, the present study has investigated whether the profit and loss of 
Malaysian PLC interims are comparable for one period with another. Profit 
and loss items were selected because Mangena (2004) found that profit and 
loss information was very helpful for analysts to make investment decisions.   
 
Four profit and loss items (i.e. revenues, gross profit, profit before tax and 
profit after tax) were selected as comparable figures. These figures were 
checked when interims were originally issued and when they were placed in 
the next year’s corresponding quarter as a comparative figure. If PLC 
resubmits interims at a later date then the resubmission figures were used 
for the comparison. If the figures differ then there is a tendency of 
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manipulation of accounting figures by the PLC, which may impair the quality 
of interims. However, the different figures may also be due to restatement as 
a result of revision of accounting standards.  
 
One score is given to PLC if each profit and loss item’s figures initially issued 
are equivalent with the comparative figures in the next year corresponding 
period, and zero score otherwise. The scores of each profit and loss figure 
were summed up and the sum value varies between zero and four, where a 
zero score indicates non-comparability of interims and a score of four 
indicates full comparability of interims. The amount of comparability of 
interims is abbreviated by SCOCOMP. 
 
Two approaches were used to measure the comparability of interims. The 
first approach used a dichotomous value where one score is given to PLC if 
the SCOCOMP is equivalent to four and zero score otherwise. The quality 
score of comparability of interims using the first approach is abbreviated as 
SCOCOMP1. The second approach used a continuous value and the actual 
value of SCOCOMP is used to measure the quality score on the 
comparability of interims. PLC with a higher-ranking score of comparability of 
interims will have a higher quality value of interims and vice versa. The 
quality score on comparability of interims using the second approach is 
abbreviated as SCOCOMP2. Apart from the general analysis on 
comparability of interims, the analysis was also made across the quarters, 
type of BSE, and type of industry to examine any differences. 
 
Additional investigation was done to ensure that interims are comparable. 
The revenues, gross profit, profit before tax, and profit after tax figures in 
quarter one, two, three and four in a year were summed up and compared 
with the annual report of the corresponding year. The comparison was made 
because the annual financial reports were audited and the involvement of 
external auditors is believed to enhance the quality of financial reports. If the 
financial figures differ between interims and annual reports, there is a 
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possibility that PLC manipulated the accounting figures in interims, which 
may impair their quality.  
 
3.6.5 Scoring Procedures of the Overall Quality Value of Interims 
The overall quality of Malaysian interims is determined by the sum of all 
interims’ qualitative characteristics’ quality value. There are two approaches 
used by the present study to identify the quality of each qualitative 
characteristic of interims namely dichotomous and continuous values. The 
formula for each approach is detailed below. For the first approach, which 
used a dichotomous value, the equation for overall quality value of interims, 
which is abbreviated as QUALITY1, is: 
QUALITY1    = SCOTI1 + SCOFRS1 + SCOBMLR1 + SCOCOMP1 
SCOTI1   = Score of timeliness 
SCOFRS1            = Score of compliance with the FRS 134 
SCOBMLR1             = Score of compliance with the BMLR 
SCOCOMPARE1  = Score of comparability of interims  
 
The overall quality of interims by using the second approach, which used a 
continuous value, is abbreviated as QUALITY2 .The equation is: 
QUALITY2 = SCOTI2 + SCOFRS2 + SCOBMLR2 + SCOCOMPARE2 
SCOTI2    = Score of timeliness 
SCOFRS2  = Score of compliance with the FRS 134 
SCOBMLR2   = Score of compliance with the BMLR 
SCOCOMPARE2 = Score of comparability of interims  
 
Apart from determining the overall quality value of interims in general, the 
quality value of interims was also assessed across the quarters, type of 
BSE, and types of industries to determine any differences. Unlike the US, 
Malaysian interims are not subject to audit reviews. Due to the absence of 
audit reviews, the present study cannot use any audit variables to determine 
the influence of audit reviews on the quality of interims. Therefore, a 
statistical test is not recommended because there is no variation of variables 
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to do the analysis. Consequently, the present study uses the scale in Table 
3.3 to determine the level of quality of interims. The basic rule to follow is 
that a higher quality score indicates a higher quality of interims. 
 
Table 3.6 The Level of Quality of Interims 
Score Quality Level 
3.51-4.00 Very High 
3.01-3.50 High 
2.51-3.00 Moderate 
2.00-2.50 Low 
<1.99 Very Low 
 
3.7 Measurements of Corporate Governance on the Quality of Interims 
Corporate governance is a set of policies and guidelines which affects the 
way a company is managed by the BOD. Corporate governance is important 
because the BOD help to monitor and control the behaviour of senior 
managers and protect the shareholders’ interests (Beekes et. al, 2004). 
Improved corporate governance and stronger regulatory controls have been 
found to assist Malaysia and some other countries to recover from financial 
crisis (Vichitsarawang, 2010).  
  
Directors are professionals from various educational backgrounds and they 
bring depth and diversity in experience, expertise, and perspectives to the 
company’s business operations. A BOD size and other characteristics (e.g. 
membership composition) appear to be an important factor in determining 
the effectiveness of corporate governance (DeZoort et al., 2002; Lin et al., 
2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Jackling and Johl, 2009; and Carter et al., 
2010). Epstein and Roy (2010) also highlighted that the frequency of a BOD 
meetings, the percentage of directors who are independent and financially 
literate, the number of boards that the directors serve on (corporate 
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governance expertise), and the diversity of board members in terms of race 
and gender are important for BOD to perform their duties effectively. 
 
According to the suggestions drawn from the previous research (e.g. 
Mohiuddin and Karbhari, 2010; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Jackling and Johl, 
2009), the present study has investigated the influence of corporate 
governance on the quality of interims by assessing CGC, which are the 
frequency of BOD meetings, independence, financial literacy, corporate 
governance expertise and ethnicity of directors. To answer the second 
research question, this section firstly describes the measures for each CGC 
which are detailed in Table 3.7. 
 
Table 3.7 Measures of Corporate Governance Variables 
Variables Measures 
1 Frequency of BOD 
meetings 
The number of meetings held by BOD each year. 
2 Independence The proportion of independent non-executive 
directors on the board and is expressed as a 
percentage. 
3 Financial expertise The proportion of directors with financial 
expertise on the board and is measured as a 
percentage. 
4 Corporate 
governance expertise 
The proportion of directors with corporate 
governance expertise which is to hold more than 
one directorship on the board and is measured in 
percentage. 
5 Ethnicity The proportion of Bumiputra directors on the 
board and is measured in percentage. 
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3.8 Statistical Tests 
The present study employs the Statistical Packages for Social Science 
(SPSS) software program to analyse the data scientifically and determine 
the hypotheses (which were developed in Section 3.3). The data were firstly 
examined prior to conducting the analysis. The process of examining the 
data, checking the reliability of the data, the types and justification to use the 
statistical tests to analyse the data namely univariate, bivariate, and 
multivariate analyses are detailed in the subsection which follow. 
 
3.8.1 Examination of Data 
The examination of data prior to analysis is essential because any missing 
data, errors and outliers will distort the statistical results if no corrections are 
made. The missing data were verified by inspecting the frequencies of each 
variable. If the total number (N) is not equal to 116 for each variable in every 
quarter, then there is an existence of missing data. Data errors were 
investigated by running the descriptive analysis and checking the minimum 
and maximum number for each variable. The outliers are examined by 
inspecting the boxplot. The outliers’ points appear as little circles with an ID 
number attached to them.  
 
No missing data and errors have been found for each variable in the present 
study. However, several points are found to be outliers. The raw data were 
checked again to ensure that the outliers’ points are genuine and not due to 
input errors. The present study checked the 5% trimmed mean in the 
descriptive table produced by SPSS after the outliers were found to be 
genuine. The original mean and the 5% trimmed mean were compared to 
identify whether the outliers’ values have a significant influence on the 
original mean. The present study found that the difference between the 
original mean and 5% trimmed mean was insignificant for all variables 
except for company size. These results indicate that the outliers’ values 
were not extreme and did not influence the original mean value. Therefore, 
the outliers were retained and not removed from the data. There was a 
   
- 135 - 
 
substantial range in company size between the smallest and the largest 
value. Therefore, similar to prior studies, the company size proxy by the 
amount of assets owned by the company was transformed to log asset.  
 
3.8.2 Reliability of the Data Scale 
Using a reliable data scale is important in a research study (Pallant, 2005). 
Cronbach’s Alpha was used to measure the internal consistency of the 
research instruments. The Cronbach’s Alpha value of 0.794 in Table 3.8 
indicates the reliability status of all 68 variables in the present study. Based 
on Nunnally’s (1960) criteria, the data is considered to be reliable if 
Cronbach’s Alpha value is more than 60%. Therefore, the Cronbach’s Alpha 
value of 0.794 or 79.4% indicates that all the data used in the present study 
is reliable. The impact of removing each item from the scale is shown in 
Appendix 3-2. The Cronbach’s Alpha value is still more than 70% for all 
variables if one of the variables is removed from the data. Therefore, these 
values further confirm the reliability of data used in the present study. 
 
Table 3.8 Reliability test  
Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Cronbach’s Alpha Based on Standardised 
Items 
No. of 
Items 
 .866  .794  68 
 
3.8.3 Univariate Analysis 
Univariate, or one variable, analysis was used in this study to investigate the 
quality of interims every quarter. Univariate analysis is presented by 
descriptive statistics, which aim to generate summary information on the 
distribution of all variables, variability and the central tendency of the 
continuous variables. The descriptive statistics showed the mean, median, 
mode, standard deviation, variance, range, minimum, maximum, kurtosis, 
and skewness for each variable. The descriptive statistics were presented 
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across quarters, the type of BSE, and types of industries, apart from the 
general descriptive statistics, to investigate any differences.   
 
Before proceeding with the bivariate and multivariate analysis, a diagnostic 
test was conducted on all of the incorporated variables in the present study. 
The parametric tests were chosen to analyse the data. One of the conditions 
to use the parametric tests is to have normal distribution variables. The 
normal distribution of each variable was checked by conducting an Explore 
analysis. Three results produced by SPSS were used to analyse the normal 
distribution which are:  
1) Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests;  
2) Skewness and kurtosis; and,  
3) Histograms.  
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests were found to be significant for 
all variables, which indicate that all of the variables were not normally 
distributed. The skewness values show that all of the qualitative items are 
negatively skewed since most PLC are inclined to publish interims at the end 
of the allowable period of 60 days, have a high compliance score with the 
interim reporting standards, and high comparability ranking score of interims. 
All corporate governance and control variables are positively skewed, except 
for the corporate governance expertise of directors and profitability. 
However, the degree of skewness varies and becomes an arbitrary to 
determine which value renders the non -normality of data. Finally, a 
histogram (which is a graphical representation of each variable) is compared 
with the normal curve. Independence, ethnicity, and size of BOD are the only 
variables that are normally distributed.  
 
Previous researchers have either transformed the non-normal distribution 
data to make them normally distributed or they have used non-parametric 
tests, which are free from any assumptions to utilise it. The methods used by 
the previous researchers to achieve a normal distribution variable are an art 
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and depends on the shape of the distribution (Pallant, 2005). However, 
many researchers have suggested not using the transformed data since the 
analyses were drawn from the transformed data and not the raw or original 
data. Additionally, the results obtained from the transformed data have to be 
carefully interpreted since the variables are completely new and different 
from the original data.  
 
Regarding non-parametric tests (as suggested by its name), there are no 
parameters used to measure the actual difference between the populations 
(Dallal, 2000). The non-parametric tests also throw away information 
because they discard the actual values and ignore the sign test (if the value 
is negative) by ranking the data in order from the lowest to the highest value 
(Dallal, 2000). Therefore, non-parametric tests tend to be less powerful 
because they may not detect differences or relationships when they actually 
exist (Motulsky, 1995; Pallant, 2005). 
 
Hair et al. (2010) suggested that normality can have a serious effect on a 
small sample size and the impact diminishes when the sample size reach 
200 cases or more. Skewness will not make a substantive difference in the 
analysis with a reasonable sample size (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2011). 
Therefore, the present study pooled interims data every quarter in each year 
of 2007 and 2008 in order to have a larger sample size and reduced the 
impact of non-normal distribution variables. Annaert et al. (2002) also pooled 
data in their studies. In addition, the pooling of data were done by following 
Pallant’s (2005) suggestion that sample sizes influence the statistical 
significance results of Pearson “r” and larger sizes will generate more 
generalisable results.  
 
According to the Stata web books, dependent and independent (predictor) 
variables need not be normally distributed in order to conduct a linear 
regression analysis; only the residuals need to be normally distributed to 
have a valid hypothesis test. Consequently, the present study did not 
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transform all non-normally distributed variables, except company size (as 
mentioned earlier). However, when regression analyses were done, non-
transformation of all variables failed to produce normally distributed residuals 
for timeliness and compliance with the FRS 134 regressions. The present 
study has to rank timeliness and compliance with FRS 134 to obtain 
normally distributed residuals. Ignoring the sign test is not an issue for these 
variables because all of the data are positive and continuous from zero to 
infinity. In addition to descriptive statistics, the present study has used t-test 
to check whether the qualitative characteristics of interims are within the 
desired values.  
 
3.8.4 Bivariate Analysis 
Bivariate, or two variables analysis was conducted in this study to identify a 
significant relationship between two variables, and discover the direction and 
strength of association between them. A Pearson correlation coefficient was 
used to determine the association between two variables. One of the 
Pearson correlation coefficient’s conditions is to use continuous or 
dichotomous variables. All of the incorporated variables in the present study 
are continuous variables, except for the comparability of the interims. The 
ordinal values of comparability of interims were transformed to dichotomous 
variables, where 0 and 1 denote non-comparable and comparable interims, 
respectively.  
 
The Pearson correlation coefficient (r) values ranged from -1 to +1. The 
negative correlation indicates an increase in one variable and a decrease in 
the other while positive correlation indicates an increase in two variables 
measured. Ignoring the sign, the absolute value of Pearson “r” indicates the 
strength of relationship between two variables. Zero and one value indicates 
none and perfect relationship between the two variables, respectively, or 
shows a weak and strong relationship between the two variables, 
respectively.  
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The Pearson correlation coefficient was used to identify the direction, 
significance and strength of relationship between:  
1) the qualitative characteristics of interims;  
2) the corporate governance characteristics of BOD (CGCB);  
3) the control variables;  
4) the qualitative characteristics of interims and the CGCB;  
5) the qualitative characteristics of interims and the control variables; 
and,  
6) the CGCB and the control variables.  
 
The objective to determine whether there exists a relationship between the 
qualitative characteristics is to identify whether:  
1) PLC that publish interims more timely have higher compliance with 
the FRS 134 and the BMLR, or vice versa;  
2) PLC that publish interims more timely have higher comparability score 
of interims, or vice versa; and,  
3) PLC that have higher comparability score of interims have higher 
compliance with the FRS 134 and the BMLR, or vice versa.  
 
The present study also investigates the interrelationship of CGC as well as 
control variables. The purpose to investigate these relationships is to identify 
whether the CGC and control variables are associated with each other. The 
associations between the qualitative characteristics of interims and 
corporate governance of BOD, as well as control variables, answer the 
second research question of the present study that is to investigate whether 
CGC and control variables are associated with qualitative characteristics of 
interims. 
 
3.8.5 Multivariate Analysis 
Multivariate analysis is an extension of bivariate analysis where more than 
two variables are used for the analysis. The Pearson correlation coefficients 
only identify the direction, significance, and strength of relationship between 
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two variables and it does not determine the causal relationship between 
those variables. Therefore, multiple regression analysis is used to examine 
the causal relationship of independent variables on dependent variables. In 
addition, multiple regression analysis explores the predictive ability of a set 
of independent variables on dependent variables and it identifies which 
variable is the best predictor of dependent variable (Pallant, 2005). 
 
In order to have a reliable analysis, the assumptions of multiple regressions 
namely, sample size, outliers, multicollinearity, normality, linearity and 
homoscedasticity of residuals were checked. Sample size is an issue 
because larger sample size will generate more generalizable results 
(Pallant, 2005). For a reliable equation of multiple regression analysis, 
Stevens (1996) recommends fifteen subjects per predictor and Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2001) suggests the following formula: N > 50 + 8m, where m is 
the number of predictors. There are nine predictors in the present study. 
Following the formulas of Stevens (1996) and Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), 
the recommended minimum sample size for multiple regression analysis for 
the present study is 135 and 122 subjects. The actual sample size for the 
present study is more than that suggested by Stevens (1996) and 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2001), which is 464 subjects for each year of 2007 
and 2008 and 928 for the pool data. 
 
As suggested by Pallant (2005), the outliers in this study were checked by 
inspecting the Cook’s and Mahalanobis distance in the Residuals 
Diagnostics table produced by the multiple regression analysis. Tabachnick 
and Fidell (2001) suggest that a value of Cook’s distance above 1 indicates 
that the outliers have an undue influence on the results of the multiple 
regression models as a whole and the outliers need to be removed. The 
present study found that that the Cook’s distance is above 1 for multiple 
regressions of timeliness and the BMLR in 2007 and pool years due to one 
offending outlier. Therefore, this sole outlier was removed from the multiple 
regression analyses of timeliness and the BMLR in 2007 and the pool data 
   
- 141 - 
 
which then caused N to be 463 and 927 in 2007 and pool years, 
respectively. 
 
In this study, multicollinearity was checked from the Coefficients table 
produced by SPSS after conducting the multiple regression analysis. 
Tolerance values smaller than 0.1 and Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) values 
above 10 indicate the existence of multicollinearity. According to Pallant 
(2005), multicollinearity may also exist when independent variables are 
highly correlated, of which Pearson “r” is above 0.7. After the tolerance, VIF 
values and Pearson r were checked, no multicollinearity was found in the 
multiple regression analyses of the quality of interims. 
 
The normality, linearity, and homoscedasticity of residuals were checked by 
inspecting the residuals’ scatterplot and the normal probability plot of the 
regression standardised residuals (Pallant, 2005). A normal distribution of 
residuals (which is presented by a reasonably straight diagonal line) 
indicates that there are no major deviations from the normality assumption.  
 
After meeting all assumptions of multiple regression analysis, four basic 
multiple regression models were developed (which is one model for each 
qualitative characteristic). These four models are called Basic Model 1 
(timeliness), Basic Model 2 (compliance with the FRS 134), Basic Model 3 
(compliance with the BMLR), and Basic Model 4 (comparability of interims). 
The equations for these models are as follows: 
 
Basic Model 1 
TIME = β0 +β1MTGD + β2INDEPD + β3FINLITD + β4GOVD + 
β5ETHNICD + β6SIZECOM + β7PROFIT + β8LEVERAGE + 
β9SIZEBOD + Є 
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Basic Model 2 
FRS134     = β0 +β1MTGD + β2INDEPD + β3FINLITD + β4GOVD + 
β5ETHNICD + β6SIZECOM + β7PROFIT + β8LEVERAGE + 
β9SIZEBOD + Є 
 
Basic Model 3 
BMLR        = β0 +β1MTGD + β2INDEPD + β3FINLITD + β4GOVD + 
β5ETHNICD + β6SIZECOM + β7PROFIT + β8LEVERAGE + 
β9SIZEBOD + Є 
 
Basic Model 4 
COMPARE  = β0 +β1MTGD + β2INDEPD + β3FINLITD + β4GOVD + 
β5ETHNICD + β6SIZECOM + β7PROFIT + β8LEVERAGE + 
β9SIZEBOD + Є 
 
Where: 
TIME  =  Timeliness 
FRS 134 = Compliance with the FRS 134  
BMLR  = Compliance with the BMLR 
COMPARE = Comparability of interims’ profit and loss  
MTGD  =  Frequency of BOD meetings 
INDEPD  = Independence of directors 
FINLITD  =  Financial literacy of directors 
GOVD =  Corporate governance expertise of directors 
ETHNICD =  Ethnicity of directors 
SIZECOM  =  Company size. 
PROFIT =  Profitability 
LEVERAGE  =  Leverage. 
SIZEBOD  =  Size of BOD 
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The statistical results were interpreted to identify the impact of corporate 
governance and control variables on the quality of interims. The R2 for each 
model was identified to determine how much independent and control 
variables in each model explained the variance in each dependent variable. 
The standardised coefficient’s values in the Coefficient table indicate which 
independent or control variables mostly predict the dependent variable. The 
largest value of the Beta coefficient is the strongest contribution to the 
dependent variable when the variance explained by other variables is 
controlled for (Pallant, 2005). 
 
3.8.6 Additional Analysis 
As described in the literature review in Chapter Two, seasonality is one of 
the important factors to be disclosed in interims. Due to its importance, the 
present study did an additional analysis to ensure that the seasonality in 
interims is insignificant, as claimed by all PLC. A one-way repeated 
measures ANOVA was done to analyse the seasonality or cyclicality of the 
business operations. This test checked whether the PLC revenue differs 
across all quarters and years, and across the type of BSE.  
 
Apart from the one-way repeated measures ANOVA, the present study 
conducted three additional tests of multiple regression analysis. The aim of 
this test is to determine the sensitivity and robustness of the initial results of 
basic multiple regression analyses. The first additional test is to add new 
independent variables in the basic multiple regression models. The aim of 
this test is to examine the effect of adding new variables on all basic 
regression models. The new independent variables are the frequency of 
audit committee meetings, independence, corporate governance expertise, 
financial literacy and ethnicity of the audit committee members. The second 
additional test is to replace the CGCB with Corporate Governance of Audit 
Committee members (CGCA) to identify which group of variables has more 
influence on all qualitative characteristics of interims. The final additional test 
regresses CGCB, CGCA, and control variables individually to identify which 
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groups of variables have more influence on the qualitative characteristics of 
interims. The model specifications for additional tests are as follows: 
 
For the first additional analysis, the equations of Basic Model 1, 2, 3 and 4 
are replaced with Model 1A, 2A, 3A and 4A when CGCA are added. The 
equations for these models are as follows: 
Model 1A 
TIME        = β0 +β1MTGD + β2INDEPD + β3FINLITD + β4GOVD + 
β5ETHNICD + β6MTGAC + β7INDEPAC + β8FINLITAC + 
β9GOVAC + β10ETHNICAC + β11SIZECOM + β12PROFIT + 
β13LEVERAGE + β14SIZEBOD + Є 
 
Model 2A 
FRS 134     = β0 + β1MTGD + β2INDEPD + β3FINLITD + β4GOVD + 
β5ETHNICD + β6MTGAC + β7INDEPAC + β8FINLITAC + 
β9GOVAC + β10ETHNICAC + β11SIZECOM + β12PROFIT + 
β13LEVERAGE + β14SIZEBOD + Є 
 
Model 3A  
BMLR         = β0 + β1MTGD + β2INDEPD + β3FINLITD + β4GOVD + 
β5ETHNICD + β6MTGAC + β7INDEPAC + β8FINLITAC + 
β9GOVAC + β10ETHNICAC + β11SIZECOM + β12PROFIT + 
β13LEVERAGE + β14SIZEBOD + Є 
 
Model 4A 
COMPARE  = β0 + β1MTGD + β2INDEPD + β3FINLITD + β4GOVD + 
β5ETHNICD + β6MTGAC + β7INDEPAC + β8FINLITAC + 
β9GOVAC + β10ETHNICAC + β11SIZECOM + β12PROFIT + 
β13LEVERAGE + β14SIZEBOD + Є 
Where: 
TIME  =  Timeliness 
FRS 134 = Compliance with the FRS 134  
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BMLR  = Compliance with the BMLR 
COMPARE = Comparability of interims  
MTGD  =  Frequency of BOD meetings 
INDEPD  = Independence of directors 
FINLITD  =  Financial literacy of directors 
GOVD  =  Corporate Governance expertise of directors  
ETHNICD =  Ethnicity of directors 
MTGAC         =  Frequency of audit committee meetings 
INDEPAC  = Independence of audit committee 
FINLITAC  =  Financial literacy of audit committee 
GOVAC =  Governance expertise of audit committee 
ETHNICAC  =  Ethnicity of audit committee 
SIZECOM  =  Company’s size. 
PROFIT  =  Profitability 
LEVERAGE  =  Leverage. 
SIZEBOD  =  Size of BOD 
  
For the second additional tests, CGCB in the basic models was replaced 
with CGCA. The equations of Basic Model 1, 2, 3 and 4 are replaced with 
Model 1AA, 2AA, 3AA and 4AA. The equations for all models are as follows: 
Model1AA 
TIME         = β0 + β2MTGAC + β3INDEPAC + β4FINLITAC + β5GOVAC + 
β6ETHNICAC + β7SIZECOM + β8PROFIT + β9LEVERAGE + 
β10SIZEBOD + Є 
 
Model 2AA  
FRS 134  = β0 + β2MTGAC + β3INDEPAC + β4FINLITAC + β5GOVAC + 
β6ETHNICAC + β7SIZECOM + β8 PROFIT + β9LEVERAGE + 
β10SIZEBOD + Є 
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Model 3AA 
BMLR      = β0+ β2MTGAC+ β3INDEPAC+ β4FINLITAC+ β5GOVAC+ 
β6ETHNICAC+ β7SIZECOM+β8 PROFIT+ β9LEVERAGE+ 
β10SIZEBOD+ Є 
 
Model 4AA 
TIME       = β0 + β2MTGAC + β3INDEPAC + β4FINLITAC + β5GOVAC + 
β6ETHNICAC + β7SIZECOM + β8PROFIT + β9LEVERAGE + 
β10SIZEBOD + Є 
Where: 
TIME  =  Timeliness 
FRS 134 = Compliance with the FRS 134  
BMLR  = Compliance with the BMLR 
COMPARE = Comparability of interims  
MTGAC         =  Frequency of audit committee meetings 
INDEPAC  = Independence of audit committee 
FINLITAC  =  Financial literacy of audit committee 
GOVAC =  Governance expertise of audit committee 
ETHNICAC  =  Ethnicity of audit committee 
SIZECOM  =  Company’s size. 
PROFIT  =  Profitability 
LEVERAGE  =  Leverage. 
SIZEBOD  =  Size of BOD 
 
For the third additional analysis, CGCB, CGCA, and control variables were 
individually regressed to determine which group have a more significant 
influence on the quality of interims. The equations of Basic Model 1, 2, 3 and 
4 are replaced with Model 1AAA, 2AAA, 3AAA and 4AAA for CGCB, 1BBB, 
2BBB, 3BBB and 4BBB for CGCA and 1CCC, 2CCC, 3CCC and CCC for 
control variables. The equations of multiple regression models are as 
follows: 
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Model 1AAA 
TIME = β0+ β1MTGD + β2INDEPD + β3FINLITD + β4GOVD + 
β5ETHNICD + Є 
Model 1BBB 
TIME  = β0+ β2MTGAC +β3INDEPAC+ β4FINLITAC + β5GOVAC + 
β6ETHNICAC + Є 
Model1CCC 
TIME  = β0 + β2SIZECOM + β3PROFIT + β4LEVERAGE + 
β5SIZEBOD + Є 
Model 2AAA 
FRS134  = β0 + β1MTGD + β2INDEPD + β3FINLITD + β4GOVD + 
β5ETHNICD + Є 
Model 2BBB 
FRS134    = β0+ β2MTGAC + β3INDEPAC + β4FINLITAC + β5GOVAC +  
β6ETHNICAC + Є 
Model 2CCC 
FRS 134    = β0 + β2SIZECOM + β3PROFIT + β4LEVERAGE + 
β5SIZEBOD + Є 
Model 3AAA 
BMLR   = β0 + β1MTGD + β2INDEPD + β3FINLITD + β4GOVD + 
β5ETHNICD + Є 
Model 3BBB 
BMLR        = β0 + β2MTGAC + β3INDEPAC + β4FINLITAC + β5GOVAC + 
β6ETHNICAC + Є 
Model 3CCC 
BMLR        = β0 + β2SIZECOM + β3PROFIT + β4LEVERAGE + 
β5SIZEBOD + Є 
Model4AAA 
COMPARE  = β0 + β1MTGD + β2INDEPD + β3FINLITD + β4GOVD + 
β5ETHNICD + Є 
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Model4BBB 
COMPARE  = β0 + β2MTGAC + β3INDEPAC + β4FINLITAC + β5GOVAC + 
β6ETHNICAC + Є 
Model 4CCC 
COMPARE  = β0 + β2SIZECOM + β3PROFIT + β4LEVERAGE + 
β5SIZEBOD + Є 
 
Where: 
TIME  =  Timeliness 
FRS 134 = Compliance with the FRS 134  
BMLR  = Compliance with the BMLR 
COMPARE = Comparability of interims  
MTGD  =  Frequency of BOD meetings 
INDEPD  = Independence of directors 
FINLITD  =  Financial literacy of directors 
GOVD           =  Corporate Governance expertise of directors 
ETHNICD =  Ethnicity of directors 
MTGAC         =  Frequency of audit committee meetings 
INDEPAC  = Independence of audit committee 
FINLITAC  =  Financial literacy of audit committee 
GOVAC =  Governance expertise of audit committee 
ETHNICAC  =  Ethnicity of audit committee 
SIZECOM  =  Company’s size. 
PROFIT =  Profitability 
LEVERAGE   =  Leverage. 
SIZEBOD  =  Size of BOD 
 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter initially discussed the research framework and the research 
questions of the present study. The two objectives of the present study are 
to determine the quality of interims in the absence of audit reviews and to 
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investigate the impact of corporate governance on the quality of interims. 
The quality of interims was assessed by examining four qualitative 
characteristics of interims, which are timeliness, compliance with the FRS 
134, compliance with the BMLR, and comparability of interims’ profit and 
loss. The corporate governance variables are proxied by the frequency of 
BOD meetings, independence, financial literacy, corporate governance 
expertise, and the ethnicity of directors. The hypotheses are developed 
based on the research questions. The hypotheses are supported by findings 
of preceding research.   
 
An overview of the data collection and the procedures to select the sample 
are then described. This is followed by the measurements and instruments 
to find the quality of interims and the influence of corporate governance on 
the quality of interims. The two objectives of the present study are assessed 
by hypotheses and statistical analysis. The statistical analyses include 
univariate, bivariate and multivariate analyses. Univariate analysis is 
presented by descriptive statistics, which generate summary information of 
all incorporated variables in the present study. The descriptive statistics are 
then used in the research formulae to determine the quality of interims. 
Bivariate and multivariate analyses are used to determine the impact of 
corporate governance on the quality of interims. The Pearson correlation 
coefficients and multiple regression analyses are the instruments that are 
used for bivariate and multivariate analyses, respectively. The Pearson 
correlation discovers the direction and strength of association between 
corporate governance and quality of interims. However, the Pearson 
correlation does not determine the causal relationship between those 
variables. Therefore, multiple regression analysis was used to determine the 
causal relationship between those variables.  
 
Additional analyses were also done to determine the sensitivity and 
robustness of the initial results of basic multiple regression analyses on each 
qualitative characteristic of interims. The first test is to add new independent 
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variables, which is CGCA that consists of frequency of audit committee 
meetings, independence, financial literacy, corporate governance expertise, 
and the ethnicity of audit committee members. The second test is to replace 
CGCB with CGCA to identify which one has a more powerful influence on 
the quality of interims. The final test regresses CGCB, CGCA, and control 
variables individually to determine which group has the strongest effect on 
the quality of interims. The statistical results of all these analyses are 
discussed in Chapter Four. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the first and second empirical analysis of 
this study, which aims to evaluate the quality of interims by using the 
qualitative characteristics of interims and to ascertain the impact of 
Corporate Governance Characteristics (CGC) on the quality of interims. The 
data are analysed using the statistical methods that were discussed in 
chapter three, which are descriptive statistics and t-tests for the first 
empirical analysis and Pearson correlation coefficient and multiple 
regression analysis for the second empirical analysis. The dependent 
variable is quality of interims and it is comprised of timeliness, compliance 
with the FRS 134, compliance with the BMLR, and comparability of interims. 
The independent variables are CGC and they include the frequency of Board 
of Directors (BOD) meetings, independence, financial literacy, corporate 
governance expertise, and ethnicity of directors. In addition to the CGC, this 
study also incorporates control variables to identify their influence on the 
quality of interims. The control variables include company size, profitability, 
leverage, and the size of BOD.    
 
This chapter is organised as follows. The next section reports the quality of 
interims by firstly describing each qualitative characteristic of interims in 
descriptive statistics and t-test results. The descriptive statistics are 
presented either in graphs or tables and they are illustrated in general every 
quarter, across the first and second Boards of Stock Exchange (BSE), and 
across the types of industries to examine any differences. The quality of 
interims is then determined by using two approaches namely dichotomous 
and continuous methods. A Pearson product moment correlation is used to 
identify the relationship between quality of interims and CGC. However, 
because the Pearson correlation only exhibits association between two 
variables and does not signify the causal interrelationships among a set of 
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variables, the next section reports a further examination by using multiple 
regression analysis. In order to ascertain the credibility of initial results of 
multiple regression analyses, several additional tests were conducted and 
the results are presented towards the end of the chapter. The last section 
summarises the overall findings and concludes this chapter.  
4.2 The Quality of Interims 
Before determining the quality of interims, this section will first analyse the 
descriptive statistics of all variables as per Table 4.1. Detailed explanations 
are in Section 4.2.1 for dependent variable, Section 4.2.2 for independent 
variables and Section 4.2.3 for control variables. Section 4.2.4 explained the 
overall computation on the quality of interims. Apart from general 
explanation, this study reports the quality of interims across the first and 
second BSE, and types of industries to ascertain any dissimilarity. There are 
no missing values in every quarter and year. In total, 86 and 30 public listed 
companies (PLC) are from the first and second BSE, respectively. For these 
companies, 43, 21, 15, 11, 8, 8, 6, and 4 PLC are respectively from the 
industrial products, services, consumer, properties, plantations, construction, 
finance and technology industries. 
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Table 4.1 The Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
VARIABLES TIME FRS BMLR 
COM
PARE MTGD INDEPD FINLITD GOVD ETHNICD SIZECOM PROFIT 
LEVER
AGE 
SIZE 
BOD 
YEAR 2007 
N Valid 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 55.56 93.45 77.40 3.09 5.39 .4364 .2547 .6624 .3966 3.E+09 .07680 .24570 7.42 
Median 58.00 96.00 79.00 4.00 5.00 .4300 .2000 .7140 .3000 4.E+08 .07850 .18500 7.00 
Std. 
Deviation 
6.920 5.846 9.967 1.471 2.035 .11008 .15070 .26429 .25419 2.E+10 .426714 .386758 1.798 
Minimum 16 75 50 0 3 .17 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.E+07 -4.949 0.000 4 
Maximum 68 100 95 4 17 .71 .75 1.00 1.00 2.E+11 2.437 7.349 12 
YEAR 2008 
N Valid 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 464 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 54.83 91.88 77.15 3.34 5.38 .4505 .2666 .6716 .3828 2.91E+09 .02276 .23456 7.42 
Median 57.00 94.00 78.00 4.00 5.00 .4300 .2500 .7205 .3000 4.41E+08 .05200 .19600 7.00 
Std. 
Deviation 
7.191 6.532 9.442 1.321 1.908 .11998 .14351 .26180 .25498 1.77E+10 .552939 .199017 1.841 
Minimum 14 67 48 0 4 .22 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.36E+07 -8.385 0.000 3 
Maximum 91 100 95 4 17 .83 .67 1.00 1.00 1.96E+11 3.713 1.069 12 
Notes:  MTGD = Frequency of BOD meetings, INDEPD = Independence of Directors, FINLITD = Financial Literacy of Directors, GOVD = Governance 
Expertise of Directors, ETHNICD = Ethnicity of directors, SIZECOM = Company’ size, PROFIT = Profitability, LEVERAGE = Leverage. SIZEBOD = 
Size of BOD.
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4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable is the quality of interims. Four variables are used by 
the present study to assess the quality of interims, namely: timeliness, 
compliance with the FRS 134, compliance with the BMLR and comparability 
of interims. The explanation of each variable is described below. 
4.2.1.1 Timeliness 
The allowable time to publish Malaysian interims is 60 days. The one sample 
t-test was conducted to determine whether the timeliness to publish interims 
was more than the allowable time given. As presented in Table 4.2, 
timeliness is significant at p<0.01 every quarter, which indicates that mean 
timeliness was lower than the allowable period of 60 days. Similar with the 
previous studies (Lunt, 1982; Hussey and Woolfe, 1998; D’Arcy and 
Grabensberger, 2003; Ku Ismail and Chandler, 2004; Alias et al., 2009), the 
mean timeliness to publish interims of the present study is within the 
allowable period given. 
 
Table 4.2 Timeliness: One Sample Test  
Quarter Year 
Test Value = 60 
 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
t df 
Sig.  
(2-tailed) 
Mean 
Difference Lower Upper 
1 2007 -6.881 115 .000 -4.845 -6.24 -3.45 
2008 -6.538 115 .000 -4.871 -6.35 -3.40 
2 2007 -7.724 115 .000 -4.862 -6.11 -3.62 
2008 -6.959 115 .000 -4.750 -6.10 -3.40 
3 2007 -7.731 115 .000 -5.560 -6.98 -4.14 
2008 -9.722 115 .000 -6.741 -8.11 -5.37 
4 2007 -5.490 115 .000 -2.491 -3.39 -1.59 
2008 -8.426 115 .000 -4.319 -5.33 -3.30 
 
Figure 4.1 presents the mean number of days to publish interims. In 2007, 
the mean for four consecutive quarters are 55, 55, 54 and 58 days, while in 
2008, the means are 55, 55, 53 and 56 days. Malaysian PLC still pursues 
the conventional trend, which is the inclination to publish interims towards 
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the end of the allowable period of 60 days. This finding is similar with 
KuIsmail and Chandler (2004) and Lont and Sun (2007) but is contrary to 
that of Kross and Schroeder (1984) and Hussey and Woolfe (1998) who 
found that the US and the UK PLC were inclined to publish interims early 
and not towards the end of the allowable time period given. 
 
Figure 4.1 Mean of Timeliness 
 
Despite the absence of audit reviews, Malaysian PLC is still inclined to 
publish interims towards the end of the allowable period. Following the 
suggestion of Hussey and Woolfe (1998), there seems to be no association 
between timeliness to publish Malaysian interims and audit reviews. As 
suggested by the previous studies, the most plausible reasons to defer 
issuing Malaysian interims are due to a frequent release of financial reports 
(Gigler and Hemmer, 1998; Butler et al., 2007) and a reluctance to release 
bad financial information (Givoly and Palmon, 1982). This is evidenced by 
non-application of accounting software such as XBRL that was introduced by 
the US SEC to its PLC to expedite the financial reporting process and losses 
incurred by most PLC in the second BSE (refer to section 4.2.3). 
Nonetheless, involvement of external auditors may enrich the quality of 
interims (Raedy and Helms, 2002). 
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With the exception of quarter four, the mean number of days to publish 
interims is quite consistent in every quarter and year. The mean timeliness 
for the first two quarters in 2007 is exactly similar with the mean of the first 
two quarters in 2008. For the next two quarters, the number of days to 
publish interims reduced by one and two days in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively. This finding is quite similar with Hussey and Wolfe (1998), and 
D’Arcy and Grabensberger (2003) who found that timeliness improved over 
the period but the difference insignificantly differs. Therefore, the present 
study can conclude that timeliness to publish interims is quite consistent in 
every quarter and year for Malaysian PLC.  
 
Due to the consistency of timeliness, changes in the mean number of days 
to publish interims between one quarter and immediate quarter, and 
between one quarter and the succeeding corresponding quarter, are very 
insignificant. For example, the number of days to publish interims in quarter 
two and three in 2007 is 55 days and 54 days, respectively, and the number 
of days to publish interims in quarter two in 2008 is 55 days. Therefore, the 
difference in the number of days to publish interims for quarter two and the 
immediate quarter is one day only, and for the succeeding corresponding 
quarter there is no difference in the number of days to publish interims.  
 
The consistency of timeliness also causes an insignificant difference in the 
most and the least quarter to publish interims. The most and the least timely 
quarter to publish interims is quarter three and four, respectively, which are 
54 and 58 days in 2007 and 53 and 56 days in 2008. Most previous studies 
also found that the least timely quarter to publish interims was in quarter four 
(Ku Ismail and Chandler, 2004; Alias et al., 2009) and the deferment in 
publishing interims in quarter four was due to the time required by the 
management to make accounting adjustments before the financial reports 
were due to be audited.  
 
   
- 157 - 
 
Although quarter four is the least timely quarter to be published, the present 
study disagrees with the previous studies’ finding that the deferment in 
quarter four was due to the time required by the management to make 
accounting adjustments. This disagreement is due to the minimal differences 
between the most and the least timely quarter to publish interims, which are 
four days in 2007 and three days in 2008. A further investigation is required 
to support this finding and this is explained in further detail in Section 
4.2.1.3.  
 
Table 4.3 reports the range of timeliness in every quarter. Although the 
mean timeliness insignificantly differs between quarters and years, there is a 
substantial range between the minimum and maximum number of days to 
publish interims. The statistical results reveal that around 1% PLC publish 
interims within two weeks; 0.9% to 3.5% PLC publish interims less than or 
equal to 30 days; 83.6% to 98.3% PLC publish interims more than 30 days 
after each quarter ends; and 0% to 14% PLC publish interims more than 60 
days after each quarter ends. The statistical results indicate that the 
percentage of PLC that publishes interims within the allowable period of 60 
days is very high in every quarter, which is between 86.2% and 100%. No 
PLC publish interims exceeding 60 days in quarter four in 2007 and quarter 
three in 2008. Ku Ismail and Chandler (2004) found that all except one PLC 
publish interims within the allowable period of 60 days. They also conclude 
that Malaysian PLC publishes interims on a timely basis.  
 
Another important finding to highlight is that PLC who publishes interims 
exceeding the allowable period of 60 days greatly reduced from the 
maximum of 13.8% in 2007 to 1.7% in 2008. The improvement of reporting 
lag indicates that timeliness to publish interims improves for Malaysian PLC. 
The reason is that Malaysian PLC may realise the importance to publish 
interims more timely for use by the users of financial reports.  
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Table 4.3 Range of Timeliness 
Number of  Days 
Q1 
2007 
% 
Q2 
2007 
% 
Q3 
2007 
% 
Q4 
2007 
% 
Q1 
2008 
% 
Q2 
2008 
% 
Q3 
2008 
% 
Q4 
2008 
% 
<= 20 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
21-30 1.7 0.0 2.6 1.7 1.7 2.6 2.6 0.0 
31-40 1.7 2.6 1.7 0.0 1.7 0.9 1.7 0.0 
41-50 7.8 10.3 10.3 2.6 8.6 8.6 23.3 7.8 
51-60 74.1 74.1 75.0 95.7 86.2 86.2 71.6 89.7 
61+ 13.8 12.1 9.5 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.0 1.7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Since the timeliness to publish interims is quite consistent for Malaysian 
PLC, the present study further investigates the timeliness according to the 
type of BSE. The one sample t-test in Table 4.4 shows that mean timeliness 
to publish interims is lower than the allowable period of 60 days in every 
quarter and in every year except the first quarter of 2008 for PLC in the 
second BSE. The timeliness is insignificant at p<0.01 and is due to non-
compliance with the timeliness to publish interims by one company (namely 
Industronic Bhd.) who published interims 90 days after the quarter ended. A 
large difference of 30 days from the allowable period to publish interims 
caused the p value to be insignificant. 
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Table 4.4 Timeliness: One Sample Test (BSE) 
Quarter Year Types of Board 
Test Value = 60 
 
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference 
t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Lower Upper 
1 2007 First BSE -6.337 85 .000 -5.512 -7.24 -3.78 
Second BSE -2.828 29 .008 -2.933 -5.05 -.81 
2008 First BSE -6.944 85 .000 -5.721 -7.36 -4.08 
Second BSE -1.530 29 .137 -2.433 -5.69 .82 
2 2007 First BSE -7.330 85 .000 -5.733 -7.29 -4.18 
Second BSE -2.942 29 .006 -2.367 -4.01 -.72 
2008 First BSE -6.344 85 .000 -5.547 -7.28 -3.81 
Second BSE -3.561 29 .001 -2.467 -3.88 -1.05 
3 2007 First BSE -7.487 85 .000 -6.779 -8.58 -4.98 
Second BSE -2.996 29 .006 -2.067 -3.48 -.66 
2008 First BSE -8.924 85 .000 -7.721 -9.44 -6.00 
Second BSE -4.645 29 .000 -3.933 -5.67 -2.20 
4 2007 First BSE -4.949 85 .000 -2.942 -4.12 -1.76 
Second BSE -3.598 29 .001 -1.200 -1.88 -.52 
2008 First BSE -7.097 85 .000 -4.674 -5.98 -3.36 
Second BSE -5.693 29 .000 -3.300 -4.49 -2.11 
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Figure 4.2 depicts the mean timeliness for Malaysian PLC across the BSE. 
PLC in the first BSE have higher capital than PLC in the second BSE. In 
tandem with the higher capital, the graph shows that mean timeliness for 
PLC in the first BSE is slightly lower than second BSE, which indicates that 
PLC in the first BSE publish interims more timely than second BSE. This 
result corresponds to the findings of the previous studies by Chambers and 
Penman (1984) and Ku Ismail and Chandler (2004). The plausible reason is 
that a larger amount of capital owned by companies empowered them to 
acquire more systematic accounting systems and hire accountants that are 
more professional. These factors may affect the capability of larger PLC, 
which is the first BSE to publish interims in a more timely manner. The 
present study’s result is contrary to the results of Lunt (1982), and Lont and 
Sun (2007) who found that timeliness between small and large PLC 
insignificantly differs.   
 
Figure 4.2 Timeliness: Mean (BSE) 
 
With regard to the timeliest and the latest quarter to publish interims, the 
quarters slightly differ between PLC in the first and second BSE. For PLC in 
the first BSE and in each year of 2007 and 2008, quarter three is the 
timeliest to publish interims and quarter four is the latest quarter to publish 
interims. For PLC in the second BSE, quarter one and four is the most and 
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the least timely to publish interims in 2007, and quarter three is the timeliest 
and quarters one and two are the least timely quarter to publish interims in 
2008. Although quarter four is not the least timely quarter to publish interims 
for PLC in the second BSE, quarter four is the least comparable interims. 
The low comparability score showed in Figure 4.8 and 4.9 in section 4.2.1.3 
evidence this. Therefore, this result supports this study’s disagreement that 
the deferment in quarter four is due to the time required by the management 
to make accounting adjustments before the financial year ends.   
 
As reported in Table 4.5, a further investigation revealed that PLC in the first 
BSE has a greater range of timeliness than PLC in the second BSE. The 
greater range of timeliness is due to 1.2% PLC in the first BSE publishing 
interims within two weeks after each quarter period’s end and no PLC in the 
second BSE publishing interims less than 30 days every quarter. The 
minimum numbers of days to publish interims for PLC in the second BSE are 
inconsistent (i.e. between 34 and 52 days). 87% to 98% PLC in the first BSE 
publish interims between 30 days and 60 days after each quarter ends while 
for the second BSE, the percentages are between 70% and 100%. 
Consequently, PLC that publishes interims beyond the allowable period of 
60 days is higher for PLC in the second BSE. As PLC in the second BSE 
own a lower amount of capital, the statistical results further support the 
former conclusion that larger PLC published interims in a more timely 
manner than smaller PLC. Nevertheless, the number of PLC in the first and 
the second BSE that published interims exceeding 60 days were greatly 
reduced from 2007 to 2008.  
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Table 4.5 Range of Timeliness (BSE) 
Type of 
BSE 
Number 
of Days 
Q1 
2007 
% 
Q2 
2007 
% 
Q3 
2007 
% 
Q4 
2007 
% 
Q1 
2008 
% 
Q2 
2008 
% 
Q3 
2008 
% 
Q4 
2008 
% 
First BSE <= 20 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
 21=30 2.3 0.0 3.5 2.3 2.3 3.5 3.5 0.0 
 31-40 1.2 3.5 2.3 0.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.0 
 41-50 9.3 11.6 12.8 3.5 9.3 9.3 27.9 8.1 
 51-60 76.7 77.9 74.4 94.2 86.0 83.7 66.3 89.5 
 61+ 9.3 5.8 5.8 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 1.2 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Second 
BSE 31-40 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 3.3 0.0 
 41-50 3.3 6.7 3.3 0.0 6.7 6.7 10.0 6.7 
 51-60 66.7 63.3 76.7 100 86.7 93.3 86.7 90.0 
 61+ 26.7 30.0 20.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 3.3 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Table 4.6 depicts the mean and range of timeliness according to the types of 
industries. The mean timeliness insignificantly differs for PLC in different 
types of industries and is also towards the end of the allowable period of 60 
days, except for the finance and technology industries (the graphs on mean 
timeliness for each industry are given in Appendix 4-7). The mean timeliness 
for finance and technology industries in the present study is lower because a 
few PLC published interims within two and three weeks. Most previous 
studies did not include financial institutions in the sample because these 
companies have additional regulations to adhere to (such as the Banking 
Acts from the Central Bank). However, this study is more comprehensive 
and it includes financial institutions in the sample because all qualitative 
items investigated in this study applied to all PLC, regardless of the types of 
industries. Courtis (1976) and Bowrin (2008) support the finding of the 
present study that the financial institutions published financial reports more 
timely than non-financial institutions considering that the financial institutions 
have blue-chip stocks and are always in the eyes of prospective investors.   
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Table 4.6 Mean and Range of Timeliness by Industry 
Types of 
industries 
 
 Q1 2007 
Q2 
2007 
Q3 
2007 
Q4 
2007 
Q1 
2008 
Q2 
2008 
Q3 
2008 
Q4 
2008 
N Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
 Range Range Range Range Range Range Range Range 
Industrial 
products 
43 56 57 56 58 56 57 54 57 
 34 16 31 10 25 21 15 41 
Services 21 58 56 56 58 57 57 56 56 
 14 14 11 11 9 10 11 9 
Consumer 15 55 54 54 57 54 56 50 54 
 37 22 25 30 35 22 30 17 
Properties 11 58 56 55 58 55 53 55 56 
 14 14 18 10 15 35 15 6 
Plantations 8 51 53 53 58 54 55 54 56 
 20 16 14 3 15 11 10 4 
Construction 8 55 57 53 58 57 55 54 55 
 9 7 35 8 8 14 15 8 
Finance 6 48 51 49 52 48 49 45 50 
 43 43 44 39 46 43 45 38 
Technology 4 47 46 46 57 54 44 44 57 
 35 28 31 9 61 31 28 3 
 
The most and the least timely quarter to publish interims for PLC in various 
types of industries varies, mostly on the third and fourth quarters. In 2008, 
quarter four is not the least timely quarter for certain industries (such as 
services, consumer and construction). Despite the better timeliness to 
publish interims, the technology industry still published quarter four interims 
towards the end of the allowable period of 60 days. The mean timeliness of 
the finance industry for the fourth quarter in 2007 and 2008 is respectively 8 
and 10 days earlier than the allowable time period given.  
 
The FRS 134 and the BMLR require PLC to publish interims not more than 
60 days and two months, respectively. An exception is made in February 
because the actual number of days for every month in a calendar year is 
either 30 or 31 days. By following the two-month rule, the actual number of 
days for the first three quarters is more than 60 days (i.e. 61, 62 and 61 days 
consecutively). For the final quarter, as the number of days in February 
differs, the actual number of days is 59 and 60 in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively. If PLC follows the two-month rule, then they possibly do not 
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count the actual number of days allowable to publish interims and, therefore, 
they do not follow the period of 60 days rule of FRS 134.  
 
Figure 4.3 presents the percentage of PLC that complies with timeliness by 
comparing the FRS 134 and BMLR specific requirement. The compliance 
rate with timeliness is remarkably high in all quarters, ranging from 86% to 
100% for compliance with the FRS 134 requirement and from 98% to 100% 
for the BMLR requirement. For the FRS 134, the highest compliance rate is 
quarter four in 2007 and quarter three in 2008, whilst the lowest compliance 
rate is quarter one in 2007 and quarter four in 2008. Therefore, no specific 
quarter appears to be fully or least complied with timeliness based on the 
FRS 134 requirements. All quarters are fully complied with the BMLR 
requirement, except quarter one in 2007 and quarter one, two and four in 
2008.  
 
Figure 4.3 Timeliness: Compliance with the FRS 134 and the BMLR 
 
Based on Figure 4.3, a sizeable non-compliance frequency of the FRS 134 
in 2007 and full compliance score with the BMLR in most quarters evidenced 
that PLC are more inclined to follow a two-month rule of the BMLR than the 
allowable period of 60 days of the FRS 134. However, the frequency of non-
compliance with timeliness by following either the FRS 134 or the BMLR is 
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quite similar in 2008. The PLC either comprehends the misinterpretation 
meanings of the two-month rule or timeliness has improved over time. 
 
Figure 4.4 portrays the compliance rate of timeliness for the first and second 
BSE by following the FRS 134 rule. The range of compliance rate between 
the first and second BSE insignificantly differs, except the first three quarters 
in 2007 where PLC in the first BSE are more complied with the FRS 134 
than PLC in the second BSE.  
 
Figure 4.4 Timeliness: Compliance with the FRS 134 (BSE) 
 
 
With regard to non-compliance with the BMLR requirement, four PLC from 
the first BSE and one PLC from the second BSE did not comply with the 
two-month rule. This result indicates that non-compliance with the two-month 
rule of BMLR requirement is higher for PLC in the first BSE than PLC in the 
second BSE.  
 
Table 4.7 reports that a majority of PLC in different types of industries fully 
complied with the timeliness to publish interims by following the FRS 134 
rule. For example, plantations, construction, and finance industries fully 
complied with the FRS 134 rule of timeliness in every quarter and year. The 
present study also revealed that the number of days to publish interims 
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improved over the time period. For example, the compliance of the services, 
consumer, and property industries with the FRS 134 is less than 100% for 
the first three quarters in 2007 but increased to 100% for the remaining 
quarters and years. 
 
Table 4.7 Timeliness: Compliance Rate with the FRS 134 (Industry) 
Types of industries 
 
N 
Q1 
2007 
Q2 
2007 
Q3 
2007 
Q4 
2007 
Q1 
2008 
Q2 
2008 
Q3 
2008 
Q4 
2008 
Industrial products 43 74.4 79.1 90.7 100 100 97.7 100 95.3 
Services 21 85.7 95.2 90.5 100 100 100 100 100 
Consumer 15 86.7 80.0 86.7 100 100 100 100 100 
Properties 11 100 90.9 81.8 100 100 100 100 100 
Plantations 8 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Construction 8 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Finance 6 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Technology 4 100 100 75.0 100 75.0 100 100 100 
 
For non-compliance with the BMLR, four and one companies did not comply 
with the two-month rule of timeliness to publish interims and they are, 
respectively, from the industrial products and technology industries. 
4.2.1.2 Compliance with the Interim Reporting Standards (FRS 134 and 
BMLR) 
Compliance with the interim reporting standards requirements will make the 
published interims more relevant, reliable, comparable, and meaningful to 
the users of financial reports, especially the prospective investors. Malaysian 
PLC is required to comply with two types of accounting standards, namely 
the FRS 134 and the BMLR, to prepare interims. Similar to timeliness, the 
descriptive statistics of compliance with the FRS 134 and the BMLR are 
illustrated in general, across the type of BSE and across the types of 
industries, to determine any differences.  
 
Rahman and Ismail (2008) did not make analysis based on the types of 
interim reporting standards. Their research combined the FRS 134 and the 
BMLR requirements into an index. Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005) only 
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studied PLC compliance with the BMLR. Similar to Rahman and Ismail 
(2008), the present study makes analysis on both the FRS134 and the 
BMLR requirements. However, the present study segregated these 
requirements when forming the index.   
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.5, the present study found that the mean 
compliance score of the FRS 134 is moderately higher than the BMLR, 
which is between 92% and 94% for the FRS 134 and between 77% and 78% 
for the BMLR. The percentage insignificantly differs from the previous 
studies where the compliance rate for Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005a) and 
Rahman and Ismail (2008) ranged from 85% to 87%. Similar to timeliness, 
the compliance score with the FRS 134 and the BMLR is almost consistent 
throughout all of the quarters and years. Joshi and Bremser (2003), D’Arcy 
and Grabensberger (2003), Mangena and Taurigana (2007), and Rahman 
and Ismail (2008) also found that compliance with the interim reporting 
standards are high. Despite the absence of mechanisms set by the Bursa 
Malaysia to ensure that Malaysian PLC comply with the interim reporting 
standards, the compliance rate with the FRS 134 and the BMLR are quite 
high. This finding is different with McEwen and Schwartz (1992), Nieuwoudt 
and Koen (1999), and Glaum and Street (2002) who found that most PLC 
did not comply with the interim reporting standards and they concluded from 
this that the interims are not reliable. 
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Figure 4.5 Compliance Score with the FRS 134 and the BMLR  
 
 
Table 4.8 presents the range of compliance score with the FRS134 and the 
BMLR for every quarter and year. There is a substantial range between the 
minimum and maximum compliance score, especially with the BMLR. The 
minimum compliance score with the FRS 134 is 75% in 2007 and 67% in 
2008, and the maximum compliance score is 100% for both years. The 
minimum compliance score with the BMLR is very much lower (i.e. 50% in 
2007 and 48% in 2008). The average maximum compliance score with the 
BMLR is 95% in 2007 and 2008. No PLC has fully complied with the BMLR 
for both years, which is contrary to compliance with the FRS 134. Due to the 
lower minimum compliance score with the BMLR, there is a greater range of 
compliance score with the BMLR than the FRS 134.   
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Table 4.8 Range of Compliance Score with the FRS and the BMLR 
Compliance Score 
Q1 
2007 
% 
Q2 
2007 
% 
Q3 
2007 
% 
Q4 
2007 
% 
Q1 
2008 
% 
Q2 
2008 
% 
Q3 
2008 
% 
Q4 
2008 
% 
FRS134         
60-70 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
71 - 80 3.4 3.4 2.6 2.6 4.3 3.4 3.4 2.6 
81-90 23.3 19.8 19.8 15.5 34.5 34.5 32.8 33.6 
91-99 60.3 62.1 62.9 65.5 46.6 47.4 50.0 50.9 
100 12.9 14.7 14.7 16.4 13.8 13.8 12.9 12.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
BMLR         
<= 50 1.7 1.7 0.9 1.7 3.4 3.4 1.7 1.7 
51-60 7.8 6.9 4.3 3.4 1.7 1.7 2.6 2.6 
61-70 15.5 17.2 19.0 21.6 20.7 17.2 15.5 19.0 
71-80 28.4 29.3 33.6 36.2 35.3 36.2 44.0 39.7 
81-90 37.9 37.1 34.5 29.3 32.8 37.1 31.0 34.5 
91-99 8.6 7.8 7.8 7.8 6.0 4.3 5.2 2.6 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
The distribution of the most compliance score with the FRS 134 and the 
BMLR slightly differs. The compliance score with the FRS 134 for most PLC 
ranged between 91% and 99%, and the next highest range is between 81% 
and 90%. For the compliance score with the BMLR, the highest range is 
between 81% and 90% in 2007 and between 71% and 80% in 2008, and the 
next highest range is vice versa for both years. These results indicate that 
the compliance score with the FRS 134 is higher and more consistent than 
the compliance score with the BMLR.  
 
Previous studies did not conduct their analysis according to the type of BSE 
(Ku Ismail and Chandler, 2005a; Rahman and Ismail, 2008). Therefore, the 
present study further explored into this area. As shown in Figure 4.6, 
regardless of the type of BSE, the mean compliance score with the FRS 134 
and the BMLR are quite consistent in all quarters and years. However, PLC 
in the first BSE has an equal or slightly higher means compliance score with 
the FRS 134 and the BMLR than PLC in the second BSE. Similar to 
timeliness, these results suggest that larger companies are more likely to 
comply with the FRS 134 and the BMLR than smaller companies. This may 
   
170 
 
be due to higher accounting expertise employed by larger companies to 
prepare interims and audit committee members are more proficient to 
perform their duties because larger companies have the ability to pay them. 
 
Figure 4.6 Compliance with the FRS 134 and the BMLR (BSE) 
 
There is a considerable range between the minimum and maximum 
compliance rate with the FRS 134 and the BMLR (the details are given in 
Appendix 4-9). The minimum compliance score with the FRS 134 for PLC in 
the first BSE and second BSE is 67% and 74%, respectively, and the 
maximum is 100%, regardless of the type of BSE. For both type of BSE, the 
minimum and maximum compliance score with the BMLR is 48% and 95%, 
respectively. No PLC has fully complied with the BMLR requirements.     
  
Aljifri and Hussainey (2007) suggested that the PLC disclosure for different 
types of industries differ due to different disclosure requirements. Therefore, 
apart from the type of BSE, the present study has also investigated the 
mean compliance score with the FRS 134 and the BMLR in different types of 
industries. Graphs for each type of industry are given in Appendix 4-10. The 
graphs showed that mean compliance score with the FRS 134 and the 
BMLR are consistent throughout the quarters and years, and the mean 
insignificantly differs for different types of industries. Nevertheless, the 
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compliance rate with the FRS 134 is higher than the BMLR for all types of 
industries.  
 
Although the compliance score with the FRS 134 and the BMLR are 
consistent throughout the quarters and years, there is a substantial range 
between the minimum and maximum compliance rates for PLC in certain 
types of industries which is shown in Appendix 4-11 and 4-12. For example, 
the minimum compliance score with the FRS 134 for PLC in services 
industry is between 60% and 70%, and the maximum compliance score is 
100% throughout the quarters and years. The range between the minimum 
and maximum compliance score with the BMLR is larger because all 
industries (except for the consumer and finance industries) compliance 
score with the BMLR is less than 50% throughout the quarters and years.  
 
Two indexes were constructed to determine PLC compliance with the FRS 
134 and the BMLR and the indexes are explained in the next two sub-
sections.  
 
4.2.1.2.1 The Checklist of Compliance Score with the FRS 134 
According to the statistical results above, the mean compliance score with 
the FRS 134 is fairly high. Therefore, this study conducted a further 
investigation by breaking down the compliance score according to the 
classified groups to identify whether all items in the groups are fully, or least 
likely to comply with the FRS 134. Altogether, there are 14 classified groups, 
which are comprised of 39 items in the checklist adopted from the FRS 134. 
Items of a similar nature are grouped together. Weighting is not used in any 
of these groups because all items in the checklist are mandatory 
requirements to all Malaysian PLC. Table 4.9 presents a summary of the 
minimum disclosure requirements of the FRS 134 according to the classified 
groups.  
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Table 4.9 Compliance Score with the FRS 134 
Grp 
No. FRS 134 items N 
Q1 
2007 
% 
Q2 
2007 
% 
Q3 
2007 
% 
Q4 
2007 
% 
Q1 
2008 
% 
Q2 
2008 
% 
Q3 
2008 
% 
Q4 
2008 
% 
1 Financial statements components 5 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2 Period of financial statements 5 98 98 98 100 98 98 98 99 
3 Interims’ general requirements 3 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
4 Earnings per share 2 88 88 88 88 89 89 89 89 
5 Accounting policies 5 73 77 77 80 66 67 68 66 
6 Seasonality 1 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 99 
7 Unusual items 3 95 95 97 96 96 96 96 96 
8 Estimation of provision 3 94 95 95 94 95 95 95 95 
9 Debt and equity securities 1 100 100 100 100 99 99 100 100 
10 Segmental  Reporting 6 99 99 99 99 97 97 97 96 
11 Material subsequent events 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
12 Composition of the entity 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
13 Contingent assets or liabilities 2 77 77 76 77 77 77 77 77 
14 Type of dividends  1 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 97 
 Total  
39 
         
* Grp No. = Group Number 
 
The statistical results in Table 4.9 show that all PLC disclosed without any 
failure the components of financial statements, namely the balance sheet, 
income statement, statement of changes in equity, cash flow statement and 
explanatory notes. However, 2% of the PLC failed to disclose the 
respectable period of changes in equity and cash flow statements. The PLC 
only disclosed the cumulative financial year to date of the current quarter 
and they did not disclose the cumulative financial year to date of the 
preceding year. Therefore, the non-compliance percentage for group two in 
Table 4.9 is slightly reduced by 2%. The findings of Nieuwoudt and Koen 
(1999) are in contrast with those of the present study. They found that only 
80% to 96% PLC in Johannesburg complied with the income statement 
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requirements, and 50% to 79% complied with the balance sheet 
requirements.  
 
The interims’ general requirements show that all of the Malaysian PLC in this 
study was found to have published a condensed instead of a complete set of 
financial statements, even though they have an alternative between the two. 
In addition, all of the Malaysian PLC published consolidated financial 
statements if the recent annual reports are consolidated financial 
statements. The present study presumed that all PLC chose a condensed 
set of financial statements because they only have to provide the minimum 
disclosure requirements of the FRS 134, while a complete set of financial 
statements also requires a conformance to the FRS 101 (Presentation of 
Financial Statements). Additional conformance to these accounting 
standards will be an oppressive task to the management because of the 
limited allowable time period to publish interims. This study also revealed 
that two PLC failed to disclose their statement of compliance with the FRS 
134 in explanatory notes every quarter. 
 
With regard to the Earnings per Share (EPS), the entire PLC disclosed the 
basic EPS in the face of an income statement. McEwen and Schwartz 
(1992) also found that all PLC disclosed EPS in interims. However, the 
present study found that 30% to 32% PLC failed to disclose the diluted EPS 
every quarter. The PLC may not disclose the diluted EPS because a big 
difference between the basic and diluted EPS indicates a high potential 
dilution for the company’s shares, which is a problem for the investors and 
financial analysts. 
 
In total, 96% to 97% PLC disclosed that their interims’ accounting policies 
are consistent with the preceding annual report. However, in 2007, 17% to 
28% PLC did not disclose the effect of changes in accounting policies in 
their interims. In 2008, the percentage of non-disclosure increased between 
38% and 41%. One of the major changes of accounting policies in 2007 was 
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the FRS 117, Leases, which requires the PLC to restate their balance sheet 
figures by reclassifying the leasehold land and building held for their own 
use from property, plant, and equipment to prepaid lease. The land and 
building elements are considered separately for the lease classification. The 
land element is classified as an operating lease and the building element is 
classified as an operating or finance lease by applying the classification 
criteria in the standard. 
 
The FRS 117 defined a finance lease as a lease that transfers substantially 
all the risks and rewards incidental to the ownership of an asset and the title 
may or may not be transferred eventually. The operating lease is a lease 
other than a finance lease. The upfront payments are allocated between the 
land and buildings elements in proportion to the relative fair values at the 
inception of the lease. If the apportionment between these two elements 
cannot be done reliably, then the entire lease is classified as a finance lease. 
If both elements are operating leases, then they can be classified as the 
operating lease. The upfront payment of the land element is treated as the 
prepaid land lease payment and is amortised on a straight-line basis over 
the remaining lease term. The unamortised carrying amount is to be retained 
in the balance sheet and classified as prepaid land lease payments. The 
adoption of the FRS 117 also requires PLC to reclassify the comparative 
amounts of preceding year in the balance sheet. However, the adoption of 
the FRS 117 has no effect to the profit and loss account for the current 
quarter and comparative figures, unless the cost and fair values differ at the 
inception of the lease.   
 
Information about the seasonality or cyclicality is important to the financial 
reports’ users because they can distinguish between the seasonal results 
and turning points in a company’s operations (McEwen and Schwartz, 
1992). McEwen and Schwartz found that a majority of PLC (89%) did not 
disclose the seasonality in their interims. The present study found that all 
PLC, except one company, disclosed the seasonality or cyclicality of their 
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business operations in the explanatory notes of their interims. The PLC 
stated that the seasonality (or cyclical) factors either insignificantly or did not 
affect their business operations. To ensure that there is no seasonality or 
cyclical factors in PLC business operations, the present study has tested the 
PLC revenues by using a one-way repeated measure (i.e. ANOVA). The aim 
of this test is to confirm that there are no significant differences in the 
revenues across the quarter and years, across the type of BSE, and across 
the types of industries. All of the results of these tests are presented below 
in Tables 4.10 to Table 4.13. 
 
Table 4.10 Revenue: One-way Repeated Measures ANOVA 
Year Quarter Mean  Revenue (RM’000) Std. Deviation N 
2007 1 142800 299854 116 
 2 160464 346833 116 
 3 174168 358580 116 
 4 180250 394138 116 
2008 1 180145 400750 116 
 2 195682 427280 116 
 3 206139 463259 116 
 4 178642 342659 116 
 
Mean rank revenues in Table 4.10 significantly differ across the quarters and 
years. Inconsistent values may indicate that seasonality exists in the 
particular interims (McEwen and Schwartz, 1992). The lowest mean revenue 
in 2007 and 2008 is quarter one and four, respectively, while the highest 
mean revenue is quarter four and quarter three, respectively. There is no 
specific quarter cycle across the years. In other words, there is no specific 
quarter that flows cyclically in every year. For example, in 2007 the highest 
to the lowest mean revenue is quarter four-three-two-one while in 2008, it is 
quarter three-two-one-four. Therefore, this study has found that there is no 
cyclical factor that influences the mean rank revenues of Malaysian PLC.   
 
The value of Wilks’ Lambda in Table 4.11 is 0.831 and 0.895 in 2007 and 
2008 respectively, and the p value is less than 0.01 in both years. Since the 
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p value is less than 0.01, there is statistically significant effect for revenue of 
which there was a change in revenues across the quarters. The magnitude 
of the changes is determined by the eta squared value. In 2007 and 2008, 
the eta squared values are 0.169 and 0.105, respectively. Following the 
guidelines proposed by Cohen (1988), it was found that the changes of 
revenues in 2007 are very large and moderate in 2008.   
 
Table 4.11 Revenue: Multivariate Test 
Year Value F 
Hypothesis 
df Error df Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
2007 Pillai's Trace .169 7.653a 3.000 113.000 .000 .169 
Wilks' Lambda .831 7.653a 3.000 113.000 .000 .169 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
.203 7.653a 3.000 113.000 .000 .169 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.203 7.653a 3.000 113.000 .000 .169 
2008 Pillai's Trace .105 4.404a 3.000 113.000 .006 .105 
Wilks' Lambda .895 4.404a 3.000 113.000 .006 .105 
Hotelling's 
Trace 
.117 4.404a 3.000 113.000 .006 .105 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.117 4.404a 3.000 113.000 .006 .105 
 
The differences in mean rank revenues could possibly due to the festive 
seasons celebrated by the Malaysian population, which was estimated to be 
27.7 million in 2008. The Malaysian population is made up of 65% 
Bumiputra, 26% Chinese, 8% Indian, and 1% other races. The 
predominantly Muslim Bumiputra celebrated their festive season (i.e. Eidul 
Fitr) in the second and first week of October in 2007 and 2008, respectively. 
The Chinese celebrated their festive season (i.e. the Chinese New year) in 
February for both years. The Indians celebrated their festive seasons (i.e. 
Deepavali) in the first week of November in 2007 and in the fourth week of 
October in 2008. Therefore, in 2007 and 2008, the Bumiputra celebrated 
their festive seasons at the beginning of quarter four, the Chinese in the 
middle of the first quarter, and Indians in the middle of the fourth quarter.  
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Malaysians normally shop a few weeks before the festive seasons. The 
Bumiputra account for over half of the Malaysian population. The highest 
mean rank revenues was quarter four in 2007 and quarter three in 2008, 
which indicates that the revenues were possibly linked to the Bumiputras’ 
festive season. In 2007, due to the festive season in the second week of 
October, Bumiputras may have been triggered to shop to prepare for the 
festival, which caused the mean rank revenue to be the highest in quarter 
four. In 2008 the Bumiputra’s festive season was held in the first week of 
October. Therefore, this may be a trigger to shop in September to prepare 
for the festival, which is in quarter three. The percentage of Indians in 
Malaysia is quite low. Their principle festive celebration (which is concurrent 
with the Malay’s festival) is in quarter four in 2007. This may give further 
cause for the fourth quarter mean rank revenues to be the highest of all in 
2007. In 2008, the Bumiputra were triggered to shop in quarter three. 
Therefore, mean rank revenues is the highest in quarter three instead of 
quarter four. Therefore, the above results suggest that the PLC revenues, to 
some extent, are linked to the seasonal religious festivals of Malaysia’s 
multicultural society and are not for cyclical factors. McEwen and Schwartz 
(1992) failed to associate the differences in revenues with the seasonality by 
using non-parametric statistics.  
 
Seasonal and cyclical factors are assessed in the present study according to 
the type of BSE. The results are presented in Table 4.12. Mean rank 
revenues significantly differ across the type of BSE. However, PLC in the 
first and second BSE has the same cyclical quarter every year. For example, 
in 2007, the highest to the lowest mean revenue is quarter four-three-two-
one for the first and second BSE while in 2008, it is quarter three-two-one-
four for both type of BSE.  
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Table 4.12 Revenue: One-way Repeated Measures ANOVA (BSE) 
Type of BSE Year 
Quarter Mean Revenue 
(RM’000) 
Std. 
Deviation N 
First BSE 2007 1 183483.74 338752.942 86 
 2 205169.52 392641.767 86 
 3 223351.24 404423.048 86 
 4 231379.45 446087.471 86 
Second BSE 2007 1 26171.63 34973.742 30 
 2 32309.50 47308.260 30 
 3 33174.47 52466.886 30 
 4 33680.27 52811.507 30 
First BSE 2008 1 232470.28 453660.957 86 
 2 252736.64 483078.357 86 
 3 266404.13 524591.050 86 
 4 230744.64 384159.698 86 
Second BSE 2008 1 30145.97 47316.672 30 
 2 32126.60 51498.148 30 
 3 33379.03 52733.351 30 
 4 29279.73 43865.340 30 
 
In 2007, the value of Wilks’ Lambda in Table 4.13 is 0.790 for PLC in the first 
BSE and 0.846 for PLC in the second BSE. The p value is less than 0.01 for 
PLC in the first BSE only. In 2008, the value of Wilks’ Lambda is 0.867 for 
PLC in the first BSE and 0.839 for PLC in the second BSE. The p value is 
less than 0.01 for PLC in the first BSE only. Since the p value is less than 
0.01 for PLC in the first BSE, there is statistically significant effect of 
changes in revenue across the quarters for PLC in the first BSE only. There 
are no significant changes of revenues for PLC in the second BSE. The 
magnitude of changes for PLC in the first BSE is determined by the eta 
squared value, which is 0.210 in 2007 and 0.133 in 2008. Following the 
guidelines proposed by Cohen (1988), the changes of revenues for PLC in 
the first BSE is very large in 2007 and is moderate in 2008.   
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Table 4.13 Revenue: Multivariate Test (BSE) 
Year BSE Value F 
Hypo 
df Error df Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
2007 First 
BSE 
Pillai's Trace .210 7.360a 3.000 83.000 .000 .210 
Wilks' Lambda .790 7.360a 3.000 83.000 .000 .210 
Hotelling's Trace .266 7.360a 3.000 83.000 .000 .210 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.266 7.360a 3.000 83.000 .000 .210 
2007 Second 
BSE 
Pillai's Trace .154 1.639a 3.000 27.000 .204 .154 
Wilks' Lambda .846 1.639a 3.000 27.000 .204 .154 
Hotelling's Trace .182 1.639a 3.000 27.000 .204 .154 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.182 1.639a 3.000 27.000 .204 .154 
2008 First 
BSE 
Pillai's Trace .133 4.250a 3.000 83.000 .008 .133 
Wilks' Lambda .867 4.250a 3.000 83.000 .008 .133 
Hotelling's Trace .154 4.250a 3.000 83.000 .008 .133 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.154 4.250a 3.000 83.000 .008 .133 
2008 Second 
BSE 
Pillai's Trace .161 1.721a 3.000 27.000 .186 .161 
Wilks' Lambda .839 1.721a 3.000 27.000 .186 .161 
Hotelling's Trace .191 1.721a 3.000 27.000 .186 .161 
Roy's Largest 
Root 
.191 1.721a 3.000 27.000 .186 .161 
*Hypo = Hypothesis 
 
Table 4.9 shows that 94% to 97% PLC disclosed the unusual items and 
estimation of provisions in interims every quarter. However, 9% to 23% PLC 
did not disclose the nature and amount of the unusual items and 25% to 
67% PLC did not disclose the nature and amount of changes in estimates of 
provision that affects their financial reports. The overall percentage for 
unusual items and estimates of provision percentage are still high for all 
quarters despite the high percentages of non-disclosures. This happens 
because the items are inapplicable to 88% to 97% PLC. 
 
The compliance rate for debt and equity securities, segmental reporting, 
material subsequent events and composition of the entity have almost 
reached the maximum values of 100%, which indicate that almost all PLC 
disclosed the requirements without any failure. However, a few PLC did not 
state the inapplicability of geographical segments in their interims, which 
caused the overall percentage of segmental reporting to reduce to 96% and 
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99% every quarter. McEwen and Schwartz (1992), and D’Arcy and 
Grabensberger (2003) found that PLC interims have low compliance with the 
disclosure in segmental information.  
 
Although all PLC disclosed the existence of their contingent liabilities, only 
half of them disclosed their contingent assets. The PLC possibly did not 
have the contingent assets but the FRS134 requires them to disclose it. 
Therefore, the overall percentage of changes in composition of contingent 
assets or liabilities reduced to 76% and 77% for all quarters. Finally, all PLC 
except three companies disclosed the dividends paid according to the types 
of shares. 
 
In summary, the present study found that the compliance score with the FRS 
134 is fairly high in every quarter for all items in the 14 pre-classified groups, 
except for accounting policies and contingent assets or contingent liabilities.  
4.2.1.2.2 The Checklist of Compliance Score with the BMLR 
Since the overall mean compliance score with the BMLR is also fairly high, 
this study breaks down the compliance score according to the specified 
groups. The results are presented in Table 4.14. Altogether, there are 79 
items in the checklist, which were adopted from Appendix 9B, Part A of 
BMLR. The items are classified into 14 groups and each group is comprised 
of items of a similar nature. Similar to the compliance with the FRS 134, 
weighting is not used in any of the groups in the checklist because all of the 
items are mandatory requirements to all Malaysian PLC, regardless of the 
types of BSE and industries. The present study found that the compliance 
with the BMLR for each group in the checklist varies. 
 
Although the entire PLC stated the BOD approval at the ending page of 
interims, only 67.8% PLC stated the date of BOD meetings. An issue arises 
whether the BOD had done their duties before interims are published. 
Further investigation cannot be conducted because a majority of PLC only 
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stated the frequency of BOD meetings and not the date of the meetings in 
their annual reports. 
 
Table 4.14 Mean Compliance Score with the BMLR 
Grp 
No. BMLR items N 
Q1 
2007 
% 
Q2 
2007 
% 
Q3 
2007 
% 
Q4 
2007 
% 
Q1 
2008 
% 
Q2 
2008 
% 
Q3 
2008 
% 
Q4 
2008 
% 
1 BOD approval 1 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2 Performance Review 10 71 71 72 73 70 71 71 72 
3 Prospects 7 55 55 55 55 54 54 55 55 
4 
Profit forecast/ 
guarantee in a 
public document 5 92 91 89 90 92 92 92 92 
5 Taxation 3 64 64 64 64 61 61 61 62 
6 
Unquoted 
investments and 
properties 6 86 85 85 84 88 87 88 90 
7 Quoted securities 12 84 84 83 84 84 86 85 84 
8 
Corporate 
proposal 8 88 85 84 86 87 86 87 87 
9 
Group borrowings 
and debt 
securities 4 98 98 99 99 99 98 98 98 
10 
Off-balance sheet 
financial 
instruments 8 72 71 71 70 73 71 72 70 
11 Changes in material litigation 1 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 98 
12 Dividends 8 73 74 73 65 71 71 67 65 
13 Earnings per share 4 86 87 86 88 88 88 88 88 
14 
Qualification of 
preceding annual 
financial reports 2 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Total 
 
79 
         
* Grp No. = Group Number 
 
Performance review is important to be disclosed in interims because the 
financial report’s users especially investors would like to know about the 
company’s progress and performance. As reported in Table 4.14, the mean 
compliance score of PLC performance review ranged from 71% to 73% in 
every quarter. These percentages are quite low due to the following non-
compliances. Despite the high percentage (i.e. 90% to 92%) of disclosure of 
material changes in earnings and revenues, 22% to 34% PLC did not 
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describe the material changes for the current quarter and 43% to 61% PLC 
did not describe the material changes for the financial year to date. 
Additionally, 30% to 34% PLC did not describe the factors that affect the 
material changes in earnings and revenues, 43% to 52% PLC did not 
describe the factors for the current quarter and 62% to 77% did not describe 
the factors for the financial year to date. These non-compliances cause the 
percentage to reduce greatly every quarter. 
 
In addition, PLC also have to explain the material changes and factors 
affecting the changes in profit before tax for the current and immediate 
preceding quarter in the performance review. A total of 93% to 97% PLC 
described the material changes in profit before tax and 89% to 91% PLC 
described the changes for the required periods. Meanwhile, 79% to 87% 
PLC stated the factors affecting the changes in profit before tax for the 
required periods. However, some PLC misconceives the word “immediate 
preceding quarter” stated in the BMLR. The PLC compared the profit before 
tax between a current quarter and “immediate preceding corresponding 
quarter” instead of “immediate preceding quarter”. For example, profit before 
tax in June 2008 was compared with the profit before tax in June 2007 
instead of March 2008. This misinterpretation by some PLC also reduces the 
percentage of performance review in Table 4.14.  
 
Disclosure of a company’s prospects may assist the users of financial 
reports when they make decisions. Therefore, the BMLR requires PLC to 
comment on the company’s prospects for the remaining period until the 
financial year-ends or until the next financial year for the last quarter. 
Although all PLC disclosed their company’s prospects, 23% to 28% PLC 
failed to explain the factors that influence their company’s prospects in the 
future. Furthermore, most PLC only stated the prospects that are more likely 
to influence the company’s prospects without stating the company’s 
progress to achieve them. Only one or two PLC disclosed the BOD opinion 
regarding the possibility for the company to achieve their prospects 
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successfully. Therefore, the overall percentage of prospects is very low for 
all quarters (i.e. between 54% and 55%). Regarding the profit forecasts or 
guarantee in a public document, it is not applicable to all PLC except in two 
companies. Only one company disclosed some of the details required by the 
BMLR because the other information is not applicable. 
 
PLC have to estimate the amount of taxes payable to the Malaysian Inland 
Revenue Department (IRD) in every quarter, disclose the breakdown of tax 
charges, and disclose the explanation of the variance between the effective 
and statutory tax rate of the current quarter and financial year to date. 
McEwen and Schwartz (1992) found that two companies did not disclose the 
estimated tax rates in interims. The present study found that all PLC 
disclosed the amount of taxes payable, but 1% or 2% PLC did not disclose 
the breakdown of tax charges in every quarter. The mean score of 62% to 
64% in Table 4.14 is quite low despite the high compliance of tax disclosure 
because PLC did not explain the variance between the effective and 
statutory tax rate for the current quarter (i.e. 37% to 45%) and financial year 
to date (i.e. 69% to 74%). 
 
PLC is required to disclose the profit or losses from selling unquoted 
investments and/or properties for the current quarter and financial year to 
date. Any purchase or disposal of quoted securities also required to be 
disclosed by PLC except closed-end funds, banking, finance, and insurance 
industries. The present study found that no PLC except one to four 
companies disclosed the quoted securities in their interims in every quarter. 
The overall percentages are quite low despite the high disclosure on quoted 
securities because PLC did not disclose the items for the respectable 
periods. 
 
All except one company disclosed the status of complete corporate 
proposals in interims. PLC that disclosed the corporate proposals are 
required to explain the status of utilising the proceeds raised from the 
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corporate proposals in the following format: the purpose, the proposed and 
actual utilisation, the intended timeframe of utilization, the deviation amount, 
and explanations of the deviation amount. A total of 73% to 100% PLC 
disclosed the first three items and only 38% to 71% PLC disclosed the last 
three items. The non-compliances cause the overall percentage to be low 
every quarter. 
 
With regard to the group borrowings and debt securities disclosure, only one 
company did not disclose the item in explanatory notes of interims. Apart 
from disclosing the total amount of borrowings and debt securities, 90% to 
100% PLC disclosed the breakdown as follows: secured or unsecured, 
breakdown of secured and unsecured, short term or long term, any 
denomination of foreign currency and breakdown of each foreign currency.  
 
A total of 97% PLC disclosed off-balance sheet financial instruments 
according to the type and maturity profile. Meanwhile, 74% to 91% PLC 
disclosed the face or contract amount and the nature and terms of off-
balance sheet financial instruments. Only 19% to 53% PLC disclosed the 
credit and market risks, cash requirements and the accounting policies 
related to off-balance sheet financial instruments. Due to the high 
percentage of non-compliances, the overall percentage of off-balance sheet 
instruments descends to 70% and 73% for all quarters. With regard to the 
changes in material litigation, 98% PLC disclosed them so that the users of 
financial reports are aware of pending and up to date litigation information. 
 
Shareholders are very concerned about the distributable dividends declared 
by the company at any time during the year. Information on dividends may 
also give an influence on the decisions made by the users of financial 
reports, especially the prospective investors. They have the perception that 
the more dividends paid out by the companies, then the more profitable are 
the companies and they are worth investing. A total of 96% PLC disclosed 
the declaration or recommendation of interim dividend or final ordinary 
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dividend. However, some PLC did not include all details required by the 
BMLR, such as: the amount of dividends per share for the current period, the 
amount of dividends per share for the previous corresponding period, the 
date payable, total dividend per share for the current financial year, types of 
dividend declared (whether the amount is before tax, net of tax or exempted 
from tax), the amount of tax rates, and the cut-off date for entitlement to 
dividends for deposited securities. 
 
Concerning the earnings per share, the FRS 134 requires PLC to disclose 
the basic and diluted EPS in the face of income statement while the BMLR 
requires PLC to disclose the numerator and denominator to calculate the 
basic and diluted EPS. McEwen and Schwartz (1992) found that all PLC 
successfully disclosed their EPS in interims. The present study found that 
97% to 100% PLC disclosed the numerator and denominator of basic EPS, 
but only 67% to 70% PLC disclosed the numerator and denominator of 
diluted EPS. Finally, all PLC disclosed the qualification of the company’s 
preceding annual financial reports and the current status if the annual report 
is qualified.  
4.2.1.3 The Comparability of Interims 
One of the sources of information that is used by the users of financial 
reports before they make decisions is to compare the current accounting 
information of a company with the company’s preceding corresponding 
period in addition to information of PLC in the same industry. Due to the 
importance of comparability of financial information to the users of financial 
reports, the present study investigated whether the accounting information of 
preceding corresponding period placed in the current quarter equals the 
information when it was initially issued.  
 
This investigation is essential because Malaysian interims are neither 
audited nor being reviewed by the external auditors and, therefore, the 
validity of accounting information in interims is questionable. Comparison 
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with the annual report is also made since an equal amount with the audited 
annual report may indicate a low possibility of accounting adjustments by 
PLC. Additionally, a comparison with the annual report further strengthens 
the comparability ranking score of Malaysian PLC in the present study 
because an independent party audits the annual reports. This study 
compares four profit and loss items (namely revenues, gross profit, profit 
before tax, and profit after tax) between a quarter and preceding 
corresponding period in addition to the audited annual report. The 
comparable values are taken after PLC has made resubmission or 
restatement to their interims. 
 
Before making the comparison, this study initially examined the frequency of 
resubmission and restatement made by PLC. High frequency of 
resubmission and restatement may affect the decisions of the users of 
financial reports if they use financial information in interims before the 
resubmission and restatement was made. As reported in Figure 4.7, the 
mean score of resubmission is very low for all quarters in 2007 and 2008, 
which indicates irregular resubmission of interims by PLC.  
 
Contrary to the mean score of resubmission, the mean score of restatement 
is very high for all quarters in 2007 (i.e. almost 50% PLC restated their 
interims every quarter). However, the mean score of restatement is very low 
in 2008 (i.e. between 5% and 8% in all quarters). The significant difference 
of mean restatement between 2007 and 2008 is mainly due to the revised 
accounting policy, the FRS 117, which requires PLC to reclassify the 
leasehold land as prepaid lease payments. Other revisions of accounting 
policies did not give a significant impact to interims.  
 
Although almost half of PLC in the sample restated their interims in 2007, 
the restatement figures do not affect the decision making by the users of 
financial reports because the restatement required by the FRS 117 is only a 
reclassification of leasehold land from property, plant, and equipment to 
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prepaid lease. An insignificant difference of comparable ranking score 
between one quarter and succeeding corresponding quarter (which is shown 
in Figure 4.8) confirms that the FRS 117 has no effect on the comparability 
of interims, although adjustments are required to be made for the current 
quarter and comparable periods. 
 
Figure 4.7 Resubmission and Restatement 
 
The mean ranking score of interims’ comparability that is shown in Figure 
4.8 is reasonably high for all quarters and years except quarter four. The 
mean ranking score for the first three quarters is equal or above 3.5 while in 
quarter four the mean ranking score is almost half of the first three quarters 
(i.e. 1.9 in 2007 and 2.1 in 2008). These results suggest that interims for the 
first three quarters are more comparable than the fourth quarter. As reported 
in Table 4.17, the accounting adjustments in quarter four are still high 
regardless of the delay or early publishing of interims. Jacques (1997) found 
that net income for the fourth quarter is higher than the first three quarters 
and the plausible reason is due to adjustments of unusual and extraordinary 
items that are made at the financial year-end. Adjustment in quarter four is 
one the most plausible reasons why the quarter is the least comparable 
amongst all. 
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Figure 4.8 also reveals that the comparability ranking score for all quarters in 
2007 is slightly lower than the succeeding corresponding quarters. The 
increased ranking score from 2007 to 2008 reveals that over the time, the 
comparability of interims improves and, therefore, adds benefits to the 
stakeholders to make comparisons before making the final decisions. 
 
Figure 4.8 Mean Ranking Score of Comparability of Interims 
 
 
Table 4.15 presents the distribution of comparability ranking score of 
interims. A total of 75% to 79% PLC have the full comparability ranking 
score for the first three quarters in 2007, and the percentages increased to 
85% and 90% in 2008. The comparability ranking score of the fourth quarter 
significantly differs from the first three quarters where only 36% and 41% 
PLC have the full comparability ranking score in the fourth quarter of 2007 
and 2008, respectively. The comparability ranking score for most PLC in 
quarter four is one, which is the lowest rank amongst all. 
Table 4.15 Comparability Ranking Score of Interims 
Ranking 
Score 
Q1 
2007 
% 
Q2 
2007 
% 
Q3 
2007 
% 
Q4 
2007 
% 
Q1 
2008 
% 
Q2 
2008 
% 
Q3 
2008 
% 
Q4 
2008 
% 
1 10.3 11.2 11.2 50.0 3.4 4.3 2.6 44.8 
2 3.4 4.3 2.6 6.9 1.7 4.3 1.7 8.6 
3 11.2 6.9 6.9 6.9 8.6 6.0 6.0 6.0 
4 75.0 77.6 79.3 36.2 86.2 85.3 89.7 40.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Figure 4.9 portrays the mean comparability ranking score of interims across 
the type of BSE. The present study found that, regardless of the type of 
BSE, the mean ranking score of interims’ comparability is very high for the 
first three quarters and very low for the fourth quarter. Contrary to timeliness 
and compliance with the interim reporting standards, PLC in the second BSE 
have a higher mean comparability ranking score of interims than the first 
BSE for the first three quarters in all years. In fact, the mean comparability 
ranking score for PLC in the second BSE reached the maximum value for 
the first three quarters in 2008. However, in quarter four, PLC in the second 
BSE have a lower comparability ranking score than the first BSE. Therefore, 
the statistical results suggest that interims for PLC in the second BSE are 
more comparable than PLC in the first BSE for the first three quarters and 
PLC in the second BSE are more inclined to make accounting adjustment 
than PLC in the first BSE in the fourth quarter. 
 
Figure 4.9 Mean Comparability Ranking Score of Interims (BSE) 
 
As depicted in Table 4.16, with the exception of quarter four, the distribution 
of comparability ranking score between PLC in the first and second BSE 
significantly differs. Comparability ranking score for most PLC in the first 
BSE is four and the percentages of the first three quarter’s comparability 
ranking score are more or less equivalent. A total of 69% to 74% PLC in the 
first BSE have the full comparability ranking score for the first three quarters 
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in 2007, and the percentages increased to 80% and 86% in 2008. PLC in the 
second BSE score either the lowest or the highest comparability ranking 
score for the first three quarters and no comparability scores in between. 
Meanwhile, 90% to 93% PLC in the second BSE have the full comparability 
ranking score in the first three quarters in 2007, and the percentages 
increased to 100% in 2008. The statistical results further support the 
previous finding that interims for PLC in the second BSE are more 
comparable than the first BSE for the first three quarters and vice versa for 
the fourth quarter.  
 
Table 4.16 Comparability Ranking Score of Interims (BSE) 
Type of 
BSE 
Rank 
Score 
Q1 
2007 
% 
Q2 
2007 
% 
Q3 
2007 
% 
Q4 
2007 
% 
Q1 
2008 
% 
Q2 
2008 
% 
Q3 
2008 
% 
Q4 
2008 
% 
First BSE 1.0 11.6 11.6 12.8 47.7 4.7 5.8 3.5 39.5 
 2.0 4.7 5.8 3.5 7.0 2.3 5.8 2.3 9.3 
 3.0 15.1 9.3 9.3 8.1 11.6 8.1 8.1 7.0 
 
4.0 68.6 73.3 74.4 37.2 81.4 80.2 86.0 44.2 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Second 1.0 6.7 10.0 6.7 56.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.0 
BSE 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 
 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 
 4.0 93.3 90.0 93.3 33.3 100 100 100 30.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
The mean comparability ranking score of the first three quarters in 2007 and 
2008 for all types of industries is equal to, or higher than 3.5 except for the 
property, finance and technology industries. Mean graphs and distribution of 
comparability ranking score for each type of industry are given in Appendix 
4-13 and Appendix 4-14, respectively. It is interesting to reveal that despite 
the early timeliness for some PLC in the finance industry to publish interims 
every quarter, the comparability ranking score of interims is very low for the 
first three quarters in 2007 compared to other types of industries. This 
finding indicates that companies in the finance industry that publish interims 
on a more timely basis may have a tendency to publish less comparable 
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interims. Construction, plantations and technology industries have a full 
comparability ranking score of interims for some quarters in 2008, although 
the first two industries do not publish interims more timely.  
 
Table 4.17 shows the comparability ranking score for PLC that publishes the 
fourth quarter interims more timely. The results show that comparability 
ranking score is very low, although interims are published more timely in 
quarter four. The results further supports this study’s disagreement with the 
view that the deferments to publish interims in quarter four is due to the time 
required by the management to make adjustments before the financial year 
ends. In other words, even though PLC publishes interims more timely in 
quarter four, the comparability ranking score is very low.  
 
Table 4.17 Non-Quarter Four as the Least Timely Quarter (Industry) 
 
Types of industries 
The least timely quarter Quarter four 
Quarter Comparability 
ranking score 
Comparability 
ranking score 
Services Q108 3.9 1.4 
Q208 3.7 1.4 
Consumer Q208 3.7 2.5 
Construction Q108 4.0 1.8 
 
Apart from the overall ranking score of comparability, this study breaks down 
the comparability into its constituents namely revenues, gross profit, profit 
before tax and profit after tax. As indicated in Table 4.18, the mean 
comparability ranking score for revenues, gross profit, profit before tax and 
profit after tax are very high in the first three quarters and very low in quarter 
four, which are in tandem with the overall comparability ranking score of 
interims. This study also found that mean revenues, gross profit, profit 
before tax and profit after tax slightly differ with each other: a) Mean 
revenues are higher than mean gross profit, profit before tax and profit after 
tax; b) mean gross profit is quite similar with mean profit before tax; and c) 
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mean profit after tax is slightly higher, similar or lower than mean gross profit 
and profit before tax.  
 
A mean gross profit which is lower than mean revenues suggests that the 
number of PLC that make gross profit adjustment is higher than adjustment 
of revenues. The company either adjusts the effect of changes in revenue on 
gross profit and/or manipulates the operating expenses. Surprisingly, mean 
profit before tax is quite similar with mean gross profit, which suggests that 
the number of PLC that adjust profit before tax is more or less equivalent to 
gross profit adjustment. The same number could possibly due to the very 
low numbers of companies (or none) who have adjusted their other types of 
revenue in addition to the administration expenses. PLC that adjust the profit 
after tax are possibly due to the effects of revenues, operating and/or 
administration expense adjustments, and the wrong estimation of tax 
payable for the specific quarter. Higher, similar, or lower mean profit after tax 
than mean gross profit and profit before tax indicates that the number of PLC 
that adjust the amount of taxes payable to the authority is lower, similar, or 
higher (respectively).  
    
Table 4.18 Mean comparability of Interims 
Type 
Q1 
2007 
Q2 
2007 
Q3 
2007 
Q4 
2007 
Q1 
2008 
Q2 
2008 
Q3 
2008 
Q4 
2008 
mean mean mean mean mean mean mean mean 
Revenues 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.59 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.64 
Gross Profit 0.81 0.84 0.84 0.47 0.94 0.91 0.94 0.53 
Profit Before Tax 0.84 0.83 0.84 0.46 0.94 0.91 0.95 0.47 
Profit After Tax 0.89 0.88 0.87 0.42 0.93 0.91 0.94 0.44 
Overall (Total) 3.46 3.47 3.48 1.95 3.76 3.71 3.80 2.08 
 
Apart from breaking down the comparability of interims into revenues, gross 
profit, profit before tax and profit after tax, this study also compared the 
value of these items in interims and the corresponding annual report (the 
results are presented in Figure 4.10). This study found that, despite a high 
comparability ranking score when interims are compared with the preceding 
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corresponding period, the percentages of PLC with equal value of revenues, 
gross profit, profit before tax and profit after tax between interims and the 
corresponding annual report are quite low. As presented in Figure 4.10, only 
38.8% PLC have equal revenues, 15.5% equal gross profit, 25.9% equal 
profit before tax and 23.3% equal profit after tax between interims and the 
annual report in 2007. In 2008, the percentages slightly reduced for 
revenues and gross profit (i.e. 33.6% and 11.2% respectively) and slightly 
increased for profit before tax and profit after tax (i.e. 29.3% and 24.1% 
respectively). Al-Darayseh and Brown (1992) also found that the financial 
figures in interims were not as consistent as in the annual financial reports. 
Therefore, the present study can possibly conclude that Malaysian interims 
are not comparable with the annual financial reports despite a high-ranking 
score being assessed for interims.  
  
Figure 4.10 also shows that PLC that recorded interims’ revenues higher or 
lower than the annual report are more equivalent: a) more PLC recorded 
lower gross profit in interims than in the annual report; and b) more PLC 
recorded higher values of profit before tax and profit after tax in interims than 
in the annual report. Therefore, the overall results suggest that a) more than 
half of the PLC recorded higher amount of operating expenses in interims 
than in the annual report; and b) more PLC recorded lower administration 
and tax expenses in interims than in the annual report. Recording lower 
values of other types of revenues is very unlikely because PLC prefer to 
highlight to the users of their financial reports their companies as a going 
concern which has higher profitability. The main consequence of recording 
lower administration expenses is the value increment in profit before tax. 
Prospective investors who use profit before tax as one of the measures can 
possibly mislead their decision making.  
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Figure 4.10 Comparability between Interims and Annual Report 
*Interims= Interim financial reports, AR= Annual Report 
* REV = Revenues, GP=Gross Profit, PBT=Profit Before Tax, PAT=Profit After Tax 
 
4.2.2 Independent Variables 
The independent variables, or CGC, include the frequency of the BOD 
meetings, independence, financial literacy, corporate governance expertise, 
and the ethnicity of the directors. This section details the descriptive 
statistics of the CGC in general, across the type of BSE and types of 
industries, and identifies their non-compliance with the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG). The explanations on these variables are as 
follows. 
4.2.2.1 Frequency of BOD Meetings 
Section 9.22 of the BMLR requires PLC to get an approval of BOD before 
publishing their interims. Figure 4.11 shows the mean of BOD meetings in 
general, across the type of BSE and industry. In 2007 and 2008, the mean of 
BOD meetings was five. Therefore, the mean is more than the minimum 
requirement of MCCG. A total of 67.8% PLC stated the date of BOD 
meetings at the ending page of interims, which indicates that the BOD had 
possibly looked and discussed the interims before they were published.  
With regard to the frequency of BOD meetings (the details in Appendix 4-
18), it was held between 3 and 17 times in 2007, and between 4 and 17 
times in 2008. Therefore, in 2007, the two PLC did not comply with the 
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MCCG which requires PLC to have at least four meetings in a year. The 
above finding also suggests that the BOD of the two companies did not hold 
a meeting before they published one of their interims. The present study 
investigated interims of the two companies and found that only one company 
stated the date of BOD meetings at the ending page of their interims.  
 
However, an issue arises because the interims for the final quarter of one of 
the companies that should be approved by the BOD in the first meeting of 
2007 were incorrectly dated as 15 February 2006 instead of 2007. The date 
of the BOD meeting for the next four consecutive quarters stated in interims 
are 23 May 2007, 15 August 2007, 16 November 2007 and 22 February 
2008. If the date of the BOD meeting in the final quarter of 2006 was 
correctly dated as 15 February 2007, then there were four BOD meetings in 
2007 instead of three as disclosed in the annual report. Further investigation 
is not available because the company did not disclose the date of BOD 
meetings in the annual report. This finding suggests that there is a possibility 
that the company disclosed a wrong date of the BOD meeting in order to 
hide the BOD weaknesses in performing their duties. This study 
recommends that PLC state the date of BOD meetings at the ending page of 
interims every quarter and in the annual report in order to ensure that the 
BOD have successfully performed their duties attentively. 
  
Figure 4.11 shows that there is no significant difference on the mean 
frequency of BOD meetings for PLC in the first and second BSE, and across 
industries except services, plantations, and finance and technology 
industries. These four industries have higher frequency of BOD meetings, 
which is either six or seven times in a year. As reported earlier, two 
companies held three BOD meetings in 2007, which indicates that these 
companies did not comply with one of the MCCG’s requirements to have at 
least four meetings in a year and did not hold a meeting before one of their 
interims was published. The two companies are from the first BSE and from 
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properties and services industries. No PLC in the second BSE held BOD 
meetings lower than the MCCG’s requirement. 
 
Figure 4.11 Mean Frequency of BOD meetings 
 
4.2.2.2 Independent Directors 
BMLR 15.02 states that BOD should comprise at least two independent 
directors or one-third of directors are independent, whichever is higher. If the 
number of directors is not in multiples of three, then the nearest to one third 
shall be used. The MCCG also prescribed that the BOD should comprise at 
least one third of independent directors. In 2007 and 2008, 91.4% PLC meet 
the MCCG and BMLR requirements to have at least two independent 
directors or one-third of directors are independent (the details are in 
Appendix 4-19). Therefore, 8.6% or ten PLC did not comply with the 
requirement of having one third of independent directors in all years. The 
PLC that did not comply with the requirement is from the first BSE, except 
one and two companies from the second BSE in 2007 and 2008, 
respectively. The non-compliance PLC from the first BSE are from 
construction, consumer, plantations, services and industrial products 
industries while non-compliance PLC from the second BSE are all from the 
industrial products industry. 
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Figure 4.12 exhibits the mean proportion of independent directors in 
Malaysian PLC. A total of 42.9% directors are independent in 2007 and the 
percentage slightly increased to 44.5% in 2008. The percentages reveal the 
domination of non-independent executive directors in the composition of 
BOD in Malaysia. The mean independent of directors for PLC in the first and 
second BSE insignificantly differs but for PLC in different types of industries, 
the mean ranged between 30% and 50%. The technology and finance 
industries have the lowest and the largest mean of independent directors, 
respectively.   
 
Figure 4.12 Mean Independent Directors 
 
4.2.2.3 Financial Literacy of the Directors 
With the exception of the audit committee members, there is no specified 
portion of BOD which has to be financially literate. BMLR 15.10.1(a) requires 
a company to have at least three audit committee members and, 
commencing 31 January 2009, the MCCG requires all audit committee 
members to be financially literate. As depicted in Figure 4.13, the proportion 
of financial literacy directors is very low in Malaysian PLC. Only 25.5% of 
directors on the board are financially literate in 2007, which slightly 
increased to 26.6% in 2008. In 2007, the most frequent number of financial 
literacy directors on the board is one (46%) followed by two (30%) and three 
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(12%) members. In 2008, the percentages changed to 37%, 35%, and 15% 
for one, two, and three members, respectively. Although the number of 
financial literacy directors slightly increased in 2008, most PLC have not 
seriously taken any actions to comply with the MCCG requirement to have 
all financial literacy audit committee members commencing January 2009. 
This is evidenced by having a mean frequency of two financial literacy 
directors in 2007 and 2008, and there are no financial literacy directors in 
three (2.6%) and four (3.4%) companies in 2007 and 2008, respectively 
(details in Appendix 4-20). 
 
Figure 4.13 Mean Financial Literacy Directors 
 
The percentages of financial literacy directors between the first and second 
BSE insignificantly differ and the increment from 2007 to 2008 was  minimal. 
Despite the slight increment in the percentage of financial literacy of 
directors as a whole, the percentage of PLC that have more than half of 
financially literate directors on the board has slightly reduced. For PLC in the 
first BSE, 7% PLC have more than half financially literate directors in 2007 
and the percentage surprisingly reduced to 5.8% in 2008. A total of 6.3% 
PLC in the second BSE have more than half of their  directors who are 
financially literate in 2007 and the percentage also slightly reduced to 3.3% 
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in 2008. All non-financially literate directors are from the first BSE. Based on 
the low frequency of financially literate directors, all PLC from the first or 
second BSE are not prepared to fulfil MCCG’s requirement to have 
financially literate audit committee members as a whole, commencing 
January 2009. With regard to the proportion of financially literate directors 
according to the types of industries, the size varies from 17.4% to 33.8%. 
The finance and construction industry has the highest and lowest proportion 
of financially literate directors, respectively. 
 
This study further investigated the proportion of financial literacy audit 
committee members and the results are presented in Table 4.19. Seven and 
eight PLC did not have financial literacy audit committee members in 2007 
and 2008, respectively. PLC with more than 50% financial literacy audit 
committee members are also very low. The percentages are 13.8% in 2007 
and 16.4% in 2008. Only 1.7% PLC has all financial literate audit committee 
members in 2007 and the percentage slightly increased to 3.4% in 2008. 
The results indicate that many PLC may not comply with the MCCG 
requirement to have all financial literacy audit committee members, 
commencing January 2009. 
Table 4.19 Proportion of Financial Literacy Audit Committee Members  
 2007 2008 
Proportion Frequency % Cumulative Percentage Frequency % 
Cumulative 
Percentage 
.00 7 6.0 6.0 8 6.9 6.9 
.20 6 5.2 11.2 3 2.6 9.5 
.25 13 11.2 22.4 0 0 9.5 
.30 0 0 22.4 77 66.4 75.9 
.33 66 56.9 79.3 0 0 75.9 
.40 2 1.7 81.0 0 0 75.9 
.50 6 5.2 86.2 9 7.8 83.6 
.60 0 0 86.2 1 .9 84.5 
.67 12 10.3 96.6 0 0 84.5 
.70 0 0 96.6 12 10.3 94.8 
.75 2 1.7 98.3 0 0 94.8 
.80 0 0 98.3 2 1.7 96.6 
1.00 2 1.7 100.0 4 3.4 100.0 
Total 116 100 100 116 100 100 
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4.2.2.4 The Corporate Governance Expertise of Directors 
The mean corporate governance expertise of directors on the board is 
shown in Figure 4.14. Since corporate governance expertise magnifies BOD 
efficiency in discharging their duties, 66.2% directors hold additional 
directorships in other PLC in 2007 and the percentage slightly increased to 
67.2% in 2008. One company, or 0.9% of PLC, did not have corporate 
governance expertise directors and 19.8% PLC had corporate governance 
expertise directors on the board as a whole in 2007 and 2008. A total of 
67.2% and 68.1% PLC have more than half corporate governance expertise 
directors on the board in 2007 and 2008, respectively.  
  
PLC with corporate governance expertise significantly differ between the first 
and second BSE. A total of 71.5% directors in the first BSE had corporate 
governance expertise in 2007, and the percentage slightly increased to 
72.2% in 2008. For PLC in the second BSE, 51.1% and 52.6% directors had 
corporate governance expertise in 2007 and 2008 respectively. The result 
indicates that PLC in the first BSE has a higher proportion of directors with 
corporate governance expertise than PLC in the second BSE and the 
increment in 2007 to 2008 is very minimal.   
 
PLC in the first BSE that have the number of corporate governance 
expertise directors as a whole is higher than PLC in the second BSE (i.e. 
22.1% in 2007 and 23.3% in 2008 for PLC in the first BSE and 13.3% in 
2007 and 10% in 2008 for PLC in the second BSE). Corporate governance 
expertise for PLC across industries significantly differs and the mean 
proportion of directors with corporate governance expertise ranged from 
60.3% to 82.7%. PLC with the highest and lowest proportion of corporate 
governance expertise directors are from the finance and industrial products 
industries, respectively.    
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Figure 4.14 Mean Corporate Governance Expertise Directors 
 
4.2.2.5 The Ethnicity of Directors 
Figure 4.15 presents the mean ethnicity of directors on the board in general, 
across the type of BSE and types of industries. Around 40% and 38% 
directors are Bumiputra in 2007 and 2008 respectively. These statistical 
results suggest a nomination of non-Bumiputra directors in Malaysian PLC, 
although Bumiputra is the largest ethnic group in Malaysia. In 2007, the 
racial composition of directors in Malaysian PLC was 53% Chinese, 40% 
Bumiputra, 4% Indian, and 3% from other races. In 2008, Chinese directors 
increased by 2% and the Bumiputra directors concurrently decreased by 2% 
and there were no changes of Indians and other races. 
 
The proportion of Bumiputra directors for PLC in the first and second BSE 
significantly differs. In 2007, the composition of directors in the first BSE was 
42% Bumiputra, 50% Chinese, 4% Indians and 4% other races; while in the 
second BSE, the percentages are 32% Bumiputra, 62% Chinese, 3% 
Indians and 3% other races. There are no major changes of directors’ 
compositions in 2008, except for a reduction of 2% of Bumiputra directors 
and an increase of 2% Chinese directors for PLC in the first BSE. These 
results indicate that the proportion of non-Bumiputra directors for PLC in the 
second BSE is higher than the first BSE. With regard to the types of 
industries, it is interesting to note that the highest proportion of Bumiputra 
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directors are to be found in the services and finance industries, while the 
lowest proportion is to be found in the consumer industry. 
 
Figure 4.15 Mean Ethnicity Directors 
 
 
4.2.3 Control Variables 
The control variables investigated in the present study are company size, 
profitability, leverage and size of BOD. Table 4.20 presents the descriptive 
statistics for these control variables. The mean company size measured by 
the assets owned by PLC ranged from RM 2.53 billion to RM 3.42 billion. 
There is a substantial range between the minimum and maximum company 
size, which is from RM 23.6 million to RM196 billion. Therefore, the sample 
of this study covers both small and large companies and this makes the 
findings more generalizable than if they had concentrated on one size of 
company alone. The mean company size between the first and second BSE 
significantly differs: between RM 3.36 billion and RM 4.56 billion for PLC in 
the first BSE, and between RM 151 million and RM 163 million for PLC in the 
second BSE. Mean size for PLC in the second BSE is only around 4% of 
PLC in the first BSE. With regard to the types of industries, the highest mean 
company size came from the finance industry, and the lowest came from the 
construction and technology industries.  
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The mean profitability of the PLC ranged from -14.4% to 11.4%, and mean 
leverage ranged from 22.4% to 28.2%. Mean profitability between the first 
and second BSE significantly differs where PLC in the first and second BSE 
shows positive and negative ratios, respectively. This study can possibly 
conclude that most PLC in the first and second BSE incurred profit and 
losses respectively for both years. Although mean leverage across the type 
of BSE insignificantly differs, it is slightly higher for PLC in the second BSE. 
Finally, the mean size of BOD is seven members in 2007 and 2008, and 
eight and seven members for PLC in the first and second BSE respectively. 
These results indicate that mean size of BOD for PLC in the first BSE is 
slightly higher than PLC in the second BSE. 
 
Table 4.20 Control Variables 
Types Control 
Variables 
Q1 
2007 
Q2 
2007 
Q3 
2007 
Q4 
2007 
Q1 
2008 
Q2 
2008 
Q3 
2008 
Q4 
2008 
General 
Company 
size 
3.42E
+09 
2.53E
+09 
2.62E
+09 
2.73E
+09 
2.79
E+09 
2.90E
+09 
2.96E
+09 
2.99E
+09 
 Profitability 0.077 0.053 0.103 0.075 0.114 0.073 0.047 -0.144 
 Leverage 0.282 0.231 0.236 0.234 0.224 0.229 0.239 0.247 
 Size BOD 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Boards of Stock Exchange (BSE) 
First 
BSE 
Company 
size 
4.56E
+09 
3.36E
+09 
3.48E
+09 
3.63E
+09 
3.70
E+09 
3.85E
+09 
3.93E
+09 
3.97E
+09 
 Profitability 0.125 0.138 0.169 0.157 0.141 0.134 0.103 -0.139 
 Leverage 0.302 0.228 0.223 0.226 0.223 0.227 0.234 0.241 
 Size of BOD 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 
Second 
BSE 
Company 
size 
1.51E
+08 
1.56E
+08 
1.51E
+08 
1.57E
+08 
1.62
E+08 
1.61E
+08 
1.63E
+08 
1.60E
+08 
 Profitability -0.06 -0.193 -0.088 -0.161 0.035 -0.103 -0.113 -0.159 
 Leverage 0.226 0.238 0.272 0.258 0.226 0.234 0.252 0.262 
 Size of BOD 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
 
4.2.4 Computation on the Quality Value of Interims 
The first objective of this thesis is to determine the quality of Malaysian 
interims in the absence of audit reviews. The PLC will be considered to have 
a higher quality value of interims if all of the qualitative items measured 
earlier have higher values (i.e. have published interims sooner, have a 
higher compliance score with the FRS 134, have a higher compliance score 
with the BMLR, and have higher comparability ranking score of interims). 
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The quality value of each qualitative item is added and the accumulative 
value ranges from 0 to 4. This study computed the quality value of interims 
by using two methods (which have been described in Chapter Three). The 
first and second methods used dichotomous and continuous values, 
respectively, for all qualitative items. The results are reported in general and 
across the type of BSE and types of industries to determine any differences. 
 
4.2.4.1 Quality of Interims: Dichotomous Method 
Figure 4.18 depicts the quality value of interims by using the first method, 
which uses dichotomous values for all qualitative items. The PLC that 
comply with the allowable period to publish interims, comply with the FRS 
134, comply with the BMLR and comparable interims from one period to 
another will score one point for each variable. The quality value for each 
qualitative item is added and the results are presented graphically in Figure 
4.16. The quality value of interims progressively increased in the first three 
quarters and intensely dropped in quarter four by 0.35 in 2007 and 0.5 points 
in 2008. The quality value of interims is slightly higher in 2008.  
 
Figure 4.16 Quality Value of Interims: The Dichotomous Method  
 
 
Table 4.21 presents the quality value of each qualitative characteristic of 
interims. The value for each qualitative characteristic of interims is 
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remarkably high. Compliance with the FRS 134 is the item that mostly 
contributes to the quality of interims. However, the timeliness value is also 
high for some quarters (such as quarter four in 2007 and quarter three in 
2008). The item that contributes the least to the quality of interims is 
comparability. In 2007 and 2008, the highest quality value is quarter three 
and the lowest is quarter four.  
 
The quality value of interims is above 3.5 for the first three quarters in 2007 
and 2008 and between 3.0 and 3.5 in quarter four for both years. By 
referring to the level of quality of interims in Table 3.6, Chapter Three, the 
results indicate that the quality value of interims is very high for the first three 
quarters and high for the fourth quarter.  
 
Table 4.21 Mean Quality Value of Interims: The Dichotomous Method 
Qualitative 
characteristics Mean score 
of quality 
value 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
of Interims 2007 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008 
 % % % % % % % % Timeliness SCOTI1 0.862 0.879 0.905 1.000 0.991 0.991 1.000 0.983 
FRS134 SCOFRS1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BMLR SCOBMLR1 0.983 0.983 0.991 0.983 0.966 0.966 0.983 0.983 
Comparability SCOCOMP1 0.750 0.776 0.793 0.362 0.862 0.853 0.897 0.405 
Total QUALITY1 3.590 3.640 3.690 3.340 3.820 3.810 3.880 3.370 
 
As presented in Figure 4.17, the quality value of interims insignificantly 
differs between PLC in the first and second BSE. The quality value of 
interims for PLC in the first BSE is higher than PLC in the second BSE in 
quarter two and four in 2007 and quarter four in 2008. For the remaining 
quarters, PLC in the second BSE has a higher value of quality of interims 
than PLC in the first BSE. Regardless of the type of BSE, the highest and 
the lowest quality value of interims is in quarter three and four, respectively.  
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Figure 4.17 Mean Quality Value of Interims: The Dichotomous Method (BSE) 
 
 
Table 4.22 shows that, regardless of the type of BSE, compliance with the 
FRS 134 is the item that mostly contributes to the quality of interims. 
However, timeliness, compliance with the BMLR and comparability values is 
equally high for some quarters. The item that contributes the least to the 
quality of interims slightly differs according to the type of BSE. For PLC in 
the first BSE, comparability is the item that contributes the least to quality of 
interims. For PLC in the second BSE, timeliness and compliance with the 
BMLR is the item that contributes the least to the quality of interims for the 
first three quarters in 2007 and 2008, and comparability is the item that 
contributes the least to the quality of interims for the fourth quarter in 2007 
and 2008.  
 
Regardless of the type of BSE, the quality value of interims in the first three 
quarters is higher than 3.5 and the quality value of interims in the fourth 
quarter is between 3.0 and 3.5. These results indicate that the quality of 
interims in the first three quarters and the fourth quarter is very high and high 
respectively.  
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Table 4.22 Mean Quality Value of Interims: The Dichotomous Method (BSE) 
Qualitative 
characteristics 
Mean score 
of quality 
value 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008 
% % % % % % % % 
First BSE          Timeliness SCOTI1 0.907 0.942 0.942 1.000 1.000 0.988 1.000 0.988 
FRS134 SCOFRS1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BMLR SCOBMLR1 0.988 0.988 0.988 0.977 0.965 0.977 0.988 0.988 
Comparability SCOCOMP
1 
0.686 0.733 0.744 0.372 0.814 0.802 0.861 0.442 
Total QUALITY1 3.580 3.660 3.670 3.350 3.780 3.770 3.850 3.420 
Second BSE          Timeliness SCOTI1 0.733 0.700 0.800 1.000 0.967 1.000 1.000 0.967 
FRS134 SCOFRS1 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
BMLR SCOBMLR1 0.967 0.967 1.000 1.000 0.967 0.933 0.967 0.967 
Comparability SCOCOMP
1 
0.933 0.900 0.933 0.333 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.300 
Total QUALITY1 3.630 3.570 3.730 3.330 3.930 3.930 3.970 3.230 
 
Table 4.23 shows that the highest quality value of interims for PLC in each 
types of industries is mixed (i.e. quarter one, two, or three). The lowest 
quality value of interims is quarter four for each types of industries, except 
for the technology industry in 2008. With regard to the types of industries, 
construction and finance industry has the highest and lowest quality value of 
interims in most quarters. Although the finance industry published interims 
most timely, the comparability was very low and this has caused the quality 
of interims to be amongst the lowest when compared to other types of 
industries. 
 
The quality value of interims for most industries is above 3.5 for the first 
three quarters and between 3.0 and 3.5 for the fourth quarter, which 
indicates that the quality of interims is very high and high respectively. The 
quality of interims for the finance industry is between 3.0 and 3.5 for all 
quarters except quarter two and three in 2008. Based on these results, the 
present study can conclude that regardless of the types of industries, the 
quality of interims is high with the absence of audit reviews. 
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Table 4.23 Mean Quality Value of Interims: The Dichotomous Method 
(Industry) 
Qualitative 
characteristic
s 
Mean score 
of quality 
value 
Q1 
2007 
% 
Q2 
2007 
% 
Q3 
2007 
% 
Q4 
2007 
% 
Q1 
2008 
% 
Q2 
2008 
% 
Q3 
2008 
% 
Q4 
2008 
% 
Construction          Timeliness SCOTI1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
FRS134 SCOFRS1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
BMLR SCOBMLR1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Comparability SCOCOMP1 .8750 .8750 .8750 .1250 1.0000 .8750 1.0000 .2500 
Total QUALITY1 3.88 3.88 3.88 3.13 4.00 3.88 4.00 3.25 
Consumer          Timeliness SCOTI1 .8667 .8000 .8667 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
FRS134 SCOFRS1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
BMLR SCOBMLR1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Comparability SCOCOMP1 .8667 .9333 .8667 .4000 .9333 .8667 .9333 .6000 
Total QUALITY1 3.73 3.73 3.73 3.40 3.93 3.87 3.93 3.60 
Finance          Timeliness SCOTI1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
FRS134 SCOFRS1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
BMLR SCOBMLR1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Comparability SCOCOMP1 .5000 .3333 .3333 .1667 .3333 .6667 .8333 .1667 
Total QUALITY1 3.50 3.33 3.33 3.17 3.33 3.67 3.83 3.17 
Industrial 
Products          
Timeliness SCOTI1 .7442 .7907 .9070 1.0000 1.0000 .9767 1.0000 .9535 
FRS134 SCOFRS1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
BMLR SCOBMLR1 .9767 .9767 1.0000 1.0000 .9767 .9535 .9767 .9767 
Comparability SCOCOMP1 .7674 .7907 .8372 .3953 .9070 .8605 .9070 .4651 
Total QUALITY1 3.49 3.56 3.74 3.40 3.88 3.79 3.88 3.40 
Plantations          Timeliness SCOTI1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
FRS134 SCOFRS1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
BMLR SCOBMLR1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 .8750 .7500 .7500 .8750 .8750 
Comparability SCOCOMP1 .7500 .7500 .7500 .3750 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 .5000 
Total QUALITY1 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.25 3.75 3.75 3.88 3.38 
Properties          Timeliness SCOTI1 1.0000 .9091 .8182 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
FRS134 SCOFRS1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
BMLR SCOBMLR1 .9091 .9091 .9091 .9091 .9091 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Comparability SCOCOMP1 .6364 .7273 .7273 .2727 .7273 .8182 .7273 .2727 
Total QUALITY1 3.55 3.55 3.45 3.18 3.64 3.82 3.73 3.27 
Services          Timeliness SCOTI1 .8571 .9524 .9048 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
FRS134 SCOFRS1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
BMLR SCOBMLR1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Comparability SCOCOMP1 .7143 .7619 .8095 .4762 .9048 .8571 .8571 .2381 
Total QUALITY1 3.57 3.71 3.71 3.48 3.90 3.86 3.86 3.24 
Technology          
Timeliness SCOTI1 1.0000 1.0000 .7500 1.0000 .7500 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
FRS134 SCOFRS1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
BMLR SCOBMLR1 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
Comparability SCOCOMP1 .7500 .7500 .7500 .2500 .5000 .7500 1.0000 .7500 
Total QUALITY1 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.25 3.25 3.75 4.00 3.75 
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4.2.4.2 Quality of Interims: The Continuous Method 
Figure 4.18 exhibits the quality value of interims by using the second 
method, which measures each qualitative item continuously from 0 to 1. The 
quality value for each qualitative item is added and the accumulative amount 
is presented graphically in Figure 4.18. Similar to the dichotomous method, 
the quality value of interims for the first three quarters in 2007 and 2008 
insignificantly differs and the lowest quality value of interims is to be found in 
quarter four. The present study also found that the quality of interims by 
using the continuous method is lower because decimal points are used to 
calculate each qualitative items of interims whilst a whole number is used in 
the continuous method to calculate each qualitative item of interims. 
  
Figure 4.18 Mean Quality Value of Interims: The Continuous Method  
 
As shown in Table 4.24, the qualitative characteristic of interims that 
contribute the most and the least to the quality of interims is compliance with 
the FRS 134 and timeliness, respectively. However, comparability is the item 
that mostly contributes to the quality of interims in the first three quarters of 
2008. Although comparability is the item that mostly contributes to the quality 
of interims in the first three quarters in 2008, the mean of comparability and 
compliance with the FRS 134 insignificantly differs. Similar to the 
dichotomous method, the highest and the lowest quality value of interims is 
to be found in quarter three and four, respectively.  
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The quality value of interims for the first three quarters is between 2.5 and 
3.0, which indicates that the quality for these quarters is moderate. The 
quality of interims in quarter four is between 2.0 and 2.5, which indicates that 
the quality of interims for the fourth quarter is low. Therefore, the present 
study concludes that by using continuous method, the quality of interims is 
moderate for the first three quarters and low for the fourth quarter. This is 
due to PLC inclination to publish interims towards the end of the allowable 
period.  
 
Table 4.24 Mean Quality Value of Interims: The Continuous Method  
Qualitative 
characteristics 
Mean score 
of quality 
value 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
2007 2007 2007 2007 2008 2008 2008 2008 
% % % % % % % % 
Timeliness SCOTI2 0.100 0.100 0.110 0.060 0.100 0.100 0.130 0.090 
FRS134 SCOFRS2 0.930 0.930 0.930 0.940 0.920 0.920 0.920 0.920 
BMLR SCOBMLR2 0.780 0.770 0.780 0.770 0.770 0.770 0.770 0.770 
Comparability SCOCOMP2 0.860 0.870 0.870 0.490 0.940 0.930 0.950 0.520 
Total QUALITY2 2.670 2.670 2.690 2.250 2.730 2.710 2.770 2.290 
 
In summary, regardless of the methods used, and even with the absence of 
audit reviews, most PLC that were included in this study complied with the 
FRS 134 disclosure requirement without any failure. The item that 
contributes the least to the quality of interims is found to significantly differ if 
a different method is used. The item that contributes the least to the quality 
of interims is comparability for the dichotomous method and timeliness for 
continuous method. Most PLC publishes interims timely but towards the end 
of the allowable time period of 60 days. Therefore, the value is high in the 
dichotomous method and very low in the continuous method. Ku Ismail and 
Chandler (2004) proposed that the authority reduces the allowable period to 
publish interims so that Malaysian PLC submit interims early, which is an 
equivalent result to that found in many developed countries such as the US. 
By using the continuous method, it can be seen that the quality value of 
comparability is higher than the quality value of timeliness to publish 
interims.  
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As shown in Figure 4.19, the quality value for PLC in the first and second 
BSE insignificantly differ in all quarters and years. However, PLC in the first 
BSE has an equal or slightly higher quality values than PLC in the second 
BSE.  
 
Figure 4.19 Mean Quality Value of Interims: The Continuous Method (BSE) 
 
 
Table 4.25 reports that the item that contributes the most to the quality of 
interims slightly differs for PLC in different type of BSE. Compliance with the 
FRS 134 is the item that mostly contributes to the quality of interims for PLC 
in the first BSE. Except quarter four, comparability is the item that mostly 
contributes to the quality of interims for PLC in the second BSE. However, 
mean compliance with the FRS 134 for PLC in the second BSE is 
remarkably high and insignificantly differs from the mean of comparability of 
interims. Regardless of the type of BSE, the item that contributes the least to 
the quality of interims is timeliness. Timeliness is very low if a continuous 
method is used because PLC published interims towards the end of the 
allowable period given. Similar to the dichotomous method, the highest and 
the lowest quality of interims in the first and second BSE is quarter three and 
four, respectively.  
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Regardless of the type of BSE, the quality value of interims is between 2.5 
and 3.0 for the first three quarters and between 2.0 and 2.5 for the fourth 
quarter. These results suggest that the quality of interims for the first three 
quarters and quarter four is moderate and low respectively.  
 
Table 4.25 Mean Quality Value of Interims: The Continuous Method (BSE) 
Qualitative 
characteristics 
 
Mean score 
of quality 
value 
Q1 
2007 
% 
Q2 
2007 
% 
Q3 
2007 
% 
Q4 
2007 
% 
Q1 
2008 
% 
Q2 
2008 
% 
Q3 
2008 
% 
Q4 
2008 
% 
First BSE          Timeliness SCOTI2 0.110 0.110 0.130 0.070 0.110 0.110 0.150 0.090 
FRS134 SCOFRS2 0.930 0.940 0.940 0.950 0.920 0.920 0.920 0.920 
BMLR SCOBMLR2 0.780 0.780 0.780 0.770 0.780 0.770 0.770 0.770 
Comparability SCOCOMP2 0.840 0.850 0.840 0.510 0.920 0.900 0.930 0.560 
Total QUALITY2 2.660 2.680 2.690 2.290 2.730 2.710 2.780 2.350 
Second BSE          Timeliness SCOTI2 0.070 0.060 0.050 0.040 0.060 0.060 0.080 0.070 
FRS134 SCOFRS2 0.910 0.920 0.930 0.930 0.900 0.910 0.910 0.910 
BMLR SCOBMLR2 0.760 0.760 0.770 0.760 0.770 0.770 0.770 0.760 
Comparability SCOCOMP2 0.940 0.920 0.950 0.420 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.390 
Total QUALITY2 2.680 2.650 2.700 2.150 2.730 2.730 2.770 2.130 
 
In summary, for PLC in the first BSE, comparability is the item that 
contributes the least to the quality of interims if a dichotomous method is 
used and timeliness contributes the least to the quality of interims if a 
continuous method is used. For PLC in the second BSE, if a dichotomous 
method is used, timeliness and compliance with the BMLR is the least item 
that contributes to the quality of interims for the first three quarters in 2007 
and 2008, respectively, and comparability in quarter four. If a continuous 
method is used, then the item that contributes the least to the quality of 
interims is timeliness. 
 
Table 4.26 shows the quality value of interims based on the types of 
industries if continuous method is used. The highest quality of interims for 
most industries is quarter three and the lowest quality of interims is quarter 
four for all types of industries. The finance industry has the lowest quality 
value for the first three quarters in 2007 despite the early timeliness to 
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publish interims. Nevertheless, the quality value for the finance industry 
improved in 2008. The quality of interims for services industry is the lowest 
for the last three quarters in 2008. For the remaining industries, the quality 
values insignificantly differ.  
 
With the exception of the finance industry, the quality value of interims in the 
first three quarters is between 2.5 and 3.0, which indicates that the quality of 
interims for these quarters is moderate. The quality value of interims in the 
fourth quarter is between 2.0 and 2.5, which indicates that the quality of 
interims in quarter four is low. 
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Table 4.26 Mean Quality Value of Interims: The Continuous Method 
(Industry) 
Qualitative 
characteristics 
Mean score 
of quality 
value 
Q1 
2007 
% 
Q2 
2007 
% 
Q3 
2007 
% 
Q4 
2007 
% 
Q1 
2008 
% 
Q2 
2008 
% 
Q3 
2008 
% 
Q4 
2008 
% 
Construction          
Timeliness SCOTI2 0.106 0.071 0.142 0.052 0.075 0.098 0.117 0.100 
FRS134 SCOFRS2 0.906 0.903 0.923 0.928 0.935 0.935 0.935 0.926 
BMLR SCOBMLR2 0.735 0.760 0.750 0.748 0.763 0.760 0.760 0.740 
Comparability SCOCOMP2 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.344 1.000 0.969 1.000 0.438 
Total QUALITY2 2.623 2.608 2.689 2.071 2.773 2.762 2.812 2.204 
Consumer          
Timeliness SCOTI2 0.103 0.113 0.120 0.072 0.119 0.084 0.189 0.117 
FRS134 SCOFRS2 0.948 0.947 0.947 0.953 0.945 0.943 0.945 0.937 
BMLR SCOBMLR2 0.794 0.790 0.789 0.769 0.779 0.779 0.782 0.772 
Comparability SCOCOMP2 0.933 0.950 0.933 0.517 0.950 0.933 0.933 0.633 
Total QUALITY2 2.779 2.801 2.789 2.312 2.792 2.740 2.850 2.459 
Finance          Timeliness SCOTI2 0.225 0.167 0.200 0.144 0.211 0.208 0.267 0.192 
FRS134 SCOFRS2 0.922 0.937 0.937 0.938 0.923 0.923 0.923 0.923 
BMLR SCOBMLR2 0.780 0.757 0.765 0.770 0.755 0.777 0.777 0.785 
Comparability SCOCOMP2 0.583 0.500 0.417 0.375 0.792 0.875 0.958 0.458 
Total QUALITY2 2.510 2.360 2.318 2.228 2.681 2.783 2.925 2.358 
Industrial 
Products          
Timeliness SCOTI2 0.079 0.074 0.088 0.047 0.090 0.071 0.109 0.070 
FRS134 SCOFRS2 0.935 0.942 0.942 0.950 0.915 0.917 0.919 0.919 
BMLR SCOBMLR2 0.767 0.766 0.779 0.775 0.780 0.777 0.779 0.773 
Comparability SCOCOMP2 0.884 0.866 0.901 0.517 0.936 0.930 0.948 0.593 
Total QUALITY2 2.664 2.648 2.710 2.289 2.721 2.695 2.755 2.356 
Plantations          Timeliness SCOTI2 0.169 0.140 0.135 0.050 0.119 0.102 0.117 0.079 
FRS134 SCOFRS2 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.955 0.930 0.916 0.934 0.935 
BMLR SCOBMLR2 0.816 0.796 0.769 0.749 0.760 0.734 0.749 0.721 
Comparability SCOCOMP2 0.875 0.875 0.875 0.469 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.625 
Total QUALITY2 2.815 2.766 2.734 2.223 2.809 2.752 2.799 2.360 
Properties          Timeliness SCOTI2 0.062 0.077 0.094 0.053 0.103 0.126 0.106 0.089 
FRS134 SCOFRS2 0.938 0.938 0.938 0.944 0.922 0.931 0.931 0.935 
BMLR SCOBMLR2 0.776 0.768 0.779 0.762 0.757 0.782 0.771 0.781 
Comparability SCOCOMP2 0.773 0.886 0.886 0.273 0.932 0.886 0.932 0.318 
Total QUALITY2 2.549 2.670 2.698 2.031 2.714 2.725 2.740 2.123 
Services          
Timeliness SCOTI2 0.056 0.090 0.078 0.054 0.060 0.068 0.081 0.079 
FRS134 SCOFRS2 0.912 0.921 0.921 0.930 0.897 0.897 0.900 0.904 
BMLR SCOBMLR2 0.790 0.790 0.786 0.769 0.788 0.772 0.775 0.770 
Comparability SCOCOMP2 0.881 0.893 0.881 0.607 0.976 0.929 0.929 0.357 
Total QUALITY2 2.639 2.694 2.665 2.361 2.721 2.665 2.685 2.110 
Technology          
Timeliness SCOTI2 0.242 0.258 0.254 0.067 0.117 0.288 0.283 0.075 
FRS134 SCOFRS2 0.850 0.858 0.850 0.850 0.850 0.875 0.875 0.850 
BMLR SCOBMLR2 0.768 0.748 0.755 0.758 0.755 0.745 0.745 0.740 
Comparability SCOCOMP2 0.938 0.875 0.875 0.500 0.750 0.813 1.000 0.750 
Total QUALITY2 2.797 2.738 2.734 2.174 2.472 2.720 2.903 2.415 
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4.3 Correlation Analysis  
The second objective of this thesis is to determine the impact of CGC on the 
quality of interims. The quality of interims is proxied by the qualitative 
characteristics of financial reports, namely: timeliness, compliance with the 
FRS 134, compliance with the BMLR and comparability of interims. The 
qualitative items are categorised as dependent variables and CGC are 
categorised as independent variables.  
 
A Pearson product moment correlation coefficient was conducted to 
determine the relationships between CGC and the quality of interims. One of 
the circumstances to use the Pearson is using continuous or dichotomous 
values. Except comparability, all qualitative items of interims are using 
continuous values. Therefore, the present study has to transform the ordinal 
value of comparability to dichotomous value, where 0 and 1 denotes non-
comparable and comparable interims, respectively.  
 
This study conducted a distinctive measure from the previous studies by 
pooling the interims data for every quarter in 2007 and 2008 in order to have 
a larger sample size. This technique of pooling data follows the suggestion 
by Pallant (2005), who advised that sample size influences the statistical 
significance results of Pearson “r” and larger sizes will generate more 
generalisable results. Correlations between all variables are presented in 
Table 4.27 and there are no missing values for all variables. 
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Table 4.27 Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficients – The Basic Model 
VARIABLES 
 
TIME FRS134 
 
BMLR COMPARE MTGD INDEPD FINLITD GOVD ETHNICD SIZE 
COM 
PROFIT LEVER- 
AGE 
SIZE 
BOD 
TIME 1              
FRS134 -.036 1             
BMLR -.099** .247** 1            
COMPARE -.000 .106** -.008 1           
MTGD -.073* (H2A) -.166**(H2B) -.145**(H2C) .115**(H2D) 1          
INDEPD -.056(H2E) .058(H2F) -.005(H2G) .056(H2H) .089** 1         
FINLITD -.001(H2I) -.100**(H2J) -.091**(H2K) .081*(H2L) .240** .012 1        
GOVD -.131**(H2M) .043(H2N) .021(H2O) .047(H2P) .183** .166** .059 1       
ETHNICD .117**(H2Q) -.121**(H2R) -.101**(H2S) .075*(H2T) .201** .212** .093** .252** 1      
SIZECOM -.176** -.015 -.033 .102** .516** .189** -.089** .103** .053 1     
PROFIT -.110** -.018 .036 -.045 .048 -.044 -.059 .157** .031 .066* 1    
LEVERAGE .135** -.037 -.057 -.028 .215** .102** .083* -.025 .185** -.081* -.086** 1   
SIZEBOD -.070* .037 .032 .079* .053 -.099** -.159** -.042 .101** .100** .072* -.085** 1 
 
Source: This study 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level  * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
Dependent variables: TIME, FRS 134, BMLR and COMPARE 
Independent variables: MGTD, INDEPD, FINLITD, GOVD and ETHNICD  
Control variables: SIZECOM, PROFIT, LEVERAGE AND SIZEBOD 
MTGD = Frequency of BOD meetings, INDEPD = Independence of Directors, FINLITD = Financial Literacy of Directors, GOVD = Governance Expertise of Directors, 
ETHNICD = Ethnicity of directors, SIZECOM = Company’ size, PROFIT = Profitability, LEVERAGE = Leverage. SIZEBOD = Size of BOD.
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4.3.1 Relationship between Dependent Variables  
Dependent variables are the qualitative characteristics of interims. As 
presented in Table 4.27, there is an absence of a significant relationship 
between all dependent variables, except for an inverse relationship between 
timeliness and compliance with the BMLR, a positive relationship between 
compliance with the FRS 134 and compliance with the BMLR, and a positive 
relationship between compliance with the FRS 134 and comparability of 
interims. These associations indicate that time may not be a factor that 
influences the PLC compliance with the FRS 134 and comparative figures in 
interims and the more timely in publishing interims may cause the 
compliance score with the BMLR to be high. This finding is similar to that of 
Zeghal (1984), who found that timely financial reports contain higher quality 
information. With regard to the absence association between timeliness and 
comparability of interims, this indicates that time is not a factor for PLC to 
make accounting adjustment in their interims. Therefore, this result further 
supports this study’s disagreement with the previous studies finding that the 
time is a factor to make adjustment that cause PLC to defer in publishing 
quarter four interims. 
 
The PLC compliance score with the FRS 134 is significantly and positively 
associated with the BMLR compliance score and comparability of interims at 
p<0.01. The results suggest that as the PLC compliance score with the 
FRS134 increased, the BMLR compliance score and comparability of 
interims will also increase. Despite the significant association between the 
FRS 134 compliance score and comparability of interims, no association 
was found between the BMLR compliance score and comparability of 
interims.  
 
This study can conclude from these results that timeliness to publish interims 
is not a factor that influences PLC to comply with the FRS 134 and have 
comparable interims from one period to another. Since there is no 
association between timeliness and compliance with the FRS 134, the 
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present study supports the proposal made by Ku Ismail and Chandler 
(2004), who recommended that the regulatory authority should lessen the 
allowable time period to publish interims so as to come into line with the time 
period of other well-developed countries such as the US. The benefit of 
having timely published interims is to assist the users of financial reports to 
make decisions more accurately. Timeliness significantly influences the PLC 
compliance with the BMLR because the delay in timeliness to publish 
interims is associated with lower compliance score with the BMLR. A 
compliance score with the FRS 134 significantly affects the compliance 
score with the BMLR as well as affecting the comparability of interims. 
However, the compliance score with the BMLR in this study has no influence 
on the comparability of interims. 
 
4.3.2  Relationship between Independent Variables  
Independent variables are CGC. All of the independent variables in this 
study are significantly and positively correlated with each other, except for: 
a) the independence and financial literacy of directors; and b) the financial 
literacy and corporate governance expertise of directors. This finding 
contrasts with those of Jeanjean and Stolowy (2009), who found that 
financial expertise of directors is positively associated with the independence 
of directors.  
 
The association of independent variables indicates that PLC with a higher 
proportion of directors who are independent, financially literate, with 
corporate governance expertise and who are Bumiputra held a larger 
frequency of BOD meetings. Menon and Williams (1994) and Hossain et al. 
(2000) also found that independence directors are positively associated with 
the frequency of BOD meetings. The skills possessed by the directors may 
trigger their awareness of the importance of having the BOD meeting.  
 
This study also finds that an independent director is positively and 
significantly correlated with corporate governance expertise and the ethnicity 
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of directors, suggesting that PLC with a larger proportion of independent 
directors have a higher proportion of corporate governance expertise and 
they have more Bumiputra directors. Finally, a larger proportion of directors 
who are financially literate and who have corporate governance expertise 
are Bumiputra. 
 
4.3.3 Relationship between Control Variables 
The control variables used in the present study are: company size, 
profitability, leverage, and size of BOD. All of the control variables are either 
positively or negatively associated with each other at p<0.01 or p<0.05. 
Company size is positively and significantly associated with profitability and 
size of BOD, which suggests that PLC of a larger size have a larger 
profitability ratio and BOD with more members. An inverse association 
between company size and leverage ratio suggests that PLC of a larger size 
have a lower leverage ratio. Larger PLC takes the opportunity to issue 
additional shares and bonds instead of borrowing from financial institutions 
in order to have lower leverage ratio. Otherwise, the PLC has to pay higher 
debts due to the higher interest payment and this causes the leverage ratio 
to be higher. The lower leverage ratio of larger PLC probably causes them to 
earn higher profitability. This is supported by an inverse association between 
profitability and leverage which is found in this study (as shown in Table 
4.27). Finally, BOD with more members has higher profitability and lower 
leverage ratios. 
 
Based on these statistical results, the present study can conclude that larger 
PLC has a larger profitability ratio, a lower leverage ratio, and BOD with 
more members. Meanwhile, PLC with a lower leverage ratio has higher 
profitability because there are lower principal and interest payments made to 
the financial institutions. Finally, BOD with more members has higher 
profitability and lower leverage ratios. 
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4.3.4  Relationship between the Dependent and Independent Variables   
The relationship between dependent and independent variables will 
determine the impact of CGC on the quality of interims and provide evidence 
for hypothesis one that was developed in Chapter Three. The summary 
result of all hypotheses that may influence the quality of interims is given in 
Table 4.28.  
Table 4.28 The Hypotheses of CGC that Influence the Quality of Interims 
No Hypotheses Results 
1 H1A There is no association between the frequency of a 
BOD meetings and timeliness. 
Not 
Supported 
2 H1B There is no association between the frequency of a 
BOD meetings and compliance with the FRS 134. 
Not 
Supported 
3 H1C There is no association between the frequency of a 
BOD meetings and compliance with the BMLR. 
Not 
Supported 
4 H1D There is no association between the frequency of a 
BOD meetings and comparability. 
Not 
Supported 
5 H1E There is no association between the independent 
directors and timeliness. 
Supported 
6 H1F There is no association between the independent 
directors and compliance with the FRS 134. 
Supported 
7 H1G There is no association between the independent 
directors and compliance with the BMLR. 
Supported 
8 H1H There is no association between the  independent 
directors and comparability. 
Supported 
9 H1I There is no association between the financial expertise 
of directors and timeliness. 
Supported 
10 H1J There is no association between the financial expertise 
of directors and compliance with the FRS 134. 
Not 
Supported 
11 H1K There is no association between the financial expertise 
of directors and compliance with the BMLR. 
Not 
Supported 
12 H1L There is no association between the financial expertise 
of directors and comparability. 
Not 
Supported 
13 H1M There is no association between the corporate 
governance expertise of directors and timeliness 
Not 
Supported 
14 H1N There is no association between the corporate 
governance expertise of directors and compliance with 
the FRS 134. 
Supported 
15 H1O There is no association between the corporate 
governance expertise of directors and compliance with 
the BMLR. 
Supported 
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No Hypotheses Results 
16 H1P There is no association between the corporate 
governance expertise of directors and comparability. 
Supported 
17 H1Q There is no association between the ethnicity of 
directors and timeliness 
Not 
Supported 
18 H1R There is no association between the ethnicity of 
directors and compliance with the FRS 134. 
Not 
Supported 
19 H1S There is no association between the ethnicity of 
directors and compliance with the BMLR. 
Not 
Supported 
20 H1T There is no association between the ethnicity of 
directors and comparability. 
Not 
Supported 
 
The frequency of a BOD meetings is found in this study to be associated 
significantly with all of the qualitative characteristics of interims. Except 
comparability, there is an inverse association found between the frequency 
of a BOD meetings and all qualitative characteristics of interims. These 
results indicates that PLC with a higher frequency of BOD meetings will 
publish interims in a more timely manner, have lower compliance score with 
the FRS 134, have lower compliance score with the BMLR, and have higher 
comparability of interims. Since all of the qualitative characteristics of 
interims are significantly associated with the frequency of BOD meeting at 
either p<0.01 or p<0.05, the present study can reject the null hypotheses 
H1A, H1B H1C and H1D. These findings support the findings of Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992), Bhuiyan et al. (2000) and Craft and Benson (2006) but are in 
contrast to the findings of Jensen (1993) and Vafeas (1999).  
 
There is no significant association found between the independence of the 
directors and all qualitative characteristics of interims. Therefore, the 
independence of the directors has no significant influence on the timeliness 
to publish interims, compliance with the FRS 134, compliance with the 
BMLR and comparability of interims. Therefore, the present study failed to 
reject the null hypotheses H1E, H1F, H1G and H1H, which means that 
independent directors have no impact on the quality of interims because 
there are absences of relationship between these variables. This finding is in 
contrast to those of Abdelsalam and El-Masry (2008), CheHaat et al. (2008) 
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and Ezat and El-Masry (2008), who all found that independent directors 
were positively and significantly associated with the timeliness of publishing 
interims. 
 
The financial literacy possessed by directors has no influence on the 
timeliness to publish interims. Nevertheless, the present study unpredictably 
revealed that there was an inverse instead of a direct relationship between 
financial literacy and compliance with the FRS 134 and the BMLR. 
Realistically, financially literate directors should be more familiar with the 
accounting standards and the necessities to comply with these standards. 
Therefore, the financial expertise possessed by directors may results in 
more compliance with the interim reporting standards. The financial literacy 
of directors is associated positively with the comparability of interims, which 
suggests that PLC with a higher proportion of financially literate directors 
have a higher comparability of interims. The skill of financially literate 
directors means they understand the importance of comparative figures in 
interims for the benefits of the users of financial reports. In summary, the 
financial literacy of directors has a significant influence on all qualitative 
characteristics of interims, except timeliness. Based on the statistical results, 
the present study fails to reject hypothesis H1I and can rejects hypotheses 
H1J, H1K and H1L. 
 
In contrast to financial literacy, timeliness is the only qualitative characteristic 
of interims that is significantly associated with the corporate governance 
expertise of directors, at p<0.01. This result indicates that those PLC that 
have directors with higher corporate governance expertise will publish 
interims more timely. The other qualitative characteristics of interims are not 
significantly associated with the corporate governance expertise of directors. 
Meanwhile, in contrast, Mangena and Pike (2005) found that corporate 
governance expertise of directors is associated positively with disclosure 
level of interims. Therefore, the present study rejects the null hypothesis H1M 
and fails to reject the null hypotheses H1N, H1O and H1P.  
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The ethnicity of directors is significantly associated with all of the qualitative 
characteristic of interims. This study has found that there is a positive 
association between ethnicity of directors and timeliness as well as 
comparability of interims. These results indicate that PLC with a higher 
proportion of Bumiputra directors publish interims less timely but have higher 
comparability of interims. Meanwhile, a negative association between 
ethnicity of directors and compliance with the FRS 134 and the BMLR 
indicates that PLC with a higher proportion of Bumiputra directors has a 
lower compliance score with the interim reporting standards. Since all of the 
qualitative characteristics of interims are significantly associated with 
ethnicity of directors, the present study can reject the null hypotheses H1Q, 
H1R, H1S and H1T. Therefore, the ethnicity of directors is found by this study 
to be significantly associated with the quality of interims.  
 
Kent and Stewart (2008) and Beekes and Brown (2006) found that corporate 
governance was related with informative disclosures in financial reports. 
From these associations, this study can conclude the importance of three 
CGC that are mainly associated with qualitative characteristics of interims 
namely: the frequency of the BOD meetings, the financial literacy and 
ethnicity of directors. Therefore, these three CGC rejects hypothesis one 
that there is no association between CGC and the quality of interims. Two 
CGC namely independence and corporate governance expertise of directors 
fail to lead to rejection of hypothesis one.  
 
When the PLC held a larger frequency of BOD meetings, the timeliness to 
publish interims was found to improve and the comparability of the interims 
increased. However, BOD with a higher frequency of meetings has a lower 
compliance score with the FRS 134 and the BMLR. These BOD are possibly 
concerned about their ability to publish interims within the allowable time 
period given by the authority and they have fewer concerns about their 
compliance with the interim reporting standards. PLC with a higher 
proportion of financially literate directors have a lower compliance score with 
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the FRS 134 and the BMLR, and higher comparability of interims. Financial 
literacy is not associated significantly with timeliness to publish interims. 
However, PLC with higher proportion of directors with corporate governance 
expertise publishes interims more timely. Finally, PLC with a higher 
proportion of Bumiputra directors publish interims less timely, have a lower 
compliance score with the FRS 134 and the BMLR, and they have more 
comparable interims. 
 
4.3.5 Relationship between Dependent and Control Variables 
All of the control variables in this study have a significant association with 
timeliness, no association with FRS 134 compliance, no association with 
BMLR compliance, and they are partially associated with the comparability 
of interims. Company size, profitability ratio, and size of BOD are inversely 
associated with timeliness, which suggests that PLC of a larger size, larger 
profitability ratio, and higher size of BOD published interims in a more timely 
manner. This finding is in agreement with that of Chambers and Penman 
(1984), who also found that company size was inversely associated with 
timeliness. However, this finding disagrees with that of Abdelsalam and El-
Masry (2008), who found that company size and profitability was not 
associated with timeliness of interims, and Ezat and El-Masry (2008), who 
found that company size and the size of BOD were positively associated 
with the timeliness of interims.  
 
A positive and significant association between leverage and timeliness 
suggests that PLC with a higher leverage ratio published interims in a less 
timely manner. No association was found in this study between all of the 
control variables and compliance with the FRS 134 and the BMLR. Ku Ismail 
and Chandler (2005a) also found that there is no association between 
profitability and BMLR’s disclosure. However, Ku Ismail and Chandler found 
that PLC with higher leverage ratio has higher disclosure in interims. 
Meanwhile, Mangena and Pike (2005) found that the size of corporate 
governance does not significantly influence the level of disclosure in 
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interims. Finally, the comparability of interims is significantly and directly 
related to company size and the size of BOD. These results suggest that 
larger PLC with larger BOD will have more comparable interims. 
 
The present study can conclude that larger PLC  will tend to publish interims 
in a more timely manner than smaller PLC and they will also have more 
comparable interims. Surprisingly, profitability and leverage have been found 
to have no significant influence on any of the qualitative items, except for 
timeliness whereby PLC with higher profitability and lower leverage ratios 
have been found to publish more timely interims. This finding is in 
agreement with previous studies. Finally, PLC with larger BOD has been 
found to have published more timely interims and they have more 
comparable interims. 
 
4.3.6 The Relationship between Independent and Control Variables 
As shown in Table 4.27, PLC of a larger size held more BOD meetings, have 
a higher proportion of independent directors, have a higher proportion of 
corporate governance expertise directors, and they have a lower proportion 
of financially literate directors. No association was found in this study 
between company size and the ethnicity of directors. Boone et al. (2007), 
Linck et al. (2008), and Coles et al. (2008) found that independent directors 
are associated positively with company size. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), 
and Hossain et al. (2000) in contrary suggest that smaller companies should 
have more independent directors because larger companies can rely on an 
alternative monitoring mechanism (such as institutional investors and stock 
analysts).  
 
Unexpectedly, this study found that profitability is not associated with any 
independent variables, except for the corporate governance expertise of 
directors. This lack of association indicates that PLC with a higher proportion 
of directors with corporate governance expertise has a higher profitability 
ratio. This finding does not support that of Fich and Shivdasani (2006), who 
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found that directors who hold three or more directorship in other companies 
have lower profitability which they attribute to their weak corporate 
governance through the holding of more directorships. 
 
In contrast to profitability, this study finds that leverage is directly and 
significantly associated with all independent variables, except corporate 
governance expertise. These results suggest that PLC with a higher 
leverage ratio held more frequent BOD meetings and have a higher 
proportion of independent, financially literate and Bumiputra directors. 
Hossain et al. (2000) also found that leverage is associated positively with 
independent directors. 
 
Finally, BOD which have more members have a lower proportion of 
independent and financially literate directors but a higher proportion of 
Bumiputra directors because the associations between these variables are 
inverse and direct, respectively. There is no association between the size of 
BOD and the frequency of a BOD meetings. Nevertheless, Vafeas (1999) 
found that as the size of the BOD increases, the frequency of BOD meetings 
also increased. 
4.4 Multivariate Analysis 
The Pearson correlation coefficients only show the direction, significance 
and strength of relationship between two variables. They do not signify the 
causal relationships between the variables. Therefore, this study conducted 
a multiple regression analysis to analyse the causal and interrelationship 
among a set of variables, identify how a set of variables predict the 
dependent variable, and to identify which is the best predictor of a 
dependent variable. An assessment was made for 2007 and 2008 as well as 
the pool year in order to has a larger sample size and obtains more 
generalizable results. The pool year is a combination of year 2007 and 2008. 
The assumptions for multiple regression analyses were assessed before 
conducting the tests. The problems of multicollinearity, normality, linearity, 
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and homoscedasticity of the residuals were not encountered because 
timeliness and compliance with FRS 134 have been transformed to rank, 
which is a similar method to that used in the previous studies (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993; Wallace and Naser,1995; and Abdelsalam and Street, 
2007). The summarised results of multiple regressions of timeliness, 
compliance with the FRS 134, compliance with the BMLR, and comparability 
of interims are summarised in Table 4.29. The results are described in detail 
in Sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.4. 
 
4.4.1 Multiple Regression of Timeliness 
The equation of multiple regression of timeliness is represented by Model 
One. The R2 reveals how much the independent and control variables in 
Model One explain the total variance in timeliness. The R2 for model one is 
12.3%, 13.1%, and 12.8% for the pool years, 2007 and 2008, respectively. 
The results reveal that the variations in timeliness explained by all 
independent and control variables in Model One are quite low. However, the 
significance values of F statistics is less than 0.01 for all periods, which 
indicates that the variations explained by all independent and control 
variables in Model One are very significant. 
 
Table 4.29 shows that the frequency of a BOD meetings and the financial 
literacy of the directors have no influence on a PLC timeliness to publish 
interims because there was no association found between these variables 
and timeliness when they were regressed. Although the frequency of a BOD 
meeting is associated negatively with timeliness in Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients, the meeting is not a factor that influences the PLC timeliness to 
publish interims.  
 
This study has found that the independence and corporate governance 
expertise of directors significantly influences the PLC timeliness to publish 
interims since there is an inverse association between these variables and 
timeliness for the pool years and in 2008. The inverse associations indicate 
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that PLC with a higher proportion of independent directors and higher 
proportion of corporate governance expertise tend to publish interims in a 
more timely manner. The ethnicity of directors is associated positively and 
significantly at p<0.01 with timeliness for all periods when they were 
regressed. The direct association between these variables indicates that 
PLC with a higher proportion of Bumiputra directors publish interims in a less 
timely manner. Therefore, these relationships suggest the importance of the 
three CGC that have a significant impact on timeliness to publish interims, 
namely: independence, corporate governance expertise, and ethnicity of 
directors. The association between timeliness and independence, as well as 
corporate governance expertise and the ethnicity of directors, supported the 
present study to reject hypotheses H1E, H1M and H1Q.  
 
The multiple regression of timeliness shows that two control variables have a 
significant impact on a PLC timeliness to publish interims namely company 
size and leverage. Company size is inversely associated with timeliness, 
which indicates that PLC of a larger size publish interims more timely than 
smaller PLC. This finding is similar to those of prior studies, where larger 
companies were found to be able to publish more timely financial reports 
than smaller companies for a number of reasons, such as the ability to 
purchase a more systematic accounting system, a more experienced and 
qualified accountant who prepares the financial reports, and more interested 
users of the financial reports. A positive relationship between leverage and 
timeliness suggests that PLC with a higher leverage ratio tend to delay in 
publishing interims. This happens because by delaying to publish interims 
the companies are able to pull prospective investors to invest despite having 
a high debt ratio.  
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Table 4.29 Summary of Multivariate Analysis: CGCB and Control Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Notes:  **Significant at 0.01 level       * Significant at 0.05 level , Beta = Standardised Beta, t = t value MTGD = Frequency of BOD meetings, INDEPD = Independence of Directors, 
FINLITD = Financial Literacy of Directors, GOVD = Governance Expertise of Directors, ETHNICD = Ethnicity of directors, SIZECOM = Company’ size, PROFIT = Profitability, 
LEVERAGE = Leverage. SIZEBOD = Size of BOD. 
Types of Variables 
 
 
Timeliness Compliance with the FRS 134  
Pooled 
N=927 
2007 
N=463 
2008 
N=464 
Pooled 
N=928 
2007 
N=464 
2008 
N=464 
Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value 
MTGD -0.018 -0.522 -0.056 -1.154 0.039 0.777 -0.168 -4.612** -0.05 -0.967 -0.258 -5.016** 
INDEPD -0.069 -2.110* -0.036 -0.768 -0.099 -2.107* 0.086 2.553* 0.219 4.628** 0.004 0.091 
FINLITD -0.034 -1.032 -0.023 -0.487 -0.05 -1.076 -0.047 -1.39 -0.065 -1.383 -0.025 -0.517 
GOVD -0.08 -2.355* -0.055 -1.142 -0.111 -2.262* 0.099 2.822* 0.093 1.889 0.103 2.060* 
ETHNICD 0.21 5.973** 0.198 3.928** 0.218 4.385** -0.145 -4.046** -0.195 -3.860** -0.102 -2.001* 
SIZECOM -0.239 -6.138** -0.22 -3.926** -0.25 -4.554** 0.027 0.671 0.009 0.162 0.031 0.554 
PROFIT -0.045 -1.413 -0.08 -1.719 -0.035 -0.781 -0.027 -0.812 -0.017 -0.363 -0.03 -0.654 
LEVERAGE 0.13 3.924** 0.165 3.540** 0.082 1.707 0.028 0.821 0.011 0.229 0.02 0.408 
SIZEBOD -0.003 -0.074 0.044 0.91 -0.062 -1.246 0.06 1.693 0.033 0.658 0.097 1.913 
R-squared  0.123 0.131 0.128 0.060 0.084 0.086 
Types of Variables 
 
 
Compliance with the BMLR Comparability 
Pooled 
N=927 
2007 
N=463 
2008 
N=464 
Pooled 
N=928 
2007 
N=464 
2008 
N=464 
Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value 
MTGD -0.132 -3.640** -0.066 -1.279 -0.207 -4.003** -0.02 -0.547 -0.115 -2.252* 0.079 1.523 
INDEPD 0.031 0.897 0.011 0.227 0.071 1.47 -0.02 -0.586 -0.101 -2.154* 0.02 0.409 
FINLITD -0.04 -1.184 -0.033 -0.686 -0.039 -0.818 -0.08 -2.379* -0.08 -1.706 -0.113 -2.338* 
GOVD 0.055 1.54 0.105 2.068* -0.002 -0.048 0.012 0.35 0.052 1.071 -0.019 -0.382 
ETHNICD -0.077 -2.088* -0.038 -0.707 -0.116 -2.269* 0.019 0.528 0.056 1.119 -0.025 -0.489 
SIZECOM -0.012 -0.29 -0.079 -1.342 0.057 1 -0.23 -5.705** -0.211 -3.701** -0.249 -4.408** 
PROFIT 0.025 0.762 0.033 0.669 0.021 0.458 0.08 2.431* 0.011 0.24 0.156 3.346** 
LEVERAGE -0.07 -2.010* -0.079 -1.596 -0.071 -1.443 -0.025 -0.735 -0.034 -0.701 0.041 0.823 
SIZEBOD 0.042 1.166 0.062 1.213 0.027 0.535 -0.019 -0.52 -0.096 -1.938 0.06 1.182 
R-squared  0.043 0.033 0.075 0.064 0.103 0.075 
   
230 
 
In contrast to the prior studies, this study found that profitability has no impact 
on timeliness to publish interims. Prior studies have found that companies that 
made losses were more inclined to delay in publishing their interims because 
the prospective investors may lose their interest to invest due to the losses 
made. The companies preferentially wait for other companies to publish their 
interims and then compare their losses with companies of a similar type. 
Companies that make losses are more likely to either retain the amount or 
manipulate it to attract more investors. Therefore, it is of great concern that 
this study reveals there is no correlation between timeliness and profitability, 
and the evidence of absence relationship between these items is inconclusive. 
Finally, the size of the BOD has been found in this study to have no significant 
impact on timeliness to publish interims. 
 
The standardised Beta values show the contribution of each independent or 
control variable to timeliness in publishing interims when the other variables in 
the model are controlled for. Regardless of the positive or negative sign, the 
highest value of standardised Beta shows that the variable presents the 
strongest contribution to explain timeliness to publish interims. The strongest 
variable that contributes to explain timeliness to publish interims is company 
size, followed by the ethnicity of BOD. The standardised Beta values for these 
variables in the pool years, 2007 and 2008 are -0.239, -0.22 and -0.25 
respectively for company size and 0.21, 0.198, and 0.218 respectively for the 
ethnicity of the directors. The least contributory but significant variable to 
explain timeliness is independent directors for the pool years and 2008, and 
leverage for the year 2007.  
 
4.4.2 Multiple Regression of Compliance with the FRS 134 
The equation of multiple regression of FRS 134 is represented by Model Two. 
The R2 for Model Two is 6%, 8.4%, and 8.6% for the pool years, 2007 and 
2008 respectively. These results reveal that the variations in compliance with 
the FRS 134 explained by all independent and control variables in Model Two 
are very low and about half that of the R2 of timeliness. However, the 
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significance value of F statistics for all periods is less than 0.01, which 
indicates that the variations explained by all independent and control variables 
in Model Two are very significant. 
 
As shown in Table 4.29, contrary to timeliness, the frequency of a BOD 
meetings significantly influences the PLC compliance with the FRS 134 for the 
pool years and in 2008. An inverse association between the frequency of BOD 
meetings and compliance with the FRS 134 suggests that PLC that held a 
larger frequency of BOD meetings have a lower compliance score with the 
FRS 134. A further analysis was made, and the present study found that 
53.4% of PLC changed the frequency of BOD meetings in 2008, of which 
30.2% and 23.2% increased and reduced the frequency of BOD meetings, 
respectively. The increased frequency of BOD meetings in 2008 and 
consistent compliance with the FRS 134 every year can be one of the reasons 
why there is an association between the two items in that particular year.  
 
The independence, corporate governance expertise, and ethnicity of directors 
have a significant influence on compliance with the FRS 134, which is similar 
to timeliness. There is no association between financial literacy of directors 
and compliance with the FRS134. The independence and corporate 
governance expertise of directors are positively associated with compliance 
with the FRS 134, which suggests that PLC with a higher proportion of 
directors who are independent and who have an expertise in corporate 
governance have a higher compliance score with the FRS 134. Meanwhile, 
PLC with a higher proportion of Bumiputra directors have a lower compliance 
score with the FRS 134. 
  
A further analysis was made to investigate the non-significant association 
between the independent directors and compliance with the FRS 134 in 2008. 
Only 44% of the PLC changed their independent directors from 2007 to 2008, 
of which 30.2% and 13.8% increased and reduced the number of 
independence directors, respectively. Since the incremental percentage is 
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higher than the reduced percentage, this study has found no conclusive 
evidence why there is no association between the independence of directors 
and compliance with the FRS 134 in 2008, although the relationship between 
those items is positive. The association between compliance with the FRS 134 
and frequency of BOD meetings, as well as the ethnicity of the directors, have 
rejected the hypotheses H1B and H1R. 
 
There is no association between any of the control variables and compliance 
with the FRS 134. Therefore, company size, profitability, leverage, and size of 
BOD have no significant influence on a PLC compliance with the FRS 134. 
With regard to the standard Beta coefficient values, there is a slight difference 
in the highest and lowest contributor to compliance with the FRS 134. The 
frequency of a BOD meetings is the highest contributor in compliance with the 
FRS 134 for the pool years and 2008, and the independent of directors is the 
highest contributor in 2007. The subsequent highest contributor is the ethnicity 
of directors for the pool years and 2007. The lowest but significant contributor 
for the pool years and in 2008 is independence of directors and corporate 
governance expertise of directors respectively. 
 
4.4.3 Multiple Regression of Compliance with the BMLR 
The R2 for the pool years 2007 and 2008 are very low: 4.3%, 3.3%, and 7.5%, 
respectively. Other than 2007, the F value is statistically significant at p<0.01. 
In tandem with low R2 value, there is less association between compliance 
with the BMLR and CGCB as well as the control variables.  
 
As presented in Table 4.29, the independence and financial literacy of 
directors have no influence on a PLC compliance with the BMLR because 
there is an absence of a relationship between these variables. Non-significant 
associations between these variables cause a failure for this study to reject 
hypotheses H1G and H1K. The frequency of a BOD meetings, corporate 
governance expertise, and the ethnicity of directors are partially associated 
with compliance with the BMLR in a positive or negative direction. These 
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results suggest that PLC with a lower frequency of BOD meetings, a higher 
proportion of directors with a corporate governance expertise, and a lower 
proportion of Bumiputra directors have a higher compliance score with the 
BMLR.  
 
Similar to compliance with the FRS 134, none of the control variables are 
associated with compliance with the BMLR. However, leverage is negatively 
associated with compliance with the BMLR in the pool years, which indicate 
that PLC with a high leverage ratio have a low compliance score with the 
BMLR. Consequently, company size, profitability, and the size of the BOD 
have no significant influence on a PLC compliance score with the BMLR. 
 
The number of BOD meetings is the highest contributor to compliance with the 
BMLR for the pool years and 2008, and the standardised Beta coefficient 
values are -0.13 and -0.21, respectively. In 2007, the highest contributor is the 
corporate governance expertise of directors with the coefficients value of 
0.105. The subsequent highest contributor that influences compliance score 
with the BMLR is ethnicity. The coefficient’s values are -0.077 and -0.116 in 
the pool years and 2008, respectively. 
 
4.4.4 Multiple Regression of Comparability of Interims  
The R2 for the pool years 2007 and 2008 are 6.4%, 10.3%, and 7.5%, 
respectively. The R2 for comparability of interims is slightly higher than 
compliance with the interim reporting standards but it is lower than timeliness. 
The F-value is significant at p<0.01 for all periods.  
 
Table 4.29 shows that the frequency of a BOD meetings, and the 
independence and financial literacy of the directors are significant but partially 
associated with the comparability of interims. These results indicate that those 
PLC that held a higher frequency of BOD meetings, have a higher proportion 
of independent directors and have a higher proportion of financial literacy 
directors will have a lower comparability of interims. Although the corporate 
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governance expertise and ethnicity of directors significantly influences a PLC 
timeliness to publish interims and its compliance with the interim reporting 
standards, it did not have an impact on the comparability of interims. 
Therefore, the non-significant association between these variables failed to 
reject hypotheses H1P and H1T. Based on the regression results, this study can 
conclude that those PLC that held a higher frequency of BOD meetings, and 
who have directors who are more independent and financially literate, will also 
have less comparable interims. However, the association is true for some 
period(s) only.  
 
Company size and profitability are two control variables that are inversely and 
directly associated with the comparability of interims, respectively. These 
associations suggest that PLC of a larger size and those which  have a lower 
profitability ratio will have less comparable interims. Financial leverage and 
size of BOD have no influence on the comparability of interims as there is an 
absence of relationship between these variables. The variable with the highest 
contribution to the comparability of interims is company size, where the 
coefficient’s values are -0.23, -0.211 and -0.249 for the pool years, 2007 and 
2008, respectively. The subsequent highest contributor is profitability for the 
pool years and 2008, and the frequency of the BOD meetings for 2007. 
4.5 Additional Analyses 
Several additional tests were conducted to ascertain the credibility of the initial 
or basic multiple regressions analyses that have been reported in Section 4.4. 
The aim of the additional tests is to determine the sensitivity of the results and 
robustness of the initial findings. Firstly, this study further tests the basic 
regression models (i.e. Model One, Model Two, Model Three, and Model 
Four) by adding new independent variables, which are the corporate 
governance characteristics of audit committee members (CGCA). These 
variables are similar to corporate governance characteristics of BOD (CGCB), 
and they include the frequency of audit committee meetings and the 
independence, corporate governance expertise, financial literacy, and 
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ethnicity of the audit committee members. The aim of this test is to examine 
the effect of adding new variables on all basic regression models. The results 
of this test are described in Section 4.5.1. Meanwhile, Section 4.5.2 describes 
how this study replaced CGCB with CGCA to identify which group of variables 
has more influence on the quality of interims. Finally, Section 4.5.3 compares 
multiple regressions of CGCB, CGCA and control variables individually to 
identify which groups of variables have more influence on the quality of 
interims. 
 
4.5.1 The Addition of New Variables: Audit Committee  
Rezaee (2003) proposed that the quality of financial reports can be achieved 
by having a well-balanced and functioning system of corporate governance. 
Rezaee (2003) proposed that a “six-legged stool” model (which comprised of 
six groups namely: BOD, audit committee, top management team, internal 
auditors, external auditors, and governing bodies) should be developed by the 
companies in order to have good corporate governance. The CGCB has been 
examined in Section 4.4. Apart from the BOD, the most suitable variable to 
add in the regression tests is the audit committee. This is due to the inability to 
examine the impact of external auditors and governing bodies to the quality of 
financial reports since Malaysian interims are not subjected to audit reviews 
and there is no control mechanism set by the governing bodies on interims’ 
disclosure. Neither the internal auditors nor the top management team can be 
added as new variables because they are dependent to the companies. 
Therefore, this study cannot examine one of the CGC namely independence, 
because there are no variations in this variable. 
 
Table 4.30 presents the multiple regressions of timeliness, compliance with 
the FRS 134, compliance with the BMLR, and the comparability of interims 
when the new variables of CGCA are added to the basic regression models. 
Equations in the basic regression models (i.e. Model One, Model Two, Model 
Three, and Model Four) are adjusted to reflect the addition of new variables 
and they are known as Model 1A, Model 2A, Model 3A, and Model 4A for 
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multiple regression of timeliness, compliance with the FRS 134, compliance 
with the BMLR and comparability of interims, respectively. The equations for 
these models are in Chapter Three. The results reported that the addition of 
audit committee members causes the R2 to slightly increase or insignificantly 
differ for all models. In addition, the F-values remain significant.  
4.5.1.1 Multiple Regression of Timeliness: CGCB, CGCA and Control 
Variables 
The R2 for multiple regression of timeliness when CGCA are added to the 
regression analysis insignificantly differs from the initial result in Section 4.4. 
The R2 for the initial result is 12.3%, 13.1%, and 12.8% for the pool years, 
2007 and 2008 respectively, while for the new model, the percentages are 
12.2%, 15.9%, and 13.1%, respectively. The F-values are significant at p<0.01 
in all periods. Although the R2 insignificantly differs, the association between 
timeliness and CGCB significantly differs when audit committee characteristics 
are added up to the new regression model. In the initial regression model the 
three CGCB that are significantly associated with timeliness are 
independence, corporate governance expertise and ethnicity of directors while 
in the new regression model the ethnicity of BOD is the only variable that is 
associated with timeliness. The ethnicity of BOD is found to be positively 
associated with timeliness, which indicates that PLC with a high proportion of 
Bumiputra directors are inclined to publish interims in a less timely manner. 
 
With regard to CGCA, only a few variables are associated with timeliness 
when they are added to the regression test of Model One, namely corporate 
governance expertise and ethnicity of the audit committee members. They are 
associated with timeliness at p<0.01 in an inverse and direct direction, 
respectively. These results suggest that PLC with a higher number corporate 
governance expertise and Bumiputra audit committee members are inclined to 
publish interims in a more and less timely manner, respectively.  
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Table 4.30 Summary of Multivariate Analysis: CGCB, CGCA and Control Variables 
 Types 
of Variables Timeliness Compliance with the FRS 134  
  
Pooled 
N=927 
2007 
N=463 
2008 
N=464 
Pooled 
N=928 
2007 
N=464 
2008 
N=464 
  Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value 
MTGD -0.029 -0.687 -0.042 -0.764 -0.002 -0.032 -0.233 -5.354** -0.045 -0.776 -0.498 -7.513** 
INDEPD -0.04 -1.059 0.001 0.024 -0.087 -1.6 0.064 1.643 0.259 4.551** -0.073 -1.357 
FINLITD -0.037 -0.914 -0.095 -1.667 -0.037 -0.613 -0.059 -1.43 -0.071 -1.212 -0.062 -1.059 
GOVD -0.057 -1.333 0.058 0.928 -0.118 -1.943 0.118 2.713** 0.106 1.655 0.156 2.621** 
ETHNICD 0.14 2.579* 0.066 0.884 0.199 2.474* -0.187 -3.368** -0.329 -4.304** -0.047 -0.6 
MTGAC 0.001 0.029 -0.024 -0.441 0.058 0.843 0.114 2.658** -0.011 -0.188 0.354 5.288** 
INDEPAC -0.02 -0.53 -0.001 -0.023 -0.01 -0.185 0.083 2.196* 0.022 0.414 0.139 2.586** 
FINLITAC 0.007 0.186 0.089 1.623 -0.017 -0.299 0.04 1.002 0.022 0.39 0.087 1.535 
GOVAC -0.063 -1.457 -0.161 -2.512* 0.024 0.401 -0.02 -0.455 -0.019 -0.281 0.006 0.104 
ETHNICAC 0.115 2.248* 0.2 2.818** 0.02 0.272 0.091 1.737 0.185 2.524* -0.004 -0.059 
SIZECOM -0.232 -5.645** -0.199 -3.422** -0.27 -4.585** 0.004 0.1 0.013 0.215 -0.051 -0.881 
PROFIT -0.058 -1.76 -0.099 -2.131* -0.031 -0.664 -0.031 -0.922 -0.028 -0.574 -0.013 -0.274 
LEVERAGE 0.086 2.570** 0.167 3.527** 0.087 1.729 0.04 1.174 0.008 0.168 0.084 1.71 
SIZEBOD 0.01 0.263 0.064 1.204 -0.043 -0.722 0.043 1.063 0.04 0.735 0.062 1.072 
R-squared  0.122 0.159 0.131 0.082 0.099 0.163 
 
Notes: 
**Significant at 0.01 level       * Significant at 0.05 level, Beta = Standardized Beta, t = t value 
MTGD = Frequency of BOD meetings, INDEPD = Independence of Directors, FINLITD = Financial Literacy of Directors, GOVD = Governance Expertise of Directors, 
ETHNICD = Ethnicity of directors, MTGAC = Audit Committee’s meetings, INDEPAC = Independence of Audit Committee, FINLITAC = Financial Literacy of Audit 
Committee, GOVAC= Governance Expertise of Audit Committee, ETHNICAC = Ethnicity of Audit Committee, SIZECOM = Companies’ size, PROFIT = Companies’ 
Profitability, LEVERAGE = Companies’ Leverage. SIZEBOD = Size of BOD. 
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         Table 4.30 Summary of Multivariate Analysis: CGCB, CGCA and Control Variables (Continue) 
Types of 
Variables Compliance with the BMLR Comparability 
 
Pooled 
N=927 
2007 
N=463 
2008 
N=464 
Pooled 
N=928 
2007 
N=464 
2008 
N=464 
 
Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value 
MTGD -0.2 -4.532** -0.139 -2.427* -0.285 -4.125** -0.013 -0.298 -0.094 -1.633 0.097 1.395 
INDEPD 0.053 1.347 0.085 1.479 0.07 1.245 -0.014 -0.366 -0.097 -1.718 0.028 0.493 
FINLITD -0.038 -0.902 -0.003 -0.05 -0.062 -1.011 -0.08 -1.905 -0.075 -1.283 -0.102 -1.659 
GOVD 0.099 2.241* 0.153 2.347* 0.033 0.524 -0.04 -0.912 -0.029 -0.457 -0.037 -0.593 
ETHNICD -0.166 -2.947** -0.224 -2.878** -0.067 -0.815 0.058 1.03 0.11 1.457 -0.008 -0.095 
MTGAC 0.12 2.747** 0.123 2.178* 0.135 1.932 -0.013 -0.29 -0.036 -0.655 -0.028 -0.393 
INDEPAC -0.059 -1.535 -0.047 -0.869 -0.08 -1.417 -0.004 -0.114 -0.031 -0.591 -0.014 -0.24 
FINLITAC -0.025 -0.613 -0.047 -0.821 -0.001 -0.013 0.022 0.546 0.02 0.357 -0.017 -0.277 
GOVAC -0.049 -1.093 -0.101 -1.498 -0.018 -0.301 0.094 2.115* 0.137 2.087* 0.023 0.375 
ETHNICAC 0.091 1.709 0.263 3.526** -0.075 -0.974 -0.059 -1.123 -0.101 -1.397 -0.029 -0.381 
SIZECOM -0.046 -1.077 -0.115 -1.889 0.021 0.351 -0.234 -5.516** -0.214 -3.592** -0.246 -4.055** 
PROFIT 0.038 1.125 0.042 0.857 0.034 0.711 0.079 2.344* 0.012 0.242 0.157 3.267** 
LEVERAGE 0.001 0.037 -0.098 -1.957 -0.052 -1.005 -0.024 -0.695 -0.031 -0.646 0.034 0.667 
SIZEBOD 0.101 2.485* 0.13 2.344* 0.077 1.267 -0.035 -0.857 -0.116 -2.141* 0.064 1.05 
R-squared 0.051 0.073 0.088 0.069 0.116 0.076 
 
Notes: 
**Significant at 0.01 level       * Significant at 0.05 level, Beta = Standardized Beta, t = t value 
MTGD = Frequency of BOD meetings, INDEPD = Independence of Directors, FINLITD = Financial Literacy of Directors, GOVD = Governance Expertise of Directors, 
ETHNICD = Ethnicity of directors, MTGAC = Audit Committee’s meetings, INDEPAC = Independence of Audit Committee, FINLITAC = Financial Literacy of Audit 
Committee, GOVAC= Governance Expertise of Audit Committee, ETHNICAC = Ethnicity of Audit Committee, SIZECOM = Companies’ size, PROFIT = Companies’ 
Profitability, LEVERAGE = Companies’ Leverage. SIZEBOD = Size of BOD. 
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Company size and leverage are two control variables that are associated with 
timeliness in the initial and new regression models. However, there is a partial 
relationship between profitability and timeliness in the new regression model. 
The inverse relationship between profitability and timeliness in 2007 suggests 
that PLC with a higher profitability ratio publish interims in a more timely  
manner.  
 
In summary, when CGCA are added to the regression test, the association 
between timeliness and CGCB significantly differs but no major changes are 
found in the association between timeliness and control variables. With regard 
to CGCA, only two variables are found to be significantly associated with 
timeliness to publish interims, namely corporate governance expertise and 
ethnicity of directors.  
4.5.1.2 Multiple Regression of Compliance with the FRS 134: CGCB, 
CGCA, and Control Variables 
Table 4.30 reports the addition of CGCA in the basic regression of Model Two, 
which caused the R2 for the pool years 2007 and 2008 to increase from 6%, 
8.4%, and 8.6% in the initial regression model to 8.2%, 9.9% and 16.3% in the 
new regression model. There are no major changes of relationship between 
CGCB and compliance with the FRS 134 when CGCA is added to the 
regression test. Non-changes of association between CGCB and compliance 
with the FRS 134 indicate the stability of the findings that all qualitative 
characteristics, except the financial literacy of directors, influence the quality of 
interims.  
 
Three out of five CGCA are significantly but partially associated with 
compliance with the FRS 134, namely: the frequency of audit committee 
meetings, independence and ethnicity of audit committee members. These 
results suggest that PLC that held a higher number of audit committee 
meetings and who have a higher proportion of independent and Bumiputra 
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audit committee members will have a higher compliance score with the 
FRS134.  
 
There are no changes in the association between compliance with the FRS 
134 and control variables when CGCA are added to the regression test. The 
statistical results showed that control variables have no significant influence 
on PLC compliance with the FRS 134 in the initial and new regression models. 
Non-changes of association between these variables show the stability of the 
findings in the basic Model Two.  
4.5.1.3 Multiple Regression of Compliance with the BMLR: CGCB, CGCA, 
and Control Variables 
The addition of CGCA to the basic regression Model Three caused the R2 for 
the pool years 2007 and 2008 slightly increased from 4.3%, 3.3% and 7.5% in 
the initial regression model to 5.1%, 7.3%, and 8.8% in the new regression 
model. Table 4.30 shows that there are no changes of association between 
compliance with the BMLR and the CGCB when CGCA are added to the basic 
regression model. The frequency of a BOD meetings, corporate governance 
expertise and ethnicity of directors was found to significantly influence the 
compliance with the BMLR in the basic and new regression models.  
 
With regard to CGCA, there are only a few associations between these items 
and compliance with the BMLR. The frequency of audit committee meetings 
and the ethnicity of audit committee members are partially associated with the 
compliance with the BMLR. These statistical results suggest that PLC with a 
higher frequency of audit committee meetings and higher number of 
Bumiputra audit committee members have a higher compliance score with the 
BMLR since the relationship between these variables are positive. 
 
Control variables have no significant impact on compliance with the BMLR in 
the basic and new regression models. However, leverage and size of BOD is 
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partially associated with the compliance with the BMLR for certain period(s) in 
the basic and new regression models, respectively.   
 
4.5.1.4 Multiple Regression of Comparability: CGCB, CGCA, and Control 
Variables 
The R2 for the pool years, 2007 and 2008 has slightly increased from 6.4%, 
10.3% and 7.5% to 6.9%, 11.6% and 7.6%, respectively, when the CGCA is 
added to the basic regression Model Four. The relationship between 
comparability of interims and CGCB in the basic and new regression models 
slightly differs. The differences are that there are absence of relationships 
between comparability of interims and all CGCB in the new regression model 
while in the basic regression model, the frequency of a BOD meeting, and the 
independence and financial literacy of directors are partially associated with 
the comparability of interims. Apart from CGCB, CGCA also did not have a 
significant impact on the comparability of interims, except corporate 
governance expertise of audit committee in the pool years and 2007.  
 
There are no major changes in relationship between comparability of interims 
and control variables when the CGCA is added to the basic regression model. 
The minor change is the existence of a partial relationship between the size of 
BOD and comparability of interims in the new regression model. Non-changes 
of association between these variables show the stability of the findings in the 
basic Model Four.  
 
4.5.2 Comparison between Multiple Regression of CGCB and CGCA 
The addition of CGCA has slightly elevated the adjusted R2 for all basic 
models. This study investigated which group of variables has a more 
persuasive value of regression tests: CGCB or CGCA. In order to make the 
comparison, CGCB are replaced with CGCA. The results are presented in 
Table 4.31 for timeliness, compliance with the FRS 134, compliance with the 
BMLR, and comparability of interims. The equations for the basic regression 
models are adjusted to reflect the substitution of CGCB with CGCA. Apart 
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from identifying which group of variables has a more persuasive value of R2, 
this study will also identify the difference in associations between dependent 
and independent variables, as well as control variables. 
 
4.5.2.1 Multiple Regression of Timeliness: CGCA and Control Variables 
Table 4.31 presents the multiple regression of timeliness when CGCB is 
replaced with CGCA. The R2 insignificantly differs when the replacement was 
made and the F-values still remains significant at p<0.01 for all periods. The 
R2 for CGCB is 12.3%, 13.1%, and 12.8% for the pool years, 2007 and 2008 
respectively, and the R2 for CGCA are 12.1%, 14.9%, and 10.9% for the 
similar periods.  
 
The relationship between timeliness and CGCA are quite similar with the 
relationship between timeliness and CGCB. The only difference is the 
absence of a relationship between timeliness and independence of audit 
committee members in CGCA. There are no changes in association between 
timeliness and control variables when either the CGCA or CGCB was 
regressed with timeliness.  
 
Based on the above results, the present study can conclude that CGCA has a 
similar impact on timeliness when compared with CGCB and the associations 
between timeliness and control variables for both regressions are quite similar. 
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Table 4.31 Summary of Multivariate Analysis: CGCA and Control Variables 
Types of 
Variables 
 
Timeliness Compliance with the FRS 134 
Pooled 
N=927 
2007 
N=463 
2008 
N=464 
Pooled 
N=928 
2007 
N=464 
2008 
N=464 
Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value 
MTGAC -0.022 -0.639 -0.055 -1.144 0.037 0.744 -0.011 -0.312 -0.029 -0.57 0.000 -0.004 
INDEPAC -0.038 -1.149 0.011 0.25 -0.064 -1.303 0.155 4.473** 0.154 3.226** 0.159 3.085** 
FINLITAC -0.009 -0.289 0.037 0.81 -0.046 -0.963 -0.013 -0.386 -0.046 -0.953 0.005 0.101 
GOVAC -0.085 -2.447* -0.119 -2.394* -0.037 -0.745 0.035 0.971 0.048 0.913 0.032 0.63 
ETHNICAC 0.198 5.844** 0.233 4.826** 0.156 3.259** -0.04 -1.116 -0.066 -1.285 -0.023 -0.456 
SIZECOM -0.233 -6.012** -0.19 -3.531** -0.278 -4.912** -0.029 -0.709 0.019 0.325 -0.069 -1.167 
PROFIT -0.055 -1.69 -0.086 -1.885 -0.043 -0.93 -0.022 -0.647 -0.024 -0.491 -0.024 -0.493 
LEVERAGE 0.129 3.973** 0.161 3.526** 0.099 2.121* -0.055 -1.603 -0.061 -1.258 -0.047 -0.962 
SIZEBOD 0.049 1.372 0.067 1.39 0.031 0.572 -0.007 -0.179 -0.048 -0.942 0.023 0.413 
R-squared 0.121 0.149 0.109 0.032 0.037 0.034 
Types of 
Variables 
 
Compliance with the BMLR Comparability 
Pooled 
N=927 
2007 
N=463 
2008 
N=464 
Pooled 
N=928 
2007 
N=464 
2008 
N=464 
Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value 
MTGAC 0.009 0.25 0.074 1.462 -0.055 -1.056 -0.032 -0.916 -0.088 -1.798 0.026 0.515 
INDEPAC -0.001 -0.043 0.022 0.467 -0.031 -0.6 -0.003 -0.097 -0.056 -1.203 0.013 0.254 
FINLITAC -0.068 -1.977* -0.061 -1.262 -0.065 -1.308 -0.024 -0.704 -0.017 -0.36 -0.064 -1.312 
GOVAC -0.01 -0.271 0.002 0.039 -0.041 -0.797 0.072 2.031* 0.123 2.427* 0.017 0.342 
ETHNICAC -0.016 -0.451 0.09 1.746 -0.12 -2.407* -0.02 -0.579 -0.02 -0.404 -0.037 -0.751 
SIZECOM -0.072 -1.764 -0.145 -2.534* 0.011 0.19 -0.239 -5.983** -0.245 -4.415** -0.252 -4.356** 
PROFIT 0.04 1.171 0.053 1.091 0.028 0.576 0.082 2.459* 0.023 0.5 0.165 3.470** 
LEVERAGE -0.112 -3.253** -0.123 -2.535* -0.109 -2.251* -0.03 -0.917 -0.061 -1.335 0.048 1.001 
SIZEBOD 0.055 1.44 0.07 1.37 0.043 0.754 -0.006 -0.153 -0.069 -1.385 0.087 1.56 
R-squared 0.022 0.035 0.041 0.063 0.097 0.066 
Notes: **Significant at 0.01 level       * Significant at 0.05 level  Beta = Standardized Beta, t = t value 
MTGAC = Audit Committee’s meetings, INDEPAC = Independence of Audit Committee, FINLITAC = Financial Literacy of Audit Committee, GOVAC= Governance Expertise of Audit 
Committee, ETHNICAC = Ethnicity of Audit Committee, SIZECOM = Companies’ size, PROFIT = Companies’ Profitability, LEVERAGE = Companies’ Leverage. SIZEBOD = Size of BOD. 
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4.5.2.2 Multiple Regression of Compliance with the FRS 134: CGCA, and 
Control Variables 
Table 4.31 shows the multiple regression of the FRS 134 when CGCB is 
replaced with CGCA. The R2 for the pool years, 2007 and 2008 slightly 
reduced from 6%, 8.4% and 8.6% to 3.2%, 3.7% and 3.4%, respectively. In 
tandem with reduction of R2 when the replacement was made, there are fewer 
associations between compliance with the FRS 134 and CGCA. In the basic 
regression model, all CGCB except the financial literacy of directors are 
associated with compliance with the FRS 134. In the new regression model, 
the independence of audit committee members is the only CGCA that is 
associated with the FRS 134 compliance. This compares to the previous study 
by Mangena and Taurigana (2007), who found that independence and 
financial literacy of audit committee members are associated positively with 
compliance with the accounting standards.  
 
Control variables have no impact on compliance with the FRS 134 when they 
are regressed with either CGCB or CGCA. Based on these statistical results, 
the present study can conclude that CGCB has a more significant impact on 
compliance with the FRS 134 than the CGCA and that the control variables 
have no association with compliance with the FRS 134 when CGCA or CGCB 
are used.  
4.5.2.3 Multiple Regression of Compliance with the BMLR: CGCA and 
Control Variables 
Table 4.31 presents the multiple regression of BMLR when CGCB is replaced 
with CGCA. The R2 for the pool years and 2008 is lower than the R2 of the 
basic regression model in Section 4.4.3 and the R2 in 2007 is slightly higher by 
0.2%. The F-values for CGCB and CGCA are significant for the pool years 
and 2008, and insignificant in 2007.  
 
The association between compliance with the BMLR and independent 
variables slightly differs when CGCB is replaced with CGCA. The association 
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between compliance with the BMLR and control variables are also differ. 
There are meagre associations between compliance with the BMLR and 
CGCA as compared with the CGCB in Section 4.4.3. In the basic regression 
model, the PLC with a higher frequency of BOD meetings, directors with a 
lower level of corporate governance expertise, and a higher proportion of 
Bumiputra directors will tend to have a lower compliance score with the BMLR. 
In the new regression model, the financial literacy and ethnicity of audit 
committee members are inversely but meagrely associated with the BMLR 
compliance, which suggests that PLC with a higher proportion of financial 
literacy and Bumiputra audit committee members will have a lower compliance 
score with the BMLR.  
 
With regard to the control variables, the leverage ratio is the only variable that 
is associated with BMLR compliance in the basic regression model. When 
CGCB is replaced with CGCA, company size and leverage are inversely 
associated with the BMLR compliance. These results suggest that PLC of a 
larger size and who have a higher leverage ratio will also have a lower 
compliance score with the BMLR. Referring to the R2 values, this study can 
conclude that CGCB has a higher influence on the compliance with the BMLR 
than CGCA. 
4.5.2.4 Multiple Regression of Comparability: CGCA and Control 
Variables 
The R2 for the pool years, 2007 and 2008 slightly reduced from 6.4%, 10.3% 
and 7.5% in the basic regression model to 6.3%, 9.7% and 6.6%, respectively, 
when the CGCB is replaced with CGCA. Therefore, this study can conclude 
that CGCB has a more significant influence on the comparability of interims 
than the CGCA. The association between comparability of interims and 
corporate governance variables varies.  
  
The frequency of BOD meetings and the independence and financial literacy 
of directors are three CGCB that are associated with the comparability of 
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interims while the corporate governance expertise of audit committee 
members is the only variable of CGCA that is associated with comparability of 
interims when they are regressed. 
 
There are no changes in the association between the comparability of interims 
and control variables when they are regressed with either the CGCB or 
CGCA. Company size and profitability are inversely and directly associated 
with comparability of interims, respectively. These results indicate that PLC of 
a larger size and who have a lower profitability ratio will have less comparable 
interims. 
 
4.5.3 Comparison of Multiple Regressions of CGCB, CGCA and Control 
Variables 
The results in Section 4.5.2 show that the R2 for CGCB is slightly higher than 
the CGCA. Generally, the associations between the qualitative items and 
CGCB are similar or slightly differ from the CGCA. The associations between 
qualitative items and control variables are also quite similar when CGCB is 
replaced with CGCA. Therefore, this study will verify which group of variables 
has a more significant influence on the qualitative items by comparing the 
multiple regressions of CGCB, CGCA, and control variables individually. The 
equation for each model is constructed to reflect the independent variables for 
each qualitative item. The equations of these models are described in Chapter 
Three. The results for multiple regressions of timeliness, compliance with the 
FRS 134, compliance with the BMLR and comparability of interims are 
explained in Sections 4.5.3.1 to 4.5.3.4. 
4.5.3.1 Multiple Regression of Timeliness: Individual CGCB, CGCA and 
Control Variables 
Table 4.32 presents the multiple regression of timeliness by using the CGCB, 
CGCA and control variables. The R2 of multiple regression of timeliness by 
using the CGCB are 5.2%, 5.3% and 5.3% for the pool years, 2007 and 2008, 
respectively. The R2 values are very much lower than the multiple regression 
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of timeliness when both CGCB and control variables are collectively 
regressed. The results may suggest that the control variables have more 
influence on timeliness than the CGCB. Although the R2 is very low, the F-
values are very significant at p<0.01 for all periods.  
 
The associations between timeliness and CGCB insignificantly differ when the 
CGCB is regressed individually or collectively with the control variables. The 
only difference is the existence of a relationship between timeliness and the 
frequency of BOD meetings and the absence of relationship between 
timeliness and independence of directors when CGCB is regressed 
individually. 
 
The R2 values of the multiple regression of timeliness by using the CGCA are 
6%, 8.5% and 4% for the pool years, 2007 and 2008 respectively. The R2 
values are very much lower than the R2 values when CGCA and control 
variables are collectively regressed. These results indicate that the control 
variables have more influence on timeliness than the CGCA. However, the R2 
values are higher than the R2 values of individual regression of CGCB. 
Therefore, CGCA has more influence on timeliness than CGCB. The 
associations between timeliness and CGCA are quite similar when they are 
regressed with or without the control variables. The only difference is the 
existence of a relationship between timeliness and the frequency of audit 
committee’s meetings when CGCA is individually regressed. 
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           Table 4.32 Summary of Multivariate Analysis: Individual CGCB, CGCA and Control Variables  
Types of 
Variables 
Timeliness Compliance with the FRS 134 
Pooled 
N=927 
2007 
N=463 
2008 
N=464 
Pooled 
N=928 
2007 
N=464 
2008 
N=464 
Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value 
CGCB CGCB 
MTGD -0.085 -2.493* -0.119 -2.500* -0.04 -0.811 -0.156 -4.615** -0.051 -1.081 -0.236 -4.841** 
INDEPD -0.062 -1.884 -0.041 -0.877 -0.081 -1.692 0.084 2.539* 0.217 4.712** -0.002 -0.049 
FINLITD 0.012 0.352 0.018 0.392 0.005 0.114 -0.057 -1.735 -0.069 -1.499 -0.045 -0.97 
GOVD -0.154 -4.561** -0.13 -2.725** -0.179 -3.753** 0.092 2.730** 0.088 1.861 0.094 2.000* 
ETHNICD 0.184 5.395** 0.193 3.983** 0.167 3.438** -0.126 -3.697** -0.187 -3.936** -0.074 -1.54 
R-squared 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.057 0.083 0.074 
 
CGCA CGCA 
MTGAC -0.104 -3.206** -0.129 -2.830** -0.058 -1.226 -0.019 -0.568 -0.019 -0.395 -0.023 -0.491 
INDEPAC -0.055 -1.687 0.009 0.197 -0.108 -2.312* 0.153 4.653** 0.145 3.132** 0.16 3.415** 
FINLITAC -0.025 -0.761 0.001 0.014 -0.046 -0.957 -0.009 -0.28 -0.04 -0.855 0.013 0.279 
GOVAC -0.163 -4.758** -0.199 -4.110** -0.119 -2.448* 0.033 0.95 0.05 1.009 0.025 0.505 
ETHNICAC 0.195 5.791** 0.25 5.237** 0.135 2.809** -0.057 -1.652 -0.08 -1.633 -0.041 -0.85 
R-squared 0.060 0.085 0.040 0.028 0.031 0.028 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES CONTROL VARIABLES 
SIZECOM -0.217 -6.312** -0.197 -4.052** -0.225 -4.589** -0.035 -0.982 -0.005 -0.101 -0.063 -1.242 
PROFIT -0.048 -1.485 -0.079 -1.729 -0.042 -0.91 -0.023 -0.695 -0.016 -0.333 -0.028 -0.582 
LEVERAGE 0.176 5.506** 0.213 4.785** 0.132 2.872** -0.071 -2.134* -0.08 -1.712 -0.059 -1.244 
SIZEBOD 0.03 0.88 0.062 1.306 -0.014 -0.283 0.045 1.264 -0.003 -0.066 0.087 1.711 
R-squared 0.084 0.098 0.080 0.008 0.007 0.013 
 
Notes: 
**Significant at 0.01 level       * Significant at 0.05 level , Beta = Standardized Beta, t = t value 
MTGD = Frequency of BOD meetings, INDEPD = Independence of Directors, FINLITD = Financial Literacy of Directors, GOVD = Governance Expertise of 
Directors, ETHNICD = Ethnicity of directors, MTGAC = Audit Committee’s meetings, INDEPAC = Independence of Audit Committee, FINLITAC = Financial 
Literacy of Audit Committee, GOVAC= Governance Expertise of Audit Committee, ETHINCAC = Ethnicity of Audit Committee, SIZECOM = Company size, 
PROFIT = Companies’ Profitability, LEVERAGE = Companies’ Leverage. SIZEBOD = Size of BOD. 
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Table 4.32 Summary of Multivariate Analysis: Individual CGCB,CGCA and Control Variables (Continue) 
Types of 
Variables 
 
Compliance with the BMLR Comparability 
Pooled 
N=927 
2007 
N=463 
2008 
N=464 
Pooled 
N=928 
2007 
N=464 
2008 
N=464 
Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value Beta t-value 
CGCB CGCB 
MTGD -0.134 -3.919** -0.087 -1.79 -0.192 -3.925** -0.088 -2.564* -0.186 3.886** 0.021 0.426 
INDEPD 0.015 0.45 -0.012 -0.253 0.056 1.194 -0.037 -1.087 -0.107 2.280* 0.004 0.072 
FINLITD -0.055 -1.637 -0.046 -0.96 -0.06 -1.271 -0.056 -1.638 -0.04 0.846 -0.09 -1.855 
GOVD 0.067 1.970* 0.103 2.128* 0.027 0.567 -0.011 -0.328 0.028 -0.584 -0.056 -1.161 
ETHNICD -0.09 -2.623** -0.07 -1.428 -0.113 -2.347* -0.042 -1.208 -0.012 0.246 -0.069 -1.402 
R-squared 0.036 0.022 0.064 0.020 0.050 0.017 
 
CGCA CGCA 
MTGAC -0.014 -0.422 0.031 0.659 -0.053 -1.11 -0.113 -3.406** -0.168 -3.607** -0.069 -1.432 
INDEPAC 0.015 0.461 0.042 0.895 -0.003 -0.067 -0.027 -0.817 -0.076 -1.638 0.000 -0.005 
FINLITAC -0.042 -1.23 -0.036 -0.751 -0.043 -0.891 -0.011 -0.319 -0.021 -0.456 -0.019 -0.402 
GOVAC 0.007 0.189 0.01 0.195 -0.009 -0.186 0.03 0.851 0.058 1.168 -0.012 -0.239 
ETHNICAC -0.047 -1.35 0.043 0.863 -0.135 -2.784** -0.051 -1.491 -0.053 -1.089 -0.051 -1.046 
R-squared 0.004 0.007 0.026 0.018 0.037 0.009 
 
CONTROL VARIABLES CONTROL VARIABLES 
SIZECOM -0.066 -1.853 -0.086 -1.705 -0.046 -0.909 -0.235 -6.751** -0.248 -5.039** -0.233 -4.718** 
PROFIT 0.032 0.941 0.051 1.066 0.015 0.318 0.086 2.648* 0.038 0.813 0.154 3.317** 
LEVERAGE -0.108 -3.270** -0.098 -2.110* -0.122 -2.578* -0.033 -1.029 -0.064 -1.428 0.042 0.898 
SIZEBOD 0.043 1.218 0.055 1.119 0.027 0.535 -0.003 -0.08 -0.064 -1.33 0.073 1.483 
R-squared 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.056 0.074 0.060 
Notes: 
**Significant at 0.01 level       * Significant at 0.05 level  
 Beta = Standardized Beta, t = t value 
MTGD = Frequency of BOD meetings, INDEPD = Independence of Directors, FINLITD = Financial Literacy of Directors, GOVD = Governance Expertise of 
Directors, ETHNICD = Ethnicity of directors, MTGAC = Audit Committee’s meetings, INDEPAC = Independence of Audit Committee, FINLITAC = Financial 
Literacy of Audit Committee, GOVAC= Governance Expertise of Audit Committee, ETHINCAC = Ethnicity of Audit Committee, SIZECOM = Company size, 
PROFIT = Companies’ Profitability, LEVERAGE = Companies’ Leverage. SIZEBOD = Size of BOD. 
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The R2 values of the multiple regression of timeliness by using the control 
variables are 8.4%, 9.8% and 8% for the pool years, 2007 and 2008 
respectively. The R2 values of the control variables are higher than the R2 
values of CGCB and CGCA when they are individually regressed. Therefore, 
these results confirm that the control variables have a more significant influence 
on timeliness than the CGCB and CGCA. There are no changes of association 
between timeliness and control variables when the control variables are 
regressed individually or collectively with the CGCB and CGCA. Therefore, the 
results indicate the stability of the findings that PLC of a larger size and who 
have a lower ratio of financial leverage have published interims in a more timely 
manner. 
4.5.3.2 Multiple Regression of Compliance with the FRS 134 Individual 
CGCB, CGCA and Control Variables 
Table 4.32 presents the multiple regression of compliance with the FRS 134 by 
using the CGCB, CGCA and control variables. The R2 values are 5.7%, 8.3% 
and 7.4% for the pool years, 2007 and 2008 respectively. It is difficult to identify 
which group of variables has a more significant influence on the compliance 
score with the FRS 134 because the R2 values insignificantly differ when the 
CGCB is regressed individually or collectively with the control variables. The F-
values are very significant at p<0.01 for all periods.  
 
There are no changes of association between compliance with the FRS 134 
and CGCB when the CGCB is regressed individually or collectively with the 
control variables. Non-changes of associations indicate the stability of the 
findings that PLC with a higher frequency of BOD meetings, a lower proportion 
of independent directors, a lower proportion of corporate governance expertise 
directors and a higher proportion of Bumiputra directors have a lower 
compliance score with the FRS 134. 
 
The R2 values of the multiple regression of compliance with the FRS 134 by 
using the CGCA variables are 2.8%, 3.1% and 2.8% for the pool years, 2007 
and 2008, respectively. The F-value is significant at p<0.01 for the pool years 
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and at p<0.05 in 2007 and 2008. The R2 values are lower than the R2 values of 
individual regression of CGCB. Therefore, the CGCB has more influence on 
compliance with the FRS 134 than the CGCA. The R2 values are also slightly 
lower than the R2 values of collective regression of CGCA and control variables. 
The insignificant difference of R2 may indicate that CGCA have a more 
significant influence on compliance with the FRS 134 than control variables. 
Non-changes of association between compliance with the FRS 134 and CGCA 
when the variables are regressed individually or collectively with the control 
variables indicate the stability of the findings that PLC with a higher proportion 
of independent audit committee members also have a higher compliance score 
with the FRS 134.  
 
The R2 values for multiple regression of compliance with the FRS 134 by using 
the control variables are 0.8%, 0.7% and 1.3% for the pool years, 2007 and 
2008 respectively. The R2 values are very low for all periods and they are lower 
than the R2 values of CGCB and CGCA. Due to the low values of R2, the 
control variables do not significantly influence the PLC compliance with the FRS 
134, and both CGCB and CGCA have more influence on compliance with the 
FRS 134 than the control variables. Non-association between compliance with 
the FRS 134 and control variables when the control variables are regressed 
individually or collectively with the CGCB and CGCA further supports the 
finding that the control variables have no significant influence on compliance 
with the FRS 134. Therefore, the above results suggest that CGCB has more 
influence on compliance with the FRS 134 than CGCA, and the control 
variables have no influence on compliance with the FRS 134.  
4.5.3.3 Multiple Regression of Compliance with the BMLR Individual 
CGCB, CGCA, and Control Variables 
Table 4.32 presents the multiple regression of compliance with the BMLR by 
using the CGCB, CGCA, and control variables. The R2 values of the multiple 
regression of BMLR compliance by using the CGCB are 3.6%, 2.2% and 6.4% 
for the pool years, 2007 and 2008, respectively. The R2 values are slightly lower 
than the R2 values of collective regression of CGCB and control variables. 
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Since the percentages slightly differ, it is difficult to identify which group of 
variables has more influence on compliance with the BMLR (i.e. whether CGCB 
or control variables).  
 
The similar associations between compliance with the BMLR and the CGCB 
when the CGCB is regressed individually or collectively with the control 
variables shows the stability of the findings that PLC who held a higher 
frequency of BOD meetings, have a lower proportion of corporate governance 
expertise directors and PLC with a higher proportion of Bumiputra directors will 
have a lower compliance score with the BMLR. However, the findings are 
applicable to the pool years and 2008 only because the F-value is insignificant 
in 2007.  
 
The R2 values of the multiple regression of compliance with the BMLR by using 
the CGCA are 0.4%, 0.7% and 2.6% for the pool years, 2007 and 2008, 
respectively. The R2 values are very much lower than the R2 values when the 
CGCA is collectively regressed with the control variables. Therefore, the control 
variables may have more influence on a PLC compliance with the BMLR than 
CGCA. The R2 values are also lower than the R2 values of individual regression 
of CGCB. Therefore, CGCB has more influence on compliance with the BMLR 
than CGCA. The F value is significant at p<0.05 in 2008 only and CGCA is 
meagrely associated with compliance with the BMLR. 
 
The R2 values of multiple regression of compliance with the BMLR by using the 
control variables are 1.7%, 1.8%, and 1.8% for the pool years, 2007 and 2008, 
respectively. The R2 values are lower than the R2 values of individual 
regression of CGCB but higher than CGCA. These results indicate that CGCB 
has more influence on compliance score with the BMLR than the control 
variables, and the control variables have more influence on compliance with the 
BMLR than CGCA. The association between compliance with the BMLR and 
control variables slightly differs when the control variables are regressed 
individually or collectively with CGCB and CGCA. The minor difference is the 
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absence of a relationship between company size and compliance with the 
BMLR when the control variables are individually regressed. An inverse 
association between compliance with the BMLR and leverage indicates that 
PLC with a higher ratio of financial leverage has a lower compliance score with 
the BMLR. However, the association is only applicable to the pool years only as 
the F-values are not significant in  2007 and 2008. 
4.5.3.4 Multiple Regression of Comparability of Interims Individual CGCB, 
CGCA and Control Variables 
Table 4.32 presents the multiple regression of comparability of interims by 
using the CGCB, CGCA, and control variables. The R2 values of the multiple 
regression of comparability by using the CGCB are 2%, 5% and 1.7% for the 
pool years 2007 and 2008, respectively. The R2 values are very much lower 
than the R2 values of the multiple regressions when the CGCB is collectively 
regressed with the control variables. These results indicate that the control 
variables have more influence on the comparability of interims than CGCB.  
 
The association between comparability of interims and CGCB slightly differs 
when they are regressed individually or collectively with the control variables. 
The minor difference is the absence relationship between financial literacy of 
directors and comparability of interims when the CGCB is regressed 
individually. The inverse association between the comparability of interims and 
the frequency of a BOD meetings, as well as independent directors, indicate 
that those PLC who held a larger frequency of BOD meetings and have a 
higher proportion of independent directors will also have a lower comparability 
of interims. However, the F-values are significant at p<0.01 for the pool years 
and 2007 only. 
 
The R2 values of the multiple regression of comparability by using the CGCA 
are 1.8%, 3.7% and 0.9% for the pool years, 2007 and 2008, respectively. The 
R2 values are lower than R2 values of CGCB when they are individually 
regressed and lower than the R2 values of collective regression of CGCA and 
control variables. These results indicate that CGCB has more significant 
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influence on the comparability of interims than CGCA, and the control variables 
may have more influence on the comparability of interims than CGCA. The 
association between comparability of interims and CGCA slightly differs when 
the CGCA is individually regressed or collectively regressed with the control 
variables. The corporate governance expertise of the audit committee members 
and the frequency of audit committee meetings are associated with 
comparability of interims when the CGCA is respectively regressed with and 
without the control variables. These associations indicate that PLC with a 
higher proportion of audit committee members with a corporate governance 
expertise and who held a lower number of audit committee meetings will have 
interims that are more comparable. However, the F-values are significant for 
the pool years and 2007 only. 
 
Finally, the R2 values of the multiple regression of comparability of interims by 
using the control variables are 5.6%, 7.4% and 6% for the pool years, 2007 and 
2008, respectively. The R2 values are higher than the R2 values of CGCB and 
CGCA when they are individually regressed. This study can conclude that the 
control variables have more significant influence on the comparability of 
interims than the CGCB and CGCA. Additionally, the F values are significant at 
p<0.01 for all periods. The associations between comparability of interims and 
control variables did not change when the control variables are regressed 
individually or collectively with the CGCB and CGCA. Therefore, the non-
changes in these associations indicates the stability of the findings that PLC of 
a larger size and who have a lower profitability ratio also have less comparable 
interims.  
 
In summary, the variables that have more to less influence on the qualitative 
items are shown in Table 4.33. 
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Table 4.33 The Influence of Variables on the Qualitative Items 
Qualitative items Types of Variables 
Timeliness CV → CGCA → CGCB 
Compliance with the FRS 134 CGCB → CGCA → CV 
Compliance with the BMLR CGCB → CV → CGCA 
Comparability CV → CGCB → CGCA 
* CV= control variables, CGCB = corporate governance characteristics of the BOD, CGCA = 
corporate governance characteristics of audit committee members 
 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter discussed the results of the data analysis. The discussion began 
with the descriptive statistics and some statistical tests, such as t-tests and one 
way repeated measure ANOVA for the variables incorporated in this study 
(which are dependent variables, independent variables and control variables). 
After explaining the mean, and non-compliance of these variables, the quality 
value was determined by using two methods (i.e. dichotomous and continuous 
methods). Different quality values were then obtained by using these methods. 
The quality value was also assessed according to the type of BSE and industry 
to determine if they are any significant differences.  
 
After determining the quality of interims, this study investigated the association 
between corporate governance characteristics on the quality of interims by 
using Pearson correlation coefficients. The results show that the corporate 
governance characteristics that are associated with the quality of interims is the 
frequency of a BOD meetings, and financial literacy and ethnicity of directors. 
This thesis conducted multiple regression analysis because the Pearson 
correlation coefficients only show the direction of the relationship. The results 
show that the influence of corporate governance characteristics on the quality 
of interims is quite low and the influence of corporate governance 
characteristics on the quality of interims is mixed. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview, summary and conclusion of the two 
empirical investigations of this study. The first investigation aims to determine 
the quality of Malaysian interim financial reports. The second investigation aims 
to determine the impact of corporate governance on the quality of Malaysian 
interims. This chapter also details the implications and limitations of this study. 
It ends with a number of suggestions for future research.  
5.2 An Overview, Summary, and Conclusion of this Study 
This section begins by describing an overview of this thesis. This is followed by 
a summary of the findings obtained after the data has been analysed. It ends 
with a conclusion of the findings.  
 
5.2.1 An Overview of this Study 
Interims can be one of the most beneficial resources for the users of financial 
reports when they make economic decisions. Nevertheless, on closer 
inspection, the quality of interims is often unconvincing. This is due to several 
factors, such as the absence of audit reviews by an independent third party, 
non-disclosure of all of the required information, seasonality factors, and an 
imprecise estimation of provision and tax rates. Despite the unconvincing 
information disclosed, interims are still required because they provide up-to-
date and transparent information to the users of financial reports. Therefore, an 
investigation is necessary to determine the quality of financial information 
disclosure in interims, which is the first objective of this thesis. Additionally, 
there is less research on interims because many financial regulatory bodies 
around the world did not mandate PLC to publish interims. This study has 
aimed to fill this gap.  
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Many scholars have focused on the issue of the quality of financial reporting. 
However, their findings vary because there are a number of diverse proxies of 
quality measurement and different economic environments internationally. This 
thesis follows the recommendation of Cook (1987), Bandyopadhyay et al. 
(2007) and Williams (2008), who advise to enrich the quality of interims through 
the involvement of external auditors, compliance with the accounting standards, 
and corporate governance. However, in this study, Malaysian interims are 
assessed in the absence of audit reviews as there is no requirement for 
Malaysian interims to be reviewed by an independent party.  
 
According to McFie (2006), using a single proxy to determine the quality of 
financial reports is doubtful to be high even though the results are excellent. 
This is because a single proxy focuses on one aspect and ignores other 
aspects. McFie proposed to look at several aspects to determine the quality of 
financial reports and thus use several proxies. Consequently, this thesis has 
used several proxies to determine the quality of interims namely timeliness, 
compliance with the interim reporting standards (i.e. the FRS 134 and the 
BMLR), and comparability. These proxies were chosen because the MASB’s 
conceptual framework for the Presentation and Preparation of Financial 
Statements advises that they are a part of the qualitative characteristics of 
financial reports that determine the usefulness of financial information to the 
users of financial reports. According to Jonas and Blanchet (2000), the 
usefulness of financial information is linked to the quality of a financial report. 
 
In addition to assessing the quality of interims, this thesis has also investigated 
the impact of corporate governance on the quality of interims. Corporate 
governance responsibility to interims is expounded by both agency theory and 
resource dependence theory. Agency theory is concerned with the monitoring 
function played by the BOD for the best interests of shareholders while 
resource dependence theory is concerned with the directors’ responsibilities to 
provide resources for the best interests of the shareholders. Nevertheless, 
conflicts of interests may arise between shareholders and managers if the 
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managers gain benefits. Additionally, management usually has superior 
knowledge to that of the shareholders, and this can trigger the managers to 
exploit the shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, this thesis has investigated the 
impact of corporate governance on the quality of interims (which is the second 
objective of this thesis). Additionally, there seems to be less research on the 
impact of corporate governance on the quality of interims. 
 
Several approaches have been used to appraise corporate governance actors. 
This thesis chose to examine the role of BOD and audit committee members. 
Their characteristics have been assessed in relation to agency theory and 
resource dependence theory. As highlighted by Hillman and Dalziel (2003), 
Jackling and Johl (2009), Carter et al. (2010) and Epstein and Roy (2010), the 
important characteristics include the frequency of meetings, the independence, 
financial literacy, corporate governance expertise, and ethnicity of the directors.  
 
5.2.2 A Summary of the Findings 
In this thesis, the quality of interims is assessed by timeliness, compliance with 
the FRS 134, compliance with the BMLR, and comparability. Similar with the 
previous studies, mean timeliness of Malaysian interims is found to be within 
the allowable time period given (Lunt, 1982; Hussey and Woolfe, 1998; D’Arcy 
and Grabensberger, 2003; Ku Ismail and Chandler, 2004; Alias et al., 2009) 
and the mean of timeliness is consistent in every quarter and year (D’Arcy and 
Grabensberger, 2003). Despite the absence of audit reviews, which are 
perceived by some researchers to cause a delay in publishing interims, most 
PLC in this study are inclined to publish towards the end of the allowable time 
period, which is in contrast to the findings for US PLC (Kross and Schroeder, 
1984) and UK PLC (Hussey and Woolfe, 1998). Some of the plausible reasons 
for Malaysian PLC to defer publishing interims is due to their frequent release of 
interims and the losses incurred by PLC, especially in the second BSE. 
Furthermore, the period of interims covered by this thesis coincides with the 
economic crisis of 2008.  
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Due to the finding of consistent timeliness in every quarter, the mean number of 
days to publish interims between one quarter and the other is insignificant and 
therefore, this thesis disagrees with the previous findings that the deferment in 
quarter four is due to the time required by management to make accounting 
adjustments. The low comparability score of quarter four interims evidence this 
although they are published more timely. In other words, quarter four interims 
are less comparable as compared to the other quarters although quarter four 
interims are published on a more timely basis.  
 
The FRS 134 and the BMLR require PLC to publish interims not exceeding 60 
days and two months, respectively. By following the two-month rule, the actual 
number of days for the first three quarters are more than 60 days (i.e. 61, 62, 
and 61 days, consecutively). For the final quarter, since the number of days in 
February differs because of the leap year, the actual number of days is 59 in 
2007 and 60 in 2008. By following the FRS 134 and the BMLR requirement, 0% 
to 14% of PLC published interims exceeding 60 days after each quarter ends 
and 0% to 2% PLC published interims not exceeding the two months period. 
However, the number of PLC exceeding the period given reduced over the time 
covered by the study.  
 
With regard to the type of BSE, PLC in the first BSE are found to publish 
interims more timely than PLC in the second BSE. The most likely reason for 
this is the higher levels of capital owned by PLC in the first BSE, which enable 
these companies to acquire better accounting systems and hire more 
accountants that are professional. There is a considerable range between the 
minimum and maximum number of days taken to publish interims, especially for 
PLC in the first BSE. Some PLC in the first BSE (i.e. in the finance industry) 
publish interims within two weeks of the quarter ends. None of the PLC in the 
second BSE publishes interims within 30 days every quarter. With regard to the 
types of industries, mean timeliness insignificantly differs except for the finance 
and technology industries. The finance industry published interims early 
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because PLC in that industry are blue-chip stocks and they are always in the 
eyes of prospective investors.  
 
As shown in Table 4.4, the numbers of PLC that publish interims exceeding 60 
days are quite high for PLC in the second BSE. In line with the finding of the 
previous studies, this is possibly due to higher capital possessed by PLC in the 
first BSE enables them to acquire sophisticated accounting systems and hire 
accountants that are more qualified. With regard to compliance with the BMLR 
requirement, four PLC from the first BSE and one PLC in the second BSE did 
not comply with the two months requirement. All companies are from industrial 
products except one from the technology industry. This result shows that PLC 
are more inclined to follow the two-month rule of BMLR to publish interims than 
the 60 days allowable period of the FRS 134. Nevertheless, over the period, the 
non-compliance with both the FRS 134 and the BMLR diminished. With regard 
to the types of industries, as shown in Table 4.6, all PLC in plantations, 
construction and finance industry publish interims within the allowable period of 
60 days in every quarter and in every year. The timeliness has greatly improved 
in 2008 where almost all PLC in all types of industries publish interims in the 
allowable period of 60 days.  
 
The compliance rate for interim reporting standards is remarkably high for all 
PLC. However, compliance with the FRS 134 is higher than the BMLR, which is 
between 92% and 94% for the FRS 134 and 77% and 78% for the BMLR. 
Previous studies (Ku Ismail and Chandler, 2005a; and Rahman and Ismail, 
2008) have also found a high compliance rate with the interim reporting 
standards for Malaysian PLC. However, Ku Ismail and Chandler (2005a) only 
studied one of the interim reporting standards and Rahman and Ismail (2008) 
did not segregate the index based on the types of interim reporting standards. 
The finding of this present study is in contrast to that of McEwen and Schwartz 
(1992), Nieuwoudt and Koen (1999), and Glaum and Street (2002), who found 
that PLC did not comply with the requirements for interim reporting standards 
which caused the interims to become unreliable. Despite a high percentage in 
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the compliance score with the interim reporting standards, there is a substantial 
range between the minimum and maximum score of compliance especially with 
the BMLR. The minimum compliance score with the FRS 134 is between 75% 
and 67% and for the BMLR, it is between 50% and 48%. The maximum 
compliance rate for the FRS 134 and BMLR is 100% and 95%, respectively.  
 
The present study fills the gap of analysing PLC compliance with the interim 
reporting standards according to the type of BSE and industry. Regardless of 
the type of BSE and the types of industries, the compliance score with the FRS 
134 and the BMLR is quite consistent in all quarters and years. However, the 
compliance score with the FRS 134 is slightly higher for PLC in the first BSE 
than the second BSE. Similar to timeliness, PLC in the first BSE are able to hire 
accountants that are more qualified and this possibly causes their compliance 
score with the interim reporting standards to be higher.   
 
Two indexes were constructed to determine PLC compliance with the FRS 134 
and the BMLR. Most PLC comply with all requirements of the FRS 134, except 
accounting policies and contingent assets or liabilities. Another point to highlight 
is that all except one PLC disclosed that seasonality is insignificant in the 
narrative disclosure of interims. However, when a one way repeated measure 
ANOVA was conducted, this study found that mean revenues vary across 
quarters and possibly link to seasonality (i.e. the festive season of the 
Bumiputra who form around 65% of Malaysian population). The analysis of the 
PLC compliance with the BMLR showed that performance review, taxation, off-
balance sheet financial instruments and dividends are requirements that have 
quite a low compliance score.  
 
The resubmission and restatement of interims were investigated in this study 
prior to conducting the comparability measure. Although the resubmission rate 
has been found to be very low, the restatement rate was found to be very high 
in 2007 (i.e. almost 50% of PLC) due to the revised accounting policy of the 
FRS 117. This restatement did not affect the PLC figures because they only 
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had to reclassify leasehold land from property, plant, and equipment to prepaid 
lease. 
 
Measured ordinally, this study has found that the comparability ranking score is 
quite high for the first three quarters but it moderately declines in quarter four. 
This result suggests that the interim for the first three quarters are more 
comparable than the fourth quarter. Similar with the previous studies, the 
present study suggests that quarter four is the time for PLC to make 
adjustments before the financial reports are due to be audited. This is one of 
the reasons why the comparability ranking score in quarter four is very low (i.e. 
about half that of the first three quarters). Nevertheless, time is not a factor that 
is associated with management requirement to make accounting adjustments. 
This is proven by the lack of association between timeliness and comparability 
in the Pearson correlation coefficient in Table 4.26 and lower comparability 
ranking score in quarter four although they are published more timely than the 
other quarters (Table 4.16). Over the period, the comparability ranking score of 
interims improve, which makes the information more beneficial to the users of 
financial reports.  
 
With regard to the type of BSE, PLC in the second BSE have a higher ranking 
score than PLC in the first BSE for the first three quarters. In fact, the mean 
comparability ranking score for PLC in the second BSE reached the maximum 
value of 100% for the first three quarters in 2008. However, PLC in the first BSE 
have a higher comparability ranking score in the fourth quarter. These results 
suggest that although the interims for PLC in the second BSE are more 
comparable in the first three quarters, they are more inclined to make 
accounting adjustments in quarter four.  
 
The mean comparability ranking score for all types of industries is high, except 
for the property, finance, and technology industries. Despite the timeliness to 
publish interims, the finance industries mean comparability was the lowest in 
2007. However, their mean comparability improved in 2008. Despite the high 
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comparable ranking score, this study found that most of the profit and loss 
details of the interims are not equivalent to those in the annual reports, which 
are audited by an independent party. Consequently, the quality of interims is 
lower. 
 
Both the dichotomous and continuous methods were used in this study to 
measure the quality value of interims. Those PLC that published interims on a 
more timely basis, have a higher compliance score with the FRS 134 and the 
BMLR, and a higher comparability ranking score means that they will have 
higher quality values. The quality value of each of these qualitative items was 
then summed up and the value ranges from 0 to 4, which denotes the lowest 
and highest quality, respectively.  
 
By using the dichotomous method, it was found that the quality value of interims 
is remarkably high (i.e. above 3.5) for the first three quarters, although it is then 
found to have intensely dropped in quarter four (i.e. below 3.5). By referring to 
the level of quality value in Table 3.6, the quality of interims for the first three 
quarters is very high and for the fourth quarter, the quality of interims is high. 
Therefore, the present study concludes that in the absence of audit reviews, the 
quality of Malaysian interims is high. The items that contribute the most and the 
least to the quality of interims is compliance with the FRS 134 and 
comparability, respectively. The highest quality value is found in quarter three 
and the lowest is found in quarter four.  
 
By using dichotomous value, the quality value of interims insignificantly differs 
between PLC in the first and second BSE. However, the items that contribute 
the least to the quality of interims slightly differ between the types of BSE. For 
PLC in the first BSE, the item that contributes the least is comparability while for 
the second BSE, the items that contribute the least differs in every quarter, 
which are timeliness, compliance with the BMLR and comparability. Regardless 
of the type of BSE, the item that contributes the most to the quality of interims is 
compliance with the FRS 134. With regard to the types of industries, the 
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construction and finance industries have the highest and lowest quality value of 
interims in most quarters, respectively. Again, regardless of the type of BSE 
and types of industries, the quality of interims for the first three quarters is very 
high and for the fourth quarter, the quality of interims is high.  
 
When using the continuous method, the quality value of interims is found to be 
lower (i.e. less than 3) than in the dichotomous method. This happens because 
decimal numbers are used in the continuous method while a whole number is 
used in the dichotomous method. The quality of interims for the first three 
quarters is between 2.5 and 3.0, which indicates that the quality of interims is 
moderate. The quality of interims in the fourth quarter is between 2.0 and 2.5, 
which indicates that the quality of interims is low. Therefore, by using 
continuous method, the quality of interims is quite low due to PLC inclination to 
publish interims towards the end of the allowable period given. 
 
Similar with the dichotomous method, the highest and the lowest quality value 
of interims by using the continuous method is in quarter three and four, 
respectively, and the quality value for PLC in the first and second BSE 
insignificantly differs. The qualitative characteristic of interims that contribute 
the most and the least to the quality of interims is compliance with the FRS 134 
and timeliness, respectively. However, comparability is the item that mostly 
contributes to the quality of interims in the first three quarters of 2008. The item 
that contributes the most to the quality of interims slightly differs between the 
types of BSE. For PLC in the first BSE, the item that contributes the most is 
compliance with the FRS 134 while for the second BSE the item that 
contributes the most is comparability. Regardless of the type of BSE, the item 
that contributes the least to the quality of interims is timeliness. The finance and 
services industry has the lowest quality value of interims in most quarters.  
 
Prior to finding the impact of corporate governance on the quality of interims, 
the descriptive statistics revealed the following findings for corporate 
governance characteristics variables. Regardless of the type of BSE, the mean 
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frequency of BOD meeting is five. Two companies did not hold meetings before 
the interims were issued. The services, plantations, finance, and technology 
industries have been found to have a higher frequency of BOD meetings. In 
total, 8.6% of PLC (of which all except three PLC are from the first BSE) did not 
comply with the BMLR’s requirement to have at least two independent directors 
or one-third of directors are independent, whichever is higher. Non-independent 
executive directors dominate the composition of the BOD in Malaysia. The 
technology and finance industries have the lowest and the largest mean of 
independent directors, respectively.   
 
The mean frequency of financial literacy directors is found to be quite low (i.e. 
two members). Indeed, some PLC in the first BSE did not have any directors 
who were financially literate. Therefore, most of the PLC in this study may not 
comply with the MCCG requirement to have all financially literate audit 
committee members commencing January 2009. The finance and construction 
industries have the highest and lowest proportion of financial literacy directors, 
respectively. As corporate governance expertise magnifies BOD efficiency, 
around 66% directors have corporate governance expertise in 2007 and the 
percentage slightly increased to 67% in 2008. PLC in the second BSE have a 
lower percentage of corporate governance expertise (i.e. around 52%) than 
PLC in the first BSE (i.e. around 72%). The corporate governance expertise for 
PLC across all of the industries significantly differs. PLC with the highest and 
lowest proportion of corporate governance expertise directors are to be found in 
the finance and industrial products industries, respectively. Although Bumiputra 
is the largest ethnic group in Malaysia, only 40% and 38% of the directors in the 
companies in this study are Bumiputra. PLC in the second BSE were found to 
have a lower proportion of Bumiputra directors (around 32%). This result shows 
that non-Bumiputra directors dominate the proportion of directors on the BOD of 
Malaysian PLC. The services and finance industries have the highest 
proportion of Bumiputra directors while the lowest proportion is to be found in 
the consumer industry. 
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A Pearson correlation coefficient was used to investigate the relationship 
between corporate governance characteristics and the quality of interims and 
multivariate analysis was used to identify the impact of corporate governance 
characteristics on the quality of interims. Three corporate governance 
characteristics of BOD (CGCB) that have a very significant relationship with the 
quality of interims is the frequency of BOD meetings, the financial literacy and 
ethnicity of directors. This study has shown that independence and corporate 
governance expertise have no significant association with the quality of 
interims.  
 
In addition, this study found that there was no relationship between any of the 
qualitative characteristics of interims, except for: a) timeliness and compliance 
with the BMLR; b) compliance with the FRS 134 and compliance with the 
BMLR; and c) compliance with the FRS 134 and comparability of interims. 
Therefore, timeliness is not a factor that relates to a PLC compliance with the 
FRS 134 and comparability of interims. This finding supports this study’s 
disagreement with the view that time is not a factor in making accounting 
adjustments in quarter four, which then causes a delay in publishing interims. 
This relationship suggests that as compliance with the FRS 134 increased, 
compliance with the BMLR and comparability of interims also increased. 
 
With regard to the interrelationship between CGCB, all are found to be 
interrelated except for the relationship between financial literacy and 
independence, as well as the corporate governance expertise of directors. 
These results suggest that PLC with directors who are more independent, who 
are financially literate, who have some corporate governance expertise, and 
who come from the Bumiputra ethnic group are more likely to hold more 
frequent BOD meetings. A positive relationship between independent directors 
and directors who hold a corporate governance expertise suggests that most 
independent directors have a corporate governance expertise. Finally, most of 
the Bumiputra directors in this study were found to be independent, financially 
literate, and to have corporate governance expertise.  
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All control variables are correlated with each other. These relationships suggest 
that PLC of a larger size have higher profitability, have a lower leverage ratio 
and have BOD with larger members. Additionally, PLC with higher leverage 
ratio earn lower profitability. Finally, PLC with a larger size of BOD have a 
higher profitability and lower leverage ratios. Control variables are not 
associated significantly with all qualitative items of interims except timeliness. 
With regard to the association between control variables and CGC, all CGC are 
either partly or fully associated with the control variables. 
 
Multivariate analyses were conducted to identify the impact of CGC on the 
quality of interims as Pearson correlation coefficients do not analyse the causal 
and interrelationship among all CGC variables and quality of interims. The 
results show that the influence of CGC on quality of interims is low and the 
influence of CGC on each qualitative characteristic of interims is mixed (details 
is in Appendix 5-1). Three additional analyses were conducted to check the 
robustness of the initial multiple regression results. Firstly, new variables, which 
are the CGCA that consists of the frequency of audit committee meetings, 
independence, financial literacy, corporate governance expertise and ethnicity 
of audit committee members are added to the regression tests of the basic 
models. The results as per Appendix 5-2 show that if CGCA are added to the 
basic model, the relationship between CGC and the qualitative items of interims 
insignificantly differs. The insignificant difference shows the stability of the 
findings of this study. Secondly, the CGCB is replaced by CGCA to determine 
the influence of CGC on the quality of interims if different corporate governance 
actors are assessed. The result shows that the relationship between CGCB and 
quality of interims slightly differ with the relationship between CGCA and quality 
of interims if CGCB is replaced by CGCA (details is in Appendix 5-3). Thirdly, 
CGCB, CGCA and control variables are regressed individually to investigate 
which group of variables has more significant influence on the quality of 
interims. The result is shown in Appendix 5-4. This study also found that the 
group of variables that has more to less influence on a) timeliness is control 
variables, followed by CGCA and CGCB; b) compliance with the FRS 134 is 
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CGCB, followed by CGCA and control variables; c) compliance with the BMLR 
is CGCB, followed by control variables and CGCA; and d) comparability is 
control variables, followed by CGCB and CGCA. Finally, the R2 of all multiple 
regressions shown in Appendix 5-5 reveals that that the influence of CGCB, 
CGCA and control variables on the quality of interims is quite low.  
 
5.2.3 Conclusion 
The first objective of this study is to determine the quality of interims in the 
absence of audit reviews. This study has found that the quality value of interims 
is remarkably high for each qualitative characteristic of interims if a 
dichotomous method is used. However, the quality is lower than three if a 
continuous method is used because the timeliness to publish interims is 
towards the end of the allowable period given, and most profit and loss items of 
interims are not equivalent to the annual report that has been audited by the 
independent party.  
 
The quality value of interims is quite consistent for the first three quarters and 
the lowest is quarter four and this insignificantly differs for different types of 
BSE and industries. The item that contributes the most and the least to the 
quality of interims is the compliance with the FRS 134 and comparability, 
respectively, for the dichotomous method and compliance with the FRS 134 
and timeliness, respectively, for the continuous method. The items also differ 
when analysis is made on the types of BSE. By using a dichotomous method, 
this study found that the most and least items that contribute to the quality of 
interims is compliance with the FRS 134 and comparability for PLC in the first 
BSE, and compliance with the FRS 134 and a mixture of other qualitative items 
for PLC in the second BSE. By using the continuous method, it is found that the 
most and least items that contribute to the quality of interims is compliance with 
the FRS 134 and timeliness respectively for PLC in the first BSE, and 
comparability and timeliness respectively for PLC in the second BSE. 
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The second objective of this study is to determine the impact of corporate 
governance on the quality of interims. As presented in Tables 4.26 and 4.27, 
the corporate governance characteristics that are associated with the quality of 
interims are the frequency of BOD meetings, the financial literacy and ethnicity 
of directors. Since the Pearson correlation coefficients only show the 
association between two variables, this thesis has conducted multivariate 
analysis to confirm the influence of corporate governance characteristics on the 
quality of interims. 
 
Overall, the multiple regression analyses show that the influence of CGC on 
quality of interims is low and the influence of CGC on each qualitative 
characteristic of interims is mixed. Additional analyses results prove the stability 
of this study’s findings as the association between the initial multiple regression 
results insignificantly differs with the additional analyses. Nevertheless, the 
influence of corporate governance characteristics on the quality of interims is 
also quite low with the additional tests conducted.  
 
5.3 The Implications of this Study 
The findings of this study should be of potential interests to regulatory bodies, 
policy makers, professionals, corporate governance, shareholders, and 
academics. Of particular interests are the issues relating to quality of interims 
and corporate governance.  
 
There are no mechanisms set by Malaysian regulatory bodies to ensure that 
PLC complies with the interim reporting standards. The interim standards are 
the FRS 134 and the BMLR that are issued by the Malaysian Accounting 
Standards Board and the Bursa Malaysia, respectively. The Malaysian 
regulatory bodies can use the findings of this study to identify whether 
Malaysian PLC have successfully complied with the imposed interim reporting 
standards.  
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Policy-makers may use the findings of this study to be aware of the PLC 
misunderstanding of some provisions in the accounting standards. For 
example, some PLC has misconceived the word “immediate preceding quarter” 
stated in the BMLR and they have compared the profit before tax between a 
current quarter and an “immediate preceding corresponding quarter” instead of 
an “immediate preceding quarter”.  
 
Professionals, such as financial analysts, may use the findings of this study to 
identify those types of PLC that have higher quality interims before they make a 
decision to invest. For example, if PLC publishes interims on a more timely 
basis, do they also comply with the interim reporting standards and are they 
comparable? 
 
The findings on corporate governance may be useful to shareholders and BOD 
to determine the board’s composition that may influence the quality of interims. 
The shareholders may appoint BOD with certain characteristics, and the BOD 
may predict the impact of inclusion and exclusion of corporate governance 
characteristics included in this thesis in the board.  
 
Finally, academics may be interested with the findings of this study because 
they can be used to extend future research. 
  
5.4 Limitations of the Study 
Although this study has several strengths, there are also a number of 
limitations, which this study must recognise. 
 
Firstly, this study presumed that all data included in interims (such as the profit 
and loss figures, narrative disclosures and corporate governance information) is 
correct. It is difficult to determine the authenticity of the information beforehand, 
especially when Malaysian interims are not subject to audit reviews by an 
independent party.  
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Secondly, this study has used Malaysian interims extracted from the Bursa 
Malaysia Stock Exchange’s (BMSE) website. The periods that the interims 
covered are all quarters in 2007 and 2008 only. Therefore, the periods covered 
are very short and the only comparison that can be made is between quarters 
for these years. No analysis can be done to see the trend on a long-term basis.  
 
Thirdly, this study has only focused on the BOD and audit committee as proxies 
of corporate governance actors. According to Rezaee (2003) corporate 
governance actors include the BOD, the audit committee, the top management 
team, internal auditors, external auditors, and governing bodies to ensure the 
reliability of financial reports.  
 
Fourthly, there are other corporate governance characteristics that are not 
included in this thesis that may affect the quality of Malaysian interims (such as 
the age of the directors and CEO duality).  
 
Despite these limitations, the study has strengths and is an important 
contribution to our understanding of the development of a significant area of 
corporate reporting. However, overcoming these limitations might offer a 
platform for future research, which is explained in the next section. 
5.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
This study is able to make a number of suggestions for future research based 
on the limitations that were explained in the last section. 
 
Firstly, future research in other countries can compare the quality of interims 
when they are reviewed or not reviewed by external auditors. By examining 
interims with independent audit reviews, the quality of interims may be 
improved as external auditors may concern with timeliness to publish interims, 
compliance with the interim reporting standards and comparability of interims 
from one period to another. None compliance with all qualitative characteristics 
of interims may give an impact to the external auditors’ reputation in doing their 
business.  
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Secondly, future research can extend the periods of interims covered so that 
they can make analysis on a long-term basis. Additionally, they can see a trend 
and make a forecast for the benefit of the users of a financial report.  
 
Thirdly, future research can include other corporate governance actors in their 
studies. The results can then be compared to those of this thesis. If similar 
results are found then they may be internationally generalisable. 
 
Finally, future research can also include other corporate governance 
characteristics (such as age of the directors and CEO duality) and determine 
the association between these characteristics and the quality of interims. 
 
In conclusion, the quality of Malaysian interims is remarkably high if a 
dichotomous method is used and moderate if a continuous method is used. 
This is due to timeliness to publish interims towards the end of the allowable 
time period given and most profit and loss items of interims are not equivalent 
to the annual report that has been audited by the independent party. Only three 
CGC is associated with the quality of interims namely the frequency of a BOD 
meetings, the financial literacy and ethnicity of directors. Independence and 
corporate governance expertise is not associated with the quality of interims. 
The multiple regression analyses reveal that the impact of corporate 
governance on the quality of interims is mixed and low.  
Apart from examining the qualitative characteristics of interims to determine the 
quality, it is also interesting for future research to focus on the quantitative 
characteristics of interims such as the financial ratios and observe whether the 
impact of corporate governance characteristics on the quality of interims 
significantly or insignificantly differs between these two types of characteristics. 
By investigating the qualitative and quantitative characteristics of interims at the 
same time, the quality of interims is measured more comprehensively and the 
finding is more stable. Due to different culture and environment across 
countries, the impact of corporate governance on the quality of interims may be 
different from this study. If the impact of corporate governance characteristics 
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on qualitative and quantitative characteristics of interims is still low, future 
research may then focus on the other areas of corporate governance such as 
institutional ownership, internal controls and ethics.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 3-1: Names of Public Listed Companies  
A & M REALTY BHD                  LUSTER INDUSTRIES BHD             
ABRIC BHD                         MAA HOLDINGS BHD                  
ADVANCE SYNERGY BHD               MAGNA PRIMA BHD                   
AFFIN HOLDINGS BHD                MALAYAN FLOUR MILLS BHD           
AHMAD ZAKI RESOURCES BHD          MALAYAN UNITED INDUSTRIES BHD     
AIKBEE RESOURCES BHD              MALAYSIA PACKAGING INDUSTRY BHD   
APEX HEALTHCARE BHD               MALAYSIAN BULK CARRIERS BHD       
APM AUTOMOTIVE HOLDINGS BHD       MALPAC HOLDINGS BHD               
APP INDUSTRIES BHD                MAXTRAL INDUSTRY BHD              
ASIATIC DEVELOPMENT BHD           MBf HOLDINGS BHD                  
BANDAR RAYA DEVELOPMENTS BHD      MEASAT GLOBAL BHD                 
BERTAM ALLIANCE BHD               MEGA FIRST CORPORATION BHD        
BINTULU PORT HOLDINGS BHD         MIECO CHIPBOARD BHD               
BLD PLANTATION BHD                MINPLY HOLDINGS (M) BHD           
BOX-PAK (MALAYSIA) BHD            MITRAJAYA HOLDINGS BHD            
BTM RESOURCES BHD                 MUI PROPERTIES BHD                
CAHYA MATA SARAWAK BHD            MWE HOLDINGS BHD                  
CAM RESOURCES BHD                 NAKAMICHI CORPORATION BHD         
CARLSBERG BREWERY MALAYSIA BHD    NAM FATT CORPORATION BHD          
CENTURY LOGISTICS HOLDINGS BHD    NEPLINE BHD                       
CHEMICAL COMPANY OF MALAYSIA BHD  NPC RESOURCES BHD                 
CN ASIA CORPORATION BHD           NV MULTI CORPORATION BHD          
COUNTRY HEIGHTS HOLDINGS BHD      ORIENTAL HOLDINGS BHD             
DELLOYD VENTURES BHD              ORNAPAPER BHD                     
DKLS INDUSTRIES BHD               PADIBERAS NASIONAL BHD            
EMIVEST BHD                       PAN MALAYSIA CAPITAL BHD          
ENCORP BHD                        PAN MALAYSIA CORPORATION BHD      
ENGLOTECHS HOLDING BHD            PARAMOUNT CORPORATION BHD         
ESSO MALAYSIA BHD                 PERMAJU INDUSTRIES BHD            
FAR EAST HOLDINGS BHD             PLUS EXPRESSWAYS BHD              
FOREMOST HOLDINGS BHD             PREMIUM NUTRIENTS BHD             
FSBM HOLDINGS BHD                 PRESTAR RESOURCES BHD             
FURQAN BUSINESS ORGANISATION BHD  PRINSIPTEK CORPORATION BHD        
GLOBETRONICS TECHNOLOGY BHD       PUBLIC BANK BHD                   
GOH BAN HUAT BHD                  RAPID SYNERGY BHD                 
HAISAN RESOURCES BHD              REX INDUSTRY BHD                  
HARN LEN CORPORATION BHD          SAAG CONSOLIDATED (M) BHD         
HO WAH GENTING BHD                SCOMI GROUP BHD                   
I-BHD                             SINDORA BHD                       
IBRACO BHD                        SMIS CORPORATION BHD              
INDUSTRONICS BHD                  SOUTH MALAYSIA INDUSTRIES BHD     
INTEGRAX BHD                      SUMATEC RESOURCES BHD             
JERNEH ASIA BHD                   TA WIN HOLDINGS BHD               
KBB RESOURCES BHD                 TALIWORKS CORPORATION BHD         
KECK SENG (M) BHD                 TAN CHONG MOTOR HOLDINGS BHD      
KEN HOLDINGS BHD                  THONG GUAN INDUSTRIES BHD         
KIM HIN INDUSTRY BHD              TIMBERWELL BHD                    
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Appendix 3-1: Names of Public Listed Companies (Continue) 
KNM GROUP BHD                     TIME ENGINEERING BHD              
KNUSFORD BHD                      TRACOMA HOLDINGS BHD              
KPJ HEALTHCARE BHD                TRC SYNERGY BHD                   
KRETAM HOLDINGS BHD               TRIUMPHAL ASSOCIATES BHD          
LAFARGE MALAYAN CEMENT BHD        UCHI TECHNOLOGIES BHD             
LATEXX PARTNERS BHD               UNISEM (M) BHD 
LBS BINA GROUP BHD                UNITED PLANTATIONS BHD            
LCL CORPORATION BHD               VTI VINTAGE BHD                   
LEADER UNIVERSAL HOLDINGS BHD     WAH SEONG CORPORATION BHD         
LIMAHSOON BHD                     WOODLANDOR HOLDINGS BHD           
LITYAN HOLDINGS BHD               Y.S.P.SOUTHEAST ASIA HOLDING BHD  
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Appendix 3-2: The Cronbach’s Alpha 
 
Variables Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
TIMEQ107 1871.93 9911.776 .126 .868 
FRSQ107 1834.25 9525.240 .510 .860 
BMLRQ107 1849.35 8663.244 .709 .853 
COMPAREQ107 1923.63 10109.110 .218 .865 
TIMEQ207 1871.95 9693.509 .315 .864 
FRSQ207 1833.73 9527.237 .517 .860 
BMLRQ207 1849.67 8598.826 .759 .852 
COMPAREQ207 1923.62 10123.173 .154 .866 
TIMEQ307 1872.65 9761.288 .221 .866 
FRSQ307 1833.62 9525.344 .529 .860 
BMLRQ307 1849.38 8649.982 .797 .851 
COMPAREQ307 1923.61 10115.920 .181 .866 
TIMEQ407 1869.58 9951.317 .189 .865 
FRSQ407 1832.97 9549.596 .524 .860 
BMLRQ407 1850.36 8775.252 .724 .853 
COMPAREQ407 1925.14 10174.732 -.052 .867 
TIMEQ108 1871.96 9776.958 .200 .867 
FRSQ108 1835.43 9320.791 .607 .858 
BMLRQ108 1849.68 8729.393 .727 .853 
COMPAREQ108 1923.33 10156.377 .017 .866 
TIMEQ208 1871.84 9839.253 .182 .867 
FRSQ208 1835.27 9390.620 .568 .859 
BMLRQ208 1849.93 8809.393 .674 .855 
COMPAREQ208 1923.38 10177.668 -.115 .866 
TIMEQ308 1873.83 9715.376 .264 .865 
FRSQ308 1835.00 9479.368 .508 .860 
BMLRQ308 1849.75 8914.164 .659 .855 
COMPAREQ308 1923.29 10177.784 -.131 .866 
TIMEQ408 1871.41 9954.338 .159 .866 
FRSQ408 1835.13 9491.018 .504 .860 
BMLRQ408 1850.41 9103.534 .582 .857 
COMPAREQ408 1925.01 10166.099 -.027 .867 
MTGD07 1921.70 10264.503 -.264 .868 
INDEPD07 1926.71 10158.975 .002 .866 
CORPGOVDQ107 1926.43 10159.664 -.005 .866 
FINLITD07 1926.98 10164.581 -.082 .866 
ETHNICD07 1926.78 10167.189 -.085 .866 
MTGDQ108 1921.71 10280.421 -.321 .868 
INDEPD08 1926.70 10175.092 -.161 .866 
CORPGOVD08 1926.42 10161.031 -.031 .866 
FINLITD08 1926.96 10164.248 -.072 .866 
ETHNICD08 1926.78 10165.030 -.062 
 
 
.866 
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Appendix 3-2: The Cronbach’s Alpha (Continue) 
 
Variables Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
SIZEBOD07 1919.67 10154.057 .006 .866 
PROFITQ107 1927.01 10158.789 .011 .866 
LEVERAGEQ107 1926.81 10159.353 -.003 .866 
LGASSSETQ107 1918.44 10180.539 -.169 .866 
PROFITQ207 1927.04 10155.862 .031 .866 
LEVERAGEQ207 1926.86 10160.051 -.016 .866 
LGASSETQ207 1918.43 10175.209 -.138 .866 
PROFITQ307 1926.99 10160.327 -.014 .866 
LEVERAGEQ307 1926.85 10161.410 -.046 .866 
LGASSETQ307 1918.42 10176.107 -.142 .866 
PROFITQ407 1927.02 10157.072 .020 .866 
LEVERAGEQ407 1926.86 10159.970 -.014 .866 
LGASSETQ407 1918.42 10178.091 -.158 .866 
SIZEBOD08 1919.67 10166.153 -.027 .867 
PROFITQ108 1926.98 10162.600 -.055 .866 
LEVERAGEQ108 1926.87 10158.712 .018 .866 
LGASSETQ108 1918.41 10177.639 -.154 .866 
PROFITQ208 1927.02 10160.696 -.022 .866 
LEVERAGEQ208 1926.86 10158.131 .033 .866 
LGASSETQ208 1918.40 10177.346 -.148 .866 
PROFITQ308 1927.04 10163.281 -.059 .866 
LEVERAGEQ308 1926.85 10158.022 .035 .866 
LGASSETQ308 1918.39 10177.343 -.148 .866 
PROFITQ408 1927.23 10166.787 -.043 .866 
LEVERAGEQ408 1926.84 10157.280 .051 .866 
LGASSETQ408 1918.41 10176.486 -.140 .866 
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Appendix 4-1: Descriptive Statistics of Qualitative Characteristics 
    
TIME FRS 134 BMLR COMPARE 
N Valid 928 928 928 928 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Mean 55.20 92.67 77.27 3.21 
Std. Error of Mean .232 .205 .319 .046 
Median 58.00 94.00 78.00 4.00 
Mode 59 97 80 4 
Std. Deviation 7.062 6.245 9.704 1.402 
Variance 49.877 38.995 94.159 1.967 
Range 77 33 47 4 
Minimum 14 67 48 0 
Maximum 91 100 95 4 
Sum 51221 85994 71711 2981 
Percentiles 25 53.00 88.00 71.00 3.00 
50 58.00 94.00 78.00 4.00 
75 59.00 97.00 85.00 4.00 
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Appendix 4-2: Descriptive Statistics of Qualitative Characteristics-Quarter 
YEAR 2007 2008 
QUARTER TIME FRS BMLR 
COM
PARE TIME FRS BMLR 
COM
PARE 
1 N Valid 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 55.16 92.84 77.74 3.46 55.13 91.66 77.41 3.76 
Median 58.00 94.00 80.00 4.00 57.00 94.00 78.00 4.00 
Mode 60 97 80a 4 59 97 70 4 
Std. Deviation 7.58 6.00 10.50 1.122 8.023 6.763 9.823 .730 
Variance 57.50 36.04 110.36 1.259 64.37 45.73 96.488 .533 
Range 52 25 44 4 77 33 46 4 
Minimum 16 75 50 0 14 67 48 0 
Maximum 68 100 94 4 91 100 94 4 
Percentiles 25 54.00 89.00 70.25 3.25 53.00 87.00 70.00 4.00 
50 58.00 94.00 80.00 4.00 57.00 94.00 78.00 4.00 
75 60.00 97.00 86.00 4.00 59.00 97.00 85.00 4.00 
2 N Valid 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 55.14 93.36 77.42 3.47 55.25 91.82 77.16 3.71 
Median 58.00 95.00 78.50 4.00 58.00 94.00 77.50 4.00 
Mode 60 97 86 4 59 97 76 4 
Std. Deviation 6.780 5.920 10.325 1.130 7.352 6.588 9.891 .813 
Variance 45.96 35.05 106.61 1.277 54.05 43.40 97.825 .661 
Range 44 25 45 4 47 33 46 4 
Minimum 17 75 50 0 17 67 48 0 
Maximum 61 100 95 4 64 100 94 4 
Percentiles 25 53.00 91.00 70.00 4.00 53.00 87.25 71.00 4.00 
50 58.00 95.00 78.50 4.00 58.00 94.00 77.50 4.00 
75 60.00 97.00 86.00 4.00 59.00 97.00 85.00 4.00 
3 N Valid 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 54.44 93.47 77.71 3.48 53.26 92.09 77.34 3.80 
Median 57.00 95.00 79.00 4.00 56.00 94.00 79.00 4.00 
Mode 60 97 86 4 59 97 76a 4 
Std. Deviation 7.746 5.815 9.560 1.161 7.468 6.459 9.314 .713 
Variance 60.00 33.81 91.392 1.348 55.77 41.72 86.747 .508 
Range 45 25 44 4 45 33 47 4 
Minimum 16 75 50 0 14 67 48 0 
Maximum 61 100 94 4 59 100 95 4 
Percentiles 25 52.00 91.00 71.00 4.00 50.00 88.00 72.00 4.00 
50 57.00 95.00 79.00 4.00 56.00 94.00 79.00 4.00 
75 60.00 97.00 85.00 4.00 58.00 97.00 84.00 4.00 
4 N Valid 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 116 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 57.51 94.12 76.73 1.95 55.68 91.96 76.68 2.08 
Median 59.00 97.00 78.00 1.50 57.00 94.00 78.00 2.00 
Mode 59a 97 78a 4 58 97 80a 4 
Std. Deviation 4.887 5.645 9.536 1.754 5.521 6.389 8.805 1.785 
Variance 23.88 31.86 90.928 3.076 30.48 40.82 77.523 3.185 
Range 39 25 45 4 68 33 47 4 
Minimum 21 75 50 0 20 67 48 0 
Maximum 60 100 95 4 88 100 95 4 
Percentiles 25 57.00 93.00 70.00 .00 55.00 88.00 71.00 .00 
50 59.00 97.00 78.00 1.50 57.00 94.00 78.00 2.00 
75 60.00 97.00 84.00 4.00 58.00 97.00 83.00 4.00 
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Appendix 4-3: Descriptive Statistics of Qualitative Characteristics - BSE 
 
 TYPES OF BSE 
 
FIRST BSE 
 
SECOND BSE 
 
YEAR TIME FRS BMLR 
COM
PARE TIME FRS 
BML
R 
COM
PARE 
2007 N Valid 344 344 344 344 120 120 120 120 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 54.76 93.86 77.84 3.04 57.86 92.28 76.15 3.23 
Std. Error of Mean .404 .301 .554 .079 .379 .585 .817 .136 
Median 58.00 97.00 80.00 4.00 60.00 94.00 77.50 4.00 
Mode 59 97 86 4 60 97 82 4 
Std. Deviation 7.494 5.588 10.274 1.462 4.157 6.410 8.951 1.492 
Variance 56.154 31.23 105.56 2.138 17.28 41.092 80.11 2.226 
Range 52 25 45 4 27 24 45 4 
Minimum 16 75 50 0 34 76 50 0 
Maximum 68 100 95 4 61 100 95 4 
Sum 18837 32287 26776 1046 6943 11073 9138 387 
Percent
iles 
25 53.00 91.00 70.25 2.00 57.00 88.00 70.00 4.00 
50 58.00 97.00 80.00 4.00 60.00 94.00 77.50 4.00 
75 59.00 97.00 86.00 4.00 60.00 97.00 82.00 4.00 
2008 N Valid 344 344 344 344 120 120 120 120 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 54.08 92.22 77.36 3.32 56.97 90.93 76.55 3.39 
Std. Error of Mean .408 .357 .502 .070 .501 .565 .898 .125 
Median 57.00 94.00 78.50 4.00 58.00 91.00 76.00 4.00 
Mode 58 97 80 4 58 97 76 4 
Std. Deviation 7.563 6.623 9.306 1.303 5.486 6.193 9.835 1.374 
Variance 57.197 43.86 86.609 1.698 30.10 38.348 96.72 1.887 
Range 74 33 46 4 56 26 47 4 
Minimum 14 67 48 0 35 74 48 0 
Maximum 88 100 94 4 91 100 95 4 
Sum 18605 31722 26611 1141 6836 10912 9186 407 
Percent
iles 
25 52.00 88.00 72.00 3.00 56.25 86.25 70.00 4.00 
50 57.00 94.00 78.50 4.00 58.00 91.00 76.00 4.00 
75 58.00 97.00 84.00 4.00 59.00 97.00 84.75 4.00 
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Appendix4-4:Descriptive Statistics of Qualitative Characteristics- Industry 
YEAR 2007 2008 
INDUSTRY TIME FRS BMLR 
COMP
ARE TIME FRS BMLR 
COM
PARE 
C
O
N
S
T
R
U
C
T 
I 
O
N 
N Valid 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 55.44 91.47 74.81 2.97 55.16 93.28 75.56 3.41 
Median 58.00 91.00 75.00 4.00 56.00 97.00 74.50 4.00 
Mode 60 97 69a 4 58 97 73 4 
Std. Deviation 6.370 5.465 11.032 1.656 4.065 4.861 9.857 1.292 
Variance 40.57 29.87 121.70 2.741 16.52 23.62 97.15 1.668 
Range 35 16 37 4 16 13 37 4 
Minimum 25 81 52 0 44 84 52 0 
Maximum 60 97 89 4 60 97 89 4 
Sum 1774 2927 2394 95 1765 2985 2418 109 
Percenti
les 
25 53.00 87.00 69.00 1.25 52.00 88.00 73.00 4.00 
50 58.00 91.00 75.00 4.00 56.00 97.00 74.50 4.00 
75 59.00 97.00 84.00 4.00 58.00 97.00 81.00 4.00 
C
O
N
S
U
M
E
R 
N Valid 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 54.87 94.90 78.55 3.33 53.37 94.25 77.78 3.45 
Median 58.00 97.00 80.00 4.00 58.00 96.00 79.50 4.00 
Mode 60 97 80a 4 58 100 80a 4 
Std. Deviation 7.386 4.273 8.339 1.336 8.447 5.522 8.019 1.294 
Variance 54.55 18.26 69.540 1.785 71.35 30.49 64.30 1.675 
Range 37 14 29 4 35 16 28 4 
Minimum 24 86 63 0 25 84 64 0 
Maximum 61 100 92 4 60 100 92 4 
Sum 3292 5694 4713 200 3202 5655 4667 207 
Percenti
les 
25 52.00 91.50 70.00 4.00 51.00 89.00 70.00 4.00 
50 58.00 97.00 80.00 4.00 58.00 96.00 79.50 4.00 
75 60.00 97.00 84.00 4.00 58.00 100.0 85.00 4.00 
F 
I 
N
A
N
C
E 
N Valid 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 49.96 93.33 76.79 1.88 47.83 92.33 77.33 3.08 
Median 57.00 97.00 74.50 2.00 53.50 96.50 78.00 3.50 
Mode 60 97 67a 0 57a 97 75 4 
Std. Deviation 15.32 7.505 7.384 1.777 15.15 7.167 6.895 1.248 
Variance 234.7 56.31 54.520 3.158 229.6 51.36 47.53 1.558 
Range 44 24 24 4 46 19 25 4 
Minimum 16 76 67 0 14 78 64 0 
Maximum 60 100 91 4 60 97 89 4 
Sum 1199 2240 1843 45 1148 2216 1856 74 
Percenti
les 
25 51.25 96.00 71.25 .00 45.75 89.00 75.00 3.00 
50 57.00 97.00 74.50 2.00 53.50 96.50 78.00 3.50 
75 59.00 97.00 84.00 4.00 57.75 97.00 83.00 4.00 
I 
N
D
U
S
T
R 
I 
A 
L 
P
R
O
D 
N Valid 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 56.69 94.24 77.15 3.17 55.91 91.76 77.74 3.41 
Median 59.00 96.00 78.00 4.00 57.00 94.00 79.00 4.00 
Mode 60 97 78 4 59 97 76 4 
Std. Deviation 4.999 5.295 9.515 1.431 5.148 5.692 8.854 1.260 
Variance 24.98 28.04 90.538 2.047 26.50 32.39 78.40 1.588 
Range 38 24 45 4 53 26 46 4 
Minimum 30 76 50 0 35 74 48 0 
Maximum 68 100 95 4 88 100 94 4 
Sum 9751 16209 13270 545 9617 15782 13372 586 
Percenti
les 
25 54.00 94.00 71.00 3.00 55.00 88.00 71.25 4.00 
50 59.00 96.00 78.00 4.00 57.00 94.00 79.00 4.00 
75 60.00 97.00 85.00 4.00 59.00 97.00 84.00 4.00 
   
317 
 
Appendix 4-4:Descriptive Statistics of Qualitative Characteristics- 
Industry (Continue)
 YEAR  2007 2008 
   TIME FRS BMLR COM TIME FRS BMLR COM 
P 
L 
A
N
T
A
T 
I 
O
N
S 
N Valid 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 53.59 95.50 78.25 3.09 54.75 92.88 74.09 3.63 
Median 54.00 95.50 79.50 4.00 56.00 91.00 77.00 4.00 
Mode 59 100 60 4 56 100 48a 4 
Std. Deviation 5.593 4.158 14.317 1.422 4.333 5.047 15.397 1.070 
Variance 31.28 17.290 204.96 2.023 18.77 25.468 237.05 1.145 
Range 21 11 45 4 16 17 46 4 
Minimum 39 89 50 0 44 83 48 0 
Maximum 60 100 95 4 60 100 94 4 
Sum 1715 3056 2504 99 1752 2972 2371 116 
Percenti
les 
25 50.50 91.50 63.00 1.50 52.00 90.00 58.75 4.00 
50 54.00 95.50 79.50 4.00 56.00 91.00 77.00 4.00 
75 58.75 100.00 91.00 4.00 58.00 99.25 85.75 4.00 
P
R
O
P
E
R
T 
I 
E
S 
N Valid 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 56.70 93.95 77.14 2.82 54.64 92.95 77.27 3.07 
Median 58.50 95.00 80.00 4.00 57.00 96.00 79.00 4.00 
Mode 60 94a 83 4 57 100 83 4 
Std. Deviation 4.486 5.460 11.894 1.660 6.142 6.619 9.339 1.500 
Variance 20.12 29.812 141.46 2.757 37.72 43.812 87.226 2.251 
Range 18 19 43 4 35 19 41 4 
Minimum 43 81 50 0 25 81 50 0 
Maximum 61 100 93 4 60 100 91 4 
Sum 2495 4134 3394 124 2404 4090 3400 135 
Percenti
les 
25 55.00 92.00 68.75 1.00 53.00 87.00 70.00 3.00 
50 58.50 95.00 80.00 4.00 57.00 96.00 79.00 4.00 
75 60.00 97.00 86.00 4.00 58.00 100.00 83.00 4.00 
S
E
R
V 
I 
C
E
S 
N Valid 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 56.85 92.11 78.39 3.26 56.67 89.93 77.61 3.19 
Median 59.00 94.00 79.00 4.00 58.00 91.00 77.50 4.00 
Mode 60 97 65 4 58 97 68 4 
Std. Deviation 3.935 6.848 9.346 1.281 2.938 8.395 8.803 1.468 
Variance 15.48 46.892 87.350 1.641 8.635 70.477 77.494 2.156 
Range 14 25 35 4 12 33 34 4 
Minimum 47 75 60 0 48 67 61 0 
Maximum 61 100 95 4 60 100 95 4 
Sum 4775 7737 6585 274 4760 7554 6519 268 
Percenti
les 
25 54.00 87.00 70.25 3.00 56.00 86.00 70.00 3.00 
50 59.00 94.00 79.00 4.00 58.00 91.00 77.50 4.00 
75 60.00 97.00 86.75 4.00 59.00 97.00 84.75 4.00 
T
E
C
H
N
O
L
O
G
Y 
N Valid 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 48.69 85.19 75.69 3.19 49.56 86.25 74.63 3.31 
Median 57.50 85.50 76.00 4.00 55.50 81.00 75.50 4.00 
Mode 59a 81 67a 4 28a 81 76 4 
Std. Deviation 13.72 4.262 9.046 1.276 16.82 6.648 11.111 1.352 
Variance 188.3 18.163 81.829 1.629 283.0 44.200 123.45 1.829 
Range 37 10 27 4 63 16 33 4 
Minimum 24 81 63 0 28 81 58 0 
Maximum 61 91 90 4 91 97 91 4 
Sum 779 1363 1211 51 793 1380 1194 53 
Percenti
les 
25 32.25 81.00 67.00 2.25 31.75 81.00 63.50 3.25 
50 57.50 85.50 76.00 4.00 55.50 81.00 75.50 4.00 
75 59.75 90.00 83.75 4.00 57.75 91.00 85.00 4.00 
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Appendix 4-5: Histogram of Timeliness - Quarter 
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Appendix 4-5: Histogram of Timeliness - Quarter (Continue) 
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Appendix 4-5: Histogram of Timeliness - Quarter (Continue) 
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Appendix 4-5: Histogram of Timeliness - Quarter (Continue) 
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Appendix 4-6: Histogram of Timeliness -BSE 
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Appendix 4-6: Histogram of Timeliness - BSE (Continue) 
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Appendix 4-7: Mean of Timeliness - Industry 
Mean Timeliness: Industrial Products 
 
Mean Timeliness: Services 
 
Mean Timeliness: Consumer 
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Appendix 4-7: Mean of Timeliness - Industry (Continue) 
Mean Timeliness: Properties 
 
Mean Timeliness: Plantations 
 
Mean Timeliness: Construction 
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Appendix 4-7: Mean of Timeliness - Industry (Continue) 
Mean Timeliness: Finance 
 
Mean Timeliness: Technology 
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Appendix 4-8: Range of Timeliness - Industry  
Types of 
Industry Days 
Q1 
2007 
Q2 
2007 
Q3 
2007 
Q4 
2007 
Q1 
2008 
Q2 
2008 
Q3 
2008 
Q4 
2008 
  % % % % % % % % 
Industrial 
products 
21-30 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
31-40 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 41-50 2.3 14.0 9.3 2.3 4.7 9.3 27.9 7.0 
 51-60 69.8 65.1 79.1 97.7 93.0 88.4 72.1 88.4 
 61+ 25.6 20.9 9.3 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 4.7 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Services 41-50 9.5 9.5 4.8 4.8 0.0 0.0 14.3 4.8 
51-60 76.2 85.7 85.7 95.2 100.0 4.8 85.7 95.2 
 61+ 14.3 4.8 9.5 0.0 0.0 95.2 0.0 0.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Consumer 21-30 6.7 0.0 0.0 6.7 6.7 0.0 13.3 0.0 
 31-40 0.0 6.7 6.7 0.0 0.0 6.7 6.7 0.0 
 41-50 6.7 6.7 13.3 0.0 13.3 0.0 26.7 20.0 
 51-60 73.3 66.7 66.7 93.3 80.0 93.3 53.3 80.0 
 61+ 13.3 20.0 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Properties 21-30 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 0.0 
 41-50 9.1 9.1 18.2 9.1 27.3 9.1 9.1 0.0 
 51-60 90.9 81.8 63.6 90.9 72.7 81.8 90.9 100.0 
 61+ 0.0 9.1 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Plantations 31-40 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
41-50 25.0 25.0 37.5 0.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 
 51-60 62.5 75.0 62.5 100.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 100.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Construction 21-30 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 41-50 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 12.5 25.0 
 51-60 100.0 100.0 87.5 100.0 100.0 87.5 87.5 75.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Finance <= 20 16.7 16.7 16.7 0.0 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 
 21-30 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 41-50 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 16.7 66.7 0.0 
 51-60 66.7 83.3 83.3 83.3 66.7 66.7 16.7 83.3 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Technology 21-30 25.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 
 31-40 0.0 50.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 50.0 25.0 0.0 
 41-50 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 51-60 50.0 50.0 25.0 100.0 25.0 50.0 50.0 100.0 
 61+ 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Appendix 4-9: Range of Compliance Score with the Interim Reporting 
Standards - BSE 
Compliance 
score 
 
Q1 
2007 
Q2 
2007 
Q3 
2007 
Q4 
2007 
Q1 
2008 
Q2 
2008 
Q3 
2008 
Q4 
2008 
BSE % % % % % % % % 
FRS134 First         
 60-70 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 
 71 - 80 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.3 3.5 3.5 3.5 2.3 
 81-90 20.9 18.6 18.6 14.0 32.6 32.6 31.4 31.4 
 91-99 62.8 64.0 64.0 66.3 46.5 46.5 48.8 51.2 
 100 14.0 15.1 15.1 17.4 16.3 16.3 15.1 14.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Second         
 71 - 80 6.7 6.7 3.3 3.3 6.7 3.3 3.3 3.3 
 81-90 30.0 23.3 23.3 20.0 40.0 40.0 36.7 40.0 
 91-99 53.3 56.7 60.0 63.3 46.7 50.0 53.3 50.0 
 100 10.0 13.3 13.3 13.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
BMLR First         
 <= 50 1.2 1.2 1.2 2.3 3.5 2.3 1.2 1.2 
 51-60 8.1 8.1 4.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 3.5 3.5 
 61-70 15.1 18.6 17.4 19.8 17.4 16.3 15.1 17.4 
 71-80 24.4 22.1 30.2 36.0 37.2 36.0 45.3 40.7 
 81-90 40.7 40.7 39.5 31.4 32.6 39.5 29.1 36.0 
 91-99 10.5 9.3 7.0 8.1 7.0 3.5 5.8 1.2 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 Second         
 <= 50 3.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 3.3 6.7 3.3 3.3 
 51-60 6.7 3.3 3.3 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 61-70 16.7 13.3 23.3 26.7 30.0 20.0 16.7 23.3 
 71-80 40.0 50.0 43.3 36.7 30.0 36.7 40.0 36.7 
 81-90 30.0 26.7 20.0 23.3 33.3 30.0 36.7 30.0 
 91-99 3.3 3.3 10.0 6.7 3.3 6.7 3.3 6.7 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Appendix 4-10: Mean Compliance Score with the Interim Reporting 
Standards - Industry 
Compliance Score with the Interim Reporting Standards: Industrial Products 
 
Compliance Score with the Interim Reporting Standards: Services 
 
Compliance Score with the Interim Reporting Standards: Consumer 
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Appendix 4-10: Mean Compliance Score with the Interim Reporting 
Standards – Industry (Continue) 
Compliance Score with the Interim Reporting Standards: Properties 
 
Compliance Score with the Interim Reporting Standards: Plantations 
 
Compliance Score with the Interim Reporting Standards: Construction 
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Appendix 4-10: Mean Compliance Score with the Interim Reporting 
Standards – Industry (Continue) 
Compliance Score with the Interim Reporting Standards: Finance 
 
 
Compliance Score with the Interim Reporting Standards: Technology 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Q107 Q207 Q307 Q407 Q108 Q208 Q308 Q408
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
Quarter and Year FRS 134 BMLR
65
70
75
80
85
90
Q107 Q207 Q307 Q407 Q108 Q208 Q308 Q408
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
Quarter and Year FRS 134 BMLR
   
332 
 
Appendix 4-11: Range of Compliance Score with the FRS134 - Industry 
Industry 
Compliance 
 Score 
Q1 
2007 
% 
Q2 
2007 
% 
Q3 
2007 
% 
Q4 
2007 
% 
Q1 
2008 
% 
Q2 
2008 
% 
Q3 
2008 
% 
Q4 
2008 
% 
Construction 81-90 50.0 50.0 37.5 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 37.5 
 91-99 50.0 50.0 62.5 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 62.5 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Consumer 81-90 20.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 26.7 26.7 26.7 33.3 
 91-99 60.0 60.0 60.0 53.3 40.0 40.0 40.0 40.0 
 100 20.0 20.0 20.0 26.7 33.3 33.3 33.3 26.7 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Finance 71 - 80 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 
 81-90 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 
 91-99 66.7 83.3 83.3 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 66.7 
 100 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Industrial  71 - 80 4.7 4.7 2.3 2.3 4.7 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Products 81-90 16.3 11.6 14.0 7.0 39.5 41.9 41.9 34.9 
 91-99 67.4 69.8 69.8 76.7 48.8 48.8 48.8 55.8 
 100 11.6 14.0 14.0 14.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 7.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Plantations 81-90 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 37.5 50.0 37.5 25.0 
 91-99 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 37.5 25.0 37.5 50.0 
 100 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Properties 81-90 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.2 45.5 36.4 36.4 36.4 
 91-99 63.6 63.6 63.6 63.6 27.3 36.4 36.4 36.4 
 100 18.2 18.2 18.2 18.2 27.3 27.3 27.3 27.3 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Services 60-70 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 
 71 - 80 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 9.5 9.5 9.5 4.8 
 81-90 28.6 23.8 23.8 19.0 23.8 23.8 19.0 28.6 
 91-99 57.1 57.1 57.1 61.9 47.6 47.6 57.1 52.4 
 100 9.5 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 14.3 9.5 9.5 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Technology 81-90 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 50.0 50.0 75.0 
 91-99 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 50.0 50.0 25.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Appendix 4-12: Range of Compliance Score with the BMLR - Industry 
Types of 
Industry 
Compliance 
Score 
Q1 
2007 
% 
Q2 
2007 
% 
Q3 
2007 
% 
Q4 
2007 
% 
Q1 
2008 
% 
Q2 
2008 
% 
Q3 
2008 
% 
Q4 
2008 
% 
Construction 51-60 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 12.5 
 61-70 37.5 25.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 71-80 12.5 12.5 12.5 25.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 75.0 
 81-90 37.5 50.0 50.0 37.5 37.5 37.5 37.5 12.5 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Consumer 61-70 20.0 26.7 26.7 33.3 40.0 26.7 26.7 26.7 
 71-80 33.3 20.0 20.0 26.7 26.7 33.3 33.3 40.0 
 81-90 33.3 46.7 46.7 33.3 26.7 40.0 40.0 33.3 
 91-99 13.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Finance 61-70 16.7 33.3 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 
 71-80 50.0 33.3 50.0 50.0 66.7 50.0 50.0 50.0 
 81-90 16.7 33.3 33.3 33.3 16.7 33.3 33.3 33.3 
 91-99 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Industrial <= 50 2.3 2.3 0.0 0.0 2.3 4.7 2.3 2.3 
Products 51-60 11.6 11.6 4.7 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 61-70 9.3 7.0 16.3 18.6 20.9 16.3 11.6 16.3 
 71-80 34.9 41.9 41.9 34.9 32.6 34.9 48.8 32.6 
 81-90 39.5 32.6 32.6 37.2 41.9 37.2 32.6 48.8 
 91-99 2.3 4.7 4.7 4.7 2.3 7.0 4.7 0.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Plantations <= 50 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 25.0 25.0 12.5 12.5 
 51-60 25.0 25.0 25.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 12.5 12.5 
 61-70 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 
 71-80 0.0 25.0 37.5 50.0 25.0 37.5 37.5 37.5 
 81-90 37.5 25.0 12.5 0.0 25.0 37.5 12.5 25.0 
 91-99 37.5 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 25.0  
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Properties <= 50 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 61-70 18.2 18.2 18.2 9.1 18.2 27.3 27.3 27.3 
 71-80 18.2 18.2 18.2 45.5 36.4 18.2 27.3 27.3 
 81-90 45.5 45.5 45.5 27.3 36.4 45.5 45.5 36.4 
 91-99 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.1 0.0 9.1 0.0 9.1 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Services 51-60 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 61-70 19.0 23.8 23.8 28.6 28.6 23.8 23.8 28.6 
 71-80 23.8 28.6 33.3 38.1 33.3 38.1 47.6 42.9 
 81-90 42.9 33.3 28.6 19.0 28.6 33.3 19.0 19.0 
 91-99 9.5 14.3 14.3 14.3 9.5 4.8 9.5 9.5 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Technology 51-60 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
 61-70 25.0 50.0 25.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 71-80 50.0 0.0 50.0 25.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 
 81-90 25.0 50.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Appendix 4-13 Mean Comparability Ranking Score of Interims - Industry  
Comparability of Interims: Industrial Products 
 
Comparability of Interims: Services 
 
Comparability of Interims: Consumer 
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Appendix 4-13 Mean Comparability Ranking Score of Interims – Industry 
(Continue) 
Comparability of Interims: Properties 
 
Comparability of Interims: Plantations 
 
Comparability of Interims: Construction 
 
 
.00
.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
Q107 Q207 Q307 Q407 Q108 Q208 Q308 Q408
an
ki
ng
 S
co
re
 
Quarter and Year 
.00
.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
Q107 Q207 Q307 Q407 Q108 Q208 Q308 Q408
Ra
nk
in
g 
Sc
or
e 
Quarter and Year 
.00
.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
3.50
4.00
4.50
Q107 Q207 Q307 Q407 Q108 Q208 Q308 Q408
Ra
nk
in
g 
Sc
or
e 
Quarter and Year 
   
336 
 
Appendix 4-13 Mean Comparability Ranking Score of Interims – Industry 
(Continue) 
Comparability of Interims: Finance 
 
 
Comparability of Interims: Technology 
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Appendix 4-14: Comparability Ranking Score of Interims - Industry 
Industry 
Ranking 
Score 
Q1 
2007 
% 
Q2 
2007 
% 
Q3 
2007 
% 
Q4 
2007 
% 
Q1 
2008 
% 
Q2 
2008 
% 
Q3 
2008 
% 
Q4 
2008 
% 
Construction 1 12.5 12.5 12.5 62.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 
 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 
 3 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 12.5 0.0 12.5 
 4 87.5 87.5 87.5 12.5 100.0 87.5 100.0 25.0 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Consumer 1.0 6.7 6.7 6.7 46.7 6.7 6.7 6.7 40.0 
 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 3.0 6.7 0.0 6.7 6.7 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 
 4.0 86.7 93.3 86.7 40.0 93.3 86.7 93.3 60.0 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Finance 1.0 33.3 33.3 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 
 2 16.7 33.3 16.7 16.7 16.7 16.7 0.0 0.0 
 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 50.0 16.7 16.7 33.3 
 4.0 50.0 33.3 33.3 16.7 33.3 66.7 83.3 16.7 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Industrial 1.0 9.3 14.0 9.3 46.5 4.7 2.3 2.3 37.2 
Products 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.3 2.3 7.0 4.7 9.3 
 3.0 14.0 7.0 7.0 4.7 2.3 4.7 2.3 7.0 
 4.0 76.7 79.1 83.7 39.5 90.7 86.0 90.7 46.5 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Plantations 1.0 12.5 12.5 12.5 62.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 
 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 
 3.0 12.5 12.5 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 4.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 37.5 100.0 100.0 100.0 50.0 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Properties 1.0 18.2 9.1 9.1 72.7 0.0 9.1 0.0 63.6 
 2 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 9.1 
 3.0 9.1 18.2 18.2 0.0 27.3 0.0 27.3 0.0 
 4.0 63.6 72.7 72.7 27.3 72.7 81.8 72.7 27.3 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Services 1.0 4.8 4.8 9.5 38.1 0.0 4.8 4.8 61.9 
 2 9.5 9.5 4.8 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.5 
 3.0 14.3 9.5 4.8 9.5 9.5 9.5 9.5 4.8 
 4.0 71.4 76.2 81.0 47.6 90.5 85.7 85.7 23.8 
 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Technology 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 
 2 0.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 3.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 4.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 25.0 50.0 75.0 100.0 75.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Appendix 4-15: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables 
YEAR MTGD INDEPD FINLITD GOVD ETHNICD 
2007 N Valid 464 464 464 464 464 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 5.39 .44 .25 .66243 .40 
Std. Error of Mean .094 .005 .007 .012269 .012 
Median 5.00 .43 .20 .71400 .30 
Mode 5 1 0 1.000 0 
Std. Deviation 2.035 .110 .151 .264292 .254 
Variance 4.143 .012 .023 .070 .065 
Range 14 1 1 1.000 1 
Minimum 3 0 0 .000 0 
Maximum 17 1 1 1.000 1 
Sum 2500 202 118 307.368 184 
Percentiles 25 4.00 .33 .14 .44400 .20 
50 5.00 .43 .20 .71400 .30 
75 6.00 .50 .33 .87500 .50 
2008 N Valid 464 464 464 464 464 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 5.38 .45 .27 .67162 .38 
Std. Error of Mean .089 .006 .007 .012154 .012 
Median 5.00 .43 .25 .72050 .30 
Mode 5 1 0 1.000 0 
Std. Deviation 1.908 .120 .144 .261800 .255 
Variance 3.640 .014 .021 .069 .065 
Range 13 1 1 1.000 1 
Minimum 4 0 0 .000 0 
Maximum 17 1 1 1.000 1 
Sum 2496 209 124 311.632 178 
Percentiles 25 4.00 .37 .14 .42900 .20 
50 5.00 .43 .25 .72050 .30 
75 6.00 .50 .33 .88900 .50 
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Appendix 4-16: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables - BSE 
YEAR 2007 2008 
TYPES OF BSE MTGD INDEPD FINLITD GOVD ETHNICD MTGD INDEPD FINLITD GOVD ETHNICD 
FIRST 
BSE 
N Valid 344 344 344 344 344 344 344 344 344 344 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 5.45 .4328 .2486 .7153 .4233 5.49 .4507 .2628 .7222 .4035 
Std. Error of Mean .118 .00597 .00822 .01229 .01392 .115 .00618 .00792 .01264 .01403 
Median 5.00 .4300 .2000 .7500 .3000 5.00 .4300 .2500 .7640 .3000 
Mode 4 .50 .17 1.00 .30 5 .50 .14 1.00 .30 
Std. Deviation 2.185 .11080 .15242 .22802 .25813 2.142 .11462 .14695 .23444 .26027 
Variance 4.773 .012 .023 .052 .067 4.589 .013 .022 .055 .068 
Range 14 .50 .75 .80 1.00 13 .53 .67 .86 1.00 
Minimum 3 .17 .00 .20 .00 4 .22 .00 .14 .00 
Maximum 17 .67 .75 1.00 1.00 17 .75 .67 1.00 1.00 
Sum 1876 148.88 85.52 246.07 145.60 1888 155.04 90.40 248.45 138.80 
Percentiles 25 4.00 .3300 .1400 .5560 .3000 4.00 .3800 .1400 .5710 .2000 
50 5.00 .4300 .2000 .7500 .3000 5.00 .4300 .2500 .7640 .3000 
75 6.00 .5000 .3300 .8890 .6000 6.00 .5000 .3300 .9000 .6000 
SECOND 
BSE 
N Valid 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 5.20 .4467 .2720 .5108 .3200 5.07 .4500 .2777 .5265 .3233 
Std. Error of Mean .139 .00984 .01323 .02748 .02069 .082 .01229 .01215 .02576 .02100 
Median 5.00 .4300 .2200 .4220 .3000 5.00 .4300 .2500 .4645 .3000 
Mode 5 .50 .17 .33a .30 5 .33 .17a .33 .30 
Std. Deviation 1.521 .10779 .14491 .30107 .22663 .896 .13468 .13311 .28214 .22999 
Variance 2.313 .012 .021 .091 .051 .802 .018 .018 .080 .053 
Range 6 .42 .49 1.00 1.00 3 .58 .46 1.00 1.00 
Minimum 4 .29 .11 .00 .00 4 .25 .11 .00 .00 
Maximum 10 .71 .60 1.00 1.00 7 .83 .57 1.00 1.00 
Sum 624 53.60 32.64 61.30 38.40 608 54.00 33.32 63.18 38.80 
Percentiles 25 4.00 .3300 .1700 .2860 .2000 4.00 .3300 .1700 .3330 .2000 
50 5.00 .4300 .2200 .4220 .3000 5.00 .4300 .2500 .4645 .3000 
75 5.00 .5000 .4000 .7500 .4000 6.00 .5000 .3300 .7500 .4000 
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Appendix 4-17: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables - Industry 
YEAR 2007 2008 
INDUSTRY 
 
MTGD 
 
INDEPD 
 
FINLITD 
 
GOVD 
 
ETHNICD 
 
MTGD 
 
INDEPD 
 
FINLITD 
 
GOVD 
 
ETHNICD 
CONSTRUCTION N Valid 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 4.88 .4400 .1738 .6285 .5125 5.00 .4763 .1900 .6119 .5000 
Median 5.00 .4300 .1550 .5710 .4500 5.00 .4300 .1550 .5710 .4500 
Mode 4a .43 .14 .57 .30a 4a .43 .14 .40a .10a 
Std. Deviation .793 .12981 .04248 .19988 .31083 .880 .11870 .06486 .20956 .33697 
Variance .629 .017 .002 .040 .097 .774 .014 .004 .044 .114 
Range 2 .42 .12 .60 .90 2 .41 .16 .60 .90 
Minimum 4 .25 .13 .40 .10 4 .29 .14 .40 .10 
Maximum 6 .67 .25 1.00 1.00 6 .70 .30 1.00 1.00 
Sum 156 14.08 5.56 20.11 16.40 160 15.24 6.08 19.58 16.00 
CONSUMER N Valid 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 4.93 .4013 .2407 .6568 .2333 4.93 .4320 .2460 .7175 .2400 
Median 5.00 .4300 .1700 .6670 .3000 5.00 .4300 .1800 .7140 .3000 
Mode 5 .43a .17 1.00 .30 4 .43 .14a 1.00 .30 
Std. Deviation .936 .08974 .14135 .28245 .12577 .936 .08366 .15020 .25413 .13679 
Variance .877 .008 .020 .080 .016 .877 .007 .023 .065 .019 
Range 3 .33 .49 .88 .40 3 .36 .57 .88 .40 
Minimum 4 .17 .11 .13 .00 4 .27 .00 .13 .00 
Maximum 7 .50 .60 1.00 .40 7 .63 .57 1.00 .40 
Sum 296 24.08 14.44 39.41 14.00 296 25.92 14.76 43.05 14.40 
FINANCE N Valid 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 6.83 .5133 .3383 .8250 .5667 7.00 .5000 .3217 .8273 .4833 
Median 5.00 .5250 .3550 .8920 .4500 5.00 .5000 .3300 .8820 .4000 
Mode 4a .33a .17a 1.00 .40 4a .50 .33 .50a .30a 
Std. Deviation 4.310 .12239 .12363 .23329 .25481 4.334 .11632 .13021 .16101 .24613 
Variance 18.580 .015 .015 .054 .065 18.783 .014 .017 .026 .061 
Range 12 .34 .33 .67 .70 12 .34 .37 .50 .60 
Minimum 4 .33 .17 .33 .30 4 .33 .13 .50 .20 
Maximum 16 .67 .50 1.00 1.00 16 .67 .50 1.00 .80 
Sum 164 12.32 8.12 19.80 13.60 168 12.00 7.72 19.86 11.60 
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YEAR 
  
 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
INDUSTRY 
   
MTGD 
 
INDEPD 
 
FINLITD 
 
GOVD 
 
ETHNICD 
 
MTGD 
 
INDEPD 
 
FINLITD 
 
GOVD 
 
ETHNICD 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCTS 
N Valid 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 5.28 .4307 .2377 .6139 .3465 5.02 .4330 .2474 .6026 .3372 
Median 5.00 .4000 .2000 .6670 .3000 5.00 .4300 .2000 .6670 .3000 
Mode 4 .33 .11 1.00 .30 5 .33a .17a 1.00 .30 
Std. Deviation 1.534 .11558 .14863 .27754 .23530 1.175 .13095 .13765 .28791 .23991 
Variance 2.354 .013 .022 .077 .055 1.380 .017 .019 .083 .058 
Range 6 .49 .67 1.00 1.00 6 .61 .67 1.00 1.00 
Minimum 4 .22 .00 .00 .00 4 .22 .00 .00 .00 
Maximum 10 .71 .67 1.00 1.00 10 .83 .67 1.00 1.00 
Sum 908 74.08 40.88 105.58 59.60 864 74.48 42.56 103.64 58.00 
PLANTATIONS N Valid 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 5.50 .4113 .3150 .7609 .3375 5.38 .4225 .3288 .7541 .3375 
Median 5.00 .4150 .3100 .7890 .3000 5.00 .3900 .3250 .7890 .3000 
Mode 4a .33 .14 .67 .10a 5 .33 .11a .67 .10a 
Std. Deviation 1.832 .08965 .17391 .16556 .20907 1.519 .12748 .16323 .17990 .20907 
Variance 3.355 .008 .030 .027 .044 2.306 .016 .027 .032 .044 
Range 5 .28 .46 .57 .60 5 .42 .46 .63 .60 
Minimum 4 .29 .11 .43 .10 4 .29 .11 .38 .10 
Maximum 9 .57 .57 1.00 .70 9 .71 .57 1.00 .70 
Sum 176 13.16 10.08 24.35 10.80 172 13.52 10.52 24.13 10.80 
PROPERTIES N Valid 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 5.36 .4673 .2745 .6405 .3636 5.27 .4782 .3145 .6595 .3545 
Median 5.00 .5000 .2900 .7500 .3000 5.00 .4500 .3600 .7500 .3000 
Mode 5 .50 .17a .75 .20 5 .50 .29 .75 .20 
Std. Deviation 1.740 .09607 .13185 .22501 .16295 .973 .10712 .12986 .24294 .16907 
Variance 3.027 .009 .017 .051 .027 .947 .011 .017 .059 .029 
Range 7 .30 .50 .73 .50 3 .42 .50 .73 .50 
Minimum 3 .33 .00 .27 .20 4 .33 .00 .27 .10 
Maximum 10 .63 .50 1.00 .70 7 .75 .50 1.00 .60 
Sum 236 20.56 12.08 28.18 16.00 232 21.04 13.84 29.02 
 
 
15.60 
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YEAR 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
INDUSTRY 
   
MTGD 
 
INDEPD 
 
FINLITD 
 
GOVD 
 
ETHNICD 
 
MTGD 
 
INDEPD 
 
FINLITD 
 
GOVD 
 
ETHNICD 
SERVICES N Valid 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 5.52 .4552 .2652 .6990 .5667 5.95 .4852 .2786 .7288 .5333 
Median 5.00 .4400 .2200 .7500 .6000 5.00 .5000 .2500 .7500 .5000 
Mode 4 .50 .29 1.00 .30a 6 .50 .14a 1.00 
 
.30a 
Std. Deviation 2.839 .10210 .17351 .29088 .26404 2.750 .11523 .15424 .25377 .27999 
Variance 8.060 .010 .030 .085 .070 7.564 .013 .024 .064 .078 
Range 14 .35 .75 .80 .90 13 .42 .60 .86 1.00 
Minimum 3 .29 .00 .20 .10 4 .29 .00 .14 .00 
Maximum 17 .64 .75 1.00 1.00 17 .71 .60 1.00 1.00 
Sum 464 38.24 22.28 58.72 47.60 500 40.76 23.40 61.22 44.80 
TECHNOLOGY N Valid 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 6.25 .3725 .2950 .7010 .3750 6.50 .3800 .3025 .6955 .4000 
Median 6.00 .3450 .2900 .7635 .2500 6.50 .3450 .3000 .7800 .3000 
Mode 5 .30a .10a .44a .20 4a .33 .11a .33a .30 
Std. Deviation 1.342 .07912 .15483 .15828 .25690 1.862 .07266 .14411 .22435 .24221 
Variance 1.800 .006 .024 .025 .066 3.467 .005 .021 .050 .059 
Range 3 .20 .40 .39 .60 5 .17 .39 .56 .60 
Minimum 5 .30 .10 .44 .20 4 .33 .11 .33 .20 
Maximum 8 .50 .50 .83 .80 9 .50 .50 .89 .80 
Sum 100 5.96 4.72 11.22 6.00 104 6.08 4.84 11.13 6.40 
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Appendix 4-18: Mean of BOD meetings 
Year 
Number 
of 
Meetings 
General 
% 
N=116 
First 
BSE 
% 
N=86 
Second 
BSE 
% 
N=30 
1 
% 
N=43 
2 
% 
N=21 
3 
% 
N=15 
4 
% 
N=11 
5 
% 
N=8 
6 
% 
N=8 
7 
% 
N=6 
8 
% 
N=4 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 1.7 2.3 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
4 33.6 33.7 33.3 37.2 38.1 33.3 18.2 37.5 37.5 33.3 0.0 
5 35.3 31.4 46.7 32.6 23.8 53.3 36.4 37.5 37.5 33.3 50.0 
6 13.8 15.1 10.0 16.3 19.0 0.0 27.3 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 
7 6.0 8.1 0.0 4.7 4.8 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 25.0 
8 2.6 3.5 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 25.0 
9 3.4 2.3 6.7 7.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
10 1.7 1.2 3.3 2.3 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
16 .9 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 
17 .9 1.2 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 31.9 32.6 30.0 37.2 23.8 40.0 18.2 25.0 37.5 33.3 25.0 
5 36.2 34.9 40.0 39.5 28.6 33.3 54.5 50.0 25.0 33.3 25.0 
6 19.0 17.4 23.3 14.0 33.3 20.0 9.1 12.5 37.5 0.0 25.0 
7 6.9 7.0 6.7 7.0 4.8 6.7 18.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
8 .9 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 
9 2.6 3.5 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 25.0 
10 .9 1.2 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
16 .9 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 
17 .9 1.2 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: 
1= Industrial products, 2= Services, 3=Consumer, 4= Properties, 5=Plantations, 6=Construction, 7= Finance, 8= Technology 
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Appendix 4-19: Mean Independent Directors 
Year Ratio 
General 
% 
N=116 
First 
BSE 
% 
N=86 
Second 
BSE 
% 
N=30 
1 
% 
N=43 
2 
% 
N=21 
3 
% 
N=15 
4 
% 
N=11 
5 
% 
N=8 
6 
% 
N=8 
7 
% 
N=6 
8 
% 
N=4 
2007 0.2-0.29 .9 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.3-0.39 9.5 11.6 10.5 11.6 9.5 6.7 0.0 12.5 12.5 0.0 25.0 
0.4-0.49 50.0 48.8 50.0 53.5 42.9 60.0 27.3 62.5 62.5 33.3 50.0 
0.5-0.59 24.1 22.1 20.9 20.9 28.6 26.7 54.5 12.5 0.0 16.7 25.0 
0.6-0.69 9.5 11.6 9.3 4.7 14.3 0.0 18.2 12.5 12.5 33.3 0.0 
0.7-0.79 5.2 4.7 5.8 7.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 16.7 0.0 
0.8-0.89 .9 0.0 3.5 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2008 0.3-0.39 9.5 3.3 6.7 14.0 4.8 13.3 0.0 12.5 12.5 0.0 0.0 
 0.4-0.49 50.9 53.3 53.3 51.2 42.9 60.0 45.5 62.5 50.0 33.3 75.0 
 0.5-0.59 20.7 30.0 20.0 18.6 19.0 20.0 36.4 12.5 12.5 33.3 25.0 
 0.6-0.69 9.5 3.3 10.0 7.0 19.0 6.7 9.1 0.0 12.5 16.7 0.0 
 0.7-0.79 6.0 6.7 6.7 7.0 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 16.7 0.0 
 0.8-0.89 2.6 3.3 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 9.1 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 0.9-0.99 .9 0.0 3.3 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Note: 
1= Industrial products, 2= Services, 3=Consumer, 4= Properties, 5=Plantations, 6=Construction, 7= Finance, 8= Technology 
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Appendix 4-20:  Mean Financial Literacy Directors  
Year Ratio 
General 
% 
N=116 
First BSE 
% 
N=86 
Second 
BSE 
% 
N=30 
1 
% 
N=43 
2 
% 
N=21 
3 
% 
N=15 
4 
% 
N=11 
5 
% 
N=8 
6 
% 
N=8 
7 
% 
N=6 
8 
% 
N=4 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 2.6 3.5 0.0 2.3 4.8 0.0 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.1-0.19 1.7 2.3 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 
0.2-0.29 46.6 46.5 46.7 51.2 42.9 66.7 18.2 37.5 75.0 33.3 0.0 
0.3-0.39 20.7 20.9 20.0 23.3 28.6 6.7 27.3 12.5 25.0 0.0 25.0 
0.4-0.49 16.4 15.1 20.0 11.6 9.5 20.0 36.4 25.0 0.0 33.3 25.0 
0.5-0.59 5.2 4.7 6.7 2.3 0.0 0.0 9.1 12.5 0.0 33.3 25.0 
0.6-0.69 4.3 3.5 6.7 2.3 9.5 6.7 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.7-0.79 1.7 2.3 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.8-0.89 .9 1.2 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
0 3.4 4.7 0.0 2.3 4.8 6.7 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.1-0.19 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.2-0.29 40.5 39.5 43.3 48.8 33.3 46.7 9.1 25.0 75.0 33.3 25.0 
0.3-0.39 21.6 22.1 20.0 20.9 19.0 26.7 27.3 25.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 
0.4-0.49 21.6 22.1 20.0 16.3 28.6 6.7 45.5 25.0 0.0 50.0 25.0 
0.5-0.59 7.8 5.8 13.3 7.0 4.8 6.7 9.1 12.5 0.0 16.7 25.0 
0.6-0.69 4.3 4.7 3.3 2.3 9.5 6.7 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.7-0.79 .9 1.2 0.0 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: 
1= Industrial products, 2= Services, 3=Consumer, 4= Properties, 5=Plantations, 6=Construction, 7= Finance, 8= Technology 
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Appendix 4-21:  Mean Corporate Governance Expertise Directors 
Year Ratio 
General 
% 
N=116 
First BSE 
% 
N=86 
Second 
BSE 
% 
N=30 
1 
% 
N=43 
2 
% 
N=21 
3 
% 
N=15 
4 
% 
N=11 
5 
% 
N=8 
6 
% 
N=8 
7 
% 
N=6 
8 
% 
N=4 
2007 0 .9 0.0 3.3 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 0.2-0.29 4.3 1.2 13.3 2.3 9.5 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 0.3-0.39 7.8 5.8 13,3 11.6 14.3 0.0 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 0.4-0.49 11.2 8.1 20.0 16.3 0.0 13.3 9.1 12.5 12.5 16.7 0.0 
 0.5-0.59 8.6 9.3 6.7 9.3 0.0 6.7 18.2 0.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 
 0.6-0.69 5.2 7.0 0.0 2.3 9.5 0.0 9.1 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 
 0.7-0.79 10.3 9.3 13.3 14.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 25.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 
 0.8-0.89 17.2 19.8 10.0 11.6 23.8 20.0 27.3 25.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 
 0.9-0.99 14.7 17.4 6.7 16.3 9.5 0.0 18.2 25.0 12.5 33.3 25.0 
 1 19.8 22.1 13.3 14.0 33.3 26.7 9.1 12.5 12.5 50.0 0.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2008 0 .9 0.0 3.3 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 0.1-0.19 .9 0.0 3.3 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 0.2-0.29 2.6 1.2 6.7 2.3 4.8 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 0.3-0.39 4.3 4.7 3.3 9.3 0.0 0.0 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 0.4-0.49 18.1 12.8 33.3 20.9 14.3 13.3 18.2 12.5 37.5 0.0 25.0 
 0.5-0.59 5.2 3.5 10.0 9.3 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 
 0.6-0.69 6.9 9.3 0.0 2.3 9.5 6.7 18.2 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 
 0.7-0.79 7.8 7.0 10.0 9.3 0.0 13.3 0.0 25.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 
 0.8-0.89 15.5 18.6 6.7 7.0 23.8 20.0 27.3 25.0 0.0 16.7 25.0 
 0.9-0.99 18.1 19.8 13.3 18.6 9.5 13.3 9.1 25.0 12.5 50.0 50.0 
 1 19.8 23.3 10.0 16.3 33.3 26.7 18.2 12.5 12.5 16.7 0.0 
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: 1= Industrial products, 2= Services, 3=Consumer, 4= Properties, 5=Plantations, 6=Construction, 7= Finance, 8= Technology 
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 Appendix 4-22: Mean Ethnicity of Directors 
Year Ratio 
General 
% 
N=116 
First BSE 
% 
N=86 
Second BSE 
% 
N=30 
1 
% 
N=43 
2 
% 
N=21 
3 
% 
N=15 
4 
% 
N=11 
5 
% 
N=8 
6 
% 
N=8 
7 
% 
N=6 
8 
% 
N=4 
2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 4.3 3.5 6.7 7.0 0.0 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.1-0.19 7.8 8.1 6.7 7.0 4.8 13.3 0.0 25.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 
0.2-0.29 16.4 12.8 26.7 20.9 4.8 13.3 36.4 12.5 0.0 0.0 50.0 
0.3-0.39 29.3 27.9 33.3 34.9 19.0 46.7 18.2 25.0 25.0 16.7 25.0 
0.4-0.49 11.2 10.5 13.3 7.0 14.3 13.3 9.1 12.5 12.5 33.3 0.0 
0.5-0.59 7.8 10.5 0.0 4.7 4.8 0.0 27.3 0.0 25.0 16.7 0.0 
0.6-0.69 4.3 3.5 6.7 7.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.7-0.79 5.2 7.0 0.0 0.0 19.0 0.0 9.1 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.8-0.89 6.9 9.3 0.0 7.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 25.0 
0.9-0.99 1.7 2.3 0.0 2.3 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 5.2 4.7 6.7 2.3 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 16.7 0.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 6.0 4.7 10.0 9.3 4.8 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.1-0.19 11.2 12.8 6.7 9.3 4.8 20.0 9.1 25.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 
0.2-0.29 12.1 10.5 16.7 16.3 4.8 0.0 27.3 12.5 0.0 16.7 25.0 
0.3-0.39 29.3 26.7 36.7 34.9 14.3 46.7 18.2 25.0 12.5 33.3 50.0 
0.4-0.49 10.3 9.3 13.3 7.0 14.3 20.0 9.1 12.5 12.5 0.0 0.0 
0.5-0.59 7.8 8.1 6.7 7.0 9.5 0.0 18.2 0.0 12.5 16.7 0.0 
0.6-0.69 7.8 9.3 3.3 4.7 14.3 0.0 18.2 12.5 12.5 0.0 0.0 
0.7-0.79 1.7 2.3 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.0 0.0 12.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.8-0.89 7.8 10.5 0.0 7.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 25.0 
0.9-0.99 1.7 2.3 0.0 2.3 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
1 4.3 3.5 6.7 2.3 9.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Note: 1= Industrial products, 2= Services, 3=Consumer, 4= Properties, 5=Plantations, 6=Construction, 7= Finance, 8= Technology 
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Appendix 4-23: Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables 
YEAR SIZECOM PROFIT LEVERAGE SIZEBOD 
2007 N Valid 464 464 464 464 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Mean 2.83E+09 .07680 .24570 7.42 
Std. Error of Mean 7.590E+08 .019810 .017955 .083 
Median 4.18E+08 .07850 .18500 7.00 
Mode 3.E+08 .035a .000 6 
Std. Deviation 1.635E+10 .426714 .386758 1.798 
Variance 2.673E+20 .182 .150 3.234 
Range 2.E+11 7.386 7.349 8 
Minimum 3.E+07 -
4.949E+00 
.000 4 
Maximum 2.E+11 2.437 7.349 12 
Sum 1.E+12 35.634 114.004 3444 
Percentiles 25 1.84E+08 .01625 .05525 6.00 
50 4.18E+08 .07850 .18500 7.00 
75 1.07E+09 .16475 .35000 9.00 
2008 N Valid 464 464 464 464 
Missing 0 0 0 0 
Mean 2.91E+09 .02276 .23456 7.42 
Std. Error of Mean 8.202E+08 .025670 .009239 .085 
Median 4.41E+08 .05200 .19600 7.00 
Mode 23576000a .024 .000 7 
Std. Deviation 1.767E+10 .552939 .199017 1.841 
Variance 3.121E+20 .306 .040 3.389 
Range 2.E+11 12.098 1.069 9 
Minimum 2.E+07 -
8.385E+00 
.000 3 
Maximum 2.E+11 3.713 1.069 12 
Sum 1.E+12 10.560 108.836 3444 
Percentiles 25 1.97E+08 -.02400 .08025 6.00 
50 4.41E+08 .05200 .19600 7.00 
75 1.12E+09 .12650 .34425 9.00 
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Appendix 4-24: Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables -BSE 
TYPES OF BSE   FIRST BSE SECOND BSE 
YEAR SIZECOM PROFIT LEVERAGE SIZEBOD SIZECOM PROFIT LEVERAGE SIZEBOD 
2007 N Valid 344 344 344 344 120 120 120 120 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 3.76E+09 .14734 .24468 7.63 1.54E+08 -.12543 .24862 6.83 
Std. Error of Mean 1.019E+09 .014313 .023465 .097 9.224E+06 .061216 .017326 .154 
Median 6.23E+08 .09500 .17650 7.00 1.37E+08 .01200 .23800 6.50 
Mode 62013000a .041 .000 6 3.E+08 .022a .000 6 
Std. Deviation 1.891E+10 .265474 .435214 1.794 1.010E+08 .670588 .189801 1.682 
Variance 3.575E+20 .070 .189 3.220 1.021E+16 .450 .036 2.829 
Range 2.E+11 3.764 7.349 8 4.E+08 7.370 1.253 6 
Minimum 6.E+07 -1.327E+00 .000 4 3.E+07 -4.949E+00 .000 4 
Maximum 2.E+11 2.437 7.349 12 5.E+08 2.421 1.253 10 
Sum 1.E+12 50.685 84.170 2624 2.E+10 -1.505E+01 29.834 820 
Percentiles 25 2.99E+08 .04100 .04700 6.00 7.56E+07 -.15100 .11425 6.00 
50 6.23E+08 .09500 .17650 7.00 1.37E+08 .01200 .23800 6.50 
75 1.45E+09 .18825 .34875 9.00 1.94E+08 .07850 .38600 9.00 
2008 N Valid 344 344 344 344 120 120 120 120 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 3.87E+09 .05992 .23136 7.65 1.61E+08 -.08377 .24373 6.77 
Std. Error of Mean 1.102E+09 .029229 .011251 .099 1.017E+07 .052204 .015403 .155 
Median 6.56E+08 .07550 .18150 7.00 1.31E+08 .00750 .21650 7.00 
Mode 67648000a .044a .000 7 23576000a .019 .000 6 
Std. Deviation 2.044E+10 .542119 .208681 1.838 1.114E+08 .571863 .168727 1.694 
Variance 4.177E+20 .294 .044 3.377 1.242E+16 .327 .028 2.869 
Range 2.E+11 9.979 1.069 9 5.E+08 6.215 .639 6 
Minimum 7.E+07 -8.385E+00 .000 3 2.E+07 -2.502E+00 .000 4 
Maximum 2.E+11 1.594 1.069 12 5.E+08 3.713 .639 10 
Sum 1.E+12 20.612 79.589 2632 2.E+10 -1.005E+01 29.247 812 
Percentiles 25 3.23E+08 .00575 .06000 6.00 7.33E+07 -.18125 .12150 6.00 
50 6.56E+08 .07550 .18150 7.00 1.31E+08 .00750 .21650 7.00 
75 1.66E+09 .16175 .34175 9.00 2.18E+08 .04950 .34575 8.00 
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Appendix 4-25: Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables -Industry 
YEAR 2007 2008 
INDUSTRY SIZECOM PROFIT LEVERAGE SIZEBOD SIZECOM PROFIT LEVERAGE SIZEBOD 
CONSTRUCTION N Valid 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 5.17E+08 .09931 .21509 7.13 5.54E+08 .09056 .20019 7.00 
Median 4.42E+08 .09700 .24600 7.00 4.18E+08 .07500 .22250 7.00 
Mode 144887000a .041a .299 7 147950000a .050a .001 7 
Std. Deviation 4.256E+08 .067826 .099800 1.185 4.461E+08 .105972 .107852 1.344 
Variance 1.812E+17 .005 .010 1.403 1.990E+17 .011 .012 1.806 
Range 1.E+09 .349 .343 4 2.E+09 .569 .378 5 
Minimum 1.E+08 -1.000E-02 .001 5 1.E+08 -2.060E-01 .001 5 
Maximum 2.E+09 .339 .344 9 2.E+09 .363 .379 10 
Sum 2.E+10 3.178 6.883 228 2.E+10 2.898 6.406 224 
CONSUMER N Valid 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 6.31E+08 -.06602 .15687 6.67 7.06E+08 .11690 .16545 7.20 
Median 2.00E+08 .07400 .12400 7.00 2.18E+08 .07300 .12650 7.00 
Mode 33468000a .074 .000 6a 30524000a .075a .000 7 
Std. Deviation 1.119E+09 .889951 .147958 1.084 1.265E+09 .580163 .148537 1.286 
Variance 1.253E+18 .792 .022 1.175 1.600E+18 .337 .022 1.654 
Range 5.E+09 7.386 .513 4 5.E+09 4.364 .542 6 
Minimum 3.E+07 -4.949E+00 .000 5 3.E+07 -6.510E-01 .000 5 
Maximum 5.E+09 2.437 .513 9 5.E+09 3.713 .542 11 
Sum 4.E+10 -3.961E+00 9.412 400 4.E+10 7.014 9.927 432 
FINANCE N Valid 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 3.51E+10 .16683 .13325 7.00 3.93E+10 .07079 .12750 7.33 
Median 1.95E+09 .18500 .09300 6.00 4.86E+09 .07550 .05800 7.00 
Mode 475480000a -.090a .002 6 381255000a -.446a .019 6 
Std. Deviation 6.071E+10 .117156 .154094 2.043 6.902E+10 .184963 .172490 1.834 
Variance 3.685E+21 .014 .024 4.174 4.764E+21 .034 .030 3.362 
Range 2.E+11 .411 .479 6 2.E+11 .814 .522 5 
Minimum 5.E+08 -9.000E-02 .002 5 4.E+08 -4.460E-01 .000 5 
Maximum 2.E+11 .321 .481 11 2.E+11 .368 .522 10 
Sum 8.E+11 4.004 3.198 168 9.E+11 1.699 3.060  
176 
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YEAR 
  
2007 
 
2008 
 
INDUSTRY 
   
SIZECOM 
 
PROFIT 
 
LEVERAGE 
 
SIZEBOD 
 
SIZECOM 
 
PROFIT 
 
LEVERAGE 
 
SIZEBOD 
INDUSTRIAL 
PRODUCTS 
N Valid 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 172 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 1.28E+09 .00243 .26806 7.44 7.32E+08 -.05605 .27315 7.23 
Median 2.81E+08 .03200 .26600 7.00 2.67E+08 .01850 .29150 7.00 
Mode 26402000a .006a .000 9 23576000a .024 .000 6 
Std. Deviation 8.299E+09 .219079 .185277 1.877 1.022E+09 .331587 .173489 2.027 
Variance 6.888E+19 .048 .034 3.523 1.045E+18 .110 .030 4.109 
Range 1.E+11 1.474 1.253 8 4.E+09 3.023 .748 9 
Minimum 3.E+07 -8.100E-01 .000 4 2.E+07 -2.502E+00 .000 3 
Maximum 1.E+11 .664 1.253 12 4.E+09 .521 .748 12 
Sum 2.E+11 .418 46.107 1280 1.E+11 -9.641E+00 46.981 1244 
PLANTATIONS N Valid 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 32 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 7.40E+08 .36191 .08778 7.38 8.60E+08 .31841 .09025 7.50 
Median 5.09E+08 .31900 .01950 7.00 5.34E+08 .35250 .04300 7.50 
Mode 163970000a .176a .000 7a 174721000a .387 .000 9 
Std. Deviation 6.286E+08 .207054 .103785 1.431 7.559E+08 .251996 .108271 1.437 
Variance 3.952E+17 .043 .011 2.048 5.713E+17 .064 .012 2.065 
Range 2.E+09 .826 .283 4 2.E+09 1.603 .323 4 
Minimum 2.E+08 .081 .000 5 2.E+08 -4.100E-01 .000 5 
Maximum 2.E+09 .907 .283 9 3.E+09 1.193 .323 9 
Sum 2.E+10 11.581 2.809 236 3.E+10 10.189 2.888 240 
PROPERTIES N Valid 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 9.19E+08 .09805 .20475 8.00 9.34E+08 -.15177 .19241 7.91 
Median 6.45E+08 .08650 .13400 8.00 6.04E+08 .05800 .13900 7.00 
Mode 179521000a .277 .047 6 169377000a -.360a .003 7 
Std. Deviation 6.977E+08 .275713 .203284 2.023 7.521E+08 1.294122 .189814 2.133 
Variance 4.868E+17 .076 .041 4.093 5.656E+17 1.675 .036 4.550 
Range 2.E+09 1.691 .736 6 3.E+09 9.243 .707 7 
Minimum 2.E+08 -4.290E-01 .002 6 2.E+08 -8.385E+00 .000 5 
Maximum 2.E+09 1.262 .738 12 3.E+09 .858 .707 12 
Sum 4.E+10 4.314 9.009 352 4.E+10 
 
 
-6.678E+00 8.466 348 
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YEAR 
   
2007 
 
2008 
 
INDUSTRY 
   
SIZECOM 
 
PROFIT 
 
LEVERAGE 
 
SIZEBOD 
 
SIZECOM 
 
PROFIT 
 
LEVERAGE 
 
SIZEBOD 
SERVICES N Valid 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 84 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 1.46E+09 .17976 .36770 7.57 1.70E+09 .06608 .30212 7.62 
Median 6.62E+08 .11400 .27600 7.00 6.61E+08 .08250 .29050 7.00 
Mode 3.E+08 .039a .000 7 137982000a .108 .000 7 
Std. Deviation 2.838E+09 .467556 .798388 1.877 3.492E+09 .507428 .215119 1.796 
Variance 8.053E+18 .219 .637 3.525 1.219E+19 .257 .046 3.227 
Range 2.E+10 4.100 7.349 7 2.E+10 3.836 .739 7 
Minimum 9.E+07 -1.679E+00 .000 4 1.E+08 -2.092E+00 .000 5 
Maximum 2.E+10 2.421 7.349 11 2.E+10 1.744 .739 12 
Sum 1.E+11 15.100 30.887 636 1.E+11 5.551 25.378 640 
Percenti
les 
25 2.23E+08 .06225 .12425 6.00 3.10E+08 -.02875 .11325 7.00 
50 6.62E+08 .11400 .27600 7.00 6.61E+08 .08250 .29050 7.00 
75 1.19E+09 .30750 .45300 9.00 1.27E+09 .24675 .52375 9.00 
TECHNOLOGY N Valid 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Missing 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Mean 4.91E+08 .06250 .35619 9.00 5.39E+08 -.02950 .35813 8.75 
Median 1.99E+08 .10700 .15000 9.50 1.93E+08 .00700 .18450 9.00 
Mode 62013000a .108 .009 6a 67648000a -.278a .005a 9 
Std. Deviation 6.128E+08 .133717 .448144 1.932 6.975E+08 .133665 .436915 1.844 
Variance 3.756E+17 .018 .201 3.733 4.864E+17 .018 .191 3.400 
Range 2.E+09 .539 1.191 5 2.E+09 .410 1.065 5 
Minimum 6.E+07 -3.860E-01 .003 6 7.E+07 -2.780E-01 .004 6 
Maximum 2.E+09 .153 1.194 11 2.E+09 .132 1.069 11 
Sum 8.E+09 1.000 5.699 144 9.E+09 -4.720E-01 5.730 140 
Percenti
les 
25 8.21E+07 .05225 .01650 6.75 7.81E+07 -.14000 .01350 6.75 
50 1.99E+08 .10700 .15000 9.50 1.93E+08 .00700 .18450 9.00 
75 1.03E+09 .13750 .82475 10.75 1.31E+09 .08575 .87025 10.50 
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Appendix 5-1: A Summary of Multivariate Analysis: CGCB and Control 
Variables 
Types of 
Variables Timeliness 
FRS 134 
Compliance 
BMLR 
Compliance Comparability 
MTGD None Partial Partial Partial 
INDEPD Partial Partial None Partial 
FINLITD None None None Partial 
GOVD Partial Partial Partial None 
ETHNICD Yes Yes Partial None 
SIZECOM Yes None None Yes 
PROFIT None None None Partial 
LEVERAGE Partial None Partial None 
SIZEBOD None None None None 
 
Appendix 5-2: A Summary of Multivariate Analysis: CGCB, CGCA and 
Control Variables 
 
  
Types of 
Variables Timeliness 
FRS 134 
Compliance 
BMLR 
Compliance Comparability 
MTGD None Partial Yes None 
INDEPD None Partial None None 
FINLITD None None None None 
GOVD None Partial Partial None 
ETHNICD Partial Partial Partial None 
MTGAC None Partial Partial None 
INDEPAC None Partial None None 
FINLITAC None None None None 
GOVAC Partial None None Partial 
ETHNICAC Partial Partial Partial None 
SIZECOM Yes None None Yes 
PROFIT Partial None None Partial 
LEVERAGE Partial None None None 
SIZEBOD None None Partial Partial 
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Appendix 5-3: A Summary of Multivariate Analysis: CGCA and Control 
Variables 
Types of 
Variables Timeliness 
FRS 134 
Compliance 
BMLR 
Compliance Comparability 
MTGAC None None None None 
INDEPAC None Yes None None 
FINLITAC None None Partial None 
GOVAC Partial None None Partial 
ETHNICAC Yes None Partial None 
SIZECOM Yes None Partial Yes 
PROFIT None None None Partial 
LEVERAGE Yes None Yes None 
SIZEBOD None None None None 
 
Appendix 5-4: A Summary of Multivariate Analysis: Individual CGCB, CGCA 
and Control Variables 
Types of 
Variables Timeliness 
FRS 134 
Compliance 
BMLR 
Compliance Comparability 
MTGAC Partial Partial Partial Partial 
INDEPAC None Partial None Partial 
FINLITAC None None None None 
GOVAC Yes Partial Partial None 
ETHNICAC Yes Partial Partial None 
MTGAC Partial None None Partial 
INDEPAC Partial Yes None None 
FINLITAC None None None None 
GOVAC Yes None None None 
ETHNICAC Yes None Partial None 
SIZECOM Yes None None Yes 
PROFIT None None None Partial 
LEVERAGE Yes Partial Yes None 
SIZEBOD None None None None 
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Appendix 5-5: The R2 of Multiple Regression of CGCB, CGCA and Control Variables 
Qualitative Items  Timeliness Compliance with the FRS 134 
Compliance with the 
BMLR Comparability 
Types of Variables POOL 2007 2008 POOL 2007 2008 POOL 2007 2008 POOL 2007 2008 
CGCB and Control 
Variables 0.123 0.131 0.128 0.060 0.084 0.086 0.043 0.033 0.075 0.064 0.103 0.075 
CGCA, CGCB and 
Control Variables 0.122 0.159 0.131 0.082 0.099 0.163 0.051 0.073 0.088 0.069 0.116 0.076 
CGCA and Control 
Variables 0.121 0.149 0.109 0.032 0.037 0.034 0.022 0.035 0.041 0.063 0.097 0.066 
CGCB 
 0.052 0.053 0.053 0.057 0.083 0.074 0.036 0.022 0.064 0.020 0.050 0.017 
CGCA 
 0.060 0.085 0.040 0.028 0.031 0.028 0.004 0.007 0.026 0.018 0.037 0.009 
Control Variables 
 0.084 0.098 0.080 0.008 0.007 0.013 0.017 0.018 0.018 0.056 0.074 0.060 
 
 
